Category: terrorism

MIL-OSI Security: FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force Turns 45 – Dallas Division Reflects on Past Success, Continues Vigilance

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

DALLAS – This week, Special Agent in Charge (SAC) R. Joseph Rothrock is joining FBI offices around the country in marking the 45th anniversary of the FBI’s first Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). Formed in New York in 1980, the first JTTF became a model for law enforcement cooperation across the nation.

JTTFs can be found at each of the FBI’s 55 field offices and many resident agencies—around 280 locations in all. The Dallas Field Office organized the North Texas JTTF in 1995 and it is comprised of dozens of investigative personnel from more than 20 agencies across the Division’s territory.

JTTFs gather trained investigators, intelligence analysts, linguists, and tactical experts from federal, state, local, territorial, tribal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Task force members share intelligence and investigative leads and respond to threats and incidents.

“We know from each potential crisis or thwarted attack that we cannot do this job alone,” said SAC Rothrock. “Each member of the North Texas JTTF brings unique skills and specialized resources from their agency to enhance our collective investigative capabilities. We are proud to work side-by-side with our partners in the fight against terrorism, and will continue to vigorously defend the Dallas Division’s territory.”

The FBI’s JTTF model dates to 1979, when the New York Police Department and the FBI’s New York Field Office created a joint task force to tackle violent bank robberies. They imitated the model in 1980, when terrorist bombings, bomb threats, and other violence plagued the city, and announced the formation of the first JTTF in April 1980.

“The JTTF has proven to be a world class model of what can be accomplished when law enforcement resources from federal, state, and local agencies converge to combat terrorism and disrupt the plans of evil actors throughout the United States,” said Eastern District of Texas Acting U.S. Attorney Abe McGlothin, Jr. “The JTTF has been called upon to investigate some of the most horrific acts of violence imaginable and we should all be thankful for the work the JTTF does daily to keep communities across the United States safe.”

After the 9/11 attacks, FBI leadership directed all FBI field offices to establish a JTTF. In addition, the FBI established its National Joint Terrorism Task Force to support the local task forces in June of 2002. The NJTTF, at FBI Headquarters, enhances communication, coordination, and cooperation from partner agencies.

“This Office depends on the critical work of the JTTF in keeping Americans safe,” said Acting U. S. Attorney Chad E. Meacham. “We applaud the JTTF’s decades of significant efforts in partnership with the USAO-NDTX.”

Nationally, JTTFs have disrupted dozens of plots in the past four decades. Notable investigations in Dallas’ territory include:

•    Hosam Maher Husein Smadi: Sentenced to 24 years in prison for his attempted bombing of a downtown Dallas skyscraper in September 2009. According to documents filed, Smadi knowingly took possession of a truck that contained a weapon of mass destruction, and while the bomb was inert when Smadi took possession of it, it was a readily-convertible weapon of mass destruction.

•    Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari: Sentenced to life in prison for the attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction in connection with his 2011 purchase of chemicals and equipment necessary to make an improvised explosive device (IED) and his research of potential U.S. targets, including persons and infrastructure.

•    Omer Kuzu: Pleaded guilty in 2020 to conspiring to provide material support to terrorism. In March 2019, Kuzu was captured by the Syrian Democratic Forces, alongside 1,500 suspected ISIS fighters. He was handed over to FBI custody, returned to American soil, and charged with conspiring to provide material support to ISIS.

Report suspicious activity to 1-800-CALL-FBI (225-5324). You can also submit a tip online at tips.fbi.gov tips.fbi.gov.

MIL Security OSI –

April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Focused, 2-day capacity building programme for electoral field functionaries from Bihar begins

Source: Government of India

Focused, 2-day capacity building programme for electoral field functionaries from Bihar begins

229 BLOs, 12 EROs and 2 DEOs take part in the training program at IIIDEM in the National Capital

Specialized one-day training programme for State Police Nodal Officer (SPNO) and Police Officers from Bihar also begins

Posted On: 23 APR 2025 4:54PM by PIB Delhi

The Election Commission is organising a 2-day training and capacity building of Booth Level Officers (BLOs) at the India International Institute of Democracy & Election Management (IIIDEM), New Delhi. This is the third such batch of BLOs to be trained from the poll-bound state of Bihar. 229 BLOs, 12 EROs and 2 DEOs from the State are participating in the 2-day training programme. A specialized one-day training programme for the State Police Nodal Officer (SPNO) and Police Officers from Bihar also commenced today. The training programme was inaugurated by Chief Election Commissioner of India Shri Gyanesh Kumar in the presence of Election Commissioner Dr. Vivek Joshi at IIIDEM, New Delhi and was followed by an interaction with the participants.

The training is planned to familiarise the BLOs with their roles and responsibilities as per statutory framework and equip them with to ensure error-free electoral rolls. They will also be trained in the IT applications designed to support their roles.

This is the latest in the first phase of the ongoing physical training programmes at IIIDEM in which 555 BLOs from poll-bound states of Bihar, West Bengal and Assam and 279 Booth Level Agents (BLA-1s) of 10 recognised national and state political parties from Bihar have already been trained. These well-trained BLOs will form a corps of Assembly Level Master Trainers (ALMTs) to strengthen the entire network of BLOs nationwide.

The training of SPNOs and Police Officers from Bihar aims to improve coordination between election authorities and the police for enhanced electoral management, especially in the areas of law and order, vulnerability assessment, Paramilitary forces (CAPF) deployment, and model code of conduct (MCC) enforcement.

Till date over 3000 participants from 141 countries including large democracies such as Australia, United Kingdom, USA, Brazil, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Israel, Russia and South Africa have benefited from training programmes from India’s globally acclaimed election management practices at IIIDEM.

******

PK/GDH/RP

(Release ID: 2123840) Visitor Counter : 50

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on Banking Union – annual report 2024 – A10-0044/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on Banking Union – annual report 2024

(2024/2055(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its resolution of 16 January 2024 on Banking Union – annual report 2023 [1],

– having regard to the Commission’s follow-up to Parliament’s resolution of 16 January 2024 on Banking Union – annual report 2023,

– having regard to document published by the European Central Bank (ECB) on 25 March 2024, entitled ‘Feedback on the input provided by the European Parliament as part of its resolution on Banking Union 2023’,

– having regard to the ECB’s 2023 Annual Report on supervisory activities, published in March 2024,

– having regard to the 2023 Annual Report of the Single Resolution Board (SRB), published on 28 June 2024,

– having regard to the adoption of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD)[2] and the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR)[3], and to the establishment of the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA)[4],

– having regard to the implementation of the Basel III standards, namely to the adoption of amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive [5] and to the Capital Requirements Regulation [6],

– having regard to the adoption of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/2795 of 24 July 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk [7],

– having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action [8],

– having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and financing of resolution action [9],

– having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency [10],

– having regard to the report of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of 23 April 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme,

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 March 2018 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit servicers, credit purchasers and the recovery of collateral (COM(2018)0135),

– having regard to the Five Presidents’ Report of 22 June 2015 entitled ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’,

– having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of 10 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market – Speed, security, solidarity: empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’,

– having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

– having regard to the Eurogroup statement of 11 March 2024 on the future of Capital Markets Union, and to the Eurogroup statement of 16 June 2022 on the future of the Banking Union and the Eurogroup follow-up thereto of 28 April 2023,

– having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s disclosure framework for banks’ cryptoasset exposures and to the targeted amendments to its prudential standard on banks’ exposures to cryptoassets, both published on 17 July 2024,

– having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s core principles for effective banking supervision, published on 25 April 2024,

– having regard to the ECB’s Financial Stability Review of May 2024,

– having regard to the ECB Occasional Paper No 328 of 2023 entitled ‘The Road to Paris: stress testing the transition towards a net-zero economy’,

– having regard to the Financial Stability Board publication of 9 November 2015 entitled ‘Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalisation Capacity of G-SIBs in Resolution’,

– having regard to the Financial Stability Board report of 10 October 2023 entitled ‘2023 Bank Failures – Preliminary lessons learnt for resolution’,

– having regard to Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No 24-15 of 25 June 2024 entitled ‘Europe’s banking union at ten: unfinished yet transformative’[11],

– having regard to the Single Supervisory Mechanism supervisory priorities for 2024-2026, published in December 2023,

– having regard to the SRB’s biannual reporting note to the Eurogroup of 13 May 2024,

– having regard to the outcome of the 2023 EU-wide transparency exercise of the European Banking Authority, published on 28 July 2023,

– having regard to Special Report 12/2023 of the European Court of Auditors of 12 May 2023 entitled ‘EU supervision of banks’ credit risk – The ECB stepped up its efforts but more is needed to increase assurance that credit risk is properly managed and covered’,

– having regard to the statements by Claudia Buch, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the hearings conducted by Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 21 March 2024 and 2 September 2024,

– having regard to the statements by Dominique Laboureix, Chair of the SRB, at the hearings conducted by Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 21 March 2024 and 23 September 2024,

– having regard to the European Banking Authority’s risk assessment reports of July 2024 and December 2024,

– having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2019 on gender balance in EU economic and monetary affairs nominations [12],

– having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on strengthening the international role of the euro [13],

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0044/2025),

A. whereas the Banking Union (BU) encompasses the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Single Resolution Mechanism and a European deposit insurance that is still missing;

B. whereas the main objective of the BU is to safeguard the stability of the banking sector in Europe and prevent the need to bail out banks at risk of failure with taxpayers’ money;

C. whereas a completed BU would be a positive development for citizens and the EU economy, as it would improve the competitiveness and stability of the banking sector, reduce systemic risk, improve supply and consumer choice and offer increased opportunities for cross-border banking that enhances access to financing for households and businesses, thereby reducing costs for banks’ customers, while ensuring that public funds are not used to bail out the banking sector; whereas the ‘too big to fail’ risk has not yet been fully addressed;

D. whereas concluding the reform of the EU frameworks for bank crisis management and deposit insurance, focusing particularly on small and medium-sized banks, is fundamental in order to provide Europe’s banking sector with security, stability and resilience; whereas a complete BU with a true European deposit insurance scheme is a basic condition for ensuring that citizens trust European banks;

E. whereas fragmentation and the lack of cross-border consolidation of the EU banking sector is affecting its global competitiveness; whereas the profitability gap between EU and US banks has widened;

F. whereas a strong and diversified banking sector is key to delivering economic growth, increasing the possibility of home ownership, fostering investment and job creation, financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups and ensuring the transition to a green and digital economy;

G. whereas around 80 % of external financing for EU companies comes from banks, while only 20 % comes from the capital markets; whereas only 30 % of credit for US firms comes from banks, while 70 % is funded via capital markets, including corporate bond holdings and shares;

H. whereas the EUR 356.1 billion in non-performing loans recorded at the 110 supervised institutions in 2024, compared with EUR 988.9 billion in non-performing loans recorded at the 102 supervised institutions in the second quarter of 2015, reflects a significant downward trajectory, leaving the total non-performing loan stock at 36 % of its 2015 level; whereas further efforts are required;

I. whereas in April 2024, it adopted its position on the review of the crisis management and deposit insurance framework;

J. whereas in April 2024, its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted a report on the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme;

K. whereas financial institutions rely increasingly on the use of information and communications technology (ICT); whereas the digitalisation of finance provides key opportunities for the banking sector and has brought about significant technological advances in the EU banking sector through increased efficiency in the provision of banking services and a greater appetite for innovation; whereas it also poses challenges, including with regard to data protection, reputational risks, anti-money laundering and consumer protection concerns; whereas the EU banking sector must increase its cyber resilience to ensure that ICT systems can withstand various types of cyber security threats; whereas the ECB is currently studying the establishment of a digital euro;

L. whereas EU banks have withstood the impact of Russian aggression; whereas they play a pivotal role in ensuring the ongoing implementation of and compliance with the sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia in response to the invasion; whereas further coordination is needed to avoid circumvention of sanctions;

M. whereas climate change, environmental degradation and the transition to a low-carbon economy are factors to be taken into account when assessing the risks on banks’ balance sheets, as a source of risk potentially impacting investments across regions and sectors;

General considerations

1. Acknowledges the progress made over the last 10 years through the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM); notes that the BU will not be completed without the establishment of its third pillar, the European deposit insurance scheme;

2. Asks the Commission to ensure that the completion of the BU and the Capital Markets Union remains a key priority; highlights that these projects offer households and SMEs access to broader funding, reduce the high reliance on bank credit to foster investments and job creation, increase financial stability, reduce the impact of economic downturns, support competitiveness, give additional investment opportunities, fund the transition to a green and digital economy and unlock the EU’s growth potential; notes that the Commission is requested to take into consideration the specificities of the different banking models, while preserving a level playing field;

3. Notes the need to be prepared for episodes of banking stress that could potentially lead to bank runs such as those witnessed in some jurisdictions outside the EU in March 2023, and the need to ensure the stability of deposits;

4. Points out that cyber resilience is a key element for the competitiveness of the EU banking sector, in particular taking into account the geopolitical situation and the need to preserve financial stability;

5. Notes that a more integrated BU would help to make the EU banking sector more resilient, improve access to credit and reduce costs; notes that better cross-border integration of banking business would increase the potential for private risk sharing and ensure diversification in the EU banking market; points out that a more integrated BU is not necessarily the same as a more consolidated banking market and that there are benefits for competition in a diversified banking market; stresses that a fully developed BU would allow EU banks to grow and put them in a better position to compete in the international arena;

6. Regrets that EU banks’ ability to finance major investments is constrained by lower profitability that is not sufficient to ensure their competitiveness; notes that the profitability gap as compared with other jurisdictions is due to both structural and regulatory factors and calls for a review to streamline the regulatory framework; notes that the specific character of the EU banking system, with its large number of smaller banks, calls for proportionate solutions that take this into account and are tailored to its characteristics, without undermining financial stability; remains mindful of the ‘too big to fail’ risk;

7. Calls on the Commission to assess the need to develop targeted frameworks within the BU to enhance access to finance for SMEs and start-ups, recognising their role as the backbone of the EU economy;

8. Regrets that EU banks’ cross-border activity is still rather limited, particularly with regard to granting loans; takes the view, therefore, that it is important to complete the BU in order to uphold the free movement of capital in a fully integrated internal market;

9. Calls on the EU banks still operating in Russia to exit the Russian market as soon as possible; calls on supervisory institutions to ensure that those banks push ahead with exiting the Russian market swiftly;

10. Invites the Commission to further explore whether the creation of a separate jurisdiction for EU banks with substantial cross-border operations [14] could help to complete the BU or whether this would increase banking sector fragmentation;

11. Notes that a review of the securitisation framework to strengthen European markets and the introduction of European Secured Notes as a dual-recourse funding instrument for SMEs for long-term financing could be explored, taking due account of financial stability risks;

12. Underlines that financial literacy is essential in modern economies, contributing to the resilience of the banking systems across Member States and encouraging cross-border financial activity;

13. Underlines that a high level of consumer protection will make the BU more resilient;

14. Takes the view that the Commission should focus on aspects that contribute to achieving the goals of digitalisation, modernisation, simplification, streamlining and increased competitiveness; maintains that legal certainty, security, predictability and stability are essential for EU banks to be able to operate under favourable conditions;

15. Notes that, in addition to traditional loans, diverse sources of financing can be beneficial for EU growth and EU competitiveness, and recognises the low-risk nature of asset-backed financing solutions;

16. Notes the ECB’s progress on the digital euro and the parliamentary dialogue being held with the ECB on the topic; understands existing reservations, such as with regard to its offline functionality, given that offline transactions reduce visibility and impair financial crime prevention; recalls that the digital euro should complement, not replace, cash; considers that the decision on whether or not to introduce a digital euro is ultimately a political decision that has to be taken by the EU’s co-legislators, given the profound potential impact of this decision on a wide range of EU domains, including privacy, consumer protection, financial stability, financial policy and other areas that go beyond the strict remit of monetary policy;

17. Regrets the failure of some financial institutions to ensure gender balance, especially in their management bodies; stresses that gender balance on boards and in the workforce brings both societal and economic returns; calls on financial institutions to regularly update their diversity and inclusion policies and help to foster healthy working cultures that prioritise inclusivity; calls on private and public entities to address the lack of diversity and gender balance in the management bodies of financial institutions;

Supervision

18. Welcomes the adoption by the co-legislators of the new banking package implementing Basel III standards in the EU; notes the current lack of clarity concerning the implementation of the Basel III standards in some other jurisdictions and the potential risk for an international level playing field; stresses that the Commission should evaluate whether targeted changes could help to maintain the international competitiveness of EU banks without weakening their resilience; recalls that the delegated act on the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk postponed the date of application of the new market risk framework by one year to 1 January 2026; calls on the Commission to assess whether the equivalence decisions taken with the jurisdictions not implementing the Basel III standards need to be reviewed in order to preserve the financial stability of the EU financial sector;

19. Recalls that the Banking Package contains a high number of mandates to the European Banking Authority; calls on the European Banking Authority to respect these mandates;

20. Notes that even within the existing regulatory framework the banking sector has shown its resilience during the market events of recent years, and that the average Common Equity Tier 1 ratio has remained at high levels, at 15.81 %;

21. Notes that the non-performing loans ratio has remained stable at 2.30 % and the liquidity coverage ratio at 159.39 %;

22. Notes the varying levels of exposure to non-performing loans and recalls that there are Member States which have exposure levels in the order of 1 % or even lower, while other Member States have exposure levels exceeding 4 %; considers that efforts to reduce European banks’ exposure to this type of loan should continue as good risk management practice;

23. Highlights the fact that adverse macroeconomic conditions, geopolitical headwinds and the rapid development of deferred payment services may lead to a deterioration in asset quality and affect the level of non-performing loans in the future; highlights, therefore, the importance of prudent risk management and appropriate provisioning;

24. Notes that the current levels of banking sector profitability may provide an opportunity for an increase in macroprudential buffers and help to preserve banking sector resilience; invites the Commission to further explore this option and carefully evaluate how to revise the macroprudential framework, taking into consideration the potential impact on capital requirements and bearing in mind a level playing field with other jurisdictions;

25. Notes that the banking sector plays a role in supporting the transition to a digitalised and carbon neutral economy, in channelling funds to renewable energy sources and in supporting the achievement of the objectives of the EU Green Deal and the EU Climate Law;

26. Notes that the ECB takes account of climate- and nature-related financial risks in its supervisory practices and monitors growing physical and transition risks closely;

27. Welcomes the idea of increasing venture capital and unlocking capital to finance fast-growing companies in the EU; notes Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s commitment to put forward risk-absorbing measures to make it easier for commercial banks, investors and venture capital to finance fast-growing companies [15]; notes that this must be done in a way that does not pose a systemic risk or moral hazard;

28. Welcomes the creation of the new Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism, which will allow more effective ways to combat money laundering and terrorist financing via direct supervision of certain financial entities and better cooperation, a better flow of information between national authorities and better coordination among sanctions enforcement authorities in Members States to help close gaps in the implementation of targeted sanctions;

29. Stresses the need to enhance the resilience of non-bank financial intermediaries, including by designing specific regulatory and supervisory tools; points out that such measures must guarantee the security of the financial system and be in the best interests of the customer; welcomes the Commission consultation on macroprudential policies for non-bank financial intermediaries; supports the Eurosystem’s recommendation to introduce system-wide stress tests to identify and quantify risks to the resilience of core markets; invites the Commission to investigate whether there are any gaps in the supervisory toolkit, including in relation to potential liquidity crunches and implications for systemic risk;

30. Notes that crypto-assets create new challenges and opportunities for the financial system but also pose risks to it, and that these require attention from the national supervisors, the SSM and the European Systemic Risk Board;

Resolution

31. Recalls that the position adopted by Parliament in April 2024 on the crisis management and deposit insurance framework ensures a more consistent approach across all Member States to the application of resolution tools and deposit protection to enhance financial stability, taxpayer protection and depositor confidence; notes that small banks have some specificities that may warrant a proportionate approach; stresses that European and national competent authorities should have at their disposal appropriate and sufficient tools to respond effectively to bank failures and safeguard financial stability, and that banks need to operate in an effective regulatory environment that fosters their development;

32. Highlights the importance of preserving shareholders’ and creditors’ primary responsibility for bearing losses in the event of a bank’s failure; stresses that resorting to using taxpayers’ money must be avoided, which is still a key lesson learned from the global financial crisis; stresses that the bail-in of shareholders and creditors must remain the main source for resolution financing before any recourse is made to industry-funded sources;

33. Recalls that a sufficient minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) is crucial for a credible resolution framework and for ensuring that resolution authorities have sufficient flexibility to effectively apply the resolution strategies needed in a specific crisis situation; underlines that this minimum requirement should be sufficient to effectively implement any of the resolution strategies included in a bank’s resolution plan; recalls that the resolution framework should avoid undue increases in MREL calibration and disproportionate contributions to the Single Resolution Fund;

34. Stresses that if a bank’s eligible liabilities are issued to non-EU investors, the write-down or conversion of these liabilities should be enforceable with full certainty to safeguard the effective application of resolution tools;

35. Notes that any reliance on taxpayer money for the resolution of banks, including for liquidity support, should be avoided, in keeping with the principles of fiscal and social responsibility and market discipline;

36. Recalls that banks need to continue to meet their obligations and perform their key functions after the implementation of a resolution decision;

37. Recalls the importance of clarifying the role of the ECB as liquidity provider in resolution, paying due attention to appropriate guarantees and the ECB’s mandate;

38. Underlines the SRB’s announcement that it will enhance its capabilities for launching enforcement action to remove substantive impediments to resolvability; calls for the publication, at the end of each resolution planning cycle, of an anonymised list of identified impediments to resolvability and the actions adopted to address them;

39. Welcomes the ‘SRM Vision 2028’ strategic review initiated by the SRB to set its long-term goals, address new challenges and further strengthen collaboration with the national resolution authorities and other stakeholders; notes, in particular, the SRB’s intention to identify areas where sustainability can be embedded further in its daily operations and core business; highlights the need to ensure efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the implementation of the new strategy;

40. Welcomes the SRB plan to streamline the annual resolution planning cycle to ensure that it is increasingly efficient and has a greater focus on testing banks’ resolvability and the operationalisation of resolution strategies;

41. Welcomes the fact that the Single Resolution Fund has now been built up; calls for the full ratification of the Amending Agreement to the ESM Treaty by all Member States, including the establishment of a common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund;

42. Highlights the need for additional efforts to ensure full resolvability for all banks falling under the scope of resolution; recalls that achieving resolvability cannot be considered a ‘moving target’ and therefore calls for more standardisation and harmonisation of the resolvability assessment; recalls, nonetheless, the important role played by national resolution authorities in the assessment of resolvability;

Deposit insurance

43. Underlines the fact that the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme was published back in 2015 and that the landscape has changed significantly since then;

44. Recalls that the position of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on a European deposit insurance scheme was adopted in April 2024; notes that that position deviates from the Commission’s 2015 proposal and adopts a new approach; is waiting for, and encourages the Council to move forward with, the negotiations on a European deposit insurance scheme;

45. Notes that national deposit guarantee schemes were introduced successfully and have proved their functionality in a number of cases; underlines the need to take specific national characteristics into account and to preserve the well-functioning systems for smaller banks that are already in place in some Member States, such as institutional protection schemes, in a way that ensures a level playing field across the BU;

°

° °

46. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Central Bank, the Single Resolution Board and the European Banking Authority.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

While the Banking Union – annual reports 2022 and 2023 focused on the war in Ukraine and the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine, this report focuses more on the challenges for the EU and for the European Parliament, as mirrored in the new mandate of the Commission, namely the EU priorities to foster competitiveness, to strengthen the European single market and to boost economic growth.

The Union is currently at a turning point, which will determine the economic future in the upcoming decades. The 2024 reports of Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi underline that the EU needs a major turnaround to be able to compete with the US or China. Against this background, the Banking Union is a major cornerstone of competitiveness. A strengthened Banking Union will enable the EU to generate the necessary capital to make the European economy fit for the future.

EU banks play a key role in financing the required investments since bank loans are still the most important source of external financing for companies. However, EU banks suffer from a lower profitability compared to their US counterparts caused by too many regulatory hurdles and by an incomplete Banking Union. A robust and competitive banking sector is necessary to finalise the BU. In the last year, while co-legislators made much progress on crucial legislation for the Banking Union, the EU still has to monitor closely if the EU economy, EU citizens and EU banks benefit from those adopted proposals. This report provides realistic and achievable recommendations, which could help to strengthen further the Banking Union.

However, not only EU businesses need better access to capital. EU citizens are currently struggling to afford housing or to finance investments in sustainable renovations. It is therefore crucial to boost the profitability of EU banks, since this would in turn allow them to provide private households with better and easier access to affordable loans.

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye – A10-0067/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye

(2025/2023(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 and 18 April 2024, 30 June 2023, 23 June 2022, 24 June 2021 and 12 December 2019, and to all relevant previous Council and European Council conclusions,

– having regard to Türkiye’s membership of the Council of Europe and NATO,

– having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation [1] (EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement),

– having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 25 March 2021 on Türkiye,

– having regard to the ‘EU-Turkey statements’ of 18 March 2016 and 29 November 2015,

– having regard to the ‘Turkey Negotiating Framework’ of 3 October 2005,

– having regard to the declaration issued by the European Community and its Member States on 21 September 2005 following the declaration made by Turkey upon its signature of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement on 29 July 2005,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of December 2006 and March 2020, and to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen Criteria,

– having regard to the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024 and of 12 December 2023,

– having regard to the International Law of the Sea and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2024 Report (SWD(2024)0696),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2023)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2023 Report (SWD(2023)0696),

– having regard to Special report 06/2024 of the European Court of Auditors of 24 April 2024 entitled ‘The Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Beneficial for refugees and host communities, but impact and sustainability not yet ensured’,

– having regard to the joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Council of 29 November 2023 (JOIN(2023)0050) and of 22 March 2021 (JOIN(2021)0008) on the state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 19 December 2024 entitled ‘Eighth Annual Report of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey’ (COM(2024)0593),

– having regard to the fundamental principles of international law and to the Charter of the United Nations, the 1977 and the 1979 High-Level Agreements between the leaders of the two communities, and the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council on Cyprus, including Resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, which reaffirms the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, Resolution 550 (1984) of 11 May 1984 on secessionist actions in Cyprus, Resolution 789 (1992) of 25 November 1992, and Resolution 2537 (2020) on the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP),

– having regard to Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states that the contracting parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in any case to which they are parties, and to the ensuing obligation of Türkiye to implement all judgments of the ECtHR,

– having regard to the relevant resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,

– having regard to the 2025 Freedom in the World report published by Freedom House,

– having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders,

– having regard to the January 2025 prison statistics report published by the Civil Society in the Penal System Association (CISST) and to the 2024 country profile for Türkiye published by Prison Insider,

– having regard to the Global Gender Gap Report 2024 published by the World Economic Forum,

– having regard to recent reports of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu),

– having regard to the UNESCO statement on Hagia Sophia of 10 July 2020, and to the relevant UNESCO World Heritage Committee decisions 44 COM 7B.58 (2021) and 45 COM 7B.58 (2023), adopted in its 44th and 45th sessions respectively,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Türkiye, in particular those of 13 September 2023 on the 2022 Commission Report on Türkiye [2], of 7 June 2022 on the 2021 Commission Report on Turkey [3], and of 26 November 2020 on escalating tensions in Varosha following the illegal actions by Türkiye and the urgent need for the resumption of talks [4],

– having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement [5],

– having regard to its resolution of 15 April 2015 on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide [6],

– having regard to its resolutions of 5 May 2022 on the case of Osman Kavala in Turkey [7], of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye [8] and of 13 February 2025 on recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye [9],

– having regard to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Ankara in December 2024,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0067/2025),

A. whereas Türkiye remains a candidate for EU accession, and EU membership remains the repeatedly declared political goal of the Turkish Government, although the gap with the values and interests of the EU is growing; whereas EU accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill since 2018, owing to the deterioration of the rule of law and democracy in Türkiye;

B. whereas any accession country is expected to respect democratic values, the rule of law and human rights, and to abide by EU law; whereas Türkiye needs to credibly demonstrate its commitment to closer relations and alignment with the European Union in order to reinvigorate its European perspective; whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach and align with the EU in all aspects, including values, interests, standards and policies, inter alia with its common foreign and security policy, to respect and uphold the Copenhagen criteria, and to pursue and maintain good neighbourly relations with the EU and all of its Member States without discrimination; whereas the tensions between the EU and Türkiye in relation to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean have de-escalated but not ceased; whereas Türkiye has repeatedly been asked to refrain from all actions which violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of all EU Member States and are in breach of international and EU law;

C. whereas the 2023 Commission progress report on Türkiye painted a picture of continued backsliding, while its latest progress report of 2024 appears to present a slightly more positive overall picture of progress on enlargement-related reforms in Türkiye, such as in the area of economic and monetary policies; whereas this cannot, however, be applied to the core matters related to democracy and fundamental rights, which have deteriorated even further since the release of the Commission’s latest report; whereas the gap between Türkiye and the EU’s values and normative framework has therefore remained unaddressed during the recent period with the persistent use of laws and measures aimed at curtailing the rule of law and human rights, fundamental freedoms and civil liberties;

D. whereas the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023 struck a more positive note, putting forward a set of recommendations on cooperating in areas of joint interest in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner and based on the established conditionalities; whereas only a few concrete steps in line with the commitments therein have been taken so far; whereas the April 2024 European Council mandated Coreper to advance in the implementation of this joint communication; whereas nevertheless this joint communication has not yet received a clear political endorsement by the Council;

E. whereas Türkiye is a member of the Council of Europe and is therefore bound by the judgments of the ECtHR; whereas owing to its failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings, Türkiye is currently facing historical infringement proceedings; whereas Türkiye consistently ranks among the countries most frequently found in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the European Convention on Human Rights; whereas as of late November 2024, Türkiye had the highest number of pending cases before the ECtHR, with 22 450 applications, representing 36.7 % of the Court’s total caseload of 61 250 applications;

F. whereas Türkiye is classified as ‘not free’ by Freedom House and has experienced one of the worst declines in the level of freedom in the world in the past 10 years; whereas Türkiye ranks 158th out of 180 countries in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; whereas the Turkish Government has closed dozens of media outlets, routinely blocks online articles, is reported to control 85 % of national media and uses its state agency Anadolu as an organ of propaganda;

G. whereas the Turkish constitution provides for sufficient protection of fundamental rights, but the practice of the institutions and the critical state of the judiciary, including the lack of respect for Constitutional Court rulings, are the main reasons for the dire situation of the rule of law and human rights in the country, issues repeatedly described in the reports of the EU, the Council of Europe and international organisations;

H. whereas Türkiye has the highest incarceration rate and the largest prison population of all Council of Europe Member States, with an overcrowded prison population that has grown by 439 % between 2005 and 2023 and currently represents more than a third of all inmates of Council of Europe countries;

I. whereas Türkiye is ranked 127th out of 146 countries in the 2024 Global Gender Gap Index, underscoring severe gender inequality and systemic failures in protecting women’s rights; whereas according to the 2024 report of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu), 394 women were murdered by men and 259 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances in Türkiye in 2024, the highest number recorded since the civil society group started collecting data in 2010; whereas in its 2023 report, the platform noted that 315 women were killed by men, and 248 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances;

J. whereas in recent months, Türkiye has taken steps towards the resumption of a process for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question; whereas on 27 February 2025 jailed militant leader Abdullah Öcalan called on his Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm and disband, providing a historic opportunity to end the Turkish-Kurdish conflict; whereas these efforts have been accompanied by increasing repression and the curtailment of the powers of democratic local governments, including the dismissal of elected Kurdish and other opposition mayors;

K. whereas, alongside being a candidate for EU accession, Türkiye is a NATO ally and a key partner in the areas of trade, economic relations, security, the fight against terrorism, and migration; whereas Türkiye continues to play a key role in the region, acts as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and remains a key partner for the stability of the wider East Mediterranean region; whereas Türkiye continues to play a significant role in the Syrian conflict and maintains a military presence in northern Syria;

L. whereas Türkiye has not aligned with EU sanctions against Russia; whereas trade between Türkiye and Russia has nearly doubled since the EU’s imposition of sanctions against Russia; whereas despite some steps taken, Türkiye has not prevented its territory from being used to circumvent EU sanctions against Russia;

M. whereas the 2024 Commission progress report on Türkiye states that, as at 30 September 2024, the country maintained a very low alignment rate of 5 % with relevant statements of the High Representative on behalf of the EU and with relevant Council decisions, compared to 9 % in 2023;

N. whereas Türkiye is the EU’s fifth largest trade partner, and the EU is Türkiye’s largest trading partner by far, as well as its primary source of foreign direct investment;

O. whereas in the past year, the level of engagement between the EU and Türkiye has increased in terms of both technical and high-level meetings in sectoral areas;

P. whereas Türkiye has applied for membership of BRICS+ and shown interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO);

Q. whereas following a period of unorthodox economic policy, Türkiye has implemented a tighter monetary policy over the past year leading to a reduction in external imbalances and a moderation of inflationary pressures;

R. whereas Türkiye hosts the largest refugee population in the world, with around 3.1 million registered refugees, mainly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; whereas since 2011 the EU has directed more than EUR 10 billion to assisting refugees and host communities in Türkiye; whereas according to a credible investigative report by Lighthouse Reports and eight media partners, the EU is funding removal centres in Türkiye implicated in the detention, abuse and forced deportations of refugees under the guise of voluntary return;

S. whereas in addition to the emergency assistance coordinated via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, with an estimated financial value of EUR 38 million, the EU provided EUR 78.2 million in humanitarian aid for the earthquake response in 2023, and EUR 26 million in humanitarian aid in 2024; whereas the EU signed an additional EUR 400 million in assistance under the EU Solidarity Fund to finance recovery operations following the devastating earthquake;

T. whereas Türkiye has systematically misused counterterrorism laws to target elected officials, opposition politicians and human rights defenders, among others;

Commitment to EU accession

1. Recognises the long-standing aspirations of Turkish civil society regarding accession to the European Union; welcomes the Turkish Government’s recent statements reiterating its commitment to EU membership as a strategic goal amid an effort to revitalise EU-Türkiye relations in line with relevant European Council conclusions in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner; recognises the EU’s commitment to fostering this engagement through enhanced dialogue and cooperation;

2. Stresses that EU membership is contingent on fulfilling the accession (Copenhagen) criteria, which require stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and the protection of minorities, good neighbourly relations, respect for international law and alignment with the EU CFSP; further notes that these are absolute criteria, not issues subject to transactional strategic considerations and negotiations; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process;

3. Regrets, in this regard, that the aforementioned positive statements have not been accompanied by any concrete actions by the Turkish authorities to close the persistent and vast gap between Türkiye and the EU on values and standards, particularly with regard to the fundamentals of the accession process; reiterates its previously adopted conclusion that the Turkish Government continues to show, as it has done for the past few years, a clear lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to reactivate the accession process and continues to pursue a deeply entrenched authoritarian understanding of the presidential system;

4. Acknowledges the strategic and geopolitical importance of Türkiye, and its increasing presence and influence in areas critical to international security, such as the Black Sea region, including Ukraine, and the Middle East; reiterates that Türkiye is a strategic partner and NATO ally, and a country with which the EU has close relations in the areas of security, trade, economy and migration; welcomes closer cooperation between Türkiye and the EU, to which the Turkish Government has made frequent reference, but stresses that this cannot in any way be a substitute for the necessary real progress which Türkiye, as a candidate country, needs to make with regard to meeting the fundamental requirements for accession; highlights, in this regard, that there are no shortcuts in the accession process and that no argument can be put forward to avoid discussing the democratic principles which are at the core of the accession process;

5. Notes that the Commission’s Türkiye report 2024 paints a more positive picture of reform implementation in the context of Türkiye’s accession process than the Türkiye report 2023, shifting from further deterioration to ‘no progress’ with regard to the rule of law and human rights issues; is of the opinion, however, that at least in key areas such as democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, this is due to the fact that a very low point had already been reached and this situation has remained unchanged;

6. Further takes note of a nuanced shift in focus of the Türkiye report 2024, by contrast with the 2023 report, away from the accession process towards a strategic partnership between the European Union und Türkiye; is of the opinion that the critical state of the accession process is driving the Commission and the Council to focus merely on the partnership dimension of the EU’s relations with Türkiye, as is also reflected in the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023, and of 22 March 2021; highlights the increasing shift towards a different framework for the relationship, which might come at the expense of the accession process;

The core of the accession process: democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights

7. Considers that, in terms of human rights and the rule of law, Parliament’s recent resolutions on the matter remain valid in light of the continued dire human rights situation and democratic backsliding in Türkiye over the last year; fully endorses the latest resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the related report by its Monitoring Committee, as well as the resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which depict in detail the wide range of serious shortfalls in human rights constantly reported by locally and internationally renowned human rights organisations;

8. Notes the Turkish Government’s stated commitment to judicial reform and the introduction of measures of an organisational nature; highlights, however, the need to introduce structural measures ensuring judicial independence; deeply regrets that, despite a reform strategy with nine judicial reform packages, the state of independence of the judiciary in Türkiye remains desolate following systematic government interference in and political instrumentalisation of the judicial system; deplores, in this regard, the weakening of remaining constitutional review mechanisms, particularly individual applications, and the frequent violations of due process;

9. Is dismayed by the persecution of legal professionals, including most recently the lawsuit filed by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office that resulted in the removal of the leadership of the Istanbul Bar Association on charges of ‘making propaganda for a terrorist organization’ and ‘publicly disseminating misleading information’ for having asked for an investigation into the murders of two Kurdish journalists in Syria, and in the imprisonment of one of the members of the Istanbul Bar Association’s executive board following his trip to Strasbourg to hold meetings with Council of Europe institutions;

10. Is alarmed by the blatant lack of implementation of decisions by the Constitutional Court, including in the case of MP Can Atalay, which has turned into a serious judicial crisis, with the Court of Cassation filing a criminal complaint against nine judges of the Constitutional Court; is worried by the recent decision of the Court of Cassation to overturn the sentences of and release the terrorists involved in the ISIS attack at Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport, which claimed 45 lives in 2016;

11. Calls on Türkiye to strengthen its commitment to democratic governance, especially through reforms that ensure an independent judiciary; takes notes of the recent announcement of the Fourth Judicial Reform Strategy, spanning 2025-2029; calls on the Turkish Government to move from the superficial changes made so far through the recurrent reform packages and action plans to a profound and long overdue reform that will address, through real political will, the serious and structural shortcomings of Türkiye’s judiciary; stresses that putting an end to political interference in the judiciary requires no strategy or reform package but merely the political will to do so;

12. Remains deeply concerned by the continued deterioration of democratic standards and relentless crackdown by the Turkish authorities on any critical voices by means of a growing battery of repressive laws, the regular misuse of counterterrorism laws, including their application in relation to minors (as in the ‘Kız Çocukları Davası’ trial), the disproportionate use of the crime of insulting a public official, the extensive use of secret witnesses and dormant cases in flawed judicial proceedings, and the recurrent practice of exaggerated night arrests and home raids to portray targeted persons as extremely dangerous;

13. Welcomes the withdrawal in November 2024 of the draft amendment to Türkiye’s espionage laws, known as the ‘agent of influence’ law; urges the Turkish authorities to refrain from reintroducing a similar overly broad and vague law in the future, given the serious risk that it would be used as a tool to further criminalise the legitimate activities of civil society organisations within the country; calls on the Turkish authorities to ensure that the recently approved cybersecurity bill will serve its legitimate purpose of protecting data privacy and national security without giving way to potential infringements of fundamental rights or becoming another tool for further repression; stresses that the judicial apparatus remains heavily restrictive, with a complex web of legislation serving as a tool to systematically control and silence any critical voice, such as the 2020 social media law, the 2021 anti-money laundering law and the 2022 disinformation law;

14. Is concerned by the recent approval of legal provisions granting extraordinary powers to the State Supervisory Council (DDK) and the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), including the possibility for the former to dismiss public officials of all types and levels and appoint trustees, which could be used in an arbitrary manner;

15. Urges the Turkish authorities to put an end to the current serious restrictions on fundamental freedoms, in particular of expression, of assembly and of association, and to the constant attacks on the fundamental rights of members of the opposition, human rights defenders, lawyers, trade unionists, members of minorities, journalists, academics, artists and civil society activists, among others; strongly condemns the recent waves of mass arrest and imprisonment on politically motivated charges, and on the grounds of suspected terror links, affecting political figures, academics and journalists, including the arrests of Elif Akgül, independent journalist, Yıldız Tar, editor in chief of LGBT+ news site Kaos GL, and Ender İmrek, columnist of Evrensel daily, all well known for their work on human rights issues;

16. Deplores the continued prosecution, censorship and harassment of journalists and independent media, denying them the freedom to carry out their professional duties and inform the public, which is essential to a functioning democratic society; calls on the Turkish authorities to refrain from further attacks on independent media and to uphold fundamental rights and civil liberties such as freedom of speech and of the press; remains deeply concerned by the existing legislation that prevents an open and free internet, with lengthy prison sentences imposed for social media posts, scores of access blocks and content removal orders, and by the continued use of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) to crack down on media criticism and even on outlets deemed to spread ‘pessimism’ instead of positive news;

17. Acknowledges the positive developments in relation to the partial lifting by the minister of the interior of restrictions on the weekly vigils of the Saturday Mothers, Cumartesi Anneleri, in Istanbul’s Galatasaray Square, and the recent acquittal of all 46 people prosecuted for more than 6 years in the case surrounding the organisation’s 700th gathering in August 2018; calls for the complete removal of all restrictions on their peaceful protest, in full compliance with the relevant Constitutional Court ruling, and for an end to the ongoing judicial case against several of its members and sympathisers; is concerned by the ongoing trial against prominent human rights defender Nimet Tanrıkulu, who was released on 4 March 2025 after spending 94 days in pre-trial detention; urges the Turkish authorities to ensure the immediate release of all individuals detained for exercising their fundamental freedoms;

18. Continues to be appalled by the Turkish authorities’, in particular the Turkish judiciary’s, continuous disregard for and failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings; reiterates its condemnation of Türkiye’s blatant misuse of the judicial system and the refusal to release from detention human rights defender Osman Kavala and opposition politicians Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ,for which Türkiye is facing historical infringement proceedings in the Council of Europe, with long-awaited consequences yet to be determined; calls on Türkiye to fully comply with the ECtHR judgements related to missing persons and properties (inter alia in the Fokas case) in Cyprus; deplores the politically motivated nature of these prosecutions, which form part of a broader pattern of judicial harassment; calls on Türkiye to fully implement all judgments of the ECtHR in line with Article 46 of the ECHR and in line with the unconditional obligations derived from Article 90 of the Turkish constitution; calls on the European Commission and Member States to use all diplomatic channels to urge Türkiye to implement relevant ECtHR rulings and consider implementing relevant funding conditionality in relation to compliance with ECtHR rulings;

19. Expresses its deep concern about the dire situation in Turkish prisons owing to severe overcrowding and poor living conditions, with reports, including by the Council of Europe, of torture and ill-treatment being widespread, and access to basic needs such as hygiene and information being severely limited; is particularly worried by the conditions of imprisonment of elderly and seriously ill prisoners; is concerned by the continued use of humiliating strip searches in prisons and other places of detention and by the persisting harassment of MP Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu, who is currently facing six proceedings for the removal of his parliamentary seat and immunity, among other reasons for his having denounced this very practice;

20. Strongly condemns the Turkish Government’s decision to dismiss, following the March 2024 local elections, the democratically elected mayors of at least 13 municipalities and districts (Hakkari, Mardin, Batman, Halfeti, Tunceli, Bahçesaray, Akdeniz, Siirt, Van and Kağızman, won by the DEM Party; and Esenyurt Ovacık and Şişli, won by CHP Party) and to replace them with government trustees appointed by the interior ministry; regards this long-standing practice of appointing trustees as a blatant attack on the most basic principles of local democracy; urges the Turkish authorities to immediately cease and reverse repression of political opposition and to respect the rights of voters to elect their chosen representatives in line with the recommendations of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission; reiterates its call on the VP/HR to consider restrictive measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against Turkish officials assuming the role of trustee and those appointing them; denounces the severe repression of protests against the removal of elected mayors, including the arbitrary arrest of hundreds of protesters, some of whom were minors; regards the decision of the Turkish Government to return to this practice after the last local elections of March 2024 as a clear sign of its lack of commitment to addressing the democratic shortcomings within the country and in clear contradiction to the declared willingness to revitalise the accession process, as such actions undermine the prospects for a stronger, more comprehensive partnership with the EU and are detrimental to long-term progress towards closer cooperation;

21. Deplores the permanent targeting of political parties and members of the opposition, who continue to suffer increasing pressure; is extremely concerned by the recent arrest and removal from office of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality CHP Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, along with the mayors of Şişli and Beylikdüzü, in the framework of two separate investigations on alleged corruption and terrorist-related charges involving a total of 106 suspects; highlights that theses last cases, which are part of a long list of 42 administrative and 51 judicial investigations since İmamoğlu’s election in 2019, were launched just a few days before the internal party election to nominate him presidential candidate and the day after the controverted decision by Istanbul University to revoke his diploma, a requisite for his eligibility to be President; is appalled by the decision to temporarily ban all demonstrations in Istanbul and other provinces across the country, the slowdown on social media, the detention of journalists and the crackdown on peaceful protesters; considers that this is a politically motivated move aimed at preventing a legitimate challenger from standing in the upcoming elections and that with these actions the current Turkish authorities are further pushing the country towards a fully authoritarian model;

22. Further expresses its concern about the recent separate cases against Istanbul’s Beşiktaş district CHP Mayor Rıza Akpolat, Istanbul’s Beykoz district CHP Mayor Alaattin Köseler, CHP Youth Branch Chair Cem Aydın, and Zafer Party Chair Ümit Özdag; is appalled by the brutal and relentless crackdown on any kind of criticism to which all sectors of Turkish society have recently been subjected by the Turkish authorities, as illustrated, among others, by the case of Ayşe Barım, a well-known talent manager imprisoned since 27 January 2025 for alleged involvement in the Gezi Park protest 12 years ago, the investigation launched against Orhan Turan and Ömer Aras, the president and an executive of TÜSIAD, the country’s main business group, and the indictment, with the aim of imposing hefty prison sentences, of Halk TV Editor-in-Chief Suat Toktaş and journalists Seda Selek, Barış Pehlivan, Serhan Asker and Kürşad Oğuz, who have been provisionally acquitted; is concerned by the involvement in these and other cases of recently appointed Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek, who has a long record of involvement, in different positions, in high-profile cases against political figures, and which may give grounds for considering the application of restrictive measures under the EU Human Rights sanction regime; is also concerned by the growing financial pressure on opposition municipalities and controversial announcements, such as that made in relation to day-care centres run by opposition municipalities;

23. Expresses its deep concern at the deterioration in women’s rights, at gender-based violence and at the increase in the incidence of femicide in Türkiye in 2024, which has been the highest since 2010, the year before the signing of the Istanbul Convention; reiterates its strong condemnation of Türkiye’s withdrawal, by presidential decree, from this international agreement and reiterates its call to reverse this decision; urges the Turkish authorities to improve the legislative framework and its implementation, including by fully applying Protection Law no. 6284, in order to effectively tackle all forms of violence against women and the practice of so called ‘honour killings’, end the persistent policy of impunity by holding abusers to account, and advance towards gender equality, particularly with regard to the participation of women in decision-making and policymaking processes;

24. Strongly condemns the ongoing violations and lack of protection of the fundamental rights of LGBTI+ persons in Türkiye, including the increased incidence of hate speech, hate crimes and discriminatory rhetoric, as well as continued media stereotyping based on sexual orientation and gender identity; deplores the fact that this continued discrimination is often sanctioned by the authorities, as evidenced by the mass arrests made during the Pride March in 2023 and the banning of the march in 2024, while anti-LGBTI+ marches were permitted; urges the Turkish authorities to stop banning activities against homophobia, including Pride marches, with immediate effect;

25. Welcomes the increased dialogue with Christian minorities, but stresses that no significant progress has been registered with regard to the protection of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, in particular as regards their legal personality, including those of the Greek Orthodox population of the islands of Gökçeada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos); calls for Türkiye to implement the Venice Commission recommendations and all relevant ECtHR rulings in this regard; notes with concern that representatives of different confessions, including non-Muslim and Alevi communities, continue to face bureaucratic obstacles when attempting to register places of worship; highlights that this is a violation of the right to freedom of religion and belief; calls on Türkiye to adopt the long-awaited regulation on the election of board members in non-Muslim minority foundations controlling community hospitals; reiterates its call on Türkiye to respect the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for Orthodox Christians all over the world and to recognise its legal personality and the public use of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarch; calls on Türkiye to fully respect and protect the outstanding universal value of Hagia Sophia and the Chora museum, which are inscribed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List; notes with concern that Türkiye has still not implemented two decisions of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee of 2021 and 2023 regarding its obligations to undertake special measures to protect these monuments; deplores the lack of protection of Panagia Soumela Monastery, which has been put forward for inclusion in the UNESCO World Heritage Monuments list; stresses the need to eliminate restrictions on the training, appointment and succession of clergy; welcomes the envisaged reopening of the Halki Seminary and calls for the lifting of all obstacles to its proper functioning; calls on the Turkish authorities to effectively investigate and prosecute people responsible for any hate crimes, including hate speech, committed against minorities; condemns the antisemitic statements made in the media and by high-level officials following the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023; notes that all of these practices against any religious minority are incompatible with EU values;

26. Welcomes Abdullah Öcalan’s recent call on the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve, and to engage in a peace process, as a historic and long-awaited step that could help end a period of 40 years of violence that has caused more than 40 000 deaths; praises the efforts made by all stakeholders involved to facilitate these developments, including the constructive approach of different political leaders that was started by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, the visits to Imrali prison granted to a delegation of the DEM Party, and the broad consultations that this party has led with other political parties; underlines that this represents a significant opportunity and must be followed by an inclusive political process, with a prominent role for the Turkish Parliament, aimed at the peaceful and sustainable resolution of the Kurdish issue in its political, social, democratic and security-related aspects; stresses the need to uphold human rights, political pluralism, and civil rights for all citizens, including Kurds; regrets the continued political repression, judicial harassment and restrictions on cultural and linguistic rights faced by Kurdish citizens, which undermine democratic principles and social cohesion;

Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

27. Continues to commend Türkiye for hosting around 3.1 million refugees, including 2.9 million Syrians under temporary protection in 2024, down from 3.2 million in 2023; reiterates the importance of Türkiye’s collaboration for the effective and orderly management of migration flows; further welcomes the fact that since 2011 the EU has contributed close to EUR 10 billion to assist Türkiye in hosting refugees; notes that some EU funding has been allocated to strengthening Turkish border control and containment capabilities; welcomes the EU’s decision to allocate an additional EUR 1 billion in December 2024 to further support the healthcare, education, and integration of refugees in Türkiye since the fall of the Assad regime; at the same time, notes that these funds had already been pledged in May 2024, and therefore do not constitute new funds; calls on the Commission to ensure utmost transparency and accuracy in the allocation of funds and that EU-funded projects, particularly those related to removal centres and border control, comply with all relevant human rights standards; is alarmed by credible reports uncovering grave human rights violations at EU-funded removal centres in Türkiye and calls on the Commission to launch a transparent and independent review into the matter; notes with concern that a continuing increase in asylum applications has been registered in the Republic of Cyprus over recent years; recalls Türkiye’s obligation to take all necessary measures to halt the existing illegal migration routes and prevent the creation of new sea or land routes for illegal migration from Türkiye to the EU, particularly to Greece and the Republic of Cyprus; points out the risks related to any possible instrumentalisation of migrants by the Turkish Government; underlines the need to ensure the protection of all refugees’ and migrants’ rights and freedoms; calls on Türkiye to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 and the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement vis-à-vis all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; expresses cautious hope that developments in Syria will gradually allow an increasing number of refugees to return home; reiterates that returns should only be carried out on a voluntary basis and under conditions of safety and dignity; condemns repeated violent attacks against refugees and migrants fuelled by xenophobic rhetoric among politicians and host communities; calls on the European Commission and the EU Member States to increase their efforts to preserve humanitarian and protection space for Syrian refugees in Türkiye and to uphold the principle of non-refoulement as a cornerstone of EU policies;

28. Reiterates its strong interest in stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean; welcomes the continued de-escalation and positive momentum in the region and the recent climate of re-engagement between Türkiye and Greece, albeit that unresolved issues continue to affect bilateral relations; deplores the fact that Türkiye continues to violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, including through the promotion of the Blue Homeland doctrine; underlines that, although Turkish violations of Greek airspace have drastically decreased, violations of Greek territorial waters have risen compared to 2023, and systematic illegal fishing activities have been conducted by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters; deeply regrets that Türkiye also continues to uphold a formal threat of war against Greece (casus belli) at 12 nautical miles; calls on Türkiye to fully respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace, and their other sovereign rights, including the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is part of the EU acquis; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranen infringes upon the sovereign rights of third States, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third States;

29. Regrets the fact that the Cyprus problem remains unresolved, and calls for serious reengagement and the political will of all parties involved to bring about peaceful UN-led negotiations, with a view to achieving real progress in the Cyprus settlement talks; welcomes the resumption of informal talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General on 18 and 19 March 2025, which were held in a constructive atmosphere in which both sides showed a clear commitment to making progress and continuing dialogue; welcomes the agreement between both sides on opening four crossing points, demining, establishing a youth affairs committee and launching environmental and solar energy projects, as part of a new set of confidence-building measures; encourages all sides to use this momentum to move towards the resumption of negotiations;

30. Strongly reaffirms its view that the only solution to the Cyprus problem is a fair, comprehensive, viable and democratic settlement, including of its external aspects, within the agreed UN framework, on the basis of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with a single international legal personality, single sovereignty, single citizenship and political equality, as set out in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the agreed areas of convergence and the Framework of the UN Secretary General, as well as in accordance with international law and the principles and values on which the Union is founded; calls, as a matter of urgency, for the resumption of negotiations on the reunification of Cyprus under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General as soon as possible, from the point at which they were interrupted in Crans-Montana in 2017; calls on Türkiye to abandon the unacceptable proposal for a two-state solution in Cyprus and to return to the agreed basis for a solution and the UN framework; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and refrain from any unilateral action which would entrench the permanent division of the island and from action altering the demographic balance;

31. Calls on Türkiye to respect the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); reiterates its call for cooperation among the Republic of Cyprus, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone, and to improve security on the island; urges Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to reverse all unilateral actions and violations within and in the vicinity of the buffer zone and refrain from any further such actions and provocations; condemns the ongoing ‘opening’ of Varosha by Türkiye, as this negatively alters the situation on the ground, undermines mutual trust and negatively impacts the prospects for the resumption of direct talks on the comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem; calls on Türkiye to reverse its illegal actions in violation of UN Security Council resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992) on Varosha, which call on Türkiye to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN, and to withdraw from Strovilia and facilitate the full implementation of the Pyla Understanding;

32. Reiterates its call on Türkiye to give the Turkish Cypriot community the necessary space to act in accordance with its role as a legitimate community of the island, which is a right guaranteed by the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus; reiterates its call on the Commission to step up its efforts to engage with the Turkish Cypriot community, with a view to facilitating the resolution of the Cyprus problem and recalling that its place is in the European Union; calls for all parties involved to demonstrate a more courageous approach to bringing the communities together; stresses the need for the EU body of law to be implemented across the entire island following a comprehensive resolution of the Cyprus problem;

33. Takes note of the significant work of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP) and calls for improved access to military zones by the Turkish army, access to its military archives and information as to the relocation of remains from former to subsequent burial sites; remains deeply concerned about the education and religious restrictions and impediments faced by the enclaved Greek Cypriots; calls on Türkiye to step up its cooperation with the Council of Europe and its relevant bodies and institutions, to address their key recommendations, to fully implement the European Convention of Human Rights with regard to respecting the freedom of religion and the freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to access and enjoy cultural heritage, and to stop the deliberate destruction of cultural and religious heritage; condemns the repeated attempts by Türkiye to intimidate and silence Turkish Cypriot journalists, trade unionists, human rights defenders and progressive citizens in the Turkish Cypriot community, thus violating their right to freedom of opinion and expression; calls on Türkiye to halt its proclaimed aggressive policy of the sale and exploitation of Greek Cypriot properties, a policy designed to create irreversible effects on the ground and which completely disregards the European Code of Human Rights ruling on this issue;

34. Regrets Türkiye’s continuing refusal to comply with aviation law and establish a channel of communication between air traffic control centres in Türkiye and the Republic of Cyprus, the absence of which entails real safety risks and dangers as identified by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations; regrets, too, its denial of access to vessels under the flag of one Member State to the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles; takes the view that these could be areas where Türkiye can prove its commitment to confidence building measures and calls on Türkiye to collaborate by fully implementing EU aviation law; regrets that Türkiye has continued its attempts to impede the implementation of the Great Sea Interconnector, an EU project of common interest, and has persisted in its plans for an illegal electricity interconnector with the occupied area of Cyprus;

35. Regrets that for 20 years Türkiye has refused to implement the obligations assumed towards the EU, including those in relation to Cyprus, as per the Negotiating Framework of October 2005; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fulfil its obligation of full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement in relation to all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; further calls on Türkiye to ensure that the human and political rights of all Cypriots are fully respected and that compliance with the fundamental principles of the European Union and the European acquis is guaranteed;

36. Affirms its support for a free, secure and stable future for Syria and its citizens and highlights the need for an inclusive and peaceful political transition process that is Syrian-led and Syrian- owned, including the protection and inclusion of religious and ethnic communities; expresses its commitment to constructive cooperation between the EU and Türkiye to that end, on humanitarian aid, promoting a sustainable political solution in Syria, and the fight against DAESH, given that Türkiye has a key role in promoting stability in the region; recalls that Syria’s sovereignty must be restored; acknowledges the importance of rebuilding Syria’s economy as a pillar of long-term stability and prosperity for the region; calls on Türkiye to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and immediately cease all attacks and incursions on and occupation of Syrian territory in full compliance with international law; condemns the attacks carried out in recent weeks, taking advantage of the collapse of the Assad regime, by Turkish-backed militias against Syrian Kurdish forces in the north of Syria; expresses deep concern, as these attacks increase the number of internally displaced persons but also threaten the efficiency and continuity of the fight against Daesh; notes that its ongoing presence risks further destabilising and undermining efforts towards a sustainable political resolution in Syria; further notes that, citing security concerns, Türkiye also illegally occupies areas in Iraq; reiterates that civilian populations should never be the victim of military self-defence; calls for the necessary investigation into the cases in which there have been civilian casualties and to stop the crackdown on journalists working in the area; calls on Türkiye to support the process of implementing the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF and refrain from any interference in Syria’s internal processes;

37. Supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye in the interests of reconciliation, good neighbourly relations, regional stability and security and socio-economic development, and welcomes the progress achieved so far; welcomes the continued efforts to restore links between the two countries; urges Türkiye to ensure the speedy implementation of agreements reached by the Turkish and Armenian Governments’ special representatives, such as the opening of the airspace and the border between the two countries for the third country nationals, and, subsequently, for holders of diplomatic passports; welcomes the temporary opening of the Margara-Alican border crossing between Armenia and Türkiye to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Syria; expresses the hope that these developments may give impetus to the normalisation of relations in the South Caucasus region, also in terms of security and socio-economic development, and stresses the EU’s interest in supporting this process; encourages Türkiye to play a constructive role in promoting regional stability by facilitating the swift conclusion of the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, inter alia by exerting its influence on Azerbaijan and by deterring Azerbaijan from any further military action against Armenian sovereignty; encourages Türkiye once again to acknowledge the Armenian genocide in order to pave the way for genuine reconciliation between the Turkish and Armenian peoples and to fully respect its obligations to protect Armenian cultural heritage;

38. Notes that Türkiye’s stance in relation to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues to affect EU-Türkiye relations, as Türkiye attempts to maintain ties with both the West and Russia simultaneously; notes Türkiye’s diplomatic attempts to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, particularly regarding the Black Sea Grain Initiative, as well as its continued support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, including its vote in favour of UN General Assembly resolutions condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine; regrets that, on the other hand, trade between Türkiye and Russia has risen sharply since the start of the war in Ukraine, making Türkiye Russia’s second largest trading partner despite EU sanctions against Russia, and that Türkiye is the only NATO member state not having imposed any sanctions on Russia; further notes that the European Union’s anti-fraud office, OLAF, has initiated an investigation into a loophole that enables countries like Türkiye to rebrand sanctioned Russian oil and export it to the EU; welcomes, however, positive steps such as Türkiye’s blocking of exports to Russia for certain dual use goods, as well as products originating in the United States and the United Kingdom that are of benefit to Russian military action; reiterates its call on the Turkish Government to halt its plans for the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, which will be built, operated and owned by Russia’s state atomic energy corporation, Rosatom; expresses concern at Türkiye’s ongoing discussions with Russia to establish a gas-trading hub in Istanbul, scheduled to begin operations in 2025;

39. Welcomes Türkiye’s participation in various crisis management missions and operations (within the framework of the common security and defence policy); regrets, however, the further deterioration in the level of alignment on common foreign and security policy positions, including on sanctions and countering the circumvention of sanctions, which has fallen to a historically low rate of 5 %, the lowest rate for any accession country; recalls that EU candidate countries are required to progressively align with the common foreign and security policy of the European Union and comply with international law; regrets that Türkiye has not undertaken any steps in this regard, notably by failing to align with EU sanctions against Russia, and that in many areas of mutual interest the foreign policies of the EU and Türkiye are worryingly divergent; urges Türkiye to align with and fully implement the EU sanctions against Russia, including on anti-circumvention measures and to cooperate closely with the EU’s Sanctions Envoy;

40. Stresses the importance of reinforcing EU-Türkiye cooperation in global security matters, particularly in light of the changing geopolitical landscape and potential shifts in US foreign policy; expresses cautious hope that recent informal engagement, such as the participation of the Turkish Foreign Minister in the informal meeting of EU foreign affairs ministers in 2024, may provide an impetus towards better relations; acknowledges Türkiye’s key role as an ally in NATO and welcomes the Turkish Parliament’s decision to ratify Sweden’s NATO accession in January 2024; recalls, in this regard, that Türkiye has a key responsibility to foster stability at both regional and global levels and is expected to act in line with its NATO obligations, especially given the current geopolitical upheavals; encourages constructive engagement in a more structured and frequent political dialogue on foreign, security and defence policy to seek collaboration on convergent interests while working to reduce divergences, particularly with regard to removing persistent obstacles to the enhancement of a genuine relationship between the EU and NATO, including the acquisition from Russia of the S-400 air defence system; remains duly concerned that Türkiye continues to exclude a Member State from cooperation with NATO;

41. Welcomes Türkiye’s long-standing position in favour of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its calls for a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war, and its ongoing efforts to supply humanitarian aid to Gaza throughout the conflict; deeply regrets, at the same time, the Turkish authorities’, including the President’s, active support for the EU-listed terror group Hamas and their stance on the attack against Israel on 7 October 2023, which the Turkish Government failed to condemn; points out that Türkiye’s open support for Hamas and its refusal to designate it a terrorist organisation is not compatible with the EU’s foreign and security policy; calls, therefore, for a revision of this position;

42. Notes with concern that Türkiye has asked to be a member of BRICS+ and been offered ‘partner country’ status, and is considering the same for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), where it holds the status of a dialogue partner; expresses serious concern over Türkiye’s increasing interest in an alternative partnership framework, which is fundamentally incompatible with the EU accession process; insists that Türkiye’s new status as a BRICS partner country must not affect Türkiye’s responsibilities within NATO; notes that Türkiye has been cultivating cooperation formats, partnerships and regional alliances beyond the EU; is concerned by Türkiye’s tendency to use this multi-vector approach to advance its interests without committing to a full-fledged cooperation with any of these alliances;

43. Remains concerned by the Turkish Government’s use of the Turkish diaspora as an instrument for occasional meddling in EU Member States’ domestic policies;

Socio-economic and sustainability reforms

44. Welcomes Türkiye’s return to a more conventional economic and monetary policy, while maintaining robust growth and a moderate budget deficit; regrets, however, that the cost of this is yet again being borne by citizens in the form of higher interest rates; highlights that social vulnerabilities have increased, particularly among children and older people, primarily due to the absence of a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy and income inequalities; underlines the necessity for the Turkish authorities to implement comprehensive social protection measures, strengthen collective bargaining rights and ensure that economic reforms prioritise reducing inequality and creating decent work opportunities;

45. Regrets the fact that despite the progress observed in economic and monetary policies, other actions by the Turkish Government affecting the rule of law continue to undermine basic principles such as legal certainty, which impacts negatively on Türkiye’s potential capacity to receive investments; welcomes the removal of Türkiye from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in June 2024, following significant progress in improving its anti-money laundering regime and combating the financing of terrorism;

46. Welcomes Türkiye’s increased investment activity in the green energy sector and calls on Türkiye to continue improving the compatibility of its energy policy with the EU acquis, exploiting Türkiye’s enormous potential in renewable energy; expresses concern about the lack of any significant progress on climate action, in particular owing to the absence of a comprehensive climate law, a domestic emissions trading system, and a long-term low-emission development strategy, which undermines its 2053 climate neutrality target; highlights the need for a robust legal framework and stricter enforcement mechanisms to safeguard environmental and natural resources; urges Türkiye to align its environmental policies with the EU acquis, including respecting natural habitats when conducting mining projects, and underlines the importance of Türkiye’s adherence to the Aarhus Convention; commends the work of environmental rights defenders in Türkiye and warns against the dire environmental impact of extensive government projects, such as the expansion of its copper mining activities in Mount Ida (Kaz Daglari);

47. Highlights the fact that Türkiye has taken steps to diversify energy supplies and increase its renewable energy share; notes that the country is the seventh largest LNG market and highlights its potential as a regional energy hub; takes note that Türkiye has subscribed to the global goals on energy efficiency and renewable energy capacity by 2030; calls on the Commission to take into account Türkiye’s potential as a regional energy hub in initiatives to increase the installed renewable capacity in the Mediterranean region and in the development of the New Pact for the Mediterranean, and calls for energy cooperation to be part of the common agenda;

48. Observes some improvements in labour market conditions and points out a number of pending critical challenges, such as informal employment, the gender gap, and income inequality; is worried about the low coverage of collective bargaining and the lack of recognition of trade union rights for certain public sector employees; believes that more efforts are needed to enhance social dialogue mechanisms and address emerging occupational safety challenges; recalls that trade union freedom and social dialogue are crucial to the development and prosperity of a pluralistic society; deplores, in this regard, the recent detentions of trade unionists including Remzi Çalişkan, vice-president of the DISK confederation, and president of Genel-Iş, who was released after a month in prison, Kemal Göksoy, President of the Mersin Branch of Genel-İş, who remains in prison, and Mehmet Türkmen, chair of the textile sector union BİRTEK SEN, who was detained on 14 February 2025;

Wider EU-Türkiye relations

49. Reiterates its firm conviction that, beyond the currently frozen accession process, Türkiye is a country of strategic relevance, a key partner for the stability of the wider region and plays an important role in addressing security challenges, migration management, counterterrorism, and energy security; stresses the importance of maintaining constructive dialogue and deepening cooperation in areas of mutual strategic interest; points to a number of policy areas for future engagement, whether it be the green transition, trade, energy, a modernised customs union and visa liberalisation, among others; reaffirms that the EU is committed to pursuing the best possible relations with Türkiye, based on dialogue, respect and mutual trust, in line with international law and good neighbourly relations;

50. Stresses the importance of encouraging deeper partnership in all economic sectors, to the benefit of the EU and all of its Member States and Türkiye; notes in particular the importance of cooperation in the fields of energy, innovation, artificial intelligence, health, security and migration management, among others; in this regard, welcomes various high-level dialogues (HLDs) held recently, including the HLD on trade, and the plans for an HLD on economy, as positive steps towards pragmatic forms of cooperation in areas of mutual importance; calls again for the resumption of all relevant HLDs and for the establishment of structured HLDs on sectoral cooperation, to address common challenges and explore opportunities for joint initiatives in fields such as security, climate change, research and innovation; stresses that trade between the EU and Türkiye hit a record high last year and that the EU remains Türkiye’s largest trade and investment partner; calls for the removal of all existing trade barriers and irritants;

51. Stands ready to support an upgraded customs union with a broader, mutually beneficial scope, which could encompass a wide range of areas of common interest, including digitalisation, Green Deal alignment for green energy policies, public procurement, sustainable development commitments, and due diligence, contributing to the economic security of both sides; supports accompanying this upgraded customs union with an efficient and effective dispute settlement mechanism; underlines the fact that for Parliament to give its consent at the end of the process, such a modernisation would need to be based on strong conditionality related to human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for international law and good neighbourly relations, including Türkiye’s full implementation of the Additional Protocol on extending the Ankara Agreement to all Member States without exception and in a non-discriminatory fashion;

52. Notes with deep regret that no progress has been made by Türkiye towards meeting the required benchmarks for visa liberalisation; reiterates its willingness to start the visa liberalisation process as soon as the Turkish authorities fully fulfil the six clearly outstanding benchmarks in a non-discriminatory manner vis-à-vis all EU Member states while aligning with EU visa policy; regrets that Turkish citizens are facing problems with visa requests/applications to EU Member States owing to a marked increase in demand and fears of abuse of the system; recognises, however, the political commitment to improving access to visas and calls for intensified efforts on both sides to address the remaining technical and administrative barriers; calls on the EU Member states to increase the resources allocated to this matter; supports measures on visa facilitation, particularly with regard to business activities and Erasmus students; deeply regrets the constant attempts by the Turkish authorities to blame the EU for not making progress on this dossier, while not taking any necessary steps to comply with the remaining benchmarks; reminds Türkiye that the lack of tangible and cumulative progress on the pending conditions has a direct impact on business activities and Erasmus students; appreciates the invaluable contribution of Erasmus+ exchanges in providing rich cross-cultural educational opportunities;

The way forward for EU-Türkiye relations

53. Considers, in view of the above, that the Turkish Government has failed to take the necessary steps to address the existing fundamental democratic shortcomings within the country and therefore reiterates its view that Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed in the current circumstances, despite the democratic and pro-European aspirations of a large part of Turkish society; recalls that, as in the case of any other candidate, the accession process is contingent on full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and on the normalisation of relations with all EU Member States;

54. Urges the Turkish Government and the EU institutions and Member States to continue working, beyond the currently frozen accession process, on the basis of the relevant Council and European Council conclusions and the established conditionality, towards a closer, more dynamic and strategic partnership with particular emphasis on climate action, energy security, counter-terrorism cooperation and regional stability; insists on the need to begin a process of reflection on how this new constructive and progressive framework for EU-Türkiye relations can encompass the interests of all parties involved, for example by modernising and enhancing the current Association Agreement;

55. Considers the joint communication of 29 November 2023 on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations a good basis on which to move forward in the overall relations between the EU and Türkiye; regrets the lack of a clear political endorsement of this joint communication so far by the Council; reiterates that recognition of all EU Member States is a necessary component of any agreement between the EU and Türkiye; stresses that Türkiye’s constructive engagement, including in relation to the Cyprus problem, remains key to advancing closer cooperation between the EU and Türkiye;

56. Warns, nevertheless, that a further drift towards authoritarianism by the Turkish authorities, such as we have been witnessing recently, will ultimately have a severe impact on all dimensions of EU-Türkiye relations, including trade and security cooperation, as it prevents the trust and reliability needed between partners and antagonises both sides in the current geopolitical scene;

57. Continues to acknowledge and commend the democratic and pro-European aspirations of the majority of Turkish society (particularly among Turkish youth), whom the EU will not forsake; regards these aspirations as a major reason for keeping Türkiye’s accession process alive; calls therefore on the Commission to uphold and increase its political and financial support to the vibrant and pro-democratic civil society in Türkiye, whose efforts can contribute to generating the political will necessary for deepening EU-Türkiye relations; highlights, nevertheless, that the resumption of the accession process depends on the unwavering political will of Türkiye’s authorities and society to become a full-fledged democracy, which cannot be forced upon it by the EU;

58. Reiterates its call to strengthen and deepen mutual knowledge and understanding between our societies, promoting cultural growth, socio-cultural exchanges and combating all manifestations of social, religious, ethnic or cultural prejudice; encourages Türkiye and the EU to promote shared values, particularly by supporting young people; reiterates its utmost commitment to sustaining and increasing support for Türkiye’s independent civil society;

°

° °

59. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Council and the Commission; asks that this resolution be translated into Turkish and forwarded to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Türkiye.

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2023 – A10-0049/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2023

(2024/2083(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Articles 310(6) and 325(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to the Commission report of 25 July 2024 entitled ‘35th Annual Report on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests and the fight against fraud – 2023’ (COM(2024)0318) (2023 PIF Report),

– having regard to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 2023 annual report [1] and the Activity report of the Supervisory Committee of OLAF – 2023 [2],

– having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2023 Annual Report published on 1 March 2024,

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget [3] (the Conditionality Regulation),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law [4] (the Whistleblower Directive) and to the Commission report of 3 July 2024 on its implementation and application (COM(2024)0269),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 5 July 2023 entitled ‘2023 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2023)0800), and to the European Parliament resolution of 28 February2024 entitled ‘Report on the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report’[5],

– having regard to the Commission’s decision of 16 December 2024 not to lift the measure imposed in application of Article 2(2) of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary,

– having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of 16 February 2022 in Cases C-156/21 [6] and C-157/21 [7] and to Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary, all of which refer to the Conditionality Regulation,

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union [8] (the Financial Regulation),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 [9], Regulation (EU) 2024/1620 [10] and Directive (EU) 2024/1640 [11], all of the European Parliament and of the Council, all adopted on 31 May 2024 and all concerning the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, including through the establishment of the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism,

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law [12] (the PIF Directive),

– having regard to the Commission report of 16 September 2022 entitled ‘Second report on the implementation of Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law’ (COM(2022)0466),

– having regard to the Commission report of 3 July 2024 on the implementation and application of Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (COM(2024)0269),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy [13] (the Common Provisions Regulation),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800),

– having regard to the study entitled ‘Strengthening the fight against organised crime: Assessing the legislative framework’, published in December 2022 [14],

– having regard to the study entitled ‘Strengthening the fight against corruption: assessing the legislative and policy framework’, published in January 2023 [15],

– having regard to the study entitled ‘Compliance assessment of measures adopted by the Member States to adapt their systems to Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’)’ and its extension, both published in December 2023 [16],

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 on the fight against corruption (JOIN(2023)0012) and to the Commission proposal of 3 May 2023 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating corruption, replacing Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA and the Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union and amending Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2023)0234),

– having regard to the joint Europol-OLAF report of 6 June 2023 entitled ‘Assessing the Threats to the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) Fund’,

– having regard to the European Ombudsman’s closing note of 12 September 2023 on the Strategic Initiative concerning the transparency and accountability of the Recovery and Resilience Facility in relation to Case SI/6/2021/PVV, opened on 24 February 2022,

– having regard to the European Court of Auditors (ECA) report entitled ‘Our activities in 2023’, published on 9 October 2024,

– having regard to ECA Review 04/2023 of 6 July 2023 entitled ‘Digitalising the management of EU funds’,

– having regard to Special Eurobarometer 534 entitled ‘Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU in 2023’[17],

– having regard to ECA special report 06/2023 of 13 March 2023 entitled ‘Conflict of interest in EU cohesion and agricultural spending – Framework in place but gaps in transparency and detection measures’,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 250/2014 [18],

– having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2022 [19],

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0049/2025),

A. whereas, in line with the obligation laid down in Article 325(5) TFEU, each year, the Commission submits to the European Parliament and to the Council a report drafted in cooperation with the Member States on the measures taken for the implementation of this article (known as PIF reports);

B. whereas PIF reports are based mainly on information provided by the Member States, including data on irregularities and fraud detected, via the Irregularity Management System (IMS), and on data extracted from the Commission’s accounting system (ABAC);

C. whereas effective measures to protect the EU’s financial interests at EU level have to be implemented on the basis of data-based knowledge of the specific situation in each Member State, particularly in cases involving complex criminal activity;

D. whereas the number of irregularities detected and reported demonstrates the results of Member States’ efforts to counter illegal activities in this area and is not to be interpreted, by itself, as an indication of the level of mismanagement or fraud in the Member States;

E. whereas the links between irregularities’ occurrence, their detection and the reporting level require a wider overall assessment;

F. whereas sound management of public resources and protecting the EU’s financial interests across all EU policies should be key to increasing citizens’ confidence by ensuring the proper and effective use of taxpayers’ money;

G. whereas protecting the EU budget involves multiple actors at various levels who can only achieve their mandate through a structured network of relationships and coordination within the anti-fraud architecture (AFA)[20];

H. whereas the diversity of legal and administrative systems in the Member States and their varying levels of digitalisation need to be adequately addressed with the creation of more unified, interoperable and comparable administrative and reporting systems in the EU in order to effectively prevent and counter fraud, corruption, irregularities and other infringements;

I. whereas solid cooperation between authorities conducting administrative investigations and those conducting criminal investigations at both EU and Member State levels should be encouraged;

J. whereas the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) and ARACHNE are effective tools to protect the EU budget from risks of insolvency, negligence, fraud or irregularity committed by private actors, in the case of the EDES, and via a data-mining and risk-scoring approach, in the case of ARACHNE;

K. whereas criminal networks operating in the EU are fully embracing the entire range of cutting-edge information technology, including artificial intelligence (AI), to facilitate their criminal activities, posing an even more complex threat to the EU budget and a new challenge for law enforcement and requiring the AFA to fast-track its exploration of AI use in the fight against fraud;

L. whereas respect for the values on which the EU is founded and for fundamental rights, as well as compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, are prerequisites for accessing EU funding;

M. whereas the rule of law conditionality mechanism applies across the entire EU budget as a prerequisite for accessing all EU funds and allows measures to be taken in cases of breaches of the rule of law principles that affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the EU budget or the EU’s financial interests;

N. whereas Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility [21] (the RRF Regulation) contains provisions concerning the protection of the EU’s financial interests;

General remarks on PIF reporting and on major threats

1. Welcomes the 2023 PIF Report and its analyses on the relevant findings, and endorses its recommendations;

2. Shares the view that effective protection of the Union’s financial interests requires the acceleration of the digitalisation that facilitates knowledge sharing, data accessibility and data processing and that would enhance the governance of the overall AFA; maintains that both the EU and national authorities should intensify the use of digital tools with a view to facilitating cooperation;

3. Reiterates that a more measurable and results-oriented governance of the activities of the AFA’s many components is key both to effectively protecting the Union’s financial interests and to assessing the AFA’s efficiency;

4. Recalls that solid cooperation between the administrative and judicial authorities conducting investigations at both EU and Member State levels is essential; reiterates its concerns over the still suboptimal situation, in particular as regards the detection and reporting of suspected fraud and irregularities and their follow-up, in which there are marked differences between Member States; encourages the Member States, therefore, to take a proactive approach to protecting the Union’s financial interests and to enhance the exchange of information between their national authorities and with EU bodies and agencies, including in order to identify and address emerging risks and fraud trends in a timely manner; underlines the fact that the fight against fraud requires a holistic and comprehensive approach, covering all stages of the anti-fraud cycle and reflecting the multiple, interconnected and interdependent actors and processes in place for the protection of the financial interests of the Union;

5. Notes that the overall number of cases of fraud and irregularities reported by the competent EU and national authorities increased significantly, by 9 %, in 2023 (13 563) compared to 2022 (12 455); regrets the fact that this is an all-time high and is the continuation of a growing trend over the last five years; observes, further, that the overall financing concerned in relation to these cases in 2023 (EUR 1.90 billion) was markedly higher than in 2022 (EUR 1.77 billion), having increased by 7.3 %; acknowledges that the multiannual cycle of implementation of numerous programmes makes comparisons based on a five-year average more appropriate than year-to-year comparisons for identifying real-time situations and obtaining reliable analysis of trends and patterns; appreciates, accordingly, that the 2023 PIF Report refers to the results of the 2019-2023 period; observes that the rise in the number of irregularities and in funding that achieves no positive results highlights the need to correlate budgets with the performance indicators of the competent institutions;

6. Is concerned by the overall scenario depicted by the multiannual analysis in the 2023 PIF Report; emphasises that the current situation justifies the efforts made to ensure more effective deployment of adequate resources and their more efficient use, which requires better governance and cooperation; underlines that fraud, corruption and violations of democracy, justice and the rule of law are deeply interconnected and cannot be tackled in isolation; calls on the Commissioners on budget, fraud and public administration and on democracy, justice and the rule of law to work closely and immediately on launching initiatives to make the actions and the results of the AFA measurable and more tangible and to present them to Parliament, in line with the commitment made at the confirmation hearings; suggests that stronger synergies be created between the Commission’s Directorate-General for Budget and other Commission directorates-general working on the rule of law and the protection of other EU values, particularly the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion and the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, to ensure that all the departments work together, rather than in silos, to address these systemic challenges more effectively;

7. Reiterates the call for a holistic approach in PIF reports, which are also considered an AFA governance tool, in order to provide a comprehensive overview of the synergies between all the relevant actors, identify best practices and address shortcomings; is aware that, as emphasised in the 2023 PIF Report, the operational protection of the Union’s financial interests from fraud, irregularities and other illicit activities is entrusted to national authorities, OLAF and the EPPO, and welcomes the integration of OLAF and EPPO findings in the 2023 PIF Report; asks for a deeper analysis of the interaction between the AFA components, and for the introduction of measures to increase the efficiency of the competent institutions with a view to reducing fraud and irregularities; calls for the further improvement of this holistic approach to provide a clearer, more complete and more concrete picture of the overall state of play of the protection of the Union’s financial interests, encompassing the entirety of anti-fraud action at both national and EU levels;

8. Welcomes OLAF’s investigative performance, in particular the increased number of recommendations issued (309 compared to 275 in 2022) and the overall amount recommended for financial recovery (EUR 1 043.8 million compared to EUR 426.8 million in 2022) against a stable number of cases opened (190 in 2023 and 192 in 2022) and concluded (265 in 2023 and 256 in 2022); points out, in particular, that over the 2019-2023 period, more than 88 % of the irregularities identified as potentially fraudulent and related to expenditure disbursed under direct management were detected following OLAF investigations; regrets that the long duration of the investigations can have a negative impact regarding the consequential late launching of remedial measures; reiterates its request to receive comprehensive and adequately detailed figures on the amounts effectively recovered by the Commission on the grounds of the financial recommendations issued by OLAF; calls on the Commission also to integrate in the next PIF reports ad hoc sections on OLAF in order to develop a more granular analysis and reporting of its activities and of the financial recoveries carried out;

9. Welcomes the way in which the EPPO, operationally active since June 2021, has developed and increased its activities, which is well-reflected in the numbers of opened investigations (1 371 compared to 865 in 2022), of overall currently active investigations (1 927 compared to 1 117 in 2022) and of indictments (139 compared to 87 in 2022); appreciates the level of detail in EPPO reporting, which offers relevant information on many trends and on the situation in the participating Member States; calls for greater EPPO efficiency, with this being reflected in the amounts recovered and not just in the number of investigations;

10. Stresses the added value that EU bodies bring to the protection of the financial interests of the Union and the fight against fraud, especially when it comes to cross-border crime, as shown by the operational results of the EPPO and OLAF in 2023 too; reiterates its call for all relevant EU actors involved in the fight against fraud to be guaranteed adequate resources and, in this regard, reminds the Commission and the Council that every euro spent on investigation and anti-fraud action returns to the EU budget;

11. Is concerned that the substantial financial loss of value added tax (VAT) fraud reported by the EPPO is having a detrimental effect on the national budgets of the Member States while simultaneously threatening fair taxation and fair competition between businesses in the single market; underlines the fact that VAT is an important resource for the Union’s budget too; deems it appropriate to take into account the complexity of the underlying provisions on the system of own resources of the Union when quantifying the financial impact of the EPPO’s activities [22]; points out the concerning number of investigations into the recovery and resilience programmes (233) and the estimated financial loss (EUR 1.86 billion); calls, therefore, for adequate measures to be taken at both national and EU levels;

12. Calls on the Commission to develop and implement solutions allowing a follow-up to OLAF recommendations and EPPO prosecutions, their analysis and the measurability of the actual impact of their actions on the protection of the Union’s budget in terms of recovery of both mismanaged funds and of uncollected resources, with a view to providing additional justification for results-oriented policymaking; calls on the Commission to notify Parliament of the outcomes of EPPO prosecutions;

13. States that communication and transparency are essential to address fraud and corruption; emphasises the importance of engaging civil society, the media and investigative journalism to enhance awareness; underlines the central role played by the media and investigative journalism in the fight against fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and other misuse of public funds; considers that it is essential to safeguard the media from political pressure and influence to protect its independence and its role as a watchdog of democracy and the sound management of public funds;

14. Underlines that transparency plays an important role in the management of public funds; encourages the Commission and the Member States to maximise transparency in the use of funds, including with regard to information about final beneficiaries;

15. Underlines the importance of the role played by public authorities in fostering a zero-tolerance culture with regard to fraud and states that communication and transparency are essential to address fraud and corruption; emphasises the importance of engaging civil society, the private sector, the media and investigative journalism to enhance awareness; encourages the Commission to provide support to these relevant actors in the form of training programmes, funding and any other measures required to ensure their independence from external influence and from unlawful state surveillance, intimidation and attempts to undermine their legitimacy, in line with EU fundamental rights and the rule of law; invites the Commission to launch an EU-wide public awareness campaign on the risks of fake news, misinformation and deepfake content in fraud cases affecting EU-funded projects;

16. Is concerned about the EPPO’s and Europol’s clear warning on the increasing presence of groups of organised criminals behind the most relevant cases of cross-border fraud; notes that the EPPO’s annual report indicates 209 investigated offences concerning PIF-focused criminal organisations in its active investigations up to the end of 2023; understands that organised crime affects Union resources substantially and that the scale of fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union, in particular on the revenue side of the budget, can only be explained by the heavy involvement of serious organised criminal groups; is aware that the current analysis and reporting tools do not allow its quantification in a way that is satisfactory for evaluating the effectiveness or the shortcomings of the measures and policies in place; calls on the Commission to swiftly launch all necessary actions to address the analysis and reporting issue;

17. Maintains that the fact that the relevant EU legislation has not been transposed efficiently into the national legislation of many Member States and the fact that the Member States’ national laws are not harmonised give organised criminal groups opportunities to conduct a number of illegal cross-border activities in areas affecting the Union’s financial interests; reiterates, therefore, its previous calls for the revision of Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA on the fight against organised crime [23] and for the introduction of a new common definition of organised crime, taking into account, in particular, the use of corruption, violence, threat or intimidation to obtain control of economic activities or procurement;

18. Points out the results of the 2023 Eurobarometer survey on ‘Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU in 2023’, showing that corruption is a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses in the EU; maintains that high-level corruption, including in EU institutions, not only affects the Union’s financial interests and the EU economy as a whole, but also undermines citizens’ trust in democratic institutions, both in the EU and in the Member States; underlines that organised criminal groups are increasingly using corruption to infiltrate public administrations and gain economic advantages;

19. Points out that, in relation to corruption cases, the EPPO reported 131 investigated offences up to the end of 2023 (there were 87 cases in 2022) and that, over the years 2019-2023, 65 cases were reported to the Commission via IMS [24] by 11 countries, and that the reported irregular amounts linked to such cases come to about EUR 50.5 million; calls on the Commission to request that the EPPO inform Parliament of how much of that EUR 50.5 million has been recovered;

20. Acknowledges that anti-corruption strategies are in place in the Member States; calls for an evaluation and a periodical revision of these strategies; emphasises the importance of taking into account and fully addressing country-specific recommendations relating to the fight against corruption;

21. Acknowledges the Commission’s efforts to prevent and address cases of conflict of interest in the management of the Union’s financial resources; observes that, in the 2019-2023 period, 419 cases were reported via the IMS related to conflict of interest (there were 375 in 2018-2022), involving in total about EUR 112 million; stresses that the ECA has indicated in its audit work [25] that the main source of information on conflict of interest is the IMS and that the quantity and quality of the data recorded in the IMS varies between Member States; underlines that where Member States consider a conflict of interest to be a minor component in a wider fraud case, they do not report such cases as relating to conflicts of interest; calls on the Commission to adopt initiatives necessary to ensure consistent and adequately detailed reporting in the IMS of the above situations; calls for the provisions on conflicts of interest to be applied in a way that ensures legal certainty, be based on a clear and proportionate assessment of the risks and allow practical application by the competent authorities;

Revenue

22. Observes that, in 2023, the overall number of fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities related to traditional own resources (TOR) (5 118 compared to 4 661 in 2022) was 10 % higher than the five-year average (2019-2023), but that the amount involved decreased by 12 % to EUR 478 million (compared to EUR 783 million bat the end of2022); regrets that while the data show improved recovery for non-fraudulent cases (82 %), the recovery rate for fraudulent cases remains unchanged at 25 %, which is still low and is distributed unevenly across the Member States;

23. Points out that, in 2023, the Commission considered that in only five of the new write-off reports submitted to it by the Member States had it been satisfactorily demonstrated that TOR had been lost for reasons not imputable to the Member States in question and that the latter were not financially responsible for the loss; notes, by contrast, that in 81 cases, amounting to almost EUR 69 million, the Commission considered that the Member States had not satisfactorily demonstrated that TOR had been lost for reasons not imputable to them and that they were therefore financially responsible for the loss; concludes, therefore, that there is actionable room for improvement in the collection of TOR by the Member States;

24 Underlines that it is essential for Member States to live up to their responsibility to collect TOR in order to ensure that the burden of financing EU expenditure is shared fairly among the Member States and maintain a level playing field for economic actors in the single market; calls on the Member States to step up their efforts to improve the effectiveness of their national administrations’ activity in the field of recovery, following the detection of irregularities and fraud relating to VAT, in order to increase the amount of TOR made available to the EU budget; acknowledges that the VAT compliance gap relates to more than just fraud and evasion, but also covers VAT lost as a result of insolvencies, bankruptcies, administrative errors and legal tax optimisation; believes, however, that VAT fraud, such as missing trader intra-Community fraud, contributes meaningfully to VAT non-compliance and reiterates its call for the issue to be addressed through digital means, the fraud-proofing of VAT rules and stronger cooperation between national tax authorities and the competent EU investigative bodies;

25. Acknowledges the current legal framework relating to cooperation with OLAF, the EPPO and Eurofisc; calls on the Commission to speed up the process of revising the current legal framework to provide a clear legal basis for direct cooperation between Eurofisc and the EPPO; encourages OLAF to maximise the possibilities offered by mutual administrative assistance practices to detect and identify customs fraud and related VAT fraud, as well as to report such cases to the EPPO without delay; stresses that, in 2023, the EPPO identified VAT fraud in about 20 % of its active cases (873 cases), making this the second most frequent type of crime after non-procurement expenditure fraud (1 586 cases); is concerned by the increasing participation of groups of organised criminals in VAT fraud operations and by the identified connections between this kind of fraud and other kinds of very serious crimes, such as money laundering;

26. Reiterates its call on the Commission to reconsider the threshold of EUR 10 million set in the PIF Directive, which has a major impact on the EPPO’s activities in VAT fraud cases; maintains that different interpretations of the methodologies for calculating this threshold make the situation unclear; emphasises that the current threshold limits deterrence and allows perpetrators to seek out the weakest jurisdiction to elude the EPPO’s intervention; believes that the revision of the PIF Directive should either remove the threshold or substantially lower it; calls on the Commission, in the meantime, to provide adequate guidance on the calculation method for cases prior to the amendment of the PIF Directive;

27. Stresses the importance of effective and efficient cooperation between OLAF and the EPPO in this specific revenue sector and maintains that adequate detection and data transmission by OLAF to the EPPO could increase the collection of VAT and customs revenue for the EU budget, and would help avoid any overlap between the activities of the two offices;

Expenditure

28. Is concerned by the high levels of fraud and irregularities detected, both in 2023 and in 2022, under the common agricultural policy, both in rural development and in support for agriculture; remarks that the data confirm patterns and risks identified in previous years; observes that, during the 2019-2023 period, fraudulent irregularities reported for rural development increased, mainly owing to a rising number of irregularities detected for the 2014-2020 programming period; notes that during the 2019-2023 period, the number of non-fraudulent rural development irregularities continuously increased in line with the implementation of the programmes;

29. Observes that in cohesion policy the number and financial amounts of non-fraudulent irregularities reported for the 2014-2020 programming period are much lower than those reported during the first 10 years of implementation of the 2007-2013 programming period; points out that the fraud detection rate [26] (0.53 %) for the 2014-2020 programming period is similar to the rate for the 2007-2013 programming period, while the irregularity detection rate (0.67 %) is much lower than the rate recorded for the 2007-2013 programming period (2.5 %); notes that individual irregularities involving large financial amounts have a substantial impact on the fraud detection rate; calls for further clarification of the correlation between the fraud detection rate and the occurrence of fraud;

30. Welcomes OLAF’s analytical report entitled ‘Fraud and irregularities by areas of the cohesion policy – comparing risks’, which refers to information from Member States for the 2014-2020 programming period up until December 2023 and identifies areas particularly exposed to fraud risk (such as investments for the environment, climate change and the transition to a low carbon economy, research, development and innovation); remarks that the largest financial amounts in fraud cases were in environmental protection and research, technology development and innovation;

31. Reiterates its concern over the lengthy administrative procedures for dealing with the fraudulent cases reported; points out that, on average, during the 2019-2023 period, under the common agricultural policy, nearly four years were required from the start of an irregularity to arrive at a suspicion of fraudulent activity, and nearly three more years to close the case after its being reported to the Commission; highlights that, for cohesion, on average and during the 2014-2020 period, it took about a year and a half to arrive at a suspicion that a fraudulent irregularity had been committed and more than two years to close the case after its being reported to the Commission; asks the Commission to intensify dialogue with, and provide advice to, the Member State authorities to reduce the length of administrative procedures;

32. Observes that, for direct management between 2019 and 2023, OLAF was mentioned as the source of detection of fraudulent irregularities for 88.4 % of recovery items, corresponding to 92.1 % of total recovery amounts; asks the Commission to provide clear information on the data and on the actions taken to enhance swift recovery, including data on overall recovery levels for fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities;

33. Emphasises that when, despite preventive measures, fraudulent or non-fraudulent irregularities are detected, recovery is the measure that protects the Union’s financial interests, allowing for the correct implementation of EU policies and for the refunding of disbursed expenditure that is non-compliant with the funding requirements; stresses the findings of ECA special report 7/2024 [27] when referring to the 2014-2020 period, for which the reported irregular expenditure was EUR 14 billion, which is to be refunded via recovery; stresses the need to speed up the recovery process by establishing clear deadlines and imposing penalties for delays, so that funds are returned to the EU budget as quickly as possible; calls on the Commission to propose adequate measures to provide complete information on irregular expenditure and the associated corrective measures taken;

34. Stresses the importance of follow-up measures after the necessary corrective actions have been taken, with a view to learning from cases of fraud and improving procedures to prevent similar cases from occurring in the future; considers it important, in this regard, that the Member States thoroughly follow up on cases by analysing the enabling factors behind fraud and assessing the need to revise their management and control systems accordingly;

35. Understands that, following a lack of support in the Council for its initiatives in 2004 and 2014, the Commission is not willing to put forward another legislative proposal for mutual administrative assistance in the areas of EU spending that do not currently provide for this practice; encourages the Commission to take advantage of the revision of the OLAF Regulation [28], which already provides OLAF with an enhanced mandate for the coordination of Member States’ actions in order to further develop the current provisions with a view to filling this gap;

36. Notes that civil society organisations are an essential component of a vibrant democratic society, ensuring the broad coverage of diverse views in public debates; recognises that these organisations may receive Union funds to support their work in contributing to democratic dialogue and public engagement; emphasises that transparency in stakeholder meetings is fundamental to democratic integrity and should apply equally to all entities engaging with EU institutions; stresses that clear documentation and disclosure of such interactions strengthens public trust and democratic accountability; stresses that lobbying should be transparent, with full disclosure of all parties involved; takes notes of the allegations that the Commission subsidises NGOs to influence Members of the European Parliament; stresses that, if their existence is confirmed, such practices could distort policy discussions and contravene the principle of separation of powers and should therefore be ended; calls on the ECA to audit the programmes concerned and give its recommendations; expects the future ECA report to bring clarity on these issues; recalls that the ECA asked, in special report 05/2024 [29], for more efforts to be made to improve checks on the ground; notes with concern the ECA’s observation that lobbyists can choose to which category they belong, regardless of their legal form, to avoid disclosing financial information; notes that the EU is one of the largest global funders of civil society organisations; underlines the need for the EU Transparency Register Secretariat to enhance its systematic checks of the self-declarations of entities declaring themselves to be ‘NGOs, platforms, networks and similar’; observes that such systematic checks could be based on a set of criteria, including non-profit status, objectives relating to public benefit, and independence, to strengthen the trust in all entities registered in the EU Transparency Register, and should be supported by robust requirements for accountability and transparency;

37. Considers that when assessing delivery models for EU expenditure, the susceptibility of the various options to fraud and other misuse should be taken into account; calls on the Commission to ensure that the lessons learnt from the design and implementation of the RRF, including the recommendations addressed to it by the ECA and Parliament, are taken into account in future EU funding instruments, notably the post-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF); underlines that the shortcomings identified in the implementation of the RRF, including risks of fraud, double funding, and lack of transparency, must serve as a lesson for future EU financial frameworks; opposes any replication of the RRF model in its current form and stresses that any future performance-based funding must be accompanied by significantly stronger safeguards, transparency requirements and fraud prevention mechanisms to ensure the sound management of EU funds;

NextGenerationEU (NGEU) and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)

38. Appreciates the efforts made by the Commission in the revision of the 27 recovery and resilience plans (RRPs) to adjust to the energy market disruptions following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; notes that the integration into the RRPs of REPowerEU is expected to contribute to reducing dependence on Russian fossil fuels and increasing European self-sufficiency;

39. Recalls, nevertheless, that delays can be observed in the implementation of the RRF and calls on the Commission to remain vigilant, in particular towards the end of the RRF life cycle, in order to ensure that Member States adequately protect the financial interests of the EU and that EU taxpayers’ money is spent appropriately;

40. Underlines the importance of robust management and control systems in preventing fraud as they have the effect of deterring criminals from attempting to defraud public authorities; expresses concerns about the ECA’s repeated observations pointing to persistent weaknesses in the implementation of Member State control systems, as this poses risks to the availability of complete and accurate data underlying payment requests, access to those requests for control purposes, and the effective functioning of Member State control systems to protect the EU’s financial interests; regrets that in several Member States, the control systems were not fully functional when the national RRPs started to be implemented, and underlines that such issues pose risks to the regularity of RRF payments and to the protection of the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to ensure that the Member States remedy the inadequacies identified in their control frameworks without delay, including by implementing the recommendations addressed to it by the ECA;

41. Observes that the Commission’s control framework for the RRF relies primarily on the responsibility of the Member States to protect the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to maintain a high level of attention to the fulfilment by the Member States of the specific audit and control milestones added to those RRPs which had lacked robustness and to continue efforts to close accountability gaps; takes notes of the actions launched by the Commission following the ECA’s recommendations on the identifiable weaknesses of some Member States’ control and reporting systems; urges the Commission to take decisive and swift action whenever necessary and to make full use of the provisions of the RRF Regulation if deficiencies persist in the control systems of Member States;

42. Notes with grave concern that ECA special report 14/2024 found that the climate impact of green spending under the RRF could have been overestimated by up to EUR 34.5 billion, with some projects having minimal impact on the energy transition or even causing environmental harm while also increasing the risk of fraud;

43. Calls for the establishment of clear, measurable criteria for green investments under the EU budget and the RRF to ensure that only projects with significant and proven environmental and economic benefits receive funding, thereby enhancing accountability and long-term sustainability while reducing the risk of fraud;

44. Observes that, for the RRF in 2023, the 2023 PIF Report indicates the number of cases of suspected fraud reported by the Commission (15) and the number of audits (13, compared with 16 carried out in 2022), but it does not include the concerningly high number of EPPO investigations (233 investigations referred to recovery and resilience programmes, with an estimated financial loss of EUR 1.86 billion); is concerned by a possible increase in the number of cases of fraud, corruption, double funding and conflicts of interest in the coming years and urges the Commission and the Member States to act swiftly in order to ensure the sound management and fair distribution of RRF funds;

45. Calls on the Commission to introduce mandatory fraud reporting via the IMS for all RRF-related cases, ensuring that irregularities and fraud affecting RRF funds are systematically recorded and monitored; notes with concern the lack of transparency in reporting fraud linked to RRF funds and insists that all Member States comply with standardised reporting obligations;

46. Asks OLAF to continue its risk analysis, which, in 2023, was made available to Member States along with an updated version of the ‘RRF risk framework’, and with the training and seminars for Member State authorities; endorses the use of the IMS for reporting RRF irregularities; reiterates its call on the Commission, on the specialised EU agencies and bodies, as well as on Member States, to actively cooperate and interact to ensure the protection of the EU’s financial interests when implementing the NGEU;

47. Observes that, as part of the Guidance on RRPs, the Commission has adopted [30] Annex IV on the framework for reduction and recoveries under the RRF; understands that the reduction of a payment is feasible when there are still payments to be effected; recalls that the RRF ends in 2026; points out that recovery is only to be launched whenever no further instalments remain; is concerned by the fact that this recovery procedure, borrowed from the model for implementing cohesion funds, has proved to be extremely ineffective and was abandoned in the current MFF; strongly regrets the fact that by the end of 2023 there were no recovery orders in ABAC concerning the RRF, and that there is still no obligation for Member States to report irregularities related to the RRF via the IMS;

48. Reiterates that transparency plays a vital role in exposing fraudulent schemes and discouraging fraudsters; reiterates its dissatisfaction with the interpretation endorsed by the Commission of the concept of ‘final recipient’ under the RRF; rejects the Commission’s incomplete and misleading interpretation [31]; remarks that, even according to the Commission guidelines [32], the ‘final recipient’ is the ‘last entity’ that receives funds for an RRF measure, and that any initial or intermediary recipient of funding, such as ministries or agencies operating merely as distributors of the funds, should not be considered to be the ‘last entity’; asks the Commission again to request that the Member States provide information on the ‘final recipient’ or ‘last entity’ and not to accept from Member States any information on ‘second-level recipients’ that is not in line with the agreement between the co-legislators; calls on the Commission to review its guidance by providing cases and examples that can clarify the provision and be a solid term of reference for the national authorities, in such a way as to endorse an adequate transparency level and a homogeneous interpretation across all the Member States; stresses that, should the Commission continue to refuse to ensure full transparency, Parliament must consider all available measures to enforce compliance;

49. Is concerned by the ECA’s opinion [33] on the increasing risk of EU funds being spent twice on the same measure and handed out twice for the same action; understands that corresponding measures in similar areas, such as transport and energy infrastructure, are financed from both the EU budget and the RRF, because the EU’s pandemic recovery fund finances actions similar to those covered by standard EU programmes; acknowledges that complementarity between the RRF and other EU instruments is allowed, but observes that this could result in delivering milestones that are fully financed by funds other than the RRF, because the RRF is not linked to the reimbursement of costs effectively incurred, but rather rewards the fulfilment of milestones and targets; emphasises that the several layers of governance, the fragmented IT landscape and the limited exchanges of data or use of data-mining tools such as ARACHNE, prevent the detection of double funding, and therefore the control mechanisms in place may be insufficient to properly mitigate this increased risk; maintains that the absence of direct access to the full list of RRF final recipients limits the Commission’s capacity to detect potential cases of double funding; believes that the precaution adopted by some Member States of avoiding combining the RRF with other EU instruments contributes to mitigating the risk of double funding; calls on the Commission to increase its controls in this regard;

50. Observes that Member States may include measures in their RRPs with no estimated costs or estimated costs of zero [34]; points out also that these ‘cost-free’ milestones are the main term of reference for assessing the correct use of RRF resources for their intended purposes; understands that the payments for these ‘cost-free’ or ‘zero-cost’ milestones are released following the milestones’ achievement, irrespective of the cost sustained, in line with the ‘financing not linked to cost’ approach under the RRF; observes, however, that such milestones make it impossible to verify the sound management of paid RRF resources, because such resources are disbursed in connection with a milestone for which they have not been deployed; calls on the Commission to reconsider its assumption that a ‘zero-cost’ measure cannot induce double funding, irrespective of whether other EU funds are used to implement it; strongly calls on the Commission to strengthen controls on ‘zero-cost’ measures and to give guidance to the Member States on how to address the financial design of the measures concerned in order to prevent such risk;

51. Reiterates its calls on the Commission to maintain adequate ex post audit procedures and to pay close attention to the risk of reversal after payment for the achievement of targets previously audited and assessed as satisfactorily fulfilled;

52. Follows up on the Ombudsman’s strategic initiative, launched in February 2022 and closed in September 2023, conducted on the transparency and accountability of the RRF, whose results it fully endorses; welcomes the ongoing dialogue between the Commission and the Ombudsman to address the suboptimal situations detected, in particular concerning the scoreboard and the proactive publication of documents related to the RRF;

Digitalisation and transparency to enhance the fight against fraud

53. Welcomes the political agreement reached on the proposed recast text of the Financial Regulation; believes that extending the scope of EDES to include shared management, and the adoption of a legal basis to use ARACHNE as a model for an EU-wide data-mining and risk-scoring tool, will strengthen the protection of the EU’s financial interests; recalls the calls made in previous reports to ensure that all Member States make use of data-mining tools, especially ARACHNE, to ensure timely and diligent reporting standards;

54. Shares the view that the IMS, the system through which Member States report to the Commission on irregularities and fraud affecting the EU budget, has potential for greater interoperability with other corporate tools of the Commission, such as ARACHNE and EDES, and with digital tools in Member States; asks to be informed, following the recast of the Financial Regulation, on the progress of the EDES-IMS interface and about the possible use of IMS data within the data-mining and risk-scoring tool (ARACHNE);

55. Reiterates its call for increased interoperability between data systems and for the harmonisation of reporting, monitoring and auditing in the Union; is aware of the crosscutting nature of interoperability and appreciates the adoption of the Interoperable Europe Act [35];

56. Underlines the findings of ECA Review 4/2023 of 6 July 2023 on digitalising the management of EU funds; recalls the positive effects of digitalisation on prevention and detection of fraud and irregularities, as well as on the management, control and auditing of EU funds, by allowing easier and quicker access to data and remote cross-checks, thereby limiting costs by reducing the need for controls and on-the-spot checks;

57. Recognises that taking advantage of a real-time and data-driven economy has significant benefits for the protection of the Union’s financial interests, while reducing the administrative burden on public authorities and businesses operating and trading across borders within the EU; calls for the EU and the Member States to improve the effectiveness of data sharing by creating a digital ecosystem allowing for the seamless, real-time and secure movement of standardised, structured and machine-readable data between businesses and public authorities, in particular national tax administrations, with a view to limiting possibilities for committing fraud and tax evasion;

58. Shares the view that digitalisation should be at the core of every anti-fraud strategy, and in particular that it should be integrated into national anti-fraud strategies to allow coordination between its constituent parts and for the threats posed by new technologies to be factored in;

59. Believes that digitalisation offers opportunities for tangible improvements to the governance of the anti-fraud network and that by facilitating communication and accessibility it helps to improve reporting, thereby allowing for a better understanding of the obstacles that persist and a more timely and comprehensive response by decision-makers and co-legislators; welcomes the fact that over half of the Member States have taken steps to identify and address skills gaps in digitalisation, in particular a lack of information and access to data on digitalisation; encourages the Member States and actors in the AFA to continue addressing skills gaps through measures involving, inter alia, knowledge sharing, training and the broadening of know-how and skills in the field of digitalisation;

60. Welcomes the efforts of many components of the AFA in assessing and further developing the options offered by AI and machine learning in identifying and detecting irregularities and pursuing efficiency gains in both analysis and classic administrative tasks; reiterates that human assessment must remain the pivotal characteristic of every process; adds that AI has the potential to be a game changer in the fight against fraud, allowing the rapid analysis of large data sets, as well as enhancing fraud detection and identification of fraud patterns; recalls that the successful use of AI relies on effective collaboration between all stakeholders and on the availability of high quality data, underpinned by the effective use of ARACHNE; urges the Commission to work towards developing AI in Europe so as to uphold data sovereignty and ensure robust data protection, aligning with the principles outlined in the AI Act [36] and the General Data Protection Regulation [37] (GDPR); calls on all anti-fraud actors to strengthen their cooperation to leverage the use of AI effectively and responsibly in the fight against fraud;

61. Recognises the growing risk of AI-generated content being used to manipulate procurement processes, financial transactions and evidence in fraud investigations; calls on the Commission to prioritise research and policy measures to combat fraudulent activities enabled by artificial intelligence, including deepfake technology and AI-driven disinformation campaigns that could compromise financial and anti-fraud mechanisms; calls on the Commission to propose stricter legal provisions and penalties for entities found to be using AI to commit or facilitate financial fraud, including AI-driven money laundering schemes, falsification of contracts, and digital identity theft in procurement processes;

62. Acknowledges the importance of the use of AI to make improvements in the quality and completeness of data exchanged with Member States; welcomes, in this regard, OLAF’s actions, including recommendations in the annual PIF reports, structured bilateral dialogues with Member States, the revision of the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy action plan, and interinstitutional exchanges focusing on these matters;

63. Further calls for a dedicated EU-wide initiative to develop AI-driven fraud detection mechanisms within OLAF, the EPPO, and Europol, to increase efficiency in tracking and preventing financial crimes against the EU budget; recommends the establishment of an EU-wide task force composed of representatives from OLAF, the EPPO, Europol and national anti-fraud units, with a dedicated focus on digital fraud threats, including deepfake technology, AI-generated fake documents and synthetic identity fraud; underlines that this task force should develop and share best practices with the Member States;

64. Stresses the need for increased cross-border cooperation and data-sharing mechanisms between Member States to combat AI-enabled fraud, particularly in high-risk areas such as VAT, customs and financial aid distribution; encourages the creation of a joint EU intelligence hub to track fraudulent AI activity in real time; calls on the Commission and the Member States to integrate AI and data analytics into fraud detection systems, ensuring interoperability between national and EU-level databases while maintaining strong data protection safeguards;

65. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to implement strict transparency and audit measures in AI-based fraud detection tools to prevent bias, algorithmic manipulation and misuse in financial oversight systems; urges the development of AI ethics guidelines for anti-fraud institutions to ensure accountability;

66. Calls for a mandatory forensic verification process for all digital evidence submitted in financial fraud cases, ensuring the authenticity of documents and audio and video material used in investigations;

The internal layer of the EU’s AFA – 2023 key measures at EU level

67. Underlines the fact that the EU’s AFA is a composite institutional architecture designed to detect, prevent and combat fraud and other forms of misconduct affecting the EU’s financial interests, built on a multi-layered network of cooperation in which the first layer (OLAF, the EPPO, Europol, Eurojust, AMLA, the Commission, the ECA and the European Investment Bank (EIB)) is grounded on horizontal cooperation between the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, while the other layers are based on vertical relationships between EU and national authorities, and between EU authorities and international organisations; points out that the AFA has evolved over the years through a series of separate decisions that have led to an innovative network of entities; underlines that their coordinated activities in recent years have generated valuable experience that should be considered in the future revision of the relevant regulations; stresses that with the creation of the EPPO, the first European prosecutorial authority was established, enabling prompt and direct criminal law investigations and prosecutions, and that the lessons learnt in the first years of its operational activity need to be adequately integrated in the legislative framework to be able to take full advantage of the available tools and resources; stresses the importance of clear mandates between the various EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies in order to minimise the risk of overlaps and duplication and thereby ensure the efficiency of the functioning of the AFA;

68. Appreciates the integration in the 2023 PIF Report of the main administrative and judicial results achieved by OLAF and the EPPO, respectively, which follows the many calls from Parliament for more comprehensive reporting of the actions carried out by the components of the AFA; considers, however, that the differences in nature, scope and granularity between the two reports should be addressed and that the areas of cooperation should be indicated clearly; deems the differences in the figures provided by OLAF, the EPPO and the 2023 PIF Report to be justified in the current circumstances; highlights that reporting bodies in the Member States may report on criminal investigations only when the relevant judicial authorities grant the authorisation for them to do so, and this implies that while the EPPO and OLAF report data on active investigations, the reporting bodies are often unable to enter these details in the IMS database because of the need to protect confidentiality and ensure the proper conduct of investigations; understands that these cases result in a divergence in the data (‘delta’) that can only be eliminated when the investigations are completed and the relevant data are included in the reporting to the Commission so they can be included in a future PIF Report;

69. Welcomes the adoption by the Commission, in May 2023, of a package of anti-corruption measures which encompasses a proposal for a directive on combating corruption; believes that prevention and prosecution of corruption need to be stepped up and calls on the Commission to intensify the monitoring of the enforcement of measures in the Member States;

70. Welcomes the establishment of a network against corruption, which met for the first time on 20 September 2023, believes that the mapping of areas at a high-risk of corruption could contribute effectively to the further development of the EU anti-corruption strategy;

71. Underlines the importance of the rule of law as one of the fundamental values of the Union and stresses that the rule of law conditionality mechanism is crucial in order to ensure that Member States continue to respect rule of law principles; reiterates its deep concern regarding the situation concerning the rule of law in certain Member States, which is deeply worrying in its own right and can lead to serious losses for the Union budget; calls on the Commission to ensure the strict and fast implementation of all elements of the mechanism when Member States breach rule of law principles and when this affects, or risks affecting, EU financial interests; further insists on the need for coherence across various instruments when assessing the rule of law situation in Member States;

72. Notes that the fourth Commission Report 2023 on the rule of law, adopted in February 2024, provides a follow-up to the recommendations issued in the previous year’s Rule of Law Report; acknowledges that, in the fight against corruption, various Member States have updated or launched a revision of their national strategies and/or action plans, while others have reformed criminal law to strengthen the fight against corruption; observes that for many Member States the main obstacle to the fight against corruption is the limited resources of prosecution services; calls on the Commission to continue encouraging and supporting the efforts of Member States to reform and improve the efficacy of criminal proceedings and addressing the other challenges identified in the report; reminds the Commission of the effective tools at its disposal to safeguard the rule of law, such as infringement procedures, funding conditionality and the Article 7 TEU procedures, and expects it to make full use of them all; highlights, in this regard, that the new Financial Regulation introduces conditionality linked to the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU and calls on the Commission to start applying it, particularly in cases where infringement procedures have already been launched against a Member State for violations of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, as this constitutes a clear recognition of an ongoing breach that could also impact the sound financial management of the Union budget;

73. Takes note of the Commission’s decision not to lift the measure under Article 2(2) of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary [38]; expects the Commission and the Council to lift the adopted measures only where evidence is collected that the remedial measures adopted by the Hungarian Government have proven effective in practice and, in particular, that no regression has been detected on already adopted measures; condemns the threats, such as espionage, to which EU institution staff are exposed, such as OLAF staff during their investigative missions in Hungary; stresses that such actions gravely undermine the rule of law and the integrity of the EU institutions; calls for the swift establishment of robust protection measures to safeguard EU institution staff on missions; calls on the Hungarian authorities to take immediate and concrete steps to safeguard judicial independence, uphold media freedom and fully implement the recommendations of the Commission’s Rule of Law Report to restore democratic checks and balances; urges the Council to continue the Article 7 TEU procedure against the Hungarian Government;

74. Emphasises that respect for the rule of law, including the fight against corruption, is a key determinant of the single market environment that fosters investment, growth, jobs and innovation, and protects small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and economic operators operating across borders; stresses that the Commission is accountable for rigorous verification, as a condition for disbursing funding, of the fulfilment of the rule of law-related milestones integrated in the various Member State RRPs; recalls that the Commissioner for democracy, justice and rule of law, working in close coordination with the recently appointed Commissioner on budget, anti-fraud and public administration, holds primary responsibility for the full application of the general regime of conditionality; calls on the Commission not to use ‘dialogue’ with Member States or the ‘pilot’ procedure as an open-ended means to avoid launching actual infringement procedures; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to prioritise horizontally infringements affecting the EU’s financial interests, in particular regarding the PIF Directive and the EPPO Regulation [39]; welcomes the statement in the Commission Political Guidelines on the importance of the rule of law for EU funds and the commitment by the Commissioner for budget, anti-fraud and public administration to introduce strong safeguards on the rule of law in the next MFF;

75. Considers that the protection of the common EU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU currently included in the Common Provisions Regulation needs to be further strengthened; calls on the Commission to explore how a mechanism equivalent to the horizontal enabling conditions could be developed as a general feature in all areas of the EU budget, with a view to linking a wider range of policies to all the values set out in Article 2 TEU; calls on the Commission to explore means of linking funding to rule of law conditions and the completion of necessary reforms in order to ensure a comprehensive approach, applied horizontally to all EU funds; calls on the Commission to pursue a comprehensive approach and to put forward proposals for further strengthening the Union’s rule of law toolbox as a priority, including strengthened rule of law conditionality for funds deployed in the current programming period;

76. Maintains that corruption is intrinsically linked to money laundering, and that money laundering is one of the most important enablers of illegal activities by organised criminals, as it allows them to transfer the proceeds of their crime into the legal economy; recognises that the heterogeneous national legal systems and fragmented application of the Union’s anti-money laundering framework have made it difficult to prevent, detect and counter money laundering; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the ambitious legislative package on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, which will unify national rules and thus enhance the collective fight against money laundering across the Union; welcomes the establishment of the new Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA); considers that the new agency will play a central role in the new anti-money laundering framework through its coordinating and supervisory responsibilities; recalls that money laundering and terrorist financing are intrinsically linked and calls for the EPPO, OLAF and the ECA to have a stronger role in countering these phenomena;

77. Shares the view that the protection of the EU’s financial interests has been strengthened by the recast Financial Regulation; points out that the scope of EDES has been extended to encompass shared and direct management and provide new grounds for exclusion; welcomes the introduction of a legal basis for a risk-scoring and data-mining tool to be used by all Member States and in all management modes; regrets that both these measures will enter into force only in 2028 and only from the next MFF, resulting in several more years without comprehensive transparency regarding the final recipients of EU funds and missing a crucial opportunity to use these data to strengthen safeguards against corruption and fraud;

78. Appreciates the adoption of an updated action plan [40] for the 2019 Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy; notes that it includes 44 actions distributed over seven themes covering, in particular, digitalisation, cooperation, the RRF, customs fraud, and awareness-raising in ethical and anti-fraud culture matters;

79. Points out that the EU’s anti-fraud programme (UAFP) is the only spending programme specifically dedicated to fighting fraud affecting the EU’s financial interests and that it provides relevant support to all Member States’ authorities as components of the external layer of the AFA, in order to strengthen the fight against fraud; observes that the UAFP has the flexibility needed to adapt to the constantly changing anti-fraud landscape and is aligned with the seven-year period (2021-2027) of the current MFF; notes that, so far, 55 % of the total implementation of the UAFP has contributed to the digital transition;

80. Calls on the Commission to build on the success of the UAFP and encourages the Commissioner on budget and anti-fraud to consider the UAFP as a model to be extended in the next MFF, in line with the task, indicated in the mission letter, of securing support for Member States’ efforts to protect the Union’s financial interests;

81. Welcomes the first UAFP association request received in 2023 from a non-EU country, namely Ukraine, with which an association agreement covering its participation in the programme has been negotiated and was adopted in March 2024;

82. Expresses concern that the Commission’s latest interim evaluation of Hercule III found aspects that may have hampered the programme’s effectiveness, notably that certain Member States’ administrations lacked the resources to enable them to cope with the programme’s administrative requirements;

83. Takes note of the reiterated calls from the EPPO to bolster the detection capacity of the relevant components of the AFA, and recalls that, in line with the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy, emphasis is to be given to data analysis as a tool for detecting fraud; highlights, in this regard, the importance of harmonising definitions in order to obtain comparable data across the EU; encourages the Commission to strengthen the use of the IMS as a tool to support auditors’ risk analysis when preparing audit activities; invites OLAF to increase its training offer to Commission staff, including auditors and relevant actors in the financial flow circuit;

84. Is aware that the decentralised structure of the EPPO entails an interplay between national law and EU law and between national authorities and the EPPO; understands that the EPPO operates based on the directly applicable EU regulations but that it also requires adequate implementing measures to be adopted via national legislation transposing the PIF Directive and other relevant Union acts; calls on the Commission to ensure that national legislation is fully in line with the EPPO Regulation and the PIF Directive, launch infringement proceedings and propose the revision of these legal acts in order to make the EPPO more effective in the exercise of its mandate;

85. Notes the results of the Compliance assessment of measures adopted by the Member States to adapt their systems to the EPPO Regulation [41], which was presented in September 2023; regrets that many situations are still suboptimal and need to be addressed because they weaken the effectiveness of the protection of the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal investigations; refers, in particular, to the attribution of competence between national prosecution services and the EPPO; stresses also that the EPPO Regulation stipulates the reporting of possible EPPO cases directly and without undue delay; calls on the Commission to verify and monitor Member States’ full compliance with the EPPO Regulation and their prompt reporting of suspicions of fraud in areas within the EPPO’s competence directly to it;

86. Is concerned that in many Member States the designated national authority deciding on disagreements between the EPPO and national authorities on the competence for prosecuting a case is not a ‘court’ or a ‘tribunal’; calls on the Commission to verify and monitor whether Member States are fully complying with Article 25(6) and Article 42(2)(c) of the EPPO Regulation, which requires the possibility of an appeal to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) against a decision by a national authority on the attribution of competence;

87. Stresses that the current control by national authorities over the ‘necessary’ resources and equipment of the European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs) and the need to refer to the national authorities’ provisions for ‘adequate arrangements’ on social security, pensions and insurance coverage could constrain the autonomy and independence of the EPPO’s actions; calls on the Commission to propose adequate solutions in the forthcoming revision of the EPPO Regulation;

88. Points out that the transposition of the PIF Directive differs between Member States, which, in some cases, affects the cross-border exercise of EPPO competences; calls on the Commission to ensure proper implementation of the PIF Directive and to propose its revision, based on the experience gathered;

89. Underlines that Article 25(3) of the EPPO Regulation, which elaborates on the exercise of the EPPO’s competence in the event of non-PIF offences inextricably linked to PIF offences, raises legal and practical questions and requires further streamlining in order to make effective use of the EPPO’s legal framework; calls on the Commission to propose suitable solutions in the forthcoming revision of the EPPO Regulation in order to reinforce the EPPO’s ability to investigate cross-border organised crime;

90. Reiterates [42] that the EPPO has an important role in safeguarding the rule of law and in combating corruption in the Union, and encourages the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO in the rule of law reports; welcomes the accession of Poland and Sweden to the EPPO; notes with approval Ireland’s recent announcement of its intention to participate; calls on the Government of Hungary, the sole remaining Member State that has not yet joined the EPPO, despite the absence of any legal or constitutional impediment, to join the EPPO without further delay; recalls that broad public support for Hungary’s accession has been demonstrated by the collection of 680 000 signatures in favour of joining the EPPO, underscoring a strong societal demand for enhanced legal safeguards against fraud and corruption affecting the Union’s financial interests;

91. Reiterates its call for the launch of an exchange of views on the possible clarification of the competence of the EPPO within its mandate, as defined in the Treaty, as regards protecting the financial interests of the Union;

92. Notes that in 2023, cooperation between the relevant actors increased, with the EPPO and Eurojust cooperating on 26 ongoing cases at the end of 2023; observes that also in 2023 the EPPO and Europol cooperated efficiently on various operational matters, and understands that this cooperation almost doubled in 2023, with Europol providing support on 47 cases upon the EPPO’s request; calls on the Commission to request that the EPPO and Eurojust specify the efficiency criteria on the basis of which they conduct their activities;

93. Welcomes the efforts by OLAF and the EPPO to strengthen their cooperation; understands that information is being exchanged between the two offices in order to avoid parallel investigations into the same matters, and that, in 2023, 22 complementary investigations were opened by OLAF and four supporting investigations were requested by the EPPO; is aware that the synergies resulting from the use of complementary investigations (ex Article 12(f) of the OLAF Regulation) and investigations in support (ex Article 12(e) of the OLAF Regulation) are suboptimal; calls on the Commission to address the legal and operational causes of this when reviewing its regulations;

94. Is concerned about the lack of analysis and accurate information on the recoveries to the benefit of the Union’s budget that should follow both OLAF and EPPO investigations; is aware that the impact of the AFA on the security of citizens and on the enforcement of the rule of law in the Union goes beyond the quantification of financial recoveries alone; stresses, however, that the results of the efforts made to create the AFA should tend towards measurability and be tangible at least as regards the budgetary aspects; emphasises that the impact of the activities implemented for the protection of the Union’s financial interests should be assessed and taken into consideration in the allocation of resources and definition of mandates;

95. Understands that the Commission has yet to provide data on the recoveries to the benefit of the Union budget following the EPPO activities reported to the Commission, as provided by Article 103(2) of the EPPO Regulation, and that this matter is included in the mission letter of the Commissioner for budget, anti-fraud and public administration; observes that the freezing of assets is essential to combat crime affecting the EU budget and that a certain amount of time is needed for freezing to be converted into actual confiscations and recoveries; highlights that the amount confiscated is not expected to return by default to the Union’s budget; notes that, in line with Article 38 of the EPPO Regulation, the potential revenue resulting from seizure and confiscation measures taken by EDPs in Member States should flow back into the EU budget and could be accounted for in the EU budget as non-assigned revenue; calls on the Commission to make the necessary arrangements with the relevant national authorities to allow these sums to enter the EU budget;

96. Points out that data on effective recoveries following OLAF financial recommendations are not published in the OLAF Annual Report or in any other official report from the Commission; regrets that only aggregated data are made available and they refer to 2 299 financial recommendations issued by OLAF between 2012 and 2023 for an overall amount of about EUR 9 billion; remarks that the analysis of the available figures suggests considerable room for improvement; observes that a large gap exists between the amounts recommended for recovery by OLAF, the amount established as recoverable by the Commission’s services and the amount eventually effectively recovered; is concerned by the low recovery rates for undue expenditure (for activities implemented under shared and indirect management modes the rate is 34 % and 11 %, respectively, and for recovery under direct management only 22 %); calls on the Commission to provide data with adequate granularity on recovery and to assess the reasons behind the recovery gap; stresses the need for OLAF and the Commission to agree upon, and apply consistently, common evaluation criteria that ensure greater convergence and clarity, thereby improving the efficiency and effectiveness of financial recovery assessment; emphasises that recovery following an OLAF recommendation and the EPPO’s investigations is an important measurement of the efficiency of the AFA and calls for more transparency in this regard;

The external layer of the EU’s AFA – key measures at national level in 2023

97. Understands that the overall level of implementation by the Member States of the Commission’s recommendations issued in the 2022 PIF Report is considered satisfactory; highlights, however, that significant differences between Member States persist; is concerned, in particular, by the cases of inadequate reporting of irregularities by some Member States via the IMS; recalls that reporting is mandatory under the current regulations and encourages OLAF to strengthen its oversight and monitoring actions with a view to achieving uniform reporting across the Union;

98. Calls on the Commission to monitor the comprehensiveness of the reporting in IMS by countries benefiting from pre-accession assistance and welcomes the initiatives of the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations to enforce candidate countries’ obligations to report irregularities in the IMS on a regular basis;

99. Encourages the Member States to report in the IMS the irregularities related to the RRF, in line with the ECA recommendations; calls on the Commission to facilitate such use of the IMS by the Member States by providing support in the form of training, seminars and exchange of best practices;

100. Welcomes the participation of Sweden and Poland in the EPPO, decided on in 2024, as well as the objective of the new Irish Government to join the EPPO; insists that Member States that are not yet participating must do so without delay and calls on the Commission to incentivise participation in the EPPO through positive measures;

101. Reiterates that Member States’ ineffective, untimely or lack of cooperation with the EPPO and OLAF constitute grounds for action under the Conditionality Regulation; calls on the Commission to take into due consideration all information from the EPPO and OLAF on situations where Member States fail to comply with their obligations;

102. Maintains that National Anti-Fraud Strategies (NAFS) are the most effective tool for coordination between the various national, regional and sectoral authorities and the many local entities entrusted with the tasks into which the anti-fraud cycle is organised; notes that, in 2023, 21 out of 27 Member States reported having an anti-fraud strategy; observes that out of 21, only 10 Member States had a full national anti-fraud strategy [43] while 11 Member States had only sectoral rather than national anti-fraud strategies in place; recognises that the approach taken by Member States in their anti-fraud strategies today varies widely; regrets that six Member States do not have any anti-fraud strategy at all; strongly regrets this highly unsatisfactory situation, which compromises the integrity of EU spending and undermines citizens’ trust in EU institutions;

103. Maintains that Member States would benefit from a periodic evaluation of their anti-fraud frameworks; calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to run independent or peer reviews of their anti-fraud frameworks to enhance consistency and pursue high standards;

104. Encourages the Commission to propose enforceable initiatives to clarify the relationship and consider establishing a link between the adoption of NAFS by the Member States and the level of financial support they receive;

105. Asks the Commission to launch, in preparation for the revision of the OLAF Regulation, a monitoring exercise on the state of play of the Anti-Fraud Coordination Services (AFCOS) established in the Member States; encourages the Commission to plan for the update and redesign of their structure, role, responsibilities and mandate; regrets the suboptimal staffing level across the majority of the AFCOS in the Member States; underlines the need to ensure sufficient levels of expertise among staff in national anti-fraud coordinating structures; calls on the Commission to encourage and support Member States in addressing these issues as a matter of priority, including in the context of the European Semester cycle;

106. Underlines the role played by public authorities in fostering a zero-tolerance culture against fraud and stresses, in particular, the importance of fraud prevention to ensure that fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and other misuse of funds do not occur in the first place; recalls that the correct transposition of the PIF Directive, adopted on 5 July 2017, is crucial for the protection of the Union budget, for the implementation of all the EU policies for which EU money is used, including in the context of RRF deployment, and for establishing the scope of investigations and prosecutions by the EPPO, whose competence is established by reference to the PIF Directive, as implemented by national law; expects national authorities, including governments, in all Member States unequivocally to condemn fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and any other misuse of public funds, taking a proactive approach in protecting the financial interests of the Union through effective measures in areas including risk assessment, communication and information sharing, and training of staff; calls on the Commission to intervene in a timely manner through infringement procedures to ensure the consistent transposition of the PIF Directive and the effective liability of – and sanctions for – legal and natural persons;

107. Reiterates that whistleblowers play a key role in boosting fraud detection, investigation and prosecution; understands that, by the end of 2023, 24 Member States had adopted national legislation to transpose the Whistleblower Directive and declared their transposition complete; regrets, however, that in March 2023, after analysis of the national measures adopted, the Commission was obliged to refer six Member States to the CJEU for their failure to transpose the Directive and failure to notify transposition measures, asking the Court to impose financial sanctions; is concerned by the further infringement proceedings [44] ongoing against six other Member States; calls on the Commission to intensify the monitoring of national transposition measures and report to Parliament accordingly; stresses that Parliament itself must also urgently ensure the proper transposition of the Directive, as confirmed by the CJEU ruling of 11 September 2024, which found that Parliament’s current framework fails to provide balanced and effective protection against retaliation; calls for Parliament to immediately adopt robust rules in line with the Directive to safeguard its own whistleblowers;

108. Notes that the Investigative Division of the European Investment Bank (EIB IG/IN) had made 10 referrals to the EPPO and 17 to OLAF by the end of 2023; is aware that entities which have been found by EIB IG/IN to engage in prohibited practices may be excluded, in other words declared ineligible, for a stated period, from being awarded any contracts or entering into any relationship with the EIB; observes that, in 2023, these exclusion proceedings resulted in the exclusion of five economic operators for a minimum duration of three years, while five other companies reached settlement agreements applying conditionality to their eligibility;

External dimension of the protection of the EU’s financial interests

109. Welcomes the Commission’s reaction to its call to increase the monitoring of, and control over, the funds under the Global Europe, Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument for assistance to non-EU countries, as well as via the joint communication with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy [45]; appreciates the Commission’s continuous efforts to ensure that anti-corruption measures are mainstreamed into EU external action instruments; reiterates its recommendation to suspend budgetary support and de-commit funds to non-EU countries, including candidate countries, where the authorities clearly fail to take genuine action against widespread corruption, without compromising support for the civil population; emphasises that respect for and commitment to promoting EU values is an essential precondition for all partners aspiring to join the Union; reiterates that accession to the EU is a merit-based process whereby each applicant is assessed on its own merits and its fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria; considers that when applying the revised enlargement methodology there should be a particular focus on fundamental reforms, and that fair and rigorous conditionality should be applied as well as reversibility where setbacks occur; considers that appropriate tools must be used to ensure that candidate countries show concrete and sustainable compliance with the rule of law, democratic principles and fundamental rights, both before and after joining the Union;

110. Observes that in the context of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, Ukraine will continue to require substantial support in the current and next MFF and, in the perspective of a fair and sustainable peace agreement, Ukraine will need support for post-war reconstruction, including for central government services and reforms;

111. Considers that the three pillars of the Ukraine Facility could be reshaped accordingly and that reconstruction should align with pre-accession requirements; emphasises the importance of close coordination and cooperation with the Ukraine coordination mechanism established by the G7; calls for the EU and all Member States to increase their support for Ukraine, while putting appropriate measures in place to protect the financial interests of the EU through the prevention, detection and correction of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities in the use of Union funds, including by performing more thorough checks, in order to ensure that EU funds sent to Ukraine and to its neighbouring countries are adequately monitored and controlled and end up benefiting those most in need;

112. Stresses that the unprecedented volume of financial support received by Ukraine from the EU in recent years, and deployed in the extremely adverse conditions imposed by the ongoing war, imply the adoption of appropriate measures to ensure that such resources are employed as intended, in particular where they are aimed at benefiting infrastructure and people in need;

113. Appreciates the work carried out by OLAF and the EPPO in protecting the financial interests of the Union by providing training to increase administrative capacity and autonomy, carrying out investigations in Ukraine and agreeing on the working arrangement with the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine to facilitate cooperation in the investigation of corruption; invites the competent EU offices to continue their cooperation with and support for the Ukrainian authorities;

114. Acknowledges, in this regard, the progress made by Ukraine in advancing reforms related to judicial independence, accountability, anti-corruption and anti-money laundering, despite the difficult conditions caused by Russia’s ongoing war of aggression; encourages Ukraine to continue on the path of reform, including with regard to the influence of oligarchs in politics;

115. Welcomes the enhanced sanctions adopted by the EU against Russia so far, encompassing the banning of Russian nationals and entities from participating in public procurement contracts in the EU and restrictions on EU funding for Russian publicly owned or controlled entities; recognises, however, that despite the current measures, individuals and entities subject to the sanctions against Russia can still find ways to circumvent the sanctions and calls, therefore, for the EU and the Member States to maintain, reinforce and extend the scope and effectiveness of the sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus;

116. Recognises that the Member States and their relevant competent authorities are responsible for the effective implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions, as well as for identifying breaches and imposing appropriate penalties; underlines the role played by customs authorities and the importance of their close cooperation in strengthening the uniform enforcement of sanctions; welcomes, in this regard, the Baltic Customs Initiative;

117. Underlines that the EU is the biggest provider of external assistance to Palestinian refugees; stresses that the Union budget must continue to provide support to build peace and stability in the Middle East region, combat terrorism, hate, fundamentalism and disinformation, as well as promote human rights, fight impunity and strengthen adherence to the rule of law; emphasises, accordingly, that EU budgets must not support, under any circumstances, activities that go against these objectives; notes that, following the heinous terror attacks of 7 October 2023 by Hamas and allegations of misuse of EU funds for terrorism, a funding review has been conducted by the Commission, which, although concluding that no evidence has been found, to date, that money had been diverted for unintended purposes (including for support for incarcerated terrorists) and reporting that the safeguards in place worked well, still called for certain additional measures that were deemed necessary; recalls that all hostages taken by Hamas have to be released; emphasises the importance of ensuring that EU funds are effectively allocated and managed in order to achieve their intended goals, even via scrutiny by the EPPO, OLAF and the ECA where appropriate; recalls the ongoing issue of the destruction of EU-funded projects in Gaza and the West Bank and calls for greater accountability and safeguards in this context;

118. Stresses that suspension of budgetary support in non-EU countries, including candidate countries, is an appropriate measure in the event of failure to take genuine action against widespread corruption; expects priority to be given to the fight against corruption in pre-accession negotiations, with capacity building via the establishment of specialised anti-corruption bodies; asks the Commission to ensure, also in cases where funding is suspended, assistance for civil populations, where possible through alternative channels;

119. Underlines the importance of cooperation with international organisations in combating fraud; regrets the lack of cooperation by some international organisations in providing the ECA with complete, unlimited and timely access to the documents necessary to carry out its tasks; notes that the Commission has stepped up communication with international organisations and calls on it to further intensify efforts to ensure access to all requested documentation;

°

° °

120. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Hamas sympathisers – E-001443/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-001443/2025
to the Council
Rule 144
Moritz Körner (Renew)

1.Does the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator have an estimate of how many Hamas sympathisers are currently residing in the EU? If so, how many are there, and if not, why not?

2.Since Hamas’ attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, there have been pro-Palestinian demonstrations in many EU Member States. Does the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator know where the financial support for these demonstrations stems from? If not, why not?

Submitted: 9.4.2025
Last updated: 23 April 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: Director of Kansas City Bureau of Investigation Describes Role of JTTF

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (video statements)

Tony Mattivi, director of the Kansas City Bureau of Investigation, describes the role of FBI Kansas City’s Joint Terrorism Task Force.

More at: https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/celebrating-45-years-of-fbi-joint-terrorism-task-forces
—————————————————
Subscribe to Inside the FBI wherever you get your podcasts:
Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4H2d3cg…
Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast…
Google Podcasts: https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0…
More ways to follow us: https://inside-the-fbi.transistor.fm/…

Follow us on social media:
X: https://twitter.com/fbi
Facebook: https://facebook.com/FBI
Instagram: https://instagram.com/fbi
YouTube: youtube.com/user/fbi

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2wPMzFd-omU

MIL OSI Video –

April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: Retired Special Agent Describes Role of FBI Kansas City JTTF

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (video statements)

Retired Special Agent Dana Kreeger, who served on the Kansas City Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), describes the role of the JTTF.

More at: https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/celebrating-45-years-of-fbi-joint-terrorism-task-forces
—————————————————
Subscribe to Inside the FBI wherever you get your podcasts:
Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4H2d3cg…
Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast…
Google Podcasts: https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0…
More ways to follow us: https://inside-the-fbi.transistor.fm/…

Follow us on social media:
X: https://twitter.com/fbi
Facebook: https://facebook.com/FBI
Instagram: https://instagram.com/fbi
YouTube: youtube.com/user/fbi

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H5LMzXMc42c

MIL OSI Video –

April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: Kansas City Detective Describes Role of FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (video statements)

Vince Kingston, a detective of the Kansas City, Kansas Police Department and a task force officer on the FBI Kansas City Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), describes the role of the JTTF.

More at: https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/celebrating-45-years-of-fbi-joint-terrorism-task-forces
—————————————————
Subscribe to Inside the FBI wherever you get your podcasts:
Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4H2d3cg…
Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast…
Google Podcasts: https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0…
More ways to follow us: https://inside-the-fbi.transistor.fm/…

Follow us on social media:
X: https://twitter.com/fbi
Facebook: https://facebook.com/FBI
Instagram: https://instagram.com/fbi
YouTube: youtube.com/user/fbi

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9tqHVmnbC4g

MIL OSI Video –

April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: Special Agent Jake Foiles Discusses Role of Joint Terrorism Task Force

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (video statements)

Special Agent Jake Foiles, supervisor of the FBI Kansas City Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) discusses the role of the JTTF.

More at: https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/celebrating-45-years-of-fbi-joint-terrorism-task-forces
—————————————————
Subscribe to Inside the FBI wherever you get your podcasts:
Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4H2d3cg…
Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast…
Google Podcasts: https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0…
More ways to follow us: https://inside-the-fbi.transistor.fm/…

Follow us on social media:
X: https://twitter.com/fbi
Facebook: https://facebook.com/FBI
Instagram: https://instagram.com/fbi
YouTube: youtube.com/user/fbi

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UpmQpIoxn2w

MIL OSI Video –

April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: Retired Detective Barry Berglund Describes Role of FBI Kansas City JTTF

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (video statements)

Barry Berglund, a retired detective of the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department and a task force officer on the FBI Kansas City Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), describes the role of the JTTF.

More at: https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/celebrating-45-years-of-fbi-joint-terrorism-task-forces
—————————————————
Subscribe to Inside the FBI wherever you get your podcasts:
Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4H2d3cg…
Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast…
Google Podcasts: https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0…
More ways to follow us: https://inside-the-fbi.transistor.fm/…

Follow us on social media:
X: https://twitter.com/fbi
Facebook: https://facebook.com/FBI
Instagram: https://instagram.com/fbi
YouTube: youtube.com/user/fbi

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ConL7d3Ukg8

MIL OSI Video –

April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Australia: Somalia

Source:

We’ve reviewed our advice and continue to advise do not travel to Somalia. Terrorist attacks occur frequently. The UK and US Embassies in Somalia issue frequent security alerts about potential imminent terrorist attacks.

If you’re in Somalia, leave as soon as possible. If, despite our advice you decide to stay, get professional security advice. There are no Australian officials in Somalia and our ability to provide consular assistance is severely limited.

MIL OSI News –

April 23, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Cantwell Statement on Terrorist Attack in Jammu and Pahalgam

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Washington Maria Cantwell

04.22.25

Cantwell Statement on Terrorist Attack in Jammu and Pahalgam

EDMONDS, WA – Today, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA) released the following statement on the fatal terrorist attack in Jammu and Pahalgam:

“I am deeply saddened by the senseless acts of violence and the loss of innocent lives caused by the terrorist attack in Jammu and Pahalgam. The victims, their families, and all those affected are in the thoughts and prayers of the American people. We stand united with India in condemning such acts of terror,” Sen. Cantwell said.

MIL OSI USA News –

April 23, 2025

MIL-OSI: Baker Hughes Company Announces First-Quarter 2025 Results

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

First-quarter highlights

Orders of $6.5 billion, including $3.2 billion of IET orders.
RPO of $33.2 billion, including record IET RPO of $30.4 billion.
Revenue of $6.4 billion, consistent year-over-year.
Attributable net income of $402 million.
GAAP diluted EPS of $0.40 and adjusted diluted EPS* of $0.51.
Adjusted EBITDA* of $1,037 million, up 10% year-over-year.
Cash flows from operating activities of $709 million and free cash flow* of $454 million.
Returns to shareholders of $417 million, including $188 million of share repurchases.

HOUSTON and LONDON, April 22, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Baker Hughes Company (Nasdaq: BKR) (“Baker Hughes” or the “Company”) announced results today for the first quarter of 2025.

“Baker Hughes started the year strong, building on the positive momentum from 2024 and setting multiple first-quarter records. Our continued transformation initiatives and strong execution continue to drive structural margin improvement across both segments. The operational transformation and streamlining efforts have created a solid foundation to optimize margins and enhance returns, even in a challenging environment,” said Lorenzo Simonelli, Baker Hughes chairman and chief executive officer.

“In our IET segment, we booked $3.2 billion of orders, including our first data center awards, totaling more than 350 MW of power solutions for this rapidly evolving market. In addition to expanding opportunities for data centers, we have a strong pipeline of LNG, FPSO and gas infrastructure projects that support our order outlook for this year.”

“In OFSE, EBITDA remained resilient as our margins saw noticeable improvement compared to last year even while segment revenue fell. This is a testament to the team’s hard work in changing the way the business operates.”

“Although our outlook is tempered by broader macro and trade policy uncertainty, we remain confident in our strategy and the resilience of our portfolio. We believe Baker Hughes is well positioned to navigate near-term challenges and deliver sustainable growth in shareholder value.”

“I want to thank our employees, whose hard work, dedication and focus have been instrumental to the continued success of Baker Hughes. As we continue to execute our strategy amidst an uncertain macro backdrop, we remain committed to our customers, shareholders and employees,” concluded Simonelli.

* Non-GAAP measure. See reconciliations in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

	Three Months Ended						Variance
(in millions except per share amounts)	March 31, 2025		December 31, 2024		March 31, 2024		Sequential		Year-over- year
Orders	$	6,459	$	7,496	$	6,542	(14	%)	(1	%)
Revenue		6,427		7,364		6,418	(13	%)	—	%
Net income attributable to Baker Hughes		402		1,179		455	(66	%)	(12	%)
Adjusted net income attributable to Baker Hughes*		509		694		429	(27	%)	19	%
Adjusted EBITDA*		1,037		1,310		943	(21	%)	10	%
Diluted earnings per share (EPS)		0.40		1.18		0.45	(66	%)	(11	%)
Adjusted diluted EPS*		0.51		0.70		0.43	(27	%)	19	%
Cash flow from operating activities		709		1,189		784	(40	%)	(10	%)
Free cash flow*		454		894		502	(49	%)	(10	%)

* Non-GAAP measure. See reconciliations in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

Certain columns and rows in our tables and financial statements may not sum up due to the use of rounded numbers.

Quarter Highlights

Baker Hughes expanded its leadership position in liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) in the first quarter, including a liquefaction train award from Bechtel for a project in North America, where the Company will provide four main refrigerant compressors driven by LM6000+ gas turbines and four expander-compressors. This award builds on the previously announced December 2024 award and further demonstrates the strength of the Company’s collaboration with Bechtel to support North America LNG development.

During the quarter, Industrial & Energy Technology (“IET”) signed key strategic framework agreements with LNG operators. The Company agreed to provide gas turbines and refrigerant compressor technology, along with maintenance services, for Trains 4 to 8 of NextDecade’s Rio Grande LNG Facility. Baker Hughes also reached an agreement with Argent LNG to provide liquefaction and power solutions and related aftermarket services for its proposed 24 MTPA LNG export facility in Louisiana. The project will employ Baker Hughes’ NMBL™ modularized LNG solution, driven by the LM9000 gas turbine, while also utilizing the Company’s iCenter™ and Cordant™ digital solution, to enhance the plant’s operational efficiency.

Baker Hughes also demonstrated its continuous commitment to critical gas infrastructure projects with a strategic win in the North America pipeline compression market. The award includes the provision of two gas compression stations for a total of 10 Frame 5/2E gas turbines and 10 centrifugal compressors, anti-surge valves and critical spare parts.

In the first quarter, Baker Hughes made significant progress in reliable and sustainable power solutions deployment for data centers. In addition to being awarded over 350 MW of NovaLT™ turbines to power data centers with various other customers, the Company partnered with Frontier Infrastructure to accelerate the development of large-scale carbon capture and storage (“CCS”) and power solutions for data centers and industrial customers in the U.S. This partnership will leverage technologies and services across the Baker Hughes enterprise by providing CO₂ compression, NovaLT™ gas turbines, digital monitoring solutions, well construction and completion services.

In continued demonstration of Gas Technology’s lifecycle offerings in IET, the Company received several aftermarket service awards during the quarter. In Algeria, the Gas Technology Services (“GTS”) team is partnering with SONATRACH to deliver an upgrade solution for the modernization of a key compressor station. In the Middle East, Gas Technology received multiple equipment and services awards to support one of the world’s largest gas processing plants. The scope includes rejuvenation of two existing gas turbines to drive new compressors and the supply of a third compression train to support production expansion.

IET’s Industrial Solutions gained momentum with its Cordant™ Asset Performance Management (“APM”) solution, securing several contracts with customers across multiple regions. ADNOC Offshore will deploy the full APM suite to enhance production availability and efficiency. In the Americas, a large international oil company will conduct a proof of concept across multiple equipment trains, to support a shift from proactive to predictive maintenance. In Australia, the Company signed agreements to develop asset maintenance strategies for new mine sites supporting truck fleet maintenance.

Oilfield Services & Equipment (“OFSE”) received a significant award from ExxonMobil Guyana to provide specialty chemicals and related services for its Uaru and Whiptail offshore greenfield developments in the country’s prolific Stabroek Block, highlighting the differentiated capabilities of our Production Solutions offering. For this multi-year contract, the scope will cover topsides, subsea, water injection and utility chemicals to help ExxonMobil Guyana achieve optimal production.

OFSE continues to leverage the Company’s innovative solutions to help Petrobras unlock Brazil’s vast energy supply. In the quarter and following an open tender, Baker Hughes received a significant, multi-year fully integrated completions systems contract from Petrobras across multiple deepwater fields. A range of Baker Hughes’ technologies, including the new SureCONTROL^TM Premium interval control valve, has been specifically tailored to meet the needs of the country’s offshore developments.

OFSE secured a multi-year contract with Dubai Petroleum Establishment, for and on behalf of Dubai Supply Authority, to provide integrated coiled-tubing drilling services for the Company’s Margham Gas storage project. This follows a third-quarter 2024 IET award for integrated compressor line units for the same project, demonstrating growing commercial synergies across Baker Hughes’ diverse portfolio.

The Company drove growth in Mature Assets Solutions, signing a multi-year framework agreement with Equinor to help establish a new Center of Excellence for Plug & Abandonment work in the North Sea. Based within OFSE’s operations in Bergen and Stavanger, Norway, this hub will ensure economical, reliable solutions are implemented to responsibly abandon each well, allowing Equinor to maximize value of their assets and allocate more resources to exploration and discovery.

On the digital front, OFSE received an award from the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (“SOCAR”) to expand deployment of Leucipa™ automated field production solution for all its wells, including those with non-Baker Hughes electric submersible pumps, in the Absheron and Gunseli fields. Leucipa also marked its first deployment in Sub-Saharan Africa through an agreement with the NNPC/FIRST E&P joint venture, which will utilize the platform across its offshore wells in the Niger Delta.

Consolidated Financial Results

Revenue for the quarter was $6,427 million, a decrease of 13% sequentially and up $9 million year-over-year. The increase in revenue year-over-year was driven by an increase in IET and partially offset by a decrease in OFSE.

The Company’s total book-to-bill ratio in the first quarter of 2025 was 1.0; the IET book-to-bill ratio was 1.1.

Net income as determined in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America (“GAAP”), for the first quarter of 2025 was $402 million. Net income decreased $777 million sequentially and decreased $53 million year-over-year.

Adjusted net income (a non-GAAP financial measure) for the first quarter of 2025 was $509 million, which excludes adjustments totaling $108 million. A list of the adjusting items and associated reconciliation from GAAP has been provided in Table 1b in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.” Adjusted net income for the first quarter of 2025 was down 27% sequentially and up 19% year-over-year.

Depreciation and amortization for the first quarter of 2025 was $285 million.

Adjusted EBITDA (a non-GAAP financial measure) for the first quarter of 2025 was $1,037 million, which excludes adjustments totaling $140 million. See Table 1a in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.” Adjusted EBITDA for the first quarter was down 21% sequentially and up 10% year-over-year.

The sequential decrease in adjusted net income and adjusted EBITDA was primarily driven by lower volume in both segments, partially offset by productivity and structural cost-out initiatives. The year-over-year increase in adjusted net income and adjusted EBITDA was driven by increased volume in IET including higher proportionate growth in Gas Technology Equipment (“GTE”) and productivity, structural cost-out initiatives and higher pricing in both segments, partially offset by decreased volume and business mix in OFSE and cost inflation in both segments.

Other Financial Items

Remaining Performance Obligations (“RPO”) in the first quarter of 2025 ended at $33.2 billion, a decrease of $0.1 billion from the fourth quarter of 2024. OFSE RPO was $2.8 billion, down 7% sequentially, while IET RPO was $30.4 billion, up $300 million sequentially. Within IET RPO, GTE RPO was $11.9 billion and GTS RPO was $15.1 billion.

Income tax expense in the first quarter of 2025 was $152 million.

Other (income) expense, net in the first quarter of 2025 was $140 million, primarily related to changes in fair value for equity securities of $140 million.

GAAP diluted earnings per share was $0.40. Adjusted diluted earnings per share (a non-GAAP financial measure) was $0.51. Excluded from adjusted diluted earnings per share were all items listed in Table 1b in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

Cash flow from operating activities was $709 million for the first quarter of 2025. Free cash flow (a non-GAAP financial measure) for the quarter was $454 million. A reconciliation from GAAP has been provided in Table 1c in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

Capital expenditures, net of proceeds from disposal of assets, were $255 million for the first quarter of 2025, of which $158 million was for OFSE and $83 million was for IET.

Results by Reporting Segment

The following segment discussions and variance explanations are intended to reflect management’s view of the relevant comparisons of financial results on a sequential or year-over-year basis, depending on the business dynamics of the reporting segments.

Oilfield Services & Equipment

(in millions)	Three Months Ended									Variance
Segment results	March 31, 2025			December 31, 2024			March 31, 2024			Sequential		Year-over- year
Orders	$	3,281		$	3,740		$	3,624		(12	%)	(9	%)
Revenue	$	3,499		$	3,871		$	3,783		(10	%)	(8	%)
EBITDA	$	623		$	755		$	644		(18	%)	(3	%)
EBITDA margin		17.8	%		19.5	%		17.0	%	-1.7pts		0.8pts

(in millions)	Three Months Ended						Variance
Revenue by Product Line	March 31, 2025		December 31, 2024		March 31, 2024		Sequential		Year-over- year
Well Construction	$	892	$	943	$	1,061	(5	%)	(16	%)
Completions, Intervention, and Measurements		925		1,022		1,006	(9	%)	(8	%)
Production Solutions		899		974		945	(8	%)	(5	%)
Subsea & Surface Pressure Systems		782		932		771	(16	%)	1	%
Total Revenue	$	3,499	$	3,871	$	3,783	(10	%)	(8	%)

(in millions)	Three Months Ended						Variance
Revenue by Geographic Region	March 31, 2025		December 31, 2024		March 31, 2024		Sequential		Year-over- year
North America	$	922	$	971	$	990	(5	%)	(7	%)
Latin America		568		661		637	(14	%)	(11	%)
Europe/CIS/Sub-Saharan Africa		580		740		750	(22	%)	(23	%)
Middle East/Asia		1,429		1,499		1,405	(5	%)	2	%
Total Revenue	$	3,499	$	3,871	$	3,783	(10	%)	(8	%)

North America	$	922	$	971	$	990	(5	%)	(7	%)
International	$	2,577	$	2,900	$	2,793	(11	%)	(8	%)

EBITDA excludes depreciation and amortization of $226 million, $229 million, and $222 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024, respectively. EBITDA margin is defined as EBITDA divided by revenue.

OFSE orders of $3,281 million for the first quarter of 2025 decreased by 12% sequentially. Subsea and Surface Pressure Systems orders were $532 million, down 34% sequentially, and down 16% year-over-year.

OFSE revenue of $3,499 million for the first quarter of 2025 was down 10% sequentially, and down 8% year-over-year.

North America revenue was $922 million, down 5% sequentially. International revenue was $2,577 million, down 11% sequentially, with declines across all regions.

Segment EBITDA for the first quarter of 2025 was $623 million, a decrease of $132 million, or 18% sequentially. The sequential decrease in EBITDA was primarily driven by lower volume, partially mitigated by productivity from structural cost-out initiatives.

Industrial & Energy Technology

(in millions)	Three Months Ended									Variance
Segment results	March 31, 2025			December 31, 2024			March 31, 2024			Sequential		Year-over- year
Orders	$	3,178		$	3,756		$	2,918		(15	%)	9	%
Revenue	$	2,928		$	3,492		$	2,634		(16	%)	11	%
EBITDA	$	501		$	639		$	386		(22	%)	30	%
EBITDA margin		17.1	%		18.3	%		14.7	%	-1.2pts		2.4pts

(in millions)	Three Months Ended						Variance
Orders by Product Line	March 31, 2025		December 31, 2024		March 31, 2024		Sequential		Year-over- year
Gas Technology Equipment	$	1,335	$	1,865	$	1,230	(28	%)	9	%
Gas Technology Services		913		902		692	1	%	32	%
Total Gas Technology		2,248		2,767		1,922	(19	%)	17	%
Industrial Products		501		515		546	(3	%)	(8	%)
Industrial Solutions		281		320		257	(12	%)	10	%
Total Industrial Technology		782		835		803	(6	%)	(3	%)
Climate Technology Solutions		148		154		193	(4	%)	(23	%)
Total Orders	$	3,178	$	3,756	$	2,918	(15	%)	9	%

(in millions)	Three Months Ended						Variance
Revenue by Product Line	March 31, 2025		December 31, 2024		March 31, 2024		Sequential		Year-over- year
Gas Technology Equipment	$	1,456	$	1,663	$	1,210	(12	%)	20	%
Gas Technology Services		592		796		614	(26	%)	(4	%)
Total Gas Technology		2,047		2,459		1,824	(17	%)	12	%
Industrial Products		445		548		462	(19	%)	(4	%)
Industrial Solutions		258		282		265	(8	%)	(2	%)
Total Industrial Technology		703		830		727	(15	%)	(3	%)
Climate Technology Solutions		178		204		83	(13	%)	114	%
Total Revenue	$	2,928	$	3,492	$	2,634	(16	%)	11	%

EBITDA excludes depreciation and amortization of $53 million, $56 million, and $56 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024, respectively. EBITDA margin is defined as EBITDA divided by revenue.

IET orders of $3,178 million for the first quarter of 2025 increased by $260 million, or 9% year-over-year. The increase was driven primarily by Gas Technology, up $326 million or 17% year-over-year.

IET revenue of $2,928 million for the first quarter of 2025 increased $294 million, or 11% year-over-year. The increase was driven by Gas Technology Equipment, up $246 million or 20% year-over-year, and Climate Technology Solutions, up $95 million or 114% year-over-year.

Segment EBITDA for the quarter was $501 million, an increase of $114 million, or 30% year-over-year. The year-over-year increase in segment EBITDA was driven by productivity, positive pricing and increased volume including higher proportionate growth in GTE, partially offset by cost inflation.

Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures

Management provides non-GAAP financial measures because it believes such measures are widely accepted financial indicators used by investors and analysts to analyze and compare companies on the basis of operating performance (including adjusted EBITDA; adjusted net income attributable to Baker Hughes; and adjusted diluted earnings per share) and liquidity (free cash flow) and that these measures may be used by investors to make informed investment decisions. Management believes that the exclusion of certain identified items from several key operating performance measures enables us to evaluate our operations more effectively, to identify underlying trends in the business, and to establish operational goals for certain management compensation purposes. Management also believes that free cash flow is an important supplemental measure of our cash performance but should not be considered as a measure of residual cash flow available for discretionary purposes, or as an alternative to cash flow from operating activities presented in accordance with GAAP.

Table 1a. Reconciliation of Net Income Attributable to Baker Hughes to Adjusted EBITDA and Segment EBITDA

	Three Months Ended
(in millions)	March 31, 2025		December 31, 2024			March 31, 2024
Net income attributable to Baker Hughes (GAAP)	$	402	$	1,179		$	455
Net income attributable to noncontrolling interests		7		11			8
Provision (benefit) for income taxes		152		(398	)		178
Interest expense, net		51		54			41
Depreciation & amortization		285		291			283
Restructuring		—		258			—
Inventory impairment⁽¹⁾		—		73			—
Change in fair value of equity securities⁽²⁾		140		(196	)		(52	)
Other charges and credits⁽²⁾		—		38			30
Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP)		1,037		1,310			943
Corporate costs		85		84			88
Other income / (expense) not allocated to segments		1		—			—
Total Segment EBITDA (non-GAAP)	$	1,124	$	1,394		$	1,030
OFSE		623		755			644
IET		501		639			386

⁽¹⁾ Charges for inventory impairments are reported in “Cost of goods sold” in the condensed consolidated statements of income (loss).

⁽²⁾ Change in fair value of equity securities and other charges and credits are reported in “Other (income) expense, net” on the condensed consolidated statements of income (loss).

Table 1a reconciles net income attributable to Baker Hughes, which is the directly comparable financial result determined in accordance with GAAP, to adjusted EBITDA and Segment EBITDA. Adjusted EBITDA and Segment EBITDA exclude the impact of certain identified items.

Table 1b. Reconciliation of Net Income Attributable to Baker Hughes to Adjusted Net Income Attributable to Baker Hughes

	Three Months Ended
(in millions, except per share amounts)	March 31, 2025			December 31, 2024			March 31, 2024
Net income attributable to Baker Hughes (GAAP)	$	402		$	1,179		$	455
Restructuring		—			258			—
Inventory impairment		—			73			—
Change in fair value of equity securities		140			(196	)		(52	)
Other adjustments		—			30			32
Tax adjustments⁽¹⁾		(32	)		(650	)		(6	)
Total adjustments, net of income tax		108			(485	)		(26	)
Less: adjustments attributable to noncontrolling interests		—			—			—
Adjustments attributable to Baker Hughes		108			(485	)		(26	)
Adjusted net income attributable to Baker Hughes (non-GAAP)	$	509		$	694		$	429

Denominator:
Weighted-average shares of Class A common stock outstanding diluted		999			999			1,004
Adjusted earnings per share – diluted (non-GAAP)	$	0.51		$	0.70		$	0.43

⁽¹⁾All periods reflect the tax associated with the other (income) loss adjustments.

Table 1b reconciles net income attributable to Baker Hughes, which is the directly comparable financial result determined in accordance with GAAP, to adjusted net income attributable to Baker Hughes. Adjusted net income attributable to Baker Hughes excludes the impact of certain identified items.

Table 1c. Reconciliation of Net Cash Flows From Operating Activities to Free Cash Flow

	Three Months Ended
(in millions)	March 31, 2025			December 31, 2024			March 31, 2024
Net cash flows from operating activities (GAAP)	$	709		$	1,189		$	784
Add: cash used for capital expenditures, net of proceeds from disposal of assets		(255	)		(295	)		(282	)
Free cash flow (non-GAAP)	$	454		$	894		$	502

Table 1c reconciles net cash flows from operating activities, which is the directly comparable financial result determined in accordance with GAAP, to free cash flow. Free cash flow is defined as net cash flows from operating activities less expenditures for capital assets plus proceeds from disposal of assets.


Financial Tables (GAAP)

Condensed Consolidated Statements of Income (Loss)

(Unaudited)

	Three Months Ended March 31,
(In millions, except per share amounts)		2025			2024
Revenue	$	6,427		$	6,418
Costs and expenses:
Cost of revenue		4,952			4,976
Selling, general and administrative		577			618
Research and development costs		146			164
Other (income) expense, net		140			(22	)
Interest expense, net		51			41
Income before income taxes		561			641
Provision for income taxes		(152	)		(178	)
Net income		409			463
Less: Net income attributable to noncontrolling interests		7			8
Net income attributable to Baker Hughes Company	$	402		$	455

Per share amounts:
Basic income per Class A common stock	$	0.41		$	0.46
Diluted income per Class A common stock	$	0.40		$	0.45

Weighted average shares:
Class A basic		992			998
Class A diluted		999			1,004

Cash dividend per Class A common stock	$	0.23		$	0.21

Condensed Consolidated Statements of Financial Position

(Unaudited)

(In millions)	March 31, 2025		December 31, 2024
ASSETS
Current Assets:
Cash and cash equivalents	$	3,277	$	3,364
Current receivables, net		6,710		7,122
Inventories, net		5,161		4,954
All other current assets		1,693		1,771
Total current assets		16,841		17,211
Property, plant and equipment, less accumulated depreciation		5,168		5,127
Goodwill		6,126		6,078
Other intangible assets, net		3,927		3,951
Contract and other deferred assets		1,680		1,730
All other assets		4,368		4,266
Total assets	$	38,110	$	38,363
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
Current Liabilities:
Accounts payable	$	4,465	$	4,542
Short-term debt		55		53
Progress collections and deferred income		5,589		5,672
All other current liabilities		2,485		2,724
Total current liabilities		12,594		12,991
Long-term debt		5,969		5,970
Liabilities for pensions and other postretirement benefits		985		988
All other liabilities		1,356		1,359
Equity		17,206		17,055
Total liabilities and equity	$	38,110	$	38,363

Outstanding Baker Hughes Company shares:
Class A common stock		990		990

Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows

(Unaudited)
	Three Months Ended March 31,
(In millions)		2025			2024
Cash flows from operating activities:
Net income	$	409		$	463
Adjustments to reconcile net income to net cash flows from operating activities:
Depreciation and amortization		285			283
Stock-based compensation cost		50			51
Change in fair value of equity securities		140			(52	)
Benefit for deferred income taxes		(53	)		(24	)
Working capital		218			209
Other operating items, net		(340	)		(146	)
Net cash flows provided by operating activities		709			784
Cash flows from investing activities:
Expenditures for capital assets		(300	)		(333	)
Proceeds from disposal of assets		45			51
Other investing items, net		(55	)		13
Net cash flows used in investing activities		(310	)		(269	)
Cash flows from financing activities:
Dividends paid		(229	)		(210	)
Repurchase of Class A common stock		(188	)		(158	)
Other financing items, net		(85	)		(59	)
Net cash flows used in financing activities		(502	)		(427	)
Effect of currency exchange rate changes on cash and cash equivalents		16			(17	)
Increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents		(87	)		71
Cash and cash equivalents, beginning of period		3,364			2,646
Cash and cash equivalents, end of period	$	3,277		$	2,717
Supplemental cash flows disclosures:
Income taxes paid, net of refunds	$	207		$	108
Interest paid	$	50		$	48

Supplemental Financial Information

Supplemental financial information can be found on the Company’s website at: investors.bakerhughes.com in the Financial Information section under Quarterly Results.

Conference Call and Webcast

The Company has scheduled an investor conference call to discuss management’s outlook and the results reported in today’s earnings announcement. The call will begin at 9:30 a.m. Eastern time, 8:30 a.m. Central time on Wednesday, April 23, 2025, the content of which is not part of this earnings release. The conference call will be broadcast live via a webcast and can be accessed by visiting the Events and Presentations page on the Company’s website at: investors.bakerhughes.com. An archived version of the webcast will be available on the website for one month following the webcast.

Forward-Looking Statements

This news release (and oral statements made regarding the subjects of this release) may contain forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, (each a “forward-looking statement”). Forward-looking statements concern future circumstances and results and other statements that are not historical facts and are sometimes identified by the words “may,” “will,” “should,” “potential,” “intend,” “expect,” “would,” “seek,” “anticipate,” “estimate,” “overestimate,” “underestimate,” “believe,” “could,” “project,” “predict,” “continue,” “target,” “goal” or other similar words or expressions. There are many risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from our forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are also affected by the risk factors described in the Company’s annual report on Form 10-K for the annual period ended December 31, 2024 and those set forth from time to time in other filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The documents are available through the Company’s website at: www.investors.bakerhughes.com or through the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering and Analysis Retrieval system at: www.sec.gov. We undertake no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statement, except as required by law. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on any of these forward-looking statements.

Our expectations regarding our business outlook and business plans; the business plans of our customers; oil and natural gas market conditions; cost and availability of resources; economic, legal and regulatory conditions, and other matters are only our forecasts regarding these matters.

These forward-looking statements, including forecasts, may be substantially different from actual results, which are affected by many risks, along with the following risk factors and the timing of any of these risk factors:

Economic and political conditions – the impact of worldwide economic conditions and rising inflation; the impact of tariffs and the potential for significant increases thereto; the impact of global trade policy and the potential for significant changes thereto; the effect that declines in credit availability may have on worldwide economic growth and demand for hydrocarbons; foreign currency exchange fluctuations and changes in the capital markets in locations where we operate; and the impact of government disruptions and sanctions.
Orders and RPO – our ability to execute on orders and RPO in accordance with agreed specifications, terms and conditions and convert those orders and RPO to revenue and cash.
Oil and gas market conditions – the level of petroleum industry exploration, development and production expenditures; the price of, volatility in pricing of, and the demand for crude oil and natural gas; drilling activity; drilling permits for and regulation of the shelf and the deepwater drilling; excess productive capacity; crude and product inventories; liquefied natural gas supply and demand; seasonal and other adverse weather conditions that affect the demand for energy; severe weather conditions, such as tornadoes and hurricanes, that affect exploration and production activities; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (“OPEC”) policy and the adherence by OPEC nations to their OPEC production quotas.
Terrorism and geopolitical risks – war, military action, terrorist activities or extended periods of international conflict, particularly involving any petroleum-producing or consuming regions, including Russia and Ukraine; and the recent conflict in the Middle East; labor disruptions, civil unrest or security conditions where we operate; potentially burdensome taxation, expropriation of assets by governmental action; cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents or attacks; epidemic outbreaks.

About Baker Hughes:

Baker Hughes (Nasdaq: BKR) is an energy technology company that provides solutions to energy and industrial customers worldwide. Built on a century of experience and conducting business in over 120 countries, our innovative technologies and services are taking energy forward – making it safer, cleaner and more efficient for people and the planet. Visit us at bakerhughes.com.

For more information, please contact:

Investor Relations

Chase Mulvehill
+1 346-297-2561
investor.relations@bakerhughes.com

Media Relations

Adrienne Lynch
+1 713-906-8407
adrienne.lynch@bakerhughes.com

The MIL Network –

April 23, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Knife attacks – E-002892/2024(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The European Statistical Office (Eurostat) collects statistics on crime in the Member State s annually on voluntary basis, focusing on criminal offences as set out in the International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS)[1]. Data on police-recorded offences are disseminated in the Eurostat database[2].

However, separate data on the number of criminal offences or number of victims of knife attacks are not available. More information on the annual crime data collection is available on the Eurostat website[3].

Insights can be drawn from the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT), issued annually by the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol).

The TE-SAT provides a situational overview of terrorist-related incidents, including the number of terrorist attacks, arrests, convictions, and penalties for terrorist offences, as reported by Member States to Europol.

While the TE-SAT may include references to stabbing as a modus operandi in terrorist attacks when such information is reported by Member States, its scope is strictly limited to terrorism-related incidents.

Therefore, it does not cover all knife attacks against individuals. The TE-SAT reports are publicly accessible via Europol’s website for further consultation[4].

[1] https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/iccs.html

[2] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/crim_off_cat/default/table?lang=en&category=crim.crim_off

[3] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/crime/overview

[4] https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report
Last updated: 22 April 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
April 23, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: India hosts inaugural Capacity Building Programme for Central Asian Republics on combating terrorism financing

Source: Government of India

India hosts inaugural Capacity Building Programme for Central Asian Republics on combating terrorism financing

Senior experts from five Central Asian countries of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan participated in knowledge exchange

Posted On: 22 APR 2025 7:38PM by PIB Delhi

The Department of Revenue (DoR), in collaboration with the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), successfully organised the first-ever Capacity Building Programme for Central Asian Republics (CARs) on ‘Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) through Cryptocurrencies, Crowdfunding, and Non-Profit Organisations’. The two-day programme was held on 21^st-22^nd April, 2025.

Bringing together senior experts from five Central Asian countries — Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan — the programme served as a platform for knowledge exchange and regional cooperation in tackling terrorism financing. Participants benefited from a series of sessions led by Indian authorities, including representatives from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Cell of the Department of Revenue, Ministry of Home Affairs, the National Investigation Agency (NIA), and the Financial Intelligence Unit – India (FIU-IND). Additionally, an expert from the Eurasian Group (EAG), a FATF-style regional body (FSRB), contributed valuable insights on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) standards, with a focus on the non-profit and virtual asset sectors.

Customised to the specific needs of the Central Asian region, the programme aimed to build technical capacity and deepen understanding of emerging terrorism financing risks. Through interactive discussions, case studies, and the sharing of operational best practices, the initiative fostered a collaborative approach to addressing key challenges.

Technical sessions explored a broad range of issues, including the use of financial intelligence in terrorism-related investigations, the growing threat posed by the misuse of Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs), and the exploitation of crowdfunding platforms. Additional discussions covered the financing of radicalization and the abuse of Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) for terrorist purposes.

This initiative marks a significant step forward in strengthening regional cooperation and resilience against terrorism financing, reflecting India’s commitment to global counterterrorism efforts.

****

NB/KMN

(Release ID: 2123579) Visitor Counter : 114

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

April 23, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: CTI Chairman Pfluger Responds to Homeland Democrats’ Calls to Visit Deported Salvadoran MS-13 Gang Member, Domestic Abuser

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman August Pfluger (TX-11)

WASHINGTON, DC — Today, Congressman August Pfluger (TX-11), Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, released the following statement regarding the detention of Kilmar Abrego Garcia, a Salvadoran national with ties to the transnational gang and foreign terrorist organization MS-13, who was unlawfully present in Maryland, as multiple House and Senate Democrats are reportedly planning performative trips to visit Garcia being held in El Salvador’s Terrorism Confinement Center.

“Americans should not have their hard-earned tax dollars paying for an all-expenses-paid trip to import criminal illegal aliens back into our communities,” said Chairman August Pfluger. “Members who are rushing to El Salvador to retrieve an international gang-affiliated member, yet show zero urgency in meeting with Rachel Morin’s family or addressing the devastation from the Biden border crisis, have their priorities completely misaligned. This isn’t just failed leadership—it’s a complete abandonment of their duty to protect American citizens. While Democrats are fighting on behalf of illegal criminals on your dime, Republicans will continue to fight for the safety of American citizens.”

Background:

Kilmar Abrego Garcia is a Salvadoran national who, according to the Department of Justice, has been repeatedly identified as having ties to MS-13, a transnational gang and foreign terrorist organization. Garcia, who was unlawfully present in Maryland, was arrested and deported by the Trump administration in early March.

MIL OSI USA News –

April 23, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: FBI Marks the 45th Anniversary of the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

LEXINGTON, SC—The FBI Columbia Field Office this week is recognizing the 45th anniversary of the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).

The initial JTTF began in 1989 in New York City with a partnership between the New York Field Office and the New York City Police Department. Then, leaders from the agencies discussed how to combine expertise and resources to locate terrorist organizations responsible for attacks in the city. These conversations led to the creation of the first JTTF.

The JTTFs are the nation’s front-line defense against international and domestic terrorism. JTTFs gather evidence, follow leads, make arrets, provide security for special events, collect and share intelligence, and respond to various threats and incidents.

Following the 9/11 attacks, FBI leadership directed all FBI field offices to establish a JTTF. In addition, the FBI established its National Joint Terrorism Task Force to support the local task forces in June of 2002. The NJTTF, at FBI Headquarters, enhances communication, coordination, and cooperation from partner agencies. JTTFs have disrupted dozens of plots in the past four decades.

Today, there are nearly 200 task forces around the country, including at least one in the FBI’s field offices with about 4,400 members from participating state, local, and federal agencies.

The FBI Columbia field office’s JTFF has 19 task force officers and analysts from 12 participating agencies across South Carolina.

“The persistent threat of terrorism across South Carolina demands a united front,” said Reid Davis, acting special agent in charge of the FBI Columbia Field Office. “The FBI Columbia Field Office relies on our strong partnerships with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies and their JTTF members to swiftly disrupt threats and respond with precision whenever danger arises.”

The FBI Columbia Field Office counts numerous disruptions of its own, including a plan by a Barnwell man to detonate explosives in public locations in Pickens County in 2019 to express his frustration with the Department of Social Services. One device exploded near the Pickens County Courthouse causing minor damage to the building. Michael Lambert Seabrooke,41, was sentenced in 2021 to 12 years in federal prison for possession of explosive devices and two counts of malicious damage and attempt to damage by means of explosive materials.

The FBI Columbia JTTF also investigated a case where individuals shot at a Duke Energy regulator bank in Dalzell in 2023 which caused significant damage. One suspect, Donald Ray Hurst, 35, of Sumter, pleaded guilty to destruction of an energy facility, and is awaiting sentencing. A second individual allegedly involved, Chad Allen Kron, 33, of Sumter, was charged with destruction of an energy facility and possessing an unregistered firearm. Kron is awaiting trial.

If you see or know about suspicious activity involving chemical, biological, or radiological materials, report it to 1-800-CALL-FBI. You can also submit online tips at tips.fbi.gov.

MIL Security OSI –

April 23, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: 27 Members or Associates of Tren de Aragua Charged with Racketeering, Narcotics, Sex Trafficking, Robbery and Firearms offenses
Source: US State of California

Note: A copy of the Anti-Tren indictment can be found here.

Today, two superseding indictments were unsealed charging 27 individuals currently or formerly associated with the designated foreign terrorist organization Tren de Aragua (TdA) with racketeering conspiracy, sex trafficking conspiracy, drug trafficking conspiracy, robbery, and firearms offenses. The first superseding indictment (the “TdA Indictment”) charges six alleged members of TdA. The second superseding indictment (the “Anti-Tren Indictment”) charges 19 alleged members of “Anti-Tren,” a splinter faction comprised of former TdA members, along with two additional associates of Anti-Tren. Of the 27 defendants, 21 are in federal custody, including 16 who were already in federal criminal, immigration, or state custody and five who were arrested last night and today in operations in New York and other jurisdictions.

“As alleged, Tren de Aragua is not just a street gang – it is a highly structured terrorist organization that has destroyed American families with brutal violence, engaged in human trafficking, and spread deadly drugs through our communities,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “Today’s indictments and arrests span three states and will devastate TdA’s infrastructure as we work to completely dismantle and purge this organization from our country.”

“Today, we have filed charges against 27 alleged members, former members, and associates of Tren de Aragua, for committing murders and shootings, forcing young women trafficked from Venezuela into commercial sex work, robbing and extorting small businesses, and selling ‘tusi,’ a pink powdery drug that has become their calling card,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Matthew Podolsky for the Southern District of New York. “Today’s Indictments make clear that this Office will work tirelessly to keep the law-abiding residents of New York City safe, and hold accountable those who bring violence to our streets.”“Tren de Aragua is one of the most dangerous gangs in the country, and the NYPD has taken significant action to shut down their operations in New York City,” said New York City Police Department (NYPD) Commissioner Jessica S. Tisch. “For the first time ever, TdA is being named and charged as the criminal enterprise that it is. This isn’t just street crime—it’s organized racketeering, and this gang has shown zero regard for the safety of New Yorkers. As alleged in the indictment, these defendants wreaked havoc in our communities, trafficking women for sexual exploitation, flooding our streets with drugs, and committing violent crimes with illegal guns. Thanks to the dedicated members of the NYPD and the important work of our federal partners, their time is up.”

According to the allegations contained in the Indictments:^[1]

The TdA Indictment

TdA is a criminal organization that operated throughout New York City, including the boroughs of the Bronx and Queens, as well as internationally in Venezuela, Peru, and elsewhere. The purposes of TdA included:
- Preserving and protecting the power and territory of TdA and its members and associates through acts involving murder, assault, robbery, other acts of violence, and threats of violence, including acts of violence and threats of violence directed at former members and associates of TdA who associated with a splinter organization known as Anti-Tren.
- Enriching the members and associates of TdA through, among other things:
  - The unlawful smuggling of individuals, including young women from Venezuela, into Peru and the United States;
  - The sex trafficking of young women (whom members and associates of TdA often refer to as “multadas”) who had been unlawfully smuggled into Peru and the United States;
  - The trafficking of controlled substances, including a mixed substance called “tusi” that contains ketamine; and
  - Armed robberies.
- Keeping victims and potential victims in fear of TdA and its members and associates through threats and acts of violence.
- Promoting and enhancing TdA and the reputation and activities of its members and associates.
- Providing assistance to members and associates of TdA who committed crimes for and on behalf of TdA, such as lodging and interstate transportation for members and associates of TdA to flee prosecution.
- Protecting TdA and its members and associates from detection and prosecution by law enforcement authorities through acts of intimidation, threats, and violence against potential witnesses to crimes committed by members of TdA.
Members and associates of TdA transported “multadas” from Venezuela into Peru and the United States in exchange for debts that the “multadas” would pay back to TdA by engaging in commercial sex work. Members of TdA enforced compliance among “multadas” by, among other things:
- Threatening to kill “multadas” and their families,
- Assaulting “multadas,”
- Shooting or killing “multadas,” and
- Tracking down and kidnapping “multadas” who tried to flee.
Members of TdA also committed and conspired, attempted, and threatened to commit, acts of violence, including acts involving murder and assault, to protect and expand TdA’s criminal operations; resolve disputes within TdA; to retaliate against rival organizations, including Anti-Tren; and to maintain control over sex trafficking victims. TdA members and associates also trafficked controlled substances, committed robberies, and obtained, possessed, trafficked, and used firearms and ammunition.

The TdA Indictment charges Jarwin Valero-Calderon, also known as “La Fama,” 29; Samuel Gonzalez Castro, also known as “Klei” and “Kley, ” 28; Eferson Morillo-Gomez, also known as “Jefferson” and “Efe Trebol,” 20; Brayan Oliveros-Chero, 28; Sandro Oliveros-Chero, 25; and Armando Jose Perez Gonzalez, also known as “Biblia,” 30, (the “TdA Defendants”) with conspiring to participate in the TdA racketeering enterprise. Various of the TdA defendants are also charged with participating in offenses relating to drug trafficking, carjacking, robbery, and extortion, as well as firearms offenses. This case is assigned U.S. District Judge Denise L. Cote for the Southern District of New York.

If convicted of racketeering conspiracy, Valero-Calderon, Gonzalez Castro, Morillo-Gomez, Brayan Oliveros-Chero, Sandro Oliveros-Chero, and Perez Gonzalez face up to life in prison. If convicted of drug trafficking conspiracy, Valero-Calderon, Brayan Oliveros-Chero, Sandro Oliveros-Chero, and Perez Gonzalez face up to 20 years in prison. If convicted of carjacking conspiracy, Valero-Calderon, Gonzalez Castro, and Morillo-Gomez face up to five years in prison. If convicted of carjacking, Valero-Calderon, Gonzalez Castro, and Morillo-Gomez face up to 15 years in prison. If convicted of Hobbs Act robbery, Valero-Calderon, Gonzalez Castro, and Morillo-Gomez face up to 20 years in prison. If convicted of firearm use, carrying, and possession, Valero-Calderon, Gonzalez Castro, and Morillo-Gomez face up to life in prison with a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years in prison. If convicted of attempted Hobbs Act extortion, Valero-Calderon, Gonzalez Castro, and Morillo-Gomez face up to 20 years in prison. If convicted of firearm use, carrying, and possession – conspiracy, Valero-Calderon, Gonzalez Castro, Morillo-Gomez, Brayan Oliveros-Chero, and Sandro Oliveros-Chero face up to 20 years in prison. If convicted of possession of ammunition by an illegal alien, Brayan Oliveros-Chero faces up to 15 years in prison. If convicted of possession of a firearm and ammunition by an illegal alien, Sandro Oliveros-Chero faces up to 15 years in prison. If convicted of firearm use, carrying, and possession, Perez Gonzalez faces up to life in prison with a mandatory minimum sentence of five years in prison. If convicted of possession of a firearm and ammunition by an illegal alien, Perez Gonzalez faces up to 15 years in prison.

The Anti-Tren Indictment

Anti-Tren is a criminal organization almost exclusively comprised of former members and associates of TdA. Anti-Tren operated throughout New York City, including the boroughs of the Bronx and Queens, and in New Jersey, and elsewhere. Like TdA, the purposes of Anti-Tren included:
- Preserving and protecting the power and territory of Anti-Tren and its members and associates through acts involving murder, assault, other acts of violence, and threats of violence, including acts of violence and threats of violence directed at members and associates of TdA.
- Enriching the members and associates of Anti-Tren through, among other things:
  - The unlawful smuggling of individuals, including women and girls from Venezuela, into the United States;
  - The sex trafficking of “multadas” who had been unlawfully smuggled into the United States;
  - The trafficking of controlled substances, including “tusi”; and
  - Armed robberies.
- Keeping victims and potential victims in fear of Anti-Tren and its members and associates through threats and acts of violence.
- Promoting and enhancing Anti-Tren and the reputation and activities of its members and associates.
- Providing assistance to members and associates of Anti-Tren who committed crimes for and on behalf of Anti-Tren, such as lodging and interstate transportation for members and associates of Anti-Tren to flee prosecution, or bail money for members or associates of Anti-Tren who are detained.
- Protecting Anti-Tren and its members and associates from detection and prosecution by law enforcement authorities through acts of intimidation, threats, and violence against potential witnesses to crimes committed by members of Anti-Tren.
Like TdA, Anti-Tren engaged in human smuggling and sex trafficking of “multadas,” into the United States in exchange for debts that the “multadas” would pay back by engaging in commercial sex work. And like TdA, members of Anti-Tren enforced compliance among “multadas” by, among other things:
- Threatening to kill “multadas” and their families,
- Assaulting “multadas,”
- Shooting or killing “multadas,” and
- Tracking down and kidnapping “multadas” who tried to flee.
Members of Anti-Tren also committed and conspired, attempted, and threatened to commit, acts of violence, including acts involving murder and assault, to protect and to expand Anti-Tren’s criminal operations, resolve disputes within Anti-Tren, to retaliate against rival organizations, including Tren de Aragua, and to maintain control over sex trafficking victims. Anti-Tren members and associates also trafficked controlled substances, committed robberies, and obtained, possessed, trafficked, and used firearms and ammunition.

The Anti-Tren Indictment charges Reinaldo Rafael Gonzales-Valdez, also known as “Mariguana” and “Marijuana,” 41; Jose Manuel Guerrero-Zarate, also known as “Mantequilla,” 29; Jose David Valencia-De La Rosa, 27; Johan Carlos Mujica-Urpin, also known as “Sobrino,” 27; Luis Jose Velasquez-Hurtado, also known as “Chito,” 30; Stefano Said Pachon-Romero, 21; Guillermo Freites Velazquez, 26; Jesus David Barrios Garcia, also known as “Morocho,” 27; Giovanny Valentin Blanco Luciano, also known as “Cachorrito,” 20; Anderson Jesus Duran Berroteran, also known as “Cachorro, ” 22; Roiman Noe Bello Ferrer, 37; Luis Miguel Rodriguez-Tapia, 25; Mario Andres Pereda, also known as “Cara de Hombre,” 44; Anderson Smith Zambrano-Pacheco, 26; Yeferson Alejandro Prieto Galviz, also known as “Flaco T” and“Flacote,” 24; Jhonkennedy Bravo-Castro, also known as “Negrito,” 27; Yender Maykier Mata, 36; Kellen Alejandro Jaspe Bustamante, 20; and Luis Andres Bello-Chacon, also known as “Care de Peo,” 31 (the “Anti-Tren Defendants”) with conspiring to participate in an Anti-Tren racketeering enterprise. Various of the Anti-Tren Defendants, along with co-defendants Wilfredo Jose Avendaño Carrizalez and Carlos Gabriel Santos Mogollon, are also charged with participating in offenses relating to sex trafficking, conspiracy to import and harbor aliens, drug trafficking, obstruction of justice, and firearms offenses. This case is assigned U.S. District Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil of the Southern District of New York.

If convicted of racketeering conspiracy, Gonzales-Valdez, Guerrero-Zarate, Valencia-De La Rosa, Mujica-Urpin, Velasquez-Hurtado, Pachon-Romero, Freites Velazquez, Barrios Garcia, Blanco Luciano, Duran Berroteran, Bello Ferrer, Rodriguez-Tapia, Pereda, Zambrano-Pacheco, Prieto Galviz, Bravo-Castro, Maykier Mata, Jaspe Bustamante, and Bello-Chacon face up to life in prison. If convicted of sex trafficking conspiracy, Gonzales-Valdez, Guerrero-Zarate, Valencia-De La Rosa, Mujica-Urpin, Velasquez-Hurtado, Pachon-Romero, Freites Velazquez, Barrios Garcia, Duran Berroteran, Rodriguez-Tapia, Pereda, Zambrano-Pacheco, and Bravo-Castro face up to life in prison. If convicted of alien importation and harboring for immoral purpose – conspiracy, Gonzales-Valdez, Guerrero-Zarate, Valencia-De La Rosa, Mujica-Urpin, Velasquez-Hurtado, Pachon-Romero, Freites Velazquez, Barrios Garcia, Duran Berroteran, Rodriguez-Tapia, Pereda, Zambrano-Pacheco, and Bravo-Castro face up to five years in prison. If convicted of drug trafficking conspiracy, Gonzales-Valdez, Guerrero-Zarate, Mujica-Urpin, Freites Velazquez, Barrios Garcia, Blanco Luciano, Duran Berroteran, Prieto Galviz, Maykier Mata, Jaspe Bustamante, and Bello-Chacon face up to 20 years in prison. If convicted of firearm use, carrying, and possession, Gonzales-Valdez, Guerrero-Zarate, Mujica-Urpin, Freites Velazquez, Barrios Garcia, Blanco Luciano, Zambrano-Pacheco, Prieto Galviz, Maykier Mata, Jaspe Bustamante, and Bello-Chacon face up to life in prison with a mandatory minimum sentence of five years in prison. If convicted of obstruction of justice, Velasquez-Hurtado faces up to 20 years in prison. If convicted of unlicensed dealing of firearms, Pachon-Romero faces up to five years in prison. If convicted of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a fugitive from justice and illegal alien, Zambrano-Pacheco, faces up to 15 years in prison. If convicted of possession of a firearm and ammunition by an illegal alien, Bravo-Castro, Avendaño Carrizalez and Santos Mogollonface up to 15 years in prison.

The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendants will be determined by the judge.

Attorney General Bondi and Acting U.S. Attorney Podolsky praised the outstanding investigative work of HSI and NYPD. They also thanked the Arapahoe County District Attorney’s Office in Colorado; the Aurora Police Department in Aurora, Colorado; the New York/New Jersey Regional Fugitive Task Force of the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS); the HSI National Gang Unit and New York Human Intelligence Division; ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations New York; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); and the New York City Crime Analysis Center at the New York/New Jersey High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area.

This case received significant support from Joint Task Force Vulcan (JTFV), which was created in 2019 to eradicate MS-13 and now expanded to target Tren de Aragua, and is comprised of U.S. Attorney’s Offices across the country, including the Southern District of New York; the Eastern District of New York; the District of New Jersey; the Northern District of Ohio; the District of Utah; the District of Massachusetts; the Eastern District of Texas; the Southern District of Florida; the Eastern District of Virginia; the Southern District of California; the District of Nevada; the District of Alaska; the Southern District of Texas; and the District of Columbia, as well as the Department of Justice’s National Security Division and the Criminal Division. Additionally, the FBI; DEA; HSI; ATF; USMS; and the Federal Bureau of Prisons have been essential law enforcement partners with JTFV.

This case is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Justice Department to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN). In February 2025, Tren de Aragua was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jun Xiang, Kathryn Wheelock, and Timothy Ly of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York’s Violent and Organized Crime Unit are in charge of the prosecution.

The charges contained in the superseding indictment are merely accusations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

^[1] The charges contained in the Indictments are merely accusations and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

MIL OSI USA News –
April 22, 2025

MIL-OSI Security: 27 Members Or Associates Of Tren De Aragua Charged With Racketeering, Narcotics, Sex Trafficking, Robbery And Firearms Offenses

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

Matthew Podolsky, the Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York; Pamela Bondi, the Attorney General of the United States; Kristi Noem, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); Todd M. Lyons, the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and Jessica S. Tisch, the Commissioner of the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), announced today two Superseding Indictments charging 27 individuals currently or formerly associated with the designated foreign terrorist organization Tren de Aragua (“TdA”) with racketeering conspiracy, sex trafficking conspiracy, drug trafficking conspiracy, robbery, and firearms offenses. The first Superseding Indictment (the “TdA Indictment”) charges six alleged members of TdA. The second Superseding Indictment (the “Anti-Tren Indictment”) charges 19 alleged members of “Anti-Tren,” a splinter faction comprised of former TdA members, along with two additional associates of Anti-Tren. Of the 27 defendants, 21 are in federal custody, including 16 who were already in federal criminal, immigration, or state custody and five who were arrested last night and today in operations in New York and other jurisdictions.

Acting U.S. Attorney Matthew Podolsky said: “Today, we have filed charges against 27 alleged members, former members, and associates of Tren de Aragua, for committing murders and shootings, forcing young women trafficked from Venezuela into commercial sex work, robbing and extorting small businesses, and selling ‘tusi,’ a pink powdery drug that has become their calling card. Today’s Indictments make clear that this Office will work tirelessly to keep the law-abiding residents of New York City safe, and hold accountable those who bring violence to our streets.”

Attorney General Pam Bondi said: “As alleged, Tren de Aragua is not just a street gang – it is a highly structured terrorist organization that has destroyed American families with brutal violence, engaged in human trafficking, and spread deadly drugs through our communities. Today’s indictments and arrests span three states and will devastate TdA’s infrastructure as we work to completely dismantle and purge this organization from our country.”

NYPD Commissioner Jessica S. Tisch said: “Tren de Aragua is one of the most dangerous gangs in the country, and the NYPD has taken significant action to shut down their operations in New York City. For the first time ever, TdA is being named and charged as the criminal enterprise that it is. This isn’t just street crime—it’s organized racketeering, and this gang has shown zero regard for the safety of New Yorkers. As alleged in the indictment, these defendants wreaked havoc in our communities, trafficking women for sexual exploitation, flooding our streets with drugs, and committing violent crimes with illegal guns. Thanks to the dedicated members of the NYPD and the important work of our federal partners, their time is up.”

According to the allegations contained in the Indictments:^[1]

The TdA Indictment

TdA is a criminal organization that operated throughout New York City, including the boroughs of the Bronx and Queens, as well as internationally in Venezuela, Peru, and elsewhere. The purposes of TdA included:

Preserving and protecting the power and territory of TdA and its members and associates through acts involving murder, assault, robbery, other acts of violence, and threats of violence, including acts of violence and threats of violence directed at former members and associates of TdA who associated with a splinter organization known as Anti-Tren.
Enriching the members and associates of TdA through, among other things:
- The unlawful smuggling of individuals, including young women from Venezuela, into Peru and the U.S.;
- The sex trafficking of young women (whom members and associates of TdA often refer to as “multadas”) who had been unlawfully smuggled into Peru and the U.S.;
- The trafficking of controlled substances, including a mixed substance called “tusi” that contains ketamine; and
- Armed robberies.
Keeping victims and potential victims in fear of TdA and its members and associates through threats and acts of violence.
Promoting and enhancing TdA and the reputation and activities of its members and associates.
Providing assistance to members and associates of TdA who committed crimes for and on behalf of TdA, such as lodging and interstate transportation for members and associates of TdA to flee prosecution.
Protecting TdA and its members and associates from detection and prosecution by law enforcement authorities through acts of intimidation, threats, and violence against potential witnesses to crimes committed by members of TdA.

Members and associates of TdA transported “multadas” from Venezuela into Peru and the U.S. in exchange for debts that the “multadas” would pay back to TdA by engaging in commercial sex work. Members of TdA enforced compliance among “multadas” by, among other things:

Threatening to kill “multadas” and their families,
Assaulting “multadas,”
Shooting or killing “multadas,” and
Tracking down and kidnapping “multadas” who tried to flee.

Members of TdA also committed and conspired, attempted, and threatened to commit, acts of violence, including acts involving murder and assault, to protect and expand TdA’s criminal operations; resolve disputes within TdA; to retaliate against rival organizations, including Anti-Tren; and to maintain control over sex trafficking victims. TdA members and associates also trafficked controlled substances, committed robberies, and obtained, possessed, trafficked, and used firearms and ammunition.

The TdA Indictment charges JARWIN VALERO-CALDERON, a/k/a “La Fama”; SAMUEL GONZALEZ CASTRO, a/k/a “Klei,” a/k/a “Kley”; EFERSON MORILLO-GOMEZ, a/k/a “Jefferson,” a/k/a “Efe Trebol”; BRAYAN OLIVEROS-CHERO; SANDRO OLIVEROS-CHERO; and ARMANDO JOSE PEREZ GONZALEZ, a/k/a “Biblia” (the “TdA Defendants”) with conspiring to participate in the TdA racketeering enterprise. Various of the TdA Defendants are also charged with participating in offenses relating to drug trafficking, carjacking, robbery, and extortion, as well as firearms offenses. This case is assigned U.S. District Judge Denise L. Cote.

The Anti-Tren Indictment

Anti-Tren is a criminal organization almost exclusively comprised of former members and associates of TdA. Anti-Tren operated throughout New York City, including the boroughs of the Bronx and Queens, and in New Jersey, and elsewhere. Like TdA, the purposes of Anti-Tren included:

Preserving and protecting the power and territory of Anti-Tren and its members and associates through acts involving murder, assault, other acts of violence, and threats of violence, including acts of violence and threats of violence directed at members and associates of TdA.
Enriching the members and associates of Anti-Tren through, among other things:
- The unlawful smuggling of individuals, including women and girls from Venezuela, into the U.S.;
- The sex trafficking of “multadas” who had been unlawfully smuggled into the U.S.;
- The trafficking of controlled substances, including “tusi”; and
- Armed robberies.
Keeping victims and potential victims in fear of Anti-Tren and its members and associates through threats and acts of violence.
Promoting and enhancing Anti-Tren and the reputation and activities of its members and associates.
Providing assistance to members and associates of Anti-Tren who committed crimes for and on behalf of Anti-Tren, such as lodging and interstate transportation for members and associates of Anti-Tren to flee prosecution, or bail money for members or associates of Anti-Tren who are detained.
Protecting Anti-Tren and its members and associates from detection and prosecution by law enforcement authorities through acts of intimidation, threats, and violence against potential witnesses to crimes committed by members of Anti-Tren.

Like TdA, Anti-Tren engaged in human smuggling and sex trafficking of “multadas,” into the U.S. in exchange for debts that the “multadas” would pay back by engaging in commercial sex work. And like TdA, members of Anti-Tren enforced compliance among “multadas” by, among other things:

Threatening to kill “multadas” and their families,
Assaulting “multadas,”
Shooting or killing “multadas,” and
Tracking down and kidnapping “multadas” who tried to flee.

Members of Anti-Tren also committed and conspired, attempted, and threatened to commit, acts of violence, including acts involving murder and assault, to protect and to expand Anti-Tren’s criminal operations, resolve disputes within Anti-Tren, to retaliate against rival organizations, including Tren de Aragua, and to maintain control over sex trafficking victims. Anti-Tren members and associates also trafficked controlled substances, committed robberies, and obtained, possessed, trafficked, and used firearms and ammunition.

The Anti-Tren Indictment charges REINALDO RAFAEL GONZALES-VALDEZ, a/k/a “Mariguana,” a/k/a “Marijuana”; JOSE MANUEL GUERRERO-ZARATE, a/k/a “Mantequilla”; JOSE DAVID VALENCIA-DE LA ROSA; JOHAN CARLOS MUJICA-URPIN, a/k/a “Sobrino”; LUIS JOSE VELASQUEZ-HURTADO, a/k/a “Chito”; STEFANO SAID PACHON-ROMERO; GUILLERMO FREITES VELAZQUEZ; JESUS DAVID BARRIOS GARCIA, a/k/a “Morocho”; GIOVANNY VALENTIN BLANCO LUCIANO, a/k/a “Cachorrito”; ANDERSON JESUS DURAN BERROTERAN, a/k/a “Cachorro”; ROIMAN NOE BELLO FERRER; LUIS MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ-TAPIA; MARIO ANDRES PEREDA, a/k/a “Cara de Hombre”; ANDERSON SMITH ZAMBRANO-PACHECO; YEFERSON ALEJANDRO PRIETO GALVIZ, a/k/a “Flaco T,” a/k/a “Flacote”; JHONKENNEDY BRAVO-CASTRO, a/k/a “Negrito”; YENDER MAYKIER MATA; KELLEN ALEJANDRO JASPE BUSTAMANTE; and LUIS ANDRES BELLO-CHACON, a/k/a “Care de Peo” (the “Anti-Tren Defendants”) with conspiring to participate in an Anti-Tren racketeering enterprise. Various of the Anti-Tren Defendants, along with co-defendants WILFREDO JOSE AVENDAÑO CARRIZALEZ and CARLOS GABRIEL SANTOS MOGOLLON, are also charged with participating in offenses relating to sex trafficking, conspiracy to import and harbor aliens, drug trafficking, obstruction of justice, and firearms offenses. This case is assigned U.S. District Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil.

* * *

A chart containing the names, ages, charges, and maximum penalties for the defendants is set forth below.

The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendants will be determined by the judge.

Mr. Podolsky praised the outstanding investigative work of Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) and NYPD. He also thanked the Arapahoe County District Attorney’s Office in Colorado; the Aurora Police Department in Aurora, Colorado; the New York/New Jersey Regional Fugitive Task Force of the U.S. Marshals Service (“USMS”); the Homeland Security Investigations National Gang Unit and New York Human Intelligence Division; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s New York Enforcement and Removal Operations; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”); and the New York City Crime Analysis Center at the New York/New Jersey High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area.

This case received significant support from Joint Task Force Vulcan (“JTFV”), which was created in 2019 to eradicate MS-13 and now expanded to target Tren de Aragua, and is comprised of U.S. Attorney’s Offices across the country, including the Southern District of New York; the Eastern District of New York; the District of New Jersey; the Northern District of Ohio; the District of Utah; the District of Massachusetts; the Eastern District of Texas; the Southern District of Florida; the Eastern District of Virginia; the Southern District of California; the District of Nevada; the District of Alaska; the Southern District of Texas; and the District of Columbia, as well as the Department of Justice’s National Security Division and the Criminal Division. Additionally, the FBI; DEA; HSI; ATF; USMS; and the Federal Bureau of Prisons have been essential law enforcement partners with JTFV.

This case is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Justice Department to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN). In February 2025, Tren de Aragua was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

This case is being handled by the Office’s Violent and Organized Crime Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jun Xiang, Kathryn Wheelock, and Timothy Ly are in charge of the prosecution.

The charges contained in the Indictments are merely accusations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

The Tren de Aragua Indictment

COUNT	CHARGE	DEFENDANTS	MAX. PENALTIES
1	Racketeering conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)	JARWIN VALERO-CALDERON, a/k/a “La Fama,” 29; SAMUEL GONZALEZ CASTRO, a/k/a “Klei,” a/k/a “Kley,” 28; EFERSON MORILLO-GOMEZ, a/k/a “Jefferson,” a/k/a “Efe Trebol,” 20; BRAYAN OLIVEROS-CHERO, 28; SANDRO OLIVEROS-CHERO, 25; and ARMANDO JOSE PEREZ GONZALEZ, a/k/a “Biblia,” 30	Life in prison
2	Drug trafficking conspiracy 21 U.S.C. § 846	JARWIN VALERO-CALDERON, a/k/a “La Fama,” BRAYAN OLIVEROS-CHERO, SANDRO OLIVEROS-CHERO, and ARMANDO JOSE PEREZ GONZALEZ, a/k/a “Biblia”	20 years in prison
3	Carjacking conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 371	JARWIN VALERO-CALDERON, a/k/a “La Fama,” SAMUEL GONZALEZ CASTRO, a/k/a “Klei,” a/k/a “Kley,” and EFERSON MORILLO-GOMEZ, a/k/a “Jefferson,” a/k/a “Efe Trebol”	5 years in prison
4	Carjacking 18 U.S.C. § 2119	JARWIN VALERO-CALDERON, a/k/a “La Fama,” SAMUEL GONZALEZ CASTRO, a/k/a “Klei,” a/k/a “Kley,” and EFERSON MORILLO-GOMEZ, a/k/a “Jefferson,” a/k/a “Efe Trebol”	15 years in prison
5	Hobbs Act robbery 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2	JARWIN VALERO-CALDERON, a/k/a “La Fama,” SAMUEL GONZALEZ CASTRO, a/k/a “Klei,” a/k/a “Kley,” and EFERSON MORILLO-GOMEZ, a/k/a “Jefferson,” a/k/a “Efe Trebol”	20 years in prison
6	Firearm use, carrying, and possession 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii), and 2	JARWIN VALERO-CALDERON, a/k/a “La Fama,” SAMUEL GONZALEZ CASTRO, a/k/a “Klei,” a/k/a “Kley,” and EFERSON MORILLO-GOMEZ, a/k/a “Jefferson,” a/k/a “Efe Trebol”	Life in prison Mandatory minimum sentence of 7 years in prison
7	Attempted Hobbs Act extortion 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2	JARWIN VALERO-CALDERON, a/k/a “La Fama,” SAMUEL GONZALEZ CASTRO, a/k/a “Klei,” a/k/a “Kley,” and EFERSON MORILLO-GOMEZ, a/k/a “Jefferson,” a/k/a “Efe Trebol”	20 years in prison
8	Firearm use, carrying, and possession – conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 924(o)	JARWIN VALERO-CALDERON, a/k/a “La Fama,” SAMUEL GONZALEZ CASTRO, a/k/a “Klei,” a/k/a “Kley,” and EFERSON MORILLO-GOMEZ, a/k/a “Jefferson,” a/k/a “Efe Trebol”	20 years in prison
9	Firearm use, carrying, and possession – conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 924(o)	BRAYAN OLIVEROS-CHERO, and SANDRO OLIVEROS-CHERO	20 years in prison
10	Firearm use, carrying, and possession 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 2	BRAYAN OLIVEROS-CHERO, and SANDRO OLIVEROS-CHERO	20 years in prison
11	Possession of ammunition by an illegal alien 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5) and 2	BRAYAN OLIVEROS-CHERO	15 years in prison
12	Possession of a firearm and ammunition by an illegal alien 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5) and 2	SANDRO OLIVEROS-CHERO	15 years in prison
13	Firearm use, carrying, and possession 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 2	ARMANDO JOSE PEREZ GONZALEZ, a/k/a “Biblia,”	Life in prison Mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years in prison
14	Possession of a firearm and ammunition by an illegal alien 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5) and 2	ARMANDO JOSE PEREZ GONZALEZ, a/k/a “Biblia,”	15 years in prison

The Anti-Tren Indictment

COUNT	CHARGE	DEFENDANTS	MAX. PENALTIES
1	Racketeering conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)	REINALDO RAFAEL GONZALES-VALDEZ, a/k/a “Mariguana,” a/k/a “Marijuana,” 41; JOSE MANUEL GUERRERO-ZARATE, a/k/a “Mantequilla,” 29; JOSE DAVID VALENCIA-DE LA ROSA, 27; JOHAN CARLOS MUJICA-URPIN, a/k/a “Sobrino,” 27; LUIS JOSE VELASQUEZ-HURTADO, a/k/a “Chito,” 30; STEFANO SAID PACHON-ROMERO, 21; GUILLERMO ENRIQUE FREITES-VELAZQUEZ, 26; JESUS DAVID BARRIOS GARCIA, a/k/a “Morocho,” 27; GIOVANNY VALENTIN BLANCO LUCIANO, a/k/a “Cachorrito,” 20; ANDERSON JESUS DURAN BERROTERAN, a/k/a “Cachorro,” 22; ROIMAN NOE BELLO FERRER, 37; LUIS MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ-TAPIA, 25; MARIO ANDRES PEREDA, a/k/a “Cara de Hombre,” 44; ANDERSON SMITH ZAMBRANO-PACHECO, 26; YEFERSON ALEJANDRO PRIETO GALVIZ, a/k/a “Flaco T,” a/k/a “Flacote,” 24; JHONKENNEDY BRAVO-CASTRO, a/k/a “Negrito,” 27; YENDER MAYKIER MATA, 36; KELLEN ALEJANDRO JASPE BUSTAMANTE, 20; and LUIS ANDRES BELLO-CHACON, a/k/a “Care de Peo,” 31	Life in prison
2	Sex trafficking conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c)	REINALDO RAFAEL GONZALES-VALDEZ, a/k/a “Mariguana,” a/k/a “Marijuana,” JOSE MANUEL GUERRERO-ZARATE, a/k/a “Mantequilla,” JOSE DAVID VALENCIA-DE LA ROSA, JOHAN CARLOS MUJICA-URPIN, a/k/a “Sobrino,” LUIS JOSE VELASQUEZ-HURTADO, a/k/a “Chito,” STEFANO SAID PACHON-ROMERO, GUILLERMO FREITES VELAZQUEZ, JESUS DAVID BARRIOS GARCIA, a/k/a “Morocho,” ANDERSON JESUS DURAN BERROTERAN, a/k/a “Cachorro,” LUIS MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ-TAPIA, MARIO ANDRES PEREDA, a/k/a “Cara de Hombre,” ANDERSON SMITH ZAMBRANO-PACHECO, and JHONKENNEDY BRAVO-CASTRO, a/k/a “Negrito”	Life in prison
3	Alien importation and harboring for immoral purpose – conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 371	REINALDO RAFAEL GONZALES-VALDEZ, a/k/a “Mariguana,” a/k/a “Marijuana,” JOSE MANUEL GUERRERO-ZARATE, a/k/a “Mantequilla,” JOSE DAVID VALENCIA-DE LA ROSA, JOHAN CARLOS MUJICA-URPIN, a/k/a “Sobrino,” LUIS JOSE VELASQUEZ-HURTADO, a/k/a “Chito,” STEFANO SAID PACHON-ROMERO, GUILLERMO FREITES VELAZQUEZ, JESUS DAVID BARRIOS GARCIA, a/k/a “Morocho,” ANDERSON JESUS DURAN BERROTERAN, a/k/a “Cachorro,” LUIS MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ-TAPIA, MARIO ANDRES PEREDA, a/k/a “Cara de Hombre,” ANDERSON SMITH ZAMBRANO-PACHECO, and JHONKENNEDY BRAVO-CASTRO, a/k/a “Negrito”	5 years in prison
4	Drug trafficking conspiracy 21 U.S.C. § 846	REINALDO RAFAEL GONZALES-VALDEZ, a/k/a “Mariguana,” a/k/a “Marijuana,” JOSE MANUEL GUERRERO-ZARATE, a/k/a “Mantequilla,” JOHAN CARLOS MUJICA-URPIN, a/k/a “Sobrino,” GUILLERMO FREITES VELAZQUEZ, JESUS DAVID BARRIOS GARCIA, a/k/a “Morocho,” GIOVANNY VALENTIN BLANCO LUCIANO, a/k/a “Cachorrito,” ANDERSON SMITH ZAMBRANO-PACHECO, YEFERSON ALEJANDRO PRIETO GALVIZ, a/k/a “Flaco T,” a/k/a “Flacote,” YENDER MAYKIER MATA, KELLEN ALEJANDRO JASPE BUSTAMANTE, and LUIS ANDRES BELLO-CHACON, a/k/a “Care de Peo”	20 years in prison
5	Firearm use, carrying, and possession 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 2	REINALDO RAFAEL GONZALES-VALDEZ, a/k/a “Mariguana,” a/k/a “Marijuana,” JOSE MANUEL GUERRERO-ZARATE, a/k/a “Mantequilla,” JOHAN CARLOS MUJICA-URPIN, a/k/a “Sobrino,” GUILLERMO FREITES VELAZQUEZ, JESUS DAVID BARRIOS GARCIA, a/k/a “Morocho,” GIOVANNY VALENTIN BLANCO LUCIANO, a/k/a “Cachorrito,” ANDERSON SMITH ZAMBRANO-PACHECO, YEFERSON ALEJANDRO PRIETO GALVIZ, a/k/a “Flaco T,” a/k/a “Flacote,” YENDER MAYKIER MATA, KELLEN ALEJANDRO JASPE BUSTAMANTE, and LUIS ANDRES BELLO-CHACON, a/k/a “Care de Peo”	Life in prison Mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years in prison
6	Obstruction of justice 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c) and 2	LUIS JOSE VELASQUEZ-HURTADO, a/k/a “Chito,”	20 years in prison
7	Unlicensed dealing of firearms 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A) and 2	STEFANO PACHON-ROMERO	5 years in prison
8	Possession of a firearm and ammunition by a fugitive from justice and illegal alien 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(2) and (5), and 2	ANDERSON SMITH ZAMBRANO-PACHECO	15 years in prison
9	Possession of a firearm and ammunition by an illegal alien 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5) and 2	JHONKENNEDY BRAVO-CASTRO, a/k/a “Negrito,”	15 years in prison
10	Possession of a firearm and ammunition by an illegal alien 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5) and 2	WILFREDO JOSE AVENDAÑO CARRIZALEZ, 26; and CARLOS GABRIEL SANTOS MOGOLLON, 31	15 years in prison

^[1] The charges contained in the Indictments are merely accusations and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

MIL Security OSI –

April 22, 2025

MIL-OSI Security: 45th Anniversary of the Joint Terrorism Task Force

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) can be found at each of the FBI’s 55 field offices and many of their smaller offices—around 280 locations in all. FBI Atlanta organized its JTTF in 1994. The FBI Atlanta JTTF has representatives positioned around the state of Georgia.

JTTFs gather trained investigators, intelligence analysts, linguists, and tactical experts from federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Task force members share intelligence and investigative leads and respond to threats and incidents.

“We rely on our law enforcement partners to help keep our communities safe,” said Paul Brown, special agent in charge of FBI Atlanta. “All of our partners bring their special skills and expertise to these teams, making us all that much stronger.”

The FBI’s JTTF model dates to 1979, when the New York Police Department and the FBI’s New York Field Office created a joint task force to tackle violent bank robberies. They imitated the model in 1980, when terrorist bombings, bomb threats, and other violence plagued the city and announced the formation of the first JTTF in April 1980.

After the 9/11 attacks, FBI leadership directed all FBI field offices to establish a JTTF. In addition, the FBI established its National Joint Terrorism Task Force to support the local task forces in June 2002. The NJTTF, at FBI Headquarters, enhances communication, coordination, and cooperation from partner agencies.

JTTFs have disrupted dozens of plots in the past four decades.

FBI Atlanta counts numerous disruptions of its own, including a plan to attack the White House in 2020. Thanks to a tip from a member of the Atlanta community, Hasher Jallal Taheb was captured and sentenced to 15 years in prison.

https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/forsyth-man-sentenced-attempted-attack-white-house

The FBI Atlanta JTTF also investigated the Jihadists of Georgia case, where two men living in Georgia made videos of the U.S. Capitol and other Washington, D.C., landmarks with plans to travel and attend a terrorist training camp.

https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2009/december/jihadists_121509
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2009/december/jihadists_12170 .

MIL Security OSI –

April 22, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Up to $5 Million Reward Offered for Capture of Archaga Carías, a Top 10 Most Wanted Fugitive and Leader of Foreign Terrorist Organization MS-13

Source: US State of North Dakota

U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization MS-13 leader Yulan Andony Archaga Carías, also known as “Alexander Mendoza” and “Porky,” 43, is the highest-ranking member of MS-13, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), in Honduras and was previously charged in 2021 in a superseding indictment in the Southern District of New York with racketeering, narcotics trafficking, and firearms offenses. Archaga Carías, a Honduran national, was subsequently placed on the FBI’s 10 Most Wanted Fugitives List, the DEA’s Most Wanted Fugitives List, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations (ICE HSI)’s Most Wanted Fugitives List. The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is offering a reward under the Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program (TOCRP) of up to $5 million for information leading to his arrest and/or conviction in any country.

“This terrorist leader can no longer be allowed to live free as MS-13’s evil devastates communities in America and throughout the western hemisphere,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “If you can contribute information leading to his arrest – come forward now.”

Archaga Carías remains at large. If you have information, please contact the FBI by email at archaga-carias_tips@fbi.gov, or via WhatsApp at +1-832-267-1688. If you are outside the United States, you may also contact the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate. If you are in the United States, you may also contact the local FBI, DEA, or HSI office in your city. Only tips sent to U.S. Government will be considered for reward.

“Dismantling and ultimately eliminating MS-13 continues to be one of the FBI’s highest priorities, and we’re not stopping until that mission is complete,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “Alongside our dedicated law enforcement partners, the FBI will find Archaga Carías — a terrorist whose reign of terror at the helm of MS-13 is coming to an end.”

“With MS-13 now officially designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, the rules have changed — and so has the mission,” said DEA Acting Administrator Derek Maltz. “Archaga Carías isn’t just a fugitive — he’s a foreign terrorist waging war on innocent Americans through murder, trafficking, and terror. Let me be clear: under this Administration, we will dismantle MS-13 piece by piece—and anyone protecting him will fall with him. A $5 million is on the table. Turn him in. End this threat.”

A co-defendant, David Campbell, aka “Viejo Dan” and “Don David,” a Honduran national, is currently in custody in the United States facing the charges contained in the superseding indictment. In addition to Archaga Carías and Campbell, the superseding indictment charges three other MS-13 leaders, Juan Carlos Portillo Santos also known as “Juancy;” Victor Eduardo Morales Zelaya also known as “Cuervo;” and Jorge Alberto Velasquez Paz also known as “Chacarron,” with racketeering, narcotics trafficking, and firearms offenses. Portillo Santos, a Honduran national, is in custody in Honduras serving a lengthy prison sentence. Morales Zelaya and Velasquez Paz, both Honduran nationals, remain at large. The case is assigned to U.S. District Court Judge Gregory H. Woods for the Southern District of New York.

“MS-13 remains one of the most dangerous criminal organizations in the world, and the recent designation of MS-13 as a Foreign Terrorist Organization underscores this reality,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Matthew Podolsky for the Southern District of New York. “This Office, working closely with our law enforcement partners, will continue to investigate, prosecute and track down MS-13’s leadership, no matter where in the world they may be hiding.”

As alleged in the superseding indictment previously unsealed in Manhattan federal court, Mara Salvatrucha, commonly known as MS-13 is a transnational criminal and foreign terrorist organization that engages in acts of violence, including murders, kidnapping, and assaults, extortion, and large-scale drug importation and distribution throughout Central America and the United States. Archaga Carías is the highest-ranking member of MS-13 in Honduras. As the leader and highest-ranking member of MS-13 in Honduras, Archaga Carías is in charge of, among other things, the gang’s drug trafficking operations, ordering and coordinating acts of violence, including numerous murders, and the laundering of drug proceeds. MS-13’s drug trafficking operations led by Archaga Carías include the processing, receiving, transporting, and distributing of multi-ton loads of cocaine shipped through Honduras and into the United States.

“President Trump has been very clear — we will not allow criminal groups and their members like Porky to threaten Americans,” said Senior Bureau Official F. Cartwright Weiland of the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. “We will work with our international partners to find these criminals wherever they may be hiding.”

Archaga Carías and other MS-13 members and associates acting at his direction also provided protection to drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) engaged in transporting multi-ton loads of cocaine through Honduras and destined for the United States. Archaga Carías contracted out members of MS-13 as “Sicarios,” or hit men, to DTOs for payment. Members of MS-13 committed numerous murders for hire for DTOs trafficking cocaine through Honduras to the United States. Archaga Carías and MS-13 also supplied DTOs with firearms, including machineguns, that were received from El Salvador, Nicaragua, and elsewhere. Archaga Carías also ordered multiple murders of rival gang members and drug trafficking competitors in Honduras, as well as other members of MS-13 whom Archaga Carías believed had been disloyal to the gang.

Campbell was one of the principal suppliers of cocaine and weapons, including machineguns, to MS-13. As an associate of MS-13 and close confidant of Archaga Carías, Campbell planned and coordinated retaliatory acts of violence with Archaga Carías, and assisted MS-13 and Archaga Carías in establishing businesses to launder the gang’s drug proceeds. Campbell and MS-13 used businesses they owned or controlled to launder drug proceeds, including through banks in the United States.

Morales Zelaya was a national leader of MS-13 in Honduras and a close associate of Archaga Carías. Morales Zelaya coordinated the gang’s drug trafficking business, acts of violence (including murders) against rivals, and the movement of proceeds from the gang’s illicit activities.

Portillo Santos was a high-ranking member of MS-13 in Honduras who reported to Morales Zelaya. Portillo Santos was responsible for leading MS-13 in one of the largest sectors in Honduras, which included the distribution and movement of large shipments of cocaine, acts of violence (including murders and kidnappings) of rival gang members, and contract murders carried out against rival drug dealers. Campbell, 58, of Honduras, is currently in Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) custody facing the charges in the superseding indictment. Portillo Santos, 36, of Honduras, is currently in custody in Honduras on local charges. Archaga Carías, 43, and Morales Zelaya, 50, of Honduras, remains at large.

If convicted, Archaga Carías faces a maximum penalty of life in prison and a mandatory minimum penalty of 40 years in prison. The minimum and maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendants will be determined by a judge.

Joint Task Force Vulcan (JTFV) and the Southern District of New York’s National Security and International Narcotics Unit are handling the case. Assistant U.S. Attorney David J. Robles and Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Christopher Eason, and Trial Attorney Jacob Warren of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are in charge of the prosecution.

This case was brought by JTFV, which was created in 2019 to destroy MS-13 and now expanded to target Tren de Aragua and is comprised of U.S. Attorney’s Offices across the country, including the Southern District of New York; Eastern District of New York; the District of New Jersey; the Northern District of Ohio; the District of Utah; the District of Massachusetts; the Eastern District of Texas; the Southern District of Florida; the Eastern District of Virginia; the Southern District of California; the District of Nevada; the District of Alaska; and the District of Columbia, as well as the Department of Justice’s National Security Division and the Criminal Division. Additionally, the FBI; DEA; HSI; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the U.S. Marshals Service; and the FBOP have been essential law enforcement partners and spearheaded JTFV’s investigations.

This case is part of Operation Take Back America and an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) operation. Operation Take Back America is a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal aliens, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations, and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/OCDETF.

The charges contained in the superseding indictment are merely accusations. All defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

MIL OSI USA News –

April 22, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Up to $5 Million Reward Offered for Capture of Archaga Carías, a Top 10 Most Wanted Fugitive and Leader of Foreign Terrorist Organization MS-13

Source: United States Attorneys General 13

U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization MS-13 leader Yulan Andony Archaga Carías, also known as “Alexander Mendoza” and “Porky,” 43, is the highest-ranking member of MS-13, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), in Honduras and was previously charged in 2021 in a superseding indictment in the Southern District of New York with racketeering, narcotics trafficking, and firearms offenses. Archaga Carías, a Honduran national, was subsequently placed on the FBI’s 10 Most Wanted Fugitives List, the DEA’s Most Wanted Fugitives List, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations (ICE HSI)’s Most Wanted Fugitives List. The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is offering a reward under the Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program (TOCRP) of up to $5 million for information leading to his arrest and/or conviction in any country.

“This terrorist leader can no longer be allowed to live free as MS-13’s evil devastates communities in America and throughout the western hemisphere,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “If you can contribute information leading to his arrest – come forward now.”

Archaga Carías remains at large. If you have information, please contact the FBI by email at archaga-carias_tips@fbi.gov, or via WhatsApp at +1-832-267-1688. If you are outside the United States, you may also contact the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate. If you are in the United States, you may also contact the local FBI, DEA, or HSI office in your city. Only tips sent to U.S. Government will be considered for reward.

“Dismantling and ultimately eliminating MS-13 continues to be one of the FBI’s highest priorities, and we’re not stopping until that mission is complete,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “Alongside our dedicated law enforcement partners, the FBI will find Archaga Carías — a terrorist whose reign of terror at the helm of MS-13 is coming to an end.”

“With MS-13 now officially designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, the rules have changed — and so has the mission,” said DEA Acting Administrator Derek Maltz. “Archaga Carías isn’t just a fugitive — he’s a foreign terrorist waging war on innocent Americans through murder, trafficking, and terror. Let me be clear: under this Administration, we will dismantle MS-13 piece by piece—and anyone protecting him will fall with him. A $5 million is on the table. Turn him in. End this threat.”

A co-defendant, David Campbell, aka “Viejo Dan” and “Don David,” a Honduran national, is currently in custody in the United States facing the charges contained in the superseding indictment. In addition to Archaga Carías and Campbell, the superseding indictment charges three other MS-13 leaders, Juan Carlos Portillo Santos also known as “Juancy;” Victor Eduardo Morales Zelaya also known as “Cuervo;” and Jorge Alberto Velasquez Paz also known as “Chacarron,” with racketeering, narcotics trafficking, and firearms offenses. Portillo Santos, a Honduran national, is in custody in Honduras serving a lengthy prison sentence. Morales Zelaya and Velasquez Paz, both Honduran nationals, remain at large. The case is assigned to U.S. District Court Judge Gregory H. Woods for the Southern District of New York.

“MS-13 remains one of the most dangerous criminal organizations in the world, and the recent designation of MS-13 as a Foreign Terrorist Organization underscores this reality,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Matthew Podolsky for the Southern District of New York. “This Office, working closely with our law enforcement partners, will continue to investigate, prosecute and track down MS-13’s leadership, no matter where in the world they may be hiding.”

As alleged in the superseding indictment previously unsealed in Manhattan federal court, Mara Salvatrucha, commonly known as MS-13 is a transnational criminal and foreign terrorist organization that engages in acts of violence, including murders, kidnapping, and assaults, extortion, and large-scale drug importation and distribution throughout Central America and the United States. Archaga Carías is the highest-ranking member of MS-13 in Honduras. As the leader and highest-ranking member of MS-13 in Honduras, Archaga Carías is in charge of, among other things, the gang’s drug trafficking operations, ordering and coordinating acts of violence, including numerous murders, and the laundering of drug proceeds. MS-13’s drug trafficking operations led by Archaga Carías include the processing, receiving, transporting, and distributing of multi-ton loads of cocaine shipped through Honduras and into the United States.

“President Trump has been very clear — we will not allow criminal groups and their members like Porky to threaten Americans,” said Senior Bureau Official F. Cartwright Weiland of the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. “We will work with our international partners to find these criminals wherever they may be hiding.”

Archaga Carías and other MS-13 members and associates acting at his direction also provided protection to drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) engaged in transporting multi-ton loads of cocaine through Honduras and destined for the United States. Archaga Carías contracted out members of MS-13 as “Sicarios,” or hit men, to DTOs for payment. Members of MS-13 committed numerous murders for hire for DTOs trafficking cocaine through Honduras to the United States. Archaga Carías and MS-13 also supplied DTOs with firearms, including machineguns, that were received from El Salvador, Nicaragua, and elsewhere. Archaga Carías also ordered multiple murders of rival gang members and drug trafficking competitors in Honduras, as well as other members of MS-13 whom Archaga Carías believed had been disloyal to the gang.

Campbell was one of the principal suppliers of cocaine and weapons, including machineguns, to MS-13. As an associate of MS-13 and close confidant of Archaga Carías, Campbell planned and coordinated retaliatory acts of violence with Archaga Carías, and assisted MS-13 and Archaga Carías in establishing businesses to launder the gang’s drug proceeds. Campbell and MS-13 used businesses they owned or controlled to launder drug proceeds, including through banks in the United States.

Morales Zelaya was a national leader of MS-13 in Honduras and a close associate of Archaga Carías. Morales Zelaya coordinated the gang’s drug trafficking business, acts of violence (including murders) against rivals, and the movement of proceeds from the gang’s illicit activities.

Portillo Santos was a high-ranking member of MS-13 in Honduras who reported to Morales Zelaya. Portillo Santos was responsible for leading MS-13 in one of the largest sectors in Honduras, which included the distribution and movement of large shipments of cocaine, acts of violence (including murders and kidnappings) of rival gang members, and contract murders carried out against rival drug dealers. Campbell, 58, of Honduras, is currently in Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) custody facing the charges in the superseding indictment. Portillo Santos, 36, of Honduras, is currently in custody in Honduras on local charges. Archaga Carías, 43, and Morales Zelaya, 50, of Honduras, remains at large.

If convicted, Archaga Carías faces a maximum penalty of life in prison and a mandatory minimum penalty of 40 years in prison. The minimum and maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendants will be determined by a judge.

Joint Task Force Vulcan (JTFV) and the Southern District of New York’s National Security and International Narcotics Unit are handling the case. Assistant U.S. Attorney David J. Robles and Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Christopher Eason, and Trial Attorney Jacob Warren of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are in charge of the prosecution.

This case was brought by JTFV, which was created in 2019 to destroy MS-13 and now expanded to target Tren de Aragua and is comprised of U.S. Attorney’s Offices across the country, including the Southern District of New York; Eastern District of New York; the District of New Jersey; the Northern District of Ohio; the District of Utah; the District of Massachusetts; the Eastern District of Texas; the Southern District of Florida; the Eastern District of Virginia; the Southern District of California; the District of Nevada; the District of Alaska; and the District of Columbia, as well as the Department of Justice’s National Security Division and the Criminal Division. Additionally, the FBI; DEA; HSI; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the U.S. Marshals Service; and the FBOP have been essential law enforcement partners and spearheaded JTFV’s investigations.

This case is part of Operation Take Back America and an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) operation. Operation Take Back America is a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal aliens, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations, and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/OCDETF.

The charges contained in the superseding indictment are merely accusations. All defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

MIL Security OSI –

April 22, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Hagerstown Man Pleads Guilty to Federal Swatting Charges

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

Baltimore, Maryland – Owen Jarboe, 19, of Hagerstown, Maryland, has pled guilty to conspiracy, cyberstalking, interstate threatening communications, and threats to damage or destroy by means of fire and explosives.

Kelly O. Hayes, U.S. Attorney for the District of Maryland, announced the sentence with Special Agent in Charge William J. DelBagno of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) – Baltimore Field Office.

According to the guilty plea, from December 2023 through January 18, 2024, Jarboe along with other co-conspirators, knowingly and unlawfully conspired to place swatting calls to multiple police and emergency departments across the United States. Swatting is a form of criminal harassment that involves deceiving an emergency service into sending a police or emergency service response team to another person’s location.

Jarboe helped create an online group known as “Purgatory.” The group used multiple online social-media platforms, including Telegram and Instagram, to coordinate and plan swatting activities and to announce swats that they had conducted. Jarboe and his co-conspirators often used shared scripts to obscure their phone numbers and identities.

Swatting incidents perpetrated as part of this scheme include threatening to burn down a residential trailer park in Alabama and shoot a teacher and unnamed students at a Delaware high school. Other swatting occurrences include false allegations about multiple homicide events and shooting threats of individuals at a residence in Eastman, Georgia, and bombing and shooting threats of Albany International Airport in New York and an Ohio casino.

“Swatting is a very serious offense – one that can easily become dangerous for law enforcement and the victims involved,” Hayes said. “Emergency personnel work hard every day to ensure that first responders are dispatched to render aid to those who truly need it. Mr. Jarboe and his co-conspirators’ actions showed a complete disregard for law enforcement, the victims, and those who actually needed emergency assistance during these incidents.”

“Jarboe’s crimes are despicable and dangerous. He put our brave first responders and countless innocent lives at risk while creating unnecessary fear in many different communities,” DelBagno said. “Jarboe’s guilty plea shows that the FBI will not tolerate swatting or hoax threats and will make sure anyone committing these crimes is found and charged to the full extent of the law.”

Jarboe is facing a maximum sentence of five years in federal prison for each count of conspiracy, cyberstalking, and interstate threat, and a maximum sentence of 10 years for each charge to damage or destroy by means of fire and explosive.

Actual sentences for federal crimes are typically less than the maximum penalties. A federal district court judge determines sentencing after taking into account the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors. Sentencing is set for Wednesday, July 23, at 10 a.m.

U.S. Attorney Hayes commended the FBI for its outstanding work in the investigation. Additionally, Ms. Hayes praised the Joint Terrorism Task Force, Columbus; Ohio Police Department; Newark, Delaware Police Department; Lenoir City, Tennessee Police Department; Albany, New York Police Department; Albany County, New York Sheriff’s Office; Fairburn City, Georgia Police Department; Bethel Park, Pennsylvania Police Department; Giles County, Virginia Sheriff’s Office; Blue Springs, Missouri Police Department; Tarboro, North Carolina Police Department; Boston, Massachusetts Police Department; Dodge County, Georgia Sheriff’s Office; Houston County, Alabama Sheriff’s Office; and the FBI’s Mobile, Richmond, Boston, Charlotte, and Cincinnati Field Offices for their valuable assistance. Ms. Hayes also thanked Assistant U.S. Attorneys Robert I. Goldaris and Patricia C. McLane who are prosecuting the case.

For more information about the Maryland U.S. Attorney’s Office, its priorities, and resources available to report fraud, visit www.justice.gov/usao-md and https://www.justice.gov/usao-md/community-outreach.

# # #

MIL Security OSI –

April 22, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Reps. Robert Garcia, Maxwell Frost, Yassamin Ansari, Maxine Dexter Arrive in El Salvador to Demand Trump Administration Abide by Supreme Court Ruling, Release Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Robert Garcia California (42nd District)

Washington, D.C. – Today, Congressman Robert Garcia (CA-42), Congressman Maxwell Frost (FL-10), Congresswoman Yassamin Ansari (AZ-03), and Congresswoman Maxine Dexter (OR-03) arrived in El Salvador on a trip they are leading to demand the Trump Administration abide by the Supreme Court decision to return Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia to the United States after he was illegally deported. This is an independent, personally-funded trip conducted after Chairman James Comer refused to approve the lawmakers’ request for an official CODEL.

“While Donald Trump continues to defy the Supreme Court, Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia is being held illegally in El Salvador after being wrongfully deported,” said Congressman Robert Garcia. “That is why we’re here– to remind the American people that kidnapping immigrants and deporting them without due process is not how we do things in America. We are demanding the Trump Administration abide by the Supreme Court decision and give Kilmar and the other migrants mistakenly sent to El Salvador due process in the United States.”

Earlier this month, Congressman Garcia and Congressman Frost sent a letter to House Oversight Committee Chairman James Comer requesting authorization for a Congressional Member Delegation (CODEL) to visit Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo (CECOT), the maximum-security prison in Tecoluca, El Salvador. After the Chairman rejected their request, Congressman Garcia and Congressman Frost planned an independent trip.

Congressman Garcia remains committed to reforming our immigration system, creating fair pathways to citizenship, and treating immigrants with respect and dignity. Earlier this month, Congressman Garcia wrote letters demanding answers from the Trump Administration on its deportation of Andry Hernández Romero, a gay Venezuelan makeup artist who was sent to a prison in El Salvador in violation of a federal court order and in the absence of credible evidence supporting the government’s claims about his affiliation with a criminal gang. In July 2024, Congressman Garcia introduced the SHIELD Act, which allocated grants through the Attorney General and the Department of Justice to local and state governments to support the recruitment of staff and attorneys to ensure that immigrants receive quality, affordable representation in immigration court. Last Congress, Congressman Garcia led investigations into fundamental integrity and credibility issues within the DHS, including identifying what actions have been taken to address the threat of domestic violent extremism within the DHS. Congressman Garcia has also defended humane immigration procedures and condemned extreme rhetoric on immigration and border security that dehumanizes migrants legally seeking asylum. Congressman Garcia has also investigated the use of inappropriate language and behavior among Border Patrol agents within ICE toward immigrants following reports from the Huffington Post.

###

MIL OSI USA News –

April 22, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force Turns 45

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News (b)

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is marking the 45th anniversary of its first Joint Terrorism Task Force. Formed in New York in 1980, the first JTTF became a model for law enforcement cooperation across the nation.

Today, the FBI has a JTTF at each of its 55 field offices and at many of its smaller offices—about 280 locations in all. JTTFs gather investigators, intelligence analysts, linguists, and tactical experts from federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Task force members share intelligence and investigative leads and respond to threats and incidents.

“The JTTF model clearly demonstrates the power of law enforcement cooperation at all levels,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “Preventing terrorism is a no-fail mission. Only by working together can we keep the nation safe.”

The FBI’s JTTF model dates to the 1979, when the New York Police Department and the FBI’s New York Field Office tackled the surge in violent bank robberies by pooling resources and expertise through a joint task force. In 1980, when terrorist bombings, bomb threats, and other violence plagued the city, officials decided to imitate the bank robbery task force. They announced the formation of the first JTTF in April 1980.

The first JTTF had 10 special agents and 10 police officers. The number of task forces grew over the years, with 35 JTTFs operating by the time terrorists attacked on 9/11. Shortly after 9/11, the FBI required all field offices to establish a JTTF. By the end of 2024, JTTFs drew nearly 4,400 members from 528 state, local, territorial, and tribal agencies and 53 federal agencies.

The FBI established its National Joint Terrorism Task Force to support the local task forces in June of 2002. The NJTTF at FBI Headquarters enhances communication, coordination, and cooperation from partner agencies.

JTTFs have disrupted dozens of plots in the past four decades, including a plan to attack millennial celebrations in Los Angeles in 2000; a plan to detonate a car bomb in Times Square in New York in 2010; and plans to sow chaos in Baltimore, Maryland, in 2022 and 2023 by destroying energy facilities.

JTTFs are also among the first responders to arrive at the scenes of horrific violence—whether they are terrorist-based or not—and lead the investigations of terrorist incidents.

Among the cases JTTFs have investigated are the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York; the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000; the 9/11 attacks in 2001; the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013; the mass shooting in San Bernardino, California, in 2015; the shooting at Naval Air Station Pensacola in Florida in 2019; and the January 1, 2025, truck attack in New Orleans.

Additional Resources:

MIL Security OSI –

April 22, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Celebrating 45 Years of FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News (b)

The model is so effective that other portions of the Bureau have since tried to emulate it, noted Supervisory Special Agent Jake Foiles, who oversees the FBI Kansas City JTTF.

“The FBI’s JTTF model has expanded and evolved and has been copied now by our cyber side, our counterintelligence side, by our traditional criminal side,” he said. “We now have task forces on many of the different squads and areas that the FBI works. And the reason for that is because that task force model is incredibly effective when you have a variety of different people from different agencies and different walks of life and backgrounds working day in and day out, every single day with each other.”

JTTFs are also powerful mechanisms for community outreach, briefing on topics such as what FBI investigations into terrorism matters actually look like, signs that someone might be mobilizing to violence, and why it’s important for Americans to proactively reach out to the FBI if they spot those kinds of indicators.

Ultimately, the FBI will investigate any individual who threatens violence, including those planning to commit an act of violence to further an ideology. (The FBI cannot initiate an investigation based solely on First Amendment-protected activity.)

According to Kansas Bureau of Investigation Director Tony Mattivi, JTTFs are critical in reviewing incoming leads to determine which terrorism threats are substantive. These task forces have an obligation to resolve any real or potential threat they’re aware of “because you never know which one of those is going to turn into a really significant threat,” he said. “And that’s, I think, some of the most important work that’s done on a daily basis inside the JTTF. And nobody sees it.”

Benefits of partnerships

Retired FBI Supervisory Special Agent Dana Kreeger—a veteran of the Kansas City JTTF—said the biggest benefit of JTTF participation is the ability to keep a finger on the pulse of the terrorism threat.

“Terrorism is not a local threat,” he said. “It’s happening all across the country; a lot of it is intertwined. We have threat actors in Kansas City that might be talking to threat actors in Chicago or L.A. or Portland or New York.”

MIL Security OSI –

April 22, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Mediawatch: Jailed Australian foreign correspondent’s life spread across the big screen

By Colin Peacock, RNZ Mediawatch presenter

In 1979, Sam Neill appeared in an Australian comedy movie about hacks on a Sydney newspaper.

The Journalist was billed as “a saucy, sexy, funny look at a man with a nose for scandal and a weakness for women”.

That would probably not fly these days — but as a rule, movies about Australian journalists are no laughing matter.

Back in 1982, a young Mel Gibson starred as a foreign correspondent who was dropped into Jakarta during revolutionary chaos in The Year of Living Dangerously. The 1967 events the movie depicted were real enough, but Mel Gibson’s correspondent Guy Hamilton was made up for what was essentially a romantic drama.

There was no romance and a lot more real life 25 years later in Balibo, another movie with Australian journalists in harm’s way during Indonesian upheaval.

Anthony La Paglia had won awards for his performance as Roger East, a journalist killed in what was then East Timor — now Timor-Leste — in December 1975. East was killed while investigating the fate of five other journalists — including New Zealander Guy Cunningham — who was killed during the Indonesian invasion two months earlier.

The Correspondent has a happier ending but is still a tough watch — especially for its subject.

Met in London newsrooms
I first met Peter Greste in newsrooms in London about 30 years ago. He had worked for Reuters, CNN, and the BBC — going on to become a BBC correspondent in Afghanistan.

He later reported from Belgrade, Santiago, and then Nairobi, from where he appeared regularly on RNZ’s Nine to Noon as an African news correspondent. Greste later joined the English-language network of the Doha-based Al Jazeera and became a worldwide story himself while filling in as the correspondent in Cairo.

Actor Richard Roxburgh as jailed journalist Peter Greste in The Correspondent alongside Al Jazeera colleagues Mohammed Fahmy and Baher Mohammed. Image: The Correspondent/RNZ

Greste and two Egyptian colleagues, Baher Mohamed and Mohamed Fahmy, were arrested in late 2013 on trumped-up charges of aiding and abetting the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation labeled “terrorist” by the new Egyptian regime of the time.

Six months later he was sentenced to seven years in jail for “falsifying news” and smearing the reputation of Egypt itself. Mohamed was sentenced to 10 years.

Media organisations launched an international campaign for their freedom with the slogan “Journalism is not a crime”. Peter’s own family became familiar faces in the media while working hard for his release too.

Peter Greste was deported to Australia in February 2015. The deal stated he would serve the rest of his sentence there, but the Australian government did not enforce that. Instead, Greste became a professor of media and journalism, currently at Macquarie University in Sydney.

Movie consultant
Among other things, he has also been a consultant on The Correspondent — now in cinemas around New Zealand — with Richard Roxborough cast as Greste himself.

Greste told The Sydney Morning Herald he had to watch it “through his fingers” at first.

Australian professor of journalism Peter Greste …. posing for a photograph when he was an Al Jazeera journalist in Kibati village, near Goma, in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo on 7 August 2013. Image: IFEX media freedom/APR

“I eventually came to realise it’s not me that’s up there on the screen. It’s the product of a whole bunch of creatives. And the result is … more like a painting rather than a photograph,” Greste told Mediawatch.

“Over the years I’ve written about it, I’ve spoken about it countless times. I’ve built a career on it. But I wasn’t really anticipating the emotional impact of seeing the craziness of my arrest, the confusion of that period, the claustrophobia of the cell, the sheer frustration of the crazy trial and the really discombobulating moment of my release.

“But there is another very difficult story about what happened to a colleague of mine in Somalia, which I haven’t spoken about publicly. Seeing that on screen was actually pretty gut-wrenching.”

In 2005, his BBC colleague Kate Peyton was shot alongside him on their first day in on assignment in Somalia. She died soon after.

“That was probably the toughest day of my entire life far over and above anything I went through in Egypt. But I am glad that they put it in [The Correspondent]. It underlines … the way in which journalism is under attack. What happened to us in Egypt wasn’t a random, isolated incident — but part of a much longer pattern we’re seeing continue to this day.”

Supporters of the jailed British-Egyptian human rights activist Alaa Abd el-Fattah take part in a candlelight vigil outside Downing Street in London, United Kingdom, as he begins a complete hunger strike while world leaders arrive for COP27 climate summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, in 2022. Image: RNZ Mediawatch/AFP

‘Owed his life’
Greste says he “owes his life” to fellow prisoner Alaa Abd El-Fattah — an Egyptian activist who is also in the film.

“There’s a bit of artistic licence in the way it was portrayed but . . . he is easily one of the most intelligent, astute and charismatic humanitarians I’ve ever come across. He was one of the main pro-democracy activists who was behind the Arab Spring revolution in 2011 — a true democrat.

“He also inspired me to write the letters that we smuggled out of prison that described our arrest not as an attack on … what we’d actually come to represent. And that was press freedom.

“That helped frame the campaign that ultimately got me out. So, for both psychological and political reasons, I feel like I owe him my life.

“There was nothing in our reporting that confirmed the allegations against us. So I started to drag up all sorts of demons from the past. I started thinking maybe this is the universe punishing me for sins of the past. I was obviously digging up that particular moment as one of the most extreme and tragic moments. It took a long time for me to get past it.

“He’d been in prison a lot because of his activism, so he understood the psychology of it. He also understood the politics of it in ways that I could never do as a newcomer.”

“Unfortunately, he is still there. He should have been released on September 29th last year. His mother launched a hunger strike in London . . . so I actually joined her on hunger strike earlier this year to try and add pressure.

“If this movie also draws a bit of attention to his case, then I think that’s an important element.”

Another wrinkle
Another wrinkle in the story was the situation of his two Egyptian Al Jazeera colleagues.

Greste was essentially a stranger to them, having only arrived in Egypt shortly before their arrest.

The film shows Greste clashing with Fahmy, who later sued Al Jazeera. Fahmy felt the international pressure to free Greste was making their situation worse by pushing the Egyptian regime into a corner.

“To call it a confrontation is probably a bit of an understatement. We had some really serious arguments and sometimes they got very, very heated. But I want audiences to really understand Fahmy’s worldview in this film.

“He and I had very different understandings of what was going … and how those differences played out.

“I’ve got a hell of a lot of respect for him. He is like a brother to me. That doesn’t mean we always agreed with each other and doesn’t mean we always got on with each other like any siblings, I suppose.”

His colleagues were eventually released on bail shortly after Greste’s deportation in 2015.

Fahmy renounced his Egyptian citizenship and was later deported to Canada, while Mohamed was released on bail and eventually pardoned.

Retrial — all ‘reconvicted’
“After I was released there was a retrial … and we were all reconvicted. They were finally released and pardoned, but the pardon didn’t extend to me.

“I can’t go back because I’m still a convicted ‘terrorist’ and I still have an outstanding prison sentence to serve, which is a little bit weird. Any country that has an extradition treaty with Egypt is a problem. There are a fairly significant number of those across the Middle East and Africa.”

Greste told Mediawatch his conviction was even flagged in transit in Auckland en route from New York to Sydney. He was told he failed a character test.

“I was able to resolve it. I had some friends in Canberra and were able to sort it out, but I was told in no uncertain terms I’m not allowed into New Zealand without getting a visa because of that criminal record.

“If I’m traveling to any country I have to say … I was convicted on terrorism offences. Generally speaking, I can explain it, but it often takes a lot of bureaucratic process to do that.”

Greste’s first account of his time in jail — The First Casualty — was published in 2017. Most of the book was about media freedom around the world, lamenting that the numbers of journalists jailed and killed increased after his release.

Something that Greste also now ponders a lot in his current job as a professor of media and journalism.

Ten years on from that, it is worse again. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) says at least 124 journalists and media workers were killed last year, nearly two-thirds of them Palestinians killed by Israel in its war in Gaza.

The book has now been updated and republished as The Correspondent.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

April 20, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Federal Government of Somalia engages ISIS-Somalia with support from U.S. Forces

Source: United States AFRICOM

At the request of the Federal Government of Somalia, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) conducted a collective self-defense airstrike against ISIS-Somalia on April 18, 2025.

The airstrike occurred southeast of Bosasso, Puntland, in Northeastern Somalia.

AFRICOM, alongside the Federal Government of Somalia and Somali Armed Forces, continues to take action to degrade ISIS-Somalia’s ability to plan and conduct attacks that threaten the U.S. homeland, our forces, and our citizens abroad.

Specific details about units and assets will not be released to ensure continued operations security.

MIL Security OSI –

April 20, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Hirono, Omar Lead Colleagues in Condemning Trump’s Illegal Invocation of Alien Enemies Act, Demanding Answers About Deportees
Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Ilhan Omar (DFL-MN)

Lawmakers: “The government should not be able to falsely accuse individuals in the United States, including U.S. citizens, of gang membership and send them to foreign prisons without any judicial review or remedy.”
WASHINGTON, DC – Today, U.S. Representative Ilhan Omar (D-MN) and U.S. Senator Mazie K. Hirono (D-HI), a senior member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, led 13 of their colleagues in a letter to President Trump condemning his unlawful invocation of the Alien Enemies Actof 1798. The letter follows the Supreme Court’s recent decision to only allow Trump to continue rapid deportations under the statute if individuals are given notice and an opportunity to challenge the deportation. Senator Hirono and Representative Omar also lead the introduction of the Neighbors Not Enemies Act, legislation that would repeal the antiquated Alien Enemies Act.

“We write regarding your unlawful invocation of the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, resulting in noncitizens being deported without any due process, not to mention violating the requirement that the statute be invoked only in response to an act of war, predatory incursion, or invasion by a foreign government,” begin the lawmakers. “Our immigration laws can already hold gang members accountable and provide for their deportation. The government should not be able to falsely accuse individuals in the United States, including U.S. citizens, of gang membership and send them to foreign prisons without any judicial review or remedy.”

In 1798, President John Adams signed the “Alien and Sedition Acts” which was comprised of four bills: The Naturalization Act; the Alien Friends Act; the Sedition Act; and the Alien Enemies Act. Today, the Aliens Enemies Act (AEA) is the only one that remains in effect. The AEA allows the president to target foreign nationals of a specific country to be “apprehended, restrained, secured and removed” without due process during wartime.

The Act has only been invoked three times in American history: the War of 1812, World War I, and World War II. In their letter, the lawmakers assert that Tren de Aragua—a Venezuelan gang—does not qualify as an arm of the Venezuelan government.

“By claiming a foreign ‘invasion’ or ‘incursion,’ you are clearly attempting to suspend due process for noncitizens and speed up your mass deportation campaign,” the lawmakers continued. “Circumventing immigration law, and its requirement of verifiable evidence, will result in people with no gang affiliation being incorrectly targeted and deported.”

The lawmakers also emphasized that the Trump Administration’s choice of deportation sites will likely subject people to human rights abuses as El Salvador’s prisons are notorious for their inhumane conditions, including denial of medical care, lack of food, and outright torture.

“Over 260 people have died in those prisons in the last two and a half years, including some with signs of serious physical abuse,” wrote the lawmakers. “We should not subject individuals to mistreatment and more, much less individuals who have had no due process and have not been found guilty of any crimes.”

In their letter, the lawmakers also demand that the Trump Administration provide regular updates about the people who have already been deported, as well as information about deportees including their names, nationalities, ages, the number of individuals under the age of 18, and what evidence was used to determine whether an individual was a member of Tren de Aragua.

“Invoking the Alien Enemies Act does not make Americans safer,” concluded the lawmakers. “It endangers all of us, by removing due process protections and ignoring the plain text of the statute.”

In the Senate, this letter was also signed by Senators Cory Booker (D-NJ), Ed Markey (D-MA), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Alex Padilla (D-CA), Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), and Peter Welch (D-VT).

In the House, this letter was also signed by Representatives Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC), Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), Rashida Tlaib (D-MI), and Greg Casar (D-TX).

The full text of the letter is available here and below.

Dear President Trump:

We write regarding your unlawful invocation of the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, resulting in noncitizens being deported without any due process, not to mention violating the requirement that the statute be invoked only in response to an act of war, predatory incursion, or invasion by a foreign government. Our immigration laws can already hold gang members accountable and provide for their deportation. The government should not be able to falsely accuse individuals in the United States, including U.S. citizens, of gang membership and send them to foreign prisons without any judicial review or remedy. The Supreme Court, when confronted with the manner in which you conducted the removals, unanimously rejected the implementation and its corresponding lack of notice and opportunity to challenge individuals’ removals. Moreover, deporting these individuals to Salvadorian prisons will also subject them to inhumane conditions, further exacerbating the legal issues in invoking the Alien Enemies Act.

The Alien Enemies Act was passed as part of the infamous Alien and Sedition Acts, and it was used during World War II to detain tens of thousands of innocent Japanese, German, and Italian individuals based on nothing but their ethnicity. This wartime use of the Alien Enemies Act served as a precursor to Executive Order 9066, resulting in the incarceration of 111,000 Japanese Americans. Those who were caught up in that xenophobic panic, as well as organizations like the Japanese American National Museum, have condemned your recent invocation of the act.

We reiterate that the plain language of the law limits the president’s use of the Alien Enemies Act to two enumerated situations: times of declared war, and times of invasion or “predatory incursion” by a foreign nation or government. The Act has only been invoked three times in American history: the War of 1812, World War I, and World War II. A Venezuelan gang does not qualify as an arm of the Venezuelan government.

By claiming a foreign “invasion” or “incursion,” you are clearly attempting to suspend due process for noncitizens and speed up your mass deportation campaign. Circumventing immigration law, and its requirement of verifiable evidence, will result in people with no gang affiliation being incorrectly targeted and deported. Multiple individuals who were subjected to the Alien Enemies Act had ongoing cases arguing that they were not members of Tren de Aragua. An attorney for one individual says that her client was mislabeled as a member of the gang due to a tattoo supporting the Spanish soccer team Real Madrid and for flashing the popular hand symbol for “rock and roll.” Another individual is a tattoo artist. A third individual was a make-up artist who was seeking asylum due to his sexual orientation.

Aside from these foregoing concerns, your choice of deportation sites will likely subject people to human rights abuses. El Salvador’s prisons are notorious for their inhumane conditions, including denial of medical care, lack of food, and outright torture. Over 260 people have died in those prisons in the last two and a half years, including some with signs of serious physical abuse. An Amnesty International UK report accused the Salvadorian authorities of a “systematic policy of torture towards all those detained.” The specific prison that will house the deported individuals, the Center for Terrorism Confinement (CECOT), has been described as a place “to dispose of people without formally applying the death penalty.” According to a Times reporter who watched the individuals be transferred to CECOT, the “intake began with slaps.” When detainees fell due to how quickly they were being moved, they were kicked, slapped, and shoved. One person asked for his mom and cried. He was slapped again. We should not subject individuals to mistreatment and more, much less individuals who have had no due process and have not been found guilty of any crimes.

At this point, we request that you provide us with information and regular updates on the following:
1. The names, nationalities, and ages of the people sent to El Salvador to be imprisoned in CECOT, including the number of individuals under the age of 18;
2. What evidence was used to determine that each individual was a member of Tren de Aragua;
3. The overall estimated costs and sources of funding associated with detaining and deporting these individuals; and
4. The procedures for individuals to challenge your administration’s determination that they are a member of Tren de Aragua, either here in the United States or in El Salvador, including how much time you provide to individuals to mount a legal challenge.
In closing, invoking the Alien Enemies Act does not make Americans safer. It endangers all of us, by removing due process protections and ignoring the plain text of the statute. We urge you to abandon this decision.

###
MIL OSI USA News –
April 19, 2025

Category: terrorism

Focused, 2-day capacity building programme for electoral field functionaries from Bihar begins229 BLOs, 12 EROs and 2 DEOs take part in the training program at IIIDEM in the National Capital

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

Cantwell Statement on Terrorist Attack in Jammu and Pahalgam

India hosts inaugural Capacity Building Programme for Central Asian Republics on combating terrorism financingSenior experts from five Central Asian countries of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan participated in knowledge exchange

Lawmakers: “The government should not be able to falsely accuse individuals in the United States, including U.S. citizens, of gang membership and send them to foreign prisons without any judicial review or remedy.”

Focused, 2-day capacity building programme for electoral field functionaries from Bihar begins

229 BLOs, 12 EROs and 2 DEOs take part in the training program at IIIDEM in the National Capital

India hosts inaugural Capacity Building Programme for Central Asian Republics on combating terrorism financing

Senior experts from five Central Asian countries of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan participated in knowledge exchange