NewzIntel.com

Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump’s Gaza and Ukraine plans come under the spotlight

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate Editor

    Steve Bannon may no longer be in Donald Trump’s inner circle, but the newly reinstated US president appears to be adhering to a dictum the conservative disrupter-in-chief outlined back in 2018 as he reflected on his role in getting Trump elected the first time. “The Democrats don’t matter. The real opposition is the media. And the way to deal with them is to flood the zone with shit.”

    It’s fair to say that for the first two weeks of Trump’s second presidency the Democrats haven’t really mattered. But Trump and his advisers have got news organisations struggling to work out which way to look.

    In any normal news cycle, the appointment of vaccine-sceptic RFK Jnr. as health secretary would dominate the headlines, as would the successful installation of any of the more bizarre Trump cabinet picks. But at the same time the media has had to deal with a steady stream of other attention-grabbing announcements: the idea that the US could one way or the other acquire Greenland from Denmark, for instance, or the threats to use force to take control of the Panama Canal. We’ve had conflicting statements about how to end the war in Ukraine (more of which later) and the now you see them, now you don’t tariff threats against Mexico and Canada, not to mention the idea that the latter could be incorporated as the 51st state of the USA.

    The zone has been well and truly flooded. Meanwhile, the administration’s plan to take complete control of the civil service (which appears to be straight out of the Project 2025 playbook) has proceeded apace with career public servants being dismissed in their droves to make way for true Maga (Make America Great Again) believers in key roles. This, needless to say, has struggled for attention in light of all the eye-catching news stories.

    Sign up to receive our weekly World Affairs Briefing newsletter from The Conversation UK. Every Thursday we’ll bring you expert analysis of the big stories in international relations.

    This week’s big idea has to do with his vision for a post-conflict Gaza. Trump foreshadowed this plan last week when he announced he was talking with the leaders of Egypt and Jordan about resettling Gazans there – whether permanently or just for a period of reconstruction of Gaza was not clear, his statement was short on detail. But this week, hosting the Israeli prime minister in Washington (significantly the first foreign leader to visit since his inauguration), Trump expanded on his vision while Benjamin Netanyahu looked on approvingly.

    Initially, it appeared that Trump’s plan was for the permanent relocation of all 2.2 million Gazans to other countries while the Trump administration and its allies considered the considerable real estate investment opportunities presented by turning the 360km² Gaza Strip, with its 40km Mediterranean coastline into the “Middle East Riviera”. But as Simon Mabon notes here, administration officials were later quick to insist that the relocation would only last for as long as it takes to rebuild the stricken enclave.

    Mabon, professor of international relations at the University of Lancaster who specialises in Middle East politics, also notes that the proposal did what few other issues seem able to do: united the Arab nations in opposition. He also believes that while both Egypt and Jordan have signed peace deals with Israel, the relationship is often fractious and this latest announcement won’t have helped.

    Most importantly, perhaps, will be the reaction of Saudi Arabia. Israel (with Washington’s encouragement) has been pursuing normalisation of relations with Riyadh for some years. But the Saudi ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has explicitly rejected “any attempts to displace the Palestinians from their land as well as affirming that relations with Israel would depend on the establishment of a Palestinian state.



    Read more:
    What Trump’s proposal to ‘take over’ Gaza could mean for Arab-Israeli relations

    It’s not the first time, by any means, that the idea of clearing Gaza of Palestinians has been mooted. It’s not even the first time that the real estate investment potential of such a plan has been discussed by a senior Trump official. Back in March last year, Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and former senior adviser who was the architect of Trump’s 2020 peace plan, talked up the idea of resettling Gazans in the Negev desert while noting that “Gaza’s waterfront property could be very valuable”.

    Israel’s far-right settler movement, meanwhile, has long yearned to empty out the strip. In December 2023 the leader of the Nachala Israeli settlement movement, Daniella Weiss, declared that Gaza City had always been “one of the cities of Israel. We’re just going back. There was a historical mistake and now we are fixing it.”

    The relocation of Palestinians outside Palestine was actually part of the founding mission of UN agency Unrwa – which, incidentally was banned by Israel last week and has been defunded by the US since allegations surfaced last year that a number of Unrwa employees had taken part in the Hamas attacks on October 2023.

    Anne Irfan of University College London, a specialist in refugees and displacement, and Jo Kelcey of the Lebanese American University, whose core research area covers the politics of education in marginalised communities such as Gaza, recount here that Unrwa was set up in 1949 following the Nakba (catastrophe) when more than 700,000 Palestinians were displaced in fighting before and after the foundation of the State of Israel.

    Unrwa was set up with the aim of resettling the displaced people and sponsoring projects that would create jobs and promote economic development in their new host countries: the “works” in the agency’s title.

    As Irfan and Kelcey note, the staunchest opponents of this plan were Palestinians themselves. They could read between the lines of this mission, that their exile was intended to be permanent. It was a non-starter and within five years of Unrwa’s establishment the resettlement policy was shelved in favour of a focus on education, which remains to this day.

    Not that Trump would be keen to associate any plan of his with Unrwa. In 2018 he fully defunded the agency, the first time a US president has done this. He has also more recently extended Joe Biden’s suspension of Unrwa funding after the allegations of Hamas infiltration and has made it clear he supports Netanyahu’s ban on the agency operating in Israel.



    Read more:
    Trump plans to ‘permanently resettle’ Palestinians outside Gaza – the very reason Unrwa was originally created

    Meanwhile, how would the Gaza plan sit in terms of Trump’s “America First” strategy? Mark Shanahan, of the University of Surrey, believes this is all part of what he refers to here as “Trumperialism”. It’s not so much America as the light on the hill, trying to find a way to fix global problems and seek peaceful solutions to dangerous and distressing conflicts. Rather, in this case at least, it sees Gaza as “an opportunity for American business to build wealth – the classic US economic hegemony of the populist America First political theory”.

    Rather than emulating the Marshall plan of what feels now like a more enlightened era, Trump’s plan for Gaza, at least as he laid it out after his meeting with Netanyahu, is more akin to the plan for the rebuilding of Iraq after the 2003 invasion, writes Shanahan. That is: US private funding for beachside condos and luxury developments while the countries to whom the displaced Palestinians are relocated would be expected to pay for the privilege.

    But Trump also hinted this might mean US boots on the ground in the Middle East, cautions Shanahan, adding that “delivering Mar-a-Lago on the Med may mean thousands of American combat troops deployed to Gaza for years at daily risk of death. How do main-street Americans benefit from that?”



    Read more:
    How Trump’s Gaza plan does – and doesn’t – fit in with his pledge to put America first

    And if you wondered whether – like so many of Trump’s big plans and executive orders issued since his second inauguration – the Gaza Riviera scheme might fall foul of the law, it would. As Tamer Morris –
    an expert in international law at the University of Sydney – explains, the US would require the consent of the Palestinian people to take control of Gaza. And this is not going to happen.

    Forced relocation is forbidden under the Geneva Conventions as is helping another state forcibly relocate people. It could also be interpreted as ethnic cleansing, as defined by the Commission of Experts report on the former state of Yugoslavia to the UN Security Council in 1994.



    Read more:
    Trump wants the US to ‘take over’ Gaza and relocate the people. Is this legal?

    Meanwhile in Ukraine

    Meanwhile, the US president has also been making noises about his ideas for bringing peace to Ukraine. The latest, aired this week, involved linking continuing US support with favourable concessions on Ukraine’s supply of rare earths and other strategic resources. Stefan Wolff, of the University of Birmingham, has been watching the diplomatic manoeuvrings around Trump, Putin, Xi and Ukraine since the war began nearly three years ago. In the past fortnight, he’s been looking at the prospect of a peace deal brokered by the US.

    Wolff thinks it unlikely that anything will be resolved in the foreseeable future beyond a ceasefire and freezing of the battle lines. And that’s not even much more than a distant possibility given that neither Kyiv nor the Kremlin seem to want this for reasons of their own.



    Read more:
    Trump’s vision of a peace deal for Ukraine is limited to a ceasefire – and it’s not even clear if Kyiv or Moscow are going to play ball

    The possibility of Europe bearing the burden of maintaining support to Ukraine without the US bearing the lion’s share of the burden also looks remote. Domestic politics in many EU member states is threatening the bloc’s unity – and, in any case, the ability of Europe to make up the shortfall caused by a possible US withdrawal of aid to Ukraine is distinctly doubtful. And unlikely improve any time soon.



    Read more:
    Ukraine: prospects for peace are slim unless Europe grips the reality of Trump’s world

    It appears, meanwhile, that Putin’s ally Kim Jong-un is poised to send another wave of North Koreans to help. Jennifer Mathers, of Aberystwyth University, takes a detailed look at what we know about how these troops have fared thus far. She concludes that, given the terribly heavy losses the North Korean units are reported to be suffering, it’s possible that their leader may be trading the high casualty rate for much-needed combat experience in case his army might want to fight in a conflict nearer to home.



    Read more:
    North Korea: Kim Jong-un is sending a second wave of soldiers to Ukraine – here’s why

    World Affairs Briefing from The Conversation UK is available as a weekly email newsletter. Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox.

    – ref. Trump’s Gaza and Ukraine plans come under the spotlight – https://theconversation.com/trumps-gaza-and-ukraine-plans-come-under-the-spotlight-249311

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Why supermarkets are siding with farmers over inheritance tax

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Kamran Mahroof, Associate Professor, Supply Chain Analytics, University of Bradford

    John Gomez/Shutterstock.com

    In recent years, British farmers have faced growing pressures, from Brexit to COVID and the Ukraine war. For some of them you can now add planned inheritance tax (IHT) reforms – announced in the budget last autumn – to that list.

    The proposals to cut certain agricultural reliefs sparked protests by farmers across the UK. Currently, farms benefit from 100% relief on agricultural and business assets, but from 2026 the relief will be capped at £1 million, with excess taxed at 20% (half the usual rate). Exactly how many farms will be affected is not yet clear but estimates range between a quarter and a third.

    Farming associations and the government have clashed over this in recent months. Some sections of the public have backed the protesting farmers and voiced their frustration after the announcement.

    But more recently, there has been support from a different – and unexpected – quarter. Seeing UK supermarkets enter the fray and highlight the concerns of farmers adds fuel to the already heated debate.

    The big chains have long faced accusations of unfair treatment towards farmers, using their might to press suppliers for the lowest prices and reportedly forcing some out of business in the process.

    So what has prompted supermarkets to speak out now? As a supply chain expert, I think there are several possible reasons.

    1. Empty shelves

    Simply put, the pressures on farmers can have far-reaching consequences for supermarket supply chains. A key reason for their support will be to avoid food shortages and empty shelves. There are many examples of supply chain disruptions leading to gaps in stores’ product lines, ultimately affecting the customer experience and supermarket profits.

    UK food supply chains are under increasing pressure. Disruptions such as adverse weather, energy price hikes and even cyberattacks have highlighted the vulnerability of the UK’s food system.

    Farmers have also demonstrated their ability in the past to cause disruption to food supply chains by protesting over cheap imports. Mass and sustained farmer protests could turn off the tap to the UK’s food supply, as happened in the Netherlands in 2022. UK supermarkets will want to avoid this at all costs.

    2. Reliance on imports

    In the event that their IHT is unaffordable (those affected will have ten years to pay the tax, interest free), some farms may be forced to sell up, leading to reduced availability of locally grown produce. Limited supply of domestic produce will increase the dependence on imports, ultimately leading to increased costs for supermarkets (and so for consumers too) as well as uncertainty.

    The UK’s food supply depends on global regions, seasonal shifts and complex sourcing to maintain fresh produce year round. Increased reliance on imports, combined with post-Brexit import charges is neither ideal nor sustainable for supermarkets.

    3. Reduced competition

    Supermarkets have a vested interest in maintaining competitive prices. Fewer agricultural producers essentially means less competition. This could mean supermarkets having less bargaining power with suppliers and a diminished ability to meet consumer demand for variety and quality.

    This could lead to higher prices in stores, potentially undermining supermarkets’ messaging around their competitive edge over smaller retailers.

    4. Public image

    Ultimately this move does supermarkets no harm. UK chains are both the backbone and the bane of farming. A handful of supermarkets dominate the food supply market, setting the prices farmers receive and shaping the structure of agricultural production.

    Supermarkets are often accused of exploiting farmers through their purchasing power, by dictating prices and imposing inflexible quotas. So their support for farmers could help with their public image. Aligning themselves with farmers offers them the opportunity to position themselves as protectors of the agricultural sector, boosting their public image while pressuring policymakers to take action.

    But will it change anything? Well, supermarkets have economic clout – and having their support is better than not having it.

    Historically, supermarkets have shown their collective ability to lobby. Their opposition to supermarket price caps, support for plastic reduction initiatives and even influencing policy in the wake of Brexit highlight how pressure from the big stores can shape national conversations.

    No one wants a return to empty supermarket shelves.
    Kauka Jarvi/Shutterstock

    All this, ultimately, is to ensure supermarkets can continue to serve customers with competitive prices. But who is paying for the UK’s cheap food culture?

    While supermarket dominance has led to lower prices for shoppers and even reduced inflation, it also exposes broader systemic issues within the UK’s food culture. Despite a recent study revealing that UK food costs were about 7% below the EU average, food prices remain a top concern for consumers in the UK.

    Farmers were not the only ones protesting. Migrant fruit and vegetable pickers staged a smaller demonstration, over claims of exploitation by farms.

    Either customers need to be prepared to pay more for their food, or supermarkets need to revisit their pricing strategies. Something has to give, and it appears that this time it cannot be the farmers or agricultural workers.

    While many farmers in the UK are asset-rich they are often cash-poor, frequently relying on wafer-thin profit margins to get by. Supermarkets may have a lot to lose if IHT reforms lead to lots of farmers leaving the sector.

    Protecting supply chains, maintaining cost structures and ultimately offering a stable, affordable domestic supply of produce is in their best interests. In the end, it may not be the farmers but the supermarkets who stand to gain (or lose) the most.

    Kamran Mahroof does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Why supermarkets are siding with farmers over inheritance tax – https://theconversation.com/why-supermarkets-are-siding-with-farmers-over-inheritance-tax-248234

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: How Trump’s Gaza plan does – and doesn’t – fit in with his pledge to put America first

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Mark Shanahan, Associate Professor of Political Engagement, University of Surrey

    Donald Trump welcomed the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to the White House on February 4 as the first foreign leader to visit Washington since his reelection as US president. At their post-meeting press conference, an unscripted Trump launched into his vision for a post-conflict Gaza.

    In just a few sentences, he expunged any remaining Palestinian hopes for a two-state solution in Israel. Trump suggested flattening what remains of the Palestinian settlement after 15 months of total war and forcing nearly 2 million people out of Gaza to make way for a US-controlled “Riviera of the Middle East”.

    As ever, the president was light on detail. But his outwardly reasonable suggestion for the fate of the Palestinian people was chilling: “You build really good quality housing, like a beautiful town, like some place where they can live and not die, because Gaza is a guarantee that they’re going to end up dying,” he told reporters.

    The secretary of state, Marco Rubio, has since clarified that the proposal to resettle Gaza’s population would only be temporary, while debris was cleared and reconstruction took place. And the White House spokeswoman, Karoline Leavitt, has now reinforced this point.

    Trump re-entered the White House intent on driving an “America First” policy, both in economic terms and as the central platform of all foreign engagement. This, as Trump outlined in a speech in 2016, essentially means putting the “interests of the American people and American security above all else”.

    While already claiming responsibility for the recent Gaza ceasefire, which has seen the exchange of a number of Israeli hostages for Palestinian prisoners, he used Netanyahu’s visit as a means to up the ante of bringing peace to the Middle East.

    It’s here that “Trumperialism” comes to the fore. He sees Gaza not as a problem of war and people displacement, but as an opportunity for American business to build wealth – the classic US economic hegemony of the populist America First political theory.

    Trump’s vision for Gaza is much more akin to the post-2011 rebuilding of Iraq than, say, the European economic recovery after the second world war. There’s no sign of any Marshall Plan for Gaza and, while US private funding may flood in to build beachfront condos and gated playgrounds for the wealthy, it seems Trump expects Israel’s neighbours to pay for the exodus of the Palestinian people and their settlement on foreign soil.

    “They say they’re not going to accept,” Trump reportedly said of Egypt and Jordan’s opposition to relocating Palestinians during a meeting with Netanyahu in the Oval Office. “I say they will.” Trump has spent the past two weeks urging Jordan and Egypt to take hundreds of thousands more Palestinian refugees each as part of his vision to “clean out Gaza”.

    As ever, there is no nuance in Trump’s thinking. It is purely transactional: the US benefits and Trump himself – as the peacemaker – benefits most. So, in this sense, his vision for Gaza can certainly be seen as putting America First. But Trump’s Gaza proposal will chill many Americans, much as it has drawn scorn and disbelief from around the world.

    Foreign relations rarely raise a ripple among the domestic US audience and, on the surface, the strengthening of the US-Israel special relationship will be cheered by many who voted for Trump. This is, not least, because of the strong Judeo-Christian links that unite the pioneer cultures of Israel and the US heartland.

    However, in his White House news conference, Trump implied that he’s willing to put American boots on the ground to secure Gaza. “We’ll do what is necessary. If it’s necessary, we’ll do that,” he responded when pressed on the issue. Members of Trump’s cabinet have since backed away from the suggestion, but the prospect of US troops being sent to Gaza is not exactly delivering on the isolationist tendency many US voters cast their ballot for.

    Trump does not like war. He is equivocal in his support for Ukraine, and has repeatedly threatened to withdraw the US from Nato. He believes that every problem can be solved by making a deal. But delivering Mar-a-Lago on the Med may mean thousands of American combat troops deployed to Gaza for years at daily risk of death. How do main-street Americans benefit from that?

    Sowing chaos

    At this stage, Trump’s proposal isn’t any kind of fully fledged plan. But his pronouncements still sow chaos. Already there’s massive fear among the Palestinian people. It’s clear that Trump sides firmly with the state of Israel and has no time for the Palestinian cause. That could well embolden what remains of Hamas, never mind the group’s allies in Lebanon, Syria and Iran, to stage attacks on Israel.

    It is already emboldening far-right nationalists in Netanyahu’s government to call for the Israeli military to finish the extermination of Hamas. Itamar Ben Gvir, who was until recently a member of Netanyahu’s cabinet, said in a post on X that “encouraging” Gazans to migrate was the only correct strategy to end the war in Gaza. If fundamentalists such as Ben Gvir gain the upper hand again, the fragile peace in Gaza will disappear.

    Trump envisaged palm trees and golf courses for a US-controlled, Israeli-enabled Gaza in his remarks. He just didn’t envisage more than a few Palestinians being there. Such a crude imposition of US economic and military hegemony won’t bring peace and is far more likely to plunge Gaza – and potentially the wider region – back into the terrors of war.

    Mark Shanahan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. How Trump’s Gaza plan does – and doesn’t – fit in with his pledge to put America first – https://theconversation.com/how-trumps-gaza-plan-does-and-doesnt-fit-in-with-his-pledge-to-put-america-first-249196

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: NFU Scotland conference 2025 – UK Government keynote address

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 2

    Today (Thursday, 6 February) UK Government Scotland Office Minister Kirsty McNeill spoke at the NFU Scotland conference in Glasgow.

    Good morning everyone, thank you for inviting me to be here with you today. I’d like to thank Martin Kennedy for that kind introduction and congratulate him for his work in leading the NFUS as he finishes his term as your President.

    I’d also like to start with a huge thanks for your dedicated work in continuing to produce, gather and distribute top quality food across the whole of the UK. But more than that, thank you to all farmers and crofters for the central role you play in our national life and heritage in Scotland.

    Despite countless challenges – not least the famous Scottish climate – farmers continue to work tirelessly, day after day, to feed the United Kingdom, and further afield.

    And be in no doubt, the UK Government will continue to do our part in supporting Scottish farmers and crofters, who form such a central part of our rural and island communities.

    Of course, the majority of environmental policy is devolved, with agriculture policy fully devolved. We will continue to respect the devolution settlement and strengthen relations with the Scottish Government as part of our ongoing resetting of relations.

    But there is much we can and are doing for farming and rural communities more broadly through our Plan for Change to turbo-charge economic growth and deliver a decade of national renewal and opportunity for all.

    Now, let’s be real. I know what you want to ask me about today. And I know that you’re angry. So I’m not going to shy away from a conversation about APR. But I do want to contextualise it. It’s the job of the NFU to make the case for your members. And it’s the job of the UK Government to listen, yes, but to also take a broad and long term view, balancing competing perspectives.

    And the facts are these. The UK Government’s Autumn Budget last year delivered the largest settlement for the Scottish Government in the history of devolution.

    The Chancellor announced on 30 October an additional £1.5 billion for the Scottish Government to spend in this financial year, and an additional £3.4 billion in the next.

    The Scottish Government will be able to allocate this record funding to devolved areas, including agriculture and rural communities. And that does mean your interests will be weighed alongside other devolved policy areas – that’s devolution in action. But I hope you will also see the benefit to your members of this record investment we’ve made available for Scotland’s public services. Because you know better than anyone that our farming communities are too often the ones with the worst access to NHS services. Public transport is sparse or non-existent. Cuts to schools and local services often hit your families harder than those in our big cities. I’m proud of this investment into the Scottish Government and I hope you will come to be too.

    And where policy is reserved, such as in relation to immigration or international trade, we will help support the industry through continuous engagement and development of policy. This is how devolution should work, and we are determined that it does.

    Our new Food Strategy will deliver clear long-term outcomes that create a healthier, fairer, and more resilient food system. We will work together with the Scottish government to complement the progress that they have already made in this area.

    Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine sent shock waves across the global supply chain, and the price of fertilisers and energy bills skyrocketed. That is one reason why we have launched our Clean Power 2030 Action Plan. By sprinting towards clean, homegrown energy, we will protect our energy security from international shocks, create thousands of good quality jobs, tackle climate change and drive down bills for good.

    We are taking some bold steps, including by setting up Great British Energy. This new, homegrown energy company – headquartered here in Scotland – will provide a catalyst for new, clean energy projects across the UK.

    Unpredictable weather has been causing floods and droughts as the climate continues to change, directly impacting crop production and, consequently, your profits. This hits particularly hard in areas that are less favourable for farming, and there are many of these in Scotland.

    This industry is resilient. I am in awe of everyone in this room who contributes to our food security, our rural and island communities and the growth of the UK economy. But let me make one thing clear – this Government does not take your resilience and adaptability for granted.

    My own constituency of Midlothian is dotted with farms and farmers, many of whom I have had the pleasure of meeting both as I campaigned, and in my first proud months as their representative in Parliament.

    I know that there is no substitute for meeting people in the places they live and work, on their terms. I have carried this principle into my first months as a Minister in the Scotland Office. On one of my very first ministerial visits last year I met with Lucy and Pete Grewar, who own Sheriffton Farm in Perthshire.

    I was there to discuss their challenges in finding staff to help pick their broccoli, and made a promise to come back with a Home Office ministerial colleague to visit Scotland to hear about these issues directly. I was thrilled that we were able to do that earlier this week when alongside NFUS representatives, Seema Malhotra, the Minister for Migration and Citizenship, and I visited a soft fruit farm in Aberdeenshire.

    Whilst on the farm, Seema and I had further discussion with the owners and NFUS about the Seasonal Workers; Visa scheme and how labour shortages impact their work, but also the need to drive economic growth and encourage domestic workers to take up these vital jobs.

    I also had similarly frank and productive conversations with crofters on the Isle of Lewis. We will continue to engage with you, and I will continue to invite my UK Government colleagues to come up to Scotland and hear directly from rural communities what they need.

    I value every single one of these visits as it gives me the opportunity to really hear from the people who are directly impacted by Government policy, and who also help us achieve our goals of food security, sustainability, Net Zero, economic growth, and countless others.

    And I just want to reassure you that I really listen in these conversations and I do, personally, read everything that I am sent in follow up. So if you have evidence you want me to read, stories you want me to hear or places you want me to visit I give you my word: you will always get a hearing from me. Just be in touch.

    Now there are four areas of UK Government policy that I want to focus on in the time I have left.

    Firstly, inheritance tax.

    This Government was forced to make many difficult decisions when it came into power due to our own challenging inheritance of the £22 billion financial black hole in public finances left by the previous Conservative administration.

    We could have just ignored it. We could have kicked the problem down the road. But when we stood for election we promised to take the hard choices head on. We needed to act.

    I know many of you in this room don’t agree with how we responded and feel let down. So I want you to hear in my own words, as someone who represents farmers right across my own constituency, why the Government made this decision.

    Under the current system, APR and BPR have granted 100% relief since 1992 on business and agricultural assets. However, this is heavily skewed towards the very wealthiest landowners and business owners.

    According to the latest data from HMRC, 40% of agricultural property relief is claimed by just 7% of UK estates making claims. That means that just 117 estates across the UK were claiming over £200 million of relief in 2021-22.

    Unfortunately, we also know that the reality today is that buying agricultural land is one of the most well-known ways to avoid inheritance tax.

    This has artificially inflated the price of farmland, locking younger farmers out of the market.

    None of this is either fair or sustainable. That is why we are reforming how agricultural and business property relief work. From April 2026, relief will be targeted in a way that still maintains significant tax relief while supporting the public finances, and protecting working people.

    I would like to thank Martin and his colleagues at NFUS for their helpful engagement with myself and the Secretary of State for Scotland, Ian Murray, on this issue. I am grateful for the dialogue we have had and will continue to have.

    We have had a disagreement, not a falling out – a difference of opinion on one question should not – must not – prevent us from talking about all the others. And talking is what we will continue to do. We will continue to engage with stakeholders in meetings like this and on farms, and we will continue to strengthen relations with the Scottish Government, respecting the fact that agriculture policy is devolved. 

    That’s why in the coming months the Scotland Office will host a food and farming roundtable where we will invite the industry and the Scottish Government to sit together and discuss these important issues. This will allow us to keep these conversations going.

    Now I would like to further address the devolved agriculture budget.

    I appreciate the vital role Scottish agriculture plays in rural communities and the economy in Scotland. The Secretary of State for Scotland wrote to the Defra Minister for Rural Affairs and Food Security outlining this prior to the Autumn Budget.

    And at the Budget, Defra announced the biggest budget for sustainable food production and nature recovery in history. This included £620m for Scotland for 2025-2026, baselined from last year. This is an above-population share, and the ringfence was removed to respect the devolution settlement – meaning it is for the Scottish Government to determine how they support farmers and rural communities with the public services they rely on.

    But we did not stop there. We wanted to address the issues rural communities face holistically – and the Autumn Budget delivered on that.

    The fuel duty freeze extension means that rural communities who depend on cars, vans and tractors will be able to save more of their income.

    The Budget also gave the go ahead for rural growth deals in Scotland, such as for Argyll and Bute, creating hundreds of jobs and countless opportunities for rural and island communities there.

    We recognise how important it is for rural areas, especially in Scotland, to have the same broadband connectivity and opportunities as the rest of the UK, so we announced in the Budget last year an additional £500 million for Project Gigabit and the Shared Rural Network.

    Next I would like to touch on seasonal workers, referred to earlier.

    While we are not currently considering a Scotland-only visa, this Government knows how important securing the right workforce is to the agri-food chain. This includes skilled jobs such as butchers and vets and temporary roles, such as seasonal horticulture harvesting and poultry processing jobs.

    Underlining the government’s commitment to the horticultural and poultry industry, the Seasonal Worker visa route has been confirmed for 2025, with a total of 43,000 Seasonal Worker visas available for horticulture and 2,000 for poultry next year.

    This will help the sector secure the labour and skills needed to bring high quality British produce, including strawberries, rhubarb, turkey and daffodils to market.

    In addition, Defra published the 2023 Seasonal Workers Survey report on 21 October 2024. 

    The survey showed that the vast majority of respondents reported a positive experience from their time in the UK and 95% expressed a desire to return. This excellent feedback reflects so well on farmers and the vibrancy of rural communities.

    When I visited a Perthshire farm weeks into office, the clearest thing I heard was that Scotland’s farmers wanted a hearing at the Home Office – I promised then that I’d try to bring a Home Office minister to Scotland to hear from farmers directly and that’s a promise kept. Just two days ago I was in a farm in Aberdeenshire with Seema Malhotra, the immigration minister, hearing about how seasonal worker rules could be made to work better for you. The door is always open and so are our minds – we want an ongoing relationship with a practical focus on getting things done.

    -And finally, just let me say something on future trade deals.

    Supporting farmers will always be a priority for this Government. We have been clear we will protect farmers from being undercut by low welfare and low standards in trade deals.

    We will continue to maintain our existing high standards for animal Health and food hygiene, ensuring that imported products comply with our domestic standards and import requirements.

    We are committed to developing a trade strategy that will support economic growth and promote the highest standards of food production.

    The UK has a network of sixteen agrifood and drink attachés around the world who break down market access barriers, create new export opportunities and protect existing trade. Our attachés work closely with Scottish Development International’s global network on delivering market access / export opportunities for Scotland.

    Promoting Scotland internationally through initiatives such as Brand Scotland – a new initiative led by my department backed by three quarters of a million pounds of funding – is a priority for this Government, and these export opportunities are an excellent way to do that.

    In addition, we will seek to negotiate a Sanitary and Phytosanitary agreement with the EU to reduce trade frictions, boost trade and deliver significant benefits on both sides.

    I want to reiterate my commitment to you that this Government will do everything it can to support you, listen to you and advocate for you, to ensure we not only protect but also maximise the potential of this incredible industry.

    Let me end by saying that it has been the honour of my life to serve as MP of Midlothian since July of last year, so I am here today telling you that I will fight for you as a Minister, but I also understand the views of my constituents. Many of them have the same concerns as you.

    Many of them are either farmers themselves, or live in a rural community where farming is a crucial backbone.

    And I want to assure you I understand your importance is more than the material benefits you bring – important though that is. Alongside farming, tourism and heritage are also in my portfolio. I treasure Scotland’s vibrant national museums, and the National Museum of Rural Life is no different – it’s a beautiful, living tribute to Scottish farming and rural life.

    Every time I visit, I can feel the importance of farming to the Scottish identity. I know that all you want is to be able to do what you are good at, what you love.

    It is my duty and that of this Government to ensure you have everything you need to do that, to protect your place in this extremely important endeavour. I promise you we will not let you down. It’s just too important.

    I am going to take a few questions now. Thank you to NFUS for inviting me here today, and to all of you for coming along. I wish you the very best for the rest of your conference.

    Updates to this page

    Published 6 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI: Drone Operations Industry Substantially Expanding Usages, Transforming into A Billion Dollar Revenue Opportunity

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    PALM BEACH, Fla., Feb. 06, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — FN Media Group News Commentary – Drones play many roles in every region of the globe… and they seem to be utilized in more situations every day! A report from MarketsAndMarkets said that the Commercial Drone market alone is projected to grow from USD 5.32 billion in 2024 to USD 9.34 Billion by 2030. The report added: “Drones are particularly important for inspecting difficult-to-reach locations at certain altitudes or in contaminated surroundings. The use of drones has modernized the telecommunication tower scrutiny as they can be used to carry out supervision of these towers cost-effectively and in less time. Drones can also be employed for aerial evaluation of buildings and other infrastructures, such as pipelines, electric grids, offshore plants, and solar plates. They can use thermal imaging cameras to detect hotspots on solar plates; spots where energy is not spreading evenly. This can enhance the productivity of solar power plants by the instant identification of potentially problematic areas… Drones can be used to deliver medical supplies in difficult terrains. Drones are considered the future of the last-mile delivery for consumer supplies since they will reduce cost per delivery, along with delivery time. As the wages of delivery persons persist to rise, autonomous delivery or human-less services will become gradually advantageous, especially in developed countries… Emerging economies lack access to roads, and this hampers speedy delivery of basic medical supplies such as blood, medicines, vaccines, drugs, etc. Air transportation of these supplies is costly.” Active Companies in the markets today include ZenaTech, Inc. (NASDAQ: ZENA), Draganfly Inc. (NASDAQ: DPRO), Red Cat Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: RCAT), Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc. (NASDAQ: KTOS), Safe Pro Group Inc. (NASDAQ: SPAI).

    MarketsAndMarkets continued: “The success of drones in the fields of ecology and environment creates a trust factor that they can also be utilized in public health, especially to deliver medical couriers. The crucial aspect of using drones is that they reduce the travel time for diagnosis and treatment. Drones are a cost-effective replacement for road transportation in challenging terrains. Drones can be used in disaster relief processes for saving victims and delivering food, water, etc., to survivors and rescue teams. As drone technology advances, regulatory bodies globally are proactively shaping clearer and more supportive regulations to facilitate drone operations. This strategic initiative aims to lower operational barriers and enhance safety, thereby accelerating the adoption of drones across various sectors. Enhanced regulatory frameworks are anticipated to unlock significant business opportunities and drive innovation in drone applications.”

    ZenaTech (NASDAQ:ZENA) ZenaDrone Starts Testing its High-Density Batteries to Extend Flight Time for ZenaDrone 1000 Drone for US Defense Applications – ZenaTech, Inc. (FSE: 49Q) (BMV: ZENA) (“ZenaTech”), a technology company specializing in AI (Artificial Intelligence) drone, Drone as a Service (DaaS), enterprise SaaS and Quantum Computing solutions, announces that ZenaDrone will commence testing work this quarter on a high density battery for the ZenaDrone 1000 multifunction AI drone designed for defense and commercial applications. High density batteries are lightweight and enable longer drone flight times, more reliability and endurance for longer defense missions, heavier payloads, and greater operational success of a wide range of military applications. ZenaDrone will use the batteries from ZenaTech’s affiliated company Galaxy Batteries Inc.

    “High density batteries are key to longer flight times and reliability in the harsh conditions of military defense operations such as cargo and resupply, intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. We will test to ensure these batteries will provide the customization, cost savings, supply chain control and superior performance we require. This is important to our goal to become a Blue UAS-certified supplier to sell to US defense branches and other military organizations,” said CEO Shaun Passley, Ph.D.

    ZenaDrone 1000 is an autonomous multifunction drone offering stable flight, maneuverability, heavy lift capabilities, innovative software technology, sensors, AI, and purpose-built attachments, along with compact and rugged hardware engineered for military and industrial use. The company previously completed two paid trials with the US Air Force and the US Navy Reserve for logistics and transportation applications carrying critical cargo, such as blood, in the field.

    The company previously announced that its supply chain is fully NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act) compliant and that it plans to apply for Green UAS (Unmanned Aerial System) followed by Blue UAS certification, an approved supplier list for drone companies.

    NDAA compliance refers to adhering to the provisions outlined in the National Defense Authorization Act, which is a set of US federal laws passed every year that specify the budget and expenditures for the Department of Defense (DoD) and address growing cybersecurity concerns. For a product to be NDAA compliant, it must not be produced by a set list of Chinese manufacturers, which extends to the chipsets, cameras, displays and other technology used.

    The Blue UAS (Unmanned Aerial System) program is a stringent government approved supplier list of drone companies that wish to do business with the US DoD; suppliers including ZenaDrone must meet strict NDAA cybersecurity and supply chain sourcing requirements. The Green UAS program is essentially the same as the Blue UAS program but has a more streamlined and faster certification process without the specifications on country of origin.   Continued… Read this full release by visiting: https://www.financialnewsmedia.com/news-zena/

    Other recent developments in the drone industry include:

    Draganfly Inc. (NASDAQ: DPRO), an award‑winning leader in drone solutions and systems development, recently confirmed through recent sales activities its positioning and preparedness to support the enhancement of border security amid evolving global trade and security uncertainties and shifting geopolitical dynamics. Highlighting recent sales activities with policing agencies, Draganfly continues to strengthen its position to support border security with advanced drone technology solutions.

    “Recent global trade challenges, tariff uncertainties, and security concerns underscore the critical importance of secure borders and resilient supply chains,” said Cameron Chell, CEO of Draganfly Inc. “Our recent sales activities with policing agencies are a testament to our ability and readiness to provide drone technology and services in support of border security solutions.”

    Red Cat Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: RCAT), a drone technology company integrating robotic hardware and software for military, government, and commercial operations, recently announced that it will host an Investor and Analyst Day on Thursday, February 27 from 11:00 a.m. – 1:00 p.m. eastern time at the Nasdaq MarketSite in New York City.

    The event will feature presentations by Jeff Thompson, Red Cat’s CEO; Geoffrey Hitchcock, Red Cat’s chief revenue officer and other members of the executive leadership team. Robert Imig, Head of USG Research and Development at Palantir Technologies, Inc. (Nasdaq: PLTR) will also present a roadmap for its recently announced strategic partnership with RedCat.

    Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc. (NASDAQ: KTOS), a technology company in the defense, national security and global markets, recently announced that Kratos Unmanned Systems Division successfully executed a multi-week demonstration of its self-driving truck platooning system technology with FPInnovations, a Canadian research and technology organization that assesses, adapts and delivers solutions to Canada’s forest industry’s total value chain.

    The Kratos developed self-driving system “kit”, which enables vehicles to be capable of autonomous driving, was deployed for evaluation in forestry operations in northern Québec, Canada. Deployment of this technology is intended to mitigate driver shortages, improve safety protocols, boost rural economic vitality, and contribute to the development of a regulatory framework for autonomous vehicles. The automated platooning technology performed exceptionally well in the challenging forestry environment and hauled both unloaded and loaded timber trailers. The Kratos system demonstrated precision navigation in automated platooning mode along complex off-pavement roadways with degraded access to GPS, steep grades, severe visibility-limiting dust, sub-freezing temperatures, rain, and under variable day/night/twilight lighting conditions.

    Safe Pro Group Inc. (NASDAQ: SPAI), a leading provider of artificial intelligence (AI) solutions specializing in drone imagery processing, recently announced that it has entered into a multi-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with NIBULON Ltd. (NIBULON) to cooperate on addressing Ukraine’s agriculture crisis which has sustained billions in damages and losses due to the ongoing war.

    Safe Pro will provide NIBULON with services and access to SpotlightAI™, its patented hyper-scalable AI-powered drone demining ecosystem running on the Amazon Web Services (AWS) cloud. The collaboration will focus on utilizing AI technology to drastically reduce the time and costs of manually surveying Ukrainian farmland potentially contaminated by landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).

    About FN Media Group:

    At FN Media Group, via our top-rated online news portal at www.financialnewsmedia.com, we are one of the very few select firms providing top tier one syndicated news distribution, targeted ticker tag press releases and stock market news coverage for today’s emerging companies. #tickertagpressreleases #pressreleases

    Follow us on Facebook to receive the latest news updates: https://www.facebook.com/financialnewsmedia

    Follow us on Twitter for real time Market News: https://twitter.com/FNMgroup

    Follow us on Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/financialnewsmedia/

    DISCLAIMER: FN Media Group LLC (FNM), which owns and operates FinancialNewsMedia.com and MarketNewsUpdates.com, is a third party publisher and news dissemination service provider, which disseminates electronic information through multiple online media channels. FNM is NOT affiliated in any manner with any company mentioned herein. FNM and its affiliated companies are a news dissemination solutions provider and are NOT a registered broker/dealer/analyst/adviser, holds no investment licenses and may NOT sell, offer to sell or offer to buy any security. FNM’s market updates, news alerts and corporate profiles are NOT a solicitation or recommendation to buy, sell or hold securities. The material in this release is intended to be strictly informational and is NEVER to be construed or interpreted as research material. All readers are strongly urged to perform research and due diligence on their own and consult a licensed financial professional before considering any level of investing in stocks. All material included herein is republished content and details which were previously disseminated by the companies mentioned in this release. FNM is not liable for any investment decisions by its readers or subscribers.  Investors are cautioned that they may lose all or a portion of their investment when investing in stocks. For current services performed FNM has been compensated fifty four hundred dollars for news coverage of the current press releases issued by ZenaTech, Inc. by the Company. FNM HOLDS NO SHARES OF ANY COMPANY NAMED IN THIS RELEASE.

    This release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended and such forward-looking statements are made pursuant to the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. “Forward-looking statements” describe future expectations, plans, results, or strategies and are generally preceded by words such as “may”, “future”, “plan” or “planned”, “will” or “should”, “expected,” “anticipates”, “draft”, “eventually” or “projected”. You are cautioned that such statements are subject to a multitude of risks and uncertainties that could cause future circumstances, events, or results to differ materially from those projected in the forward-looking statements, including the risks that actual results may differ materially from those projected in the forward-looking statements as a result of various factors, and other risks identified in a company’s annual report on Form 10-K or 10-KSB and other filings made by such company with the Securities and Exchange Commission. You should consider these factors in evaluating the forward-looking statements included herein, and not place undue reliance on such statements. The forward-looking statements in this release are made as of the date hereof and FNM undertakes no obligation to update such statements.

    Contact Information:

    Media Contact email: editor@financialnewsmedia.com – +1(561)325-8757

    SOURCE: FN Media Group

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Reports of Russia’s treatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war are deeply concerning: UK statement to the OSCE

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Deputy Ambassador Brown condemns the Russian state’s reported systematic torture, abuse, and execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war.

    Thank you, Madam Chair and good afternoon colleagues.  On behalf of the UK Delegation I would like to offer a warm welcome to the new Ukraine ambassador.  Please be assured of our continued support to you, Viktoria and to your exceptional team.

    Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, overwhelming evidence from international bodies, human rights organisations, and independent investigations demonstrates that Russia continues to disregard international law. The UK unequivocally condemns the Russian state’s reported systematic torture, abuse, and execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war.

    The UN Commission of Inquiry has concluded that Russia’s use of torture against POWs and civilian detainees amounts to crimes against humanity. Their reports outline how Russian forces have subjected Ukrainian POWs to brutal beatings, burns and electric shocks amplified by water. Additionally, they detail how Ukrainian POWs are forced to endure sexual violence, including rape, attacks on genitals, and threats of mutilation, castration, and sterilisation. In ODIHR’s latest report on Ukraine, all the Ukrainian former POWs interviewed reported severe and routine torture during their internment, supporting ODIHR’s analysis that the torture of both POWs and civilians by the Russian state is widespread and systematic.

    Furthermore, ODIHR documented that Ukrainian POWs are held in overcrowded, unsanitary conditions, and deprived of adequate food, water, and medical care. Such neglect, aimed at breaking the spirit of those already disarmed and vulnerable, is a direct affront to human dignity.

    Additionally, the Ukrainian Prosecutor-General’s Office reports that 147 Ukrainian POWs have been executed by Russian forces since the start of the full-scale invasion.

    And this week the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine raised serious concerns over a sharp increase in executions of captured Ukrainian soldiers by Russian forces. Since August 2024, the Mission documented 79 executions across 24 incidents, with many cases involving soldiers who had surrendered or were otherwise in Russian custody, including instances where unarmed and injured personnel were shot dead on the spot.

    Madam Chair, these are not isolated incidents. The testimonies gathered by the UN Commission of Inquiry highlight deliberate and systematic practices; and find a coordinated state policy of cruelty and impunity that underscores the Russian state’s complete disregard for international norms. The Geneva Conventions are clear: POWs must be treated humanely. Reporting from the UN and ODIHR outlines how Russia has not only failed in this obligation—it has systematically violated it.

    The UK demands an immediate end to all atrocities and calls for independent investigations to hold all perpetrators accountable; from those carrying out abuses to those ordering them. Alongside our international partners, we will ensure that those responsible—at all levels of the Russian state—face justice.

    The protection of prisoners of war is not optional; it is an absolute and binding requirement of international law.  The UK demands that the Russian state ensures the humane treatment of all those in detention and grants the ICRC unimpeded access to places of detention, in line with the Geneva Conventions.

    The UK welcomes the latest prisoner exchange between Ukraine and Russia facilitated by the United Arab Emirates. We continue to call on Russia to comply with International Humanitarian Law and not exploit prisoners of war and civilian detainees for political purposes. All those arbitrarily detained must be released, including our colleagues: the three Special Monitoring Mission members. We continue to call for their release.

    The UK stands in full solidarity with Ukraine and reaffirms our commitment to ensuring justice for victims and survivors. The evidence is overwhelming. The time for accountability is now. Thank you, Madam Chair.

    Updates to this page

    Published 6 February 2025

    Invasion of Ukraine

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Update 273 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi met with President Volodymyr Zelensky and assessed damage to energy infrastructure vital for nuclear safety during his 11th visit to Ukraine since the military conflict began almost three years ago, as part of the ongoing efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to help prevent a nuclear accident.

    Before his meetings with President Zelensky and senior government officials in Kyiv on Tuesday, the Director General travelled to one of the substations on which Ukraine’s nuclear power plants (NPPs) depend to receive the off-site power needed to cool their reactors and for other essential nuclear safety and security functions and also to transmit the electricity they generate.

    In recent months, Ukraine’s operating NPPs – Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine – have several times been forced to reduce power output because of widespread military activities affecting the electricity grid, in which the substations form a key part. Most recently, Ukraine informed the IAEA that the NPPs temporarily lowered their production on 1 February before returning to nominal power again.

    “The reason that this is so important, from the perspective of the IAEA, is because of the influence of this situation on the safety of the nuclear power plants’ operation,” Director General Grossi told journalists at the substation, which is among several such facilities that were further damaged and degraded in recent months.

    “This compromises the nuclear safety of a power plant, and it could eventually lead to an accident,” he said, noting the importance of a stable electricity grid for the nuclear safety and security of NPPs. “Having an external power supply is essential”.

    IAEA expert teams have travelled to nine different electrical substations across the country seen as critical for nuclear safety and security, including the one visited by Director General Grossi on 4 February. Five of these substations have been visited twice during IAEA missions in September, October and December 2024, with the teams observing a continued degradation at several facilities.

    During their visits to the substations, the IAEA teams collect information, assess the situation and provide technical advice.

    “The situation is quite dire. We should not, I think, hide the fact. And as you can see behind us, this infrastructure has been degraded,” Director General Grossi said, standing next to a visibly damaged autotransformer.

    Director General Grossi also noted the work conducted at this and other Ukrainian substations to help “preserve the stability of the grid”, for example by replacing damaged transformers.

    In his meetings with President Zelensky, Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrii Sybiha and Minister of Energy German Galushchenko, Director General Grossi also discussed progress in Ukraine’s plans to purchase equipment from the interrupted Bulgarian NPP project in Belene for new reactor units being constructed at the Khmelnytskyy NPP. The IAEA is providing technical support and nuclear safety advice for this plan, Director General Grossi said.

    At Ukraine’s NPPs over the past week, the IAEA teams based there have continued to report on indications of military activities near the sites, constant reminders of the potential risks to nuclear safety and security.

    At Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya NPP, the team heard multiple instances of explosions on most days, some very close to the plant. There were no reports of damage to the site.

    Following the disconnection of the ZNPP’s only available 750 kilovolt (kV) power line on 29 January, it was reconnected on 1 February. As a result, the site once again has two external power lines available – including one 330 kV – compared with a total of ten before the conflict.

    The IAEA teams at the Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs and the Chornobyl site continued to report daily air raid alarms. The teams at Khmelnytskyy, South Ukraine and Chornobyl were also informed of drones being detected in locations near the sites.

    At the South Ukraine NPP, a 750 kV power line that was disconnected on 29 January due to military activities remains unavailable.  

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: OSCE Co-operation with the Council of Europe: UK statement to the OSCE, February 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Ambassador Holland thanks Minister Bettel for outlining Luxembourg’s priorities at the Council of Europe, and for the close collaboration with the OSCE.

    Thank you Chair. And may I express my condolences – and those of my delegation and country – to our Swedish colleagues for the tragic school attack this week. Our thoughts are with you and the families and friends of the victims.

    Minister Bettel welcome to the Permanent Council. Thank you for your presentation and for your commitment to the work of the Council of Europe as Chair of the Committee of Ministers. The Council of Europe has been, and will continue to be, hugely important to the UK’s human rights and foreign policy agenda.

    The longstanding relationship between the OSCE and the Council of Europe is rooted in the promotion of human rights, democracy and rule of law – values that the UK is firmly committed to uphold. Respect for these common principles defines our shared endeavours in Vienna and in Strasbourg. Values such as the rule of law not only provide the freedoms which allow people to interact with each other in their day-to-day lives but also matter for growth, jobs and people’s livelihoods.

    We meet today at a particularly challenging time for European Security, with Russia‘s unprovoked and unjustified war in Ukraine about to enter a fourth year. We call on all OSCE participating States to uphold our common commitments to shared security on our continent.  We must strengthen Ukraine’s position to keep fighting through 2025 and beyond – for the sake of Ukraine itself, and Euro-Atlantic security.

    The UK is proud to be Chair of the Conference of Participants for the Register of Damage for Ukraine. The Register, now with over 14,000 claims, serves as a significant step towards securing justice for the Ukrainian people.

    The Council of Europe and the OSCE share much common ground – tackling serious organised crime and human trafficking, counter-terrorism, as well as promoting free and fair elections, media freedom, and gender rights. As both the OSCE and the Council of Europe face up to a series of common challenges this year, including a difficult security environment and – as you rightly say – the challenges of democratic backsliding, it is important that we continue to recognise each organisation’s individual merits and distinctiveness. We need to work in a coordinated way to employ the unique set of instruments and tools which each organisation offers to its States.

    Minister Bettel – like your country, the UK is, and will remain, a steadfast supporter of the work of both the Council of Europe and the OSCE. We offer you, and your team, our best wishes for your work throughout your Presidency.

    Updates to this page

    Published 6 February 2025

    Invasion of Ukraine

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Steven Maijoor: Cyber resilience in an age of geopolitical tensions

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    On December 12th 2023, Kyivstar, Ukraine’s largest telecom provider, suffered a cyberattack that disrupted services for millions of users. The attack, attributed to the Russian state-sponsored group Sandworm, was one of the biggest cyber incidents in Ukraine since the onset of the Russian invasion. The hackers had infiltrated Kyivstar’s infrastructure months earlier. They deployed malware that erased thousands of virtual servers and personal computers, crippling the company’s network for managing communication services.

    The attack had several immediate effects. First of all, approximately half of Kyivstar’s network was disabled, leaving millions without mobile and internet connection. But the damage wasn’t limited to the telecom sector. The attack also disrupted banking operations, payment processing, and online banking services. Some ATMs and point-of-sale terminals didn’t work. Financial transactions were in disarray across the country.

    Amazingly, the Ukrainians were quickly able to restore services. Over the past three years they have become quite proficient in dealing with large-scale disruption. Many critical processes in Ukraine are equipped with redundancy measures. Many people even have two sim cards in their phones. That enabled the other Ukrainian telecom providers to circumvent the outage. Services at Kyivstar were gradually reinstated, with almost full restoration achieved eight days after the attack.

    This episode raises some inconvenient questions. What if this would happen to us? What if a large scale Russian or Chinese cyberattack is launched on the telecoms sector of an EU member state? Would it be possible? How much damage could such an attack cause? Would it affect financial services? And would we be able to recover as quickly as the Ukrainians did?

    A few years ago, most people would have found these questions to be rather hypothetical, but today, unfortunately, they have become quite urgent. Geopolitical tensions have been rising for more than a decade, but over the past few years they have accelerated. Countries are re-arming, they are protecting their strategic economic infrastructures, they are imposing trade restrictions and sanctions on each other, and they are weaponising access to international financial infrastructures and services. Needless to say this is bad news for the world economy and the financial sector. But perhaps in no area is the geopolitical threat so real and acute as in the digital domain.

    Apart from the Kyivstar case, there are many other examples to back this up. In late 2023, a Russian hacker breached Microsoft’s corporate network by exploiting a legacy account. As a result, the security and confidentiality of the email accounts of many organisations around the world were potentially compromised. Last year, the FBI discovered a dormant network of Chinese hackers in the United States that had compromised hundreds of routers and that was on standby to launch an attack if called on. And recently, Russian and Chinese vessels were suspected of damaging subsea data cables. Since state-sponsored cyberattacks are often very well concealed, we do not have reliable numbers on how often they occur. But anecdotal information from intelligence agencies, like the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service, suggest their number is increasing.

    Traditionally, the financial sector has been an attractive target for cyber criminals with financial motives. But with the changing geopolitical climate, nation-state cyberattacks have become a very real possibility. Their main aim is to cause disruption and to steal sensitive information. Nation-state actors possess more resources, sophistication, and endurance than other hackers. And many sectors of the economy have become more vulnerable to large-scale disruption due to increased complexity and digitalisation. This is certainly true of financial services, with their long outsourcing chains and interconnectedness. And many financial firms depend on the same third-party service providers, so if one of these suppliers is attacked, large chunks of the financial sector may experience the knock-on effects. As we showed in our latest Financial Stability overview, a quarter of all reported global cyberattacks can potentially affect the financial sector through a vital process run by a third party on which the financial system depends.

    So, to answer the questions I posed at the start: yes, I think a major state-sponsored cyberattack on the financial sector or one of its supporting sectors could happen. And frankly, I hope we would be able to recover as quickly as the Ukrainians did.

    That is not because financial institutions haven’t prepared. Many financial institutions have taken big steps in recent years to boost their cyber resilience. I think it is fair to say the financial industry is one of the better digitally defended sectors in the economy. As it should be. But given the size and urgency of the threat, we need to do even more to keep financial services safe. This is why cyber resilience will absolutely be a key focus area in our supervision of the financial industry in the coming years. This goes both for De Nederlandsche Bank, and for the European Central Bank.

    Our aim is to make financial services safer against cyber threats. Not only by increasing the resilience of the financial sector itself, but also by stepping up the robustness of the entire chain of ICT service providers. DORA, the European Digital Operational Resilience Act, that came into effect at the beginning of this year, gives us additional tools to accomplish this aim.

    To start with, under DORA, threat-led penetration tests are mandatory for the largest financial institutions in Europe. In the Netherlands we have been conducting these kinds of tests voluntarily for over eight years with good results, and we are very pleased that it is now becoming the norm at the European level.

    But DORA also imposes stricter requirements for managing cyber risks in outsourcing chains. For example, financial firms face stricter rules for conducting due diligence on potential ICT providers. As a result, Fintechs may also experience more stringent due diligence from financial sector customers. And very importantly, under DORA, European supervisors can conduct inspections of critical third-party ICT service providers in tandem with national supervisory authorities. We expect bigtechs like Google and Microsoft to be placed under EU-wide supervision. And, just as with the banks, we are going to test their readiness to detect and withstand cyberattacks.

    Despite all efforts, there is no such thing as perfect cyber security. It is therefore vital that financial institutions take measures to recover quickly after cyber incidents. This is crucial to ensure that services can continue and people don’t lose trust in financial firms or the financial sector as a whole.

    The results of the ECB’s 2024 cyber stress test show that there is room for improvement on the recovery front. So it’s a very good thing that DORA also imposes new requirements on institutions’ continuity plans and backup policies. They need to develop a culture where cyber incidents are quickly detected and reported, they need to have their playbooks in place and they need to have clearly defined management roles and responsibilities. These are key ingredients for an effective response after a cyberattack.

    An important principle of our supervision has always been that financial institutions are responsible for putting their own house in order. And that is also the case with cybersecurity. But if we only focus on individual institutions, we miss something. As I mentioned, on a digital level the financial sector is so interconnected, and connected to other vital sectors of the economy as well, that some degree of overall coordination and cooperation is necessary to arrive at an optimal level of resilience. Notably, recent assessments, derived from nationwide contingency exercises in the Netherlands, reveal various weaknesses. These weaknesses relate to the exchange of information between critical infrastructure providers, the distribution of roles and responsibilities, and the mobilisation of scarce cyber security knowledge and expertise in the event of major cyber incidents.

    So the message here is: we need to work together. Governments should take the lead to improve cross-sectoral cooperation and coordination. They must continue to conduct large-scale cyber-drills and practice activating crisis plans. The insights gained should be used to enhance resilience.

    But there is also a role for financial supervisors like DNB. Under the new legislation, we do not only need to check whether financial firms are compliant, but we also have an obligation ourselves to look over the fence and cooperate closely with other sectors. DNB is putting this into practice by working with vital sectors that are most critical to the financial sector, such as energy and telecommunications. Within our mandate, we support these sectors with information, cooperation and ethical hacking experience.

    To sum up, the threat of major disruptions to our financial system from nation-state cyberattacks has become more urgent. Financial firms, and the entire outsourcing chain on which they depend, therefore need to do whatever they can to further boost their cyber resilience. Both in terms of detection and recovery. Cyber resilience is a top priority for European financial supervisors and there are new European laws in place. And we are going to use these laws to make sure that financial institutions under our supervision are as secure and well defended as possible. Enhancing resilience also means we need to work together. Governments, financial firms, supervisors, telecom, energy and other vital players in the outsourcing chain. Because in cyberspace, we are all linked together. And after all, a chain is only as strong as its weakest link.

    Thank you.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Derville Rowland: Innovation and technology in financial crime 

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. It is a pleasure to be with you today and to address a topic so crucial to the future of financial services: the utilisation of innovation and technology to conduct – and most importantly, combat – financial crime. 

    In the mid to late ’90s, when email truly took off as a global tool for commerce, I was a barrister working for the UK’s Crown Prosecution Service amongst others, dealing with various criminal cases including serious frauds. 

    Justified enthusiasm about the ability to connect the world more effectively and efficiently was subsequently dampened somewhat by use of the technology for all manner of deceptions, frauds and financial crimes. 

    Several decades later, we see the same pattern playing out in real-time with artificial intelligence, with criminals using AI tools to bypass customer due diligence controls and carry out fraud via social engineering. 

    These sophisticated methods, including the use of AI tools via text, images, and voice, present significant challenges for regulators and supervisors. 

    There’s a popular saying that the pessimist complains about the wind, the optimist expects it to change, but the realist adjusts the sails. 

    As a regulator with hard-won experience of developing frameworks, building the teams to implement them, and deploying technology to combat financial crime and address misconduct, I’m very much a realist – albeit one who remains stubbornly optimistic. I don’t believe it’s an either/or scenario.  

    Put simply, I believe in the potential benefits of innovation and technology for consumers, investors, businesses and society – and want to see them realised. But this also means the risks must be effectively managed – we must, as it were, adjust the sails. 

    The importance of collective responses

    The risks, of course, need no explanation to this audience. The anonymity of virtual assets can be used to transfer illicit funds quickly and across borders, with criminals increasingly leveraging new technologies to commit fraud, launder the proceeds of crime, and carry out financing of terrorism. The speed at which funds can be moved across borders makes it easier for criminals to exploit the financial system. And so on. 

    Last month, the Central Bank of Ireland published statistics showing the value of fraud in payments in Ireland increased by a quarter in 2023 compared to 2022 – from €100m to circa €126m.1 Fraud was highest in credit transfers and card payments, with the biggest growth seen in money remittance. 

    This echoes trends across Europe, with a joint EBA/ECB report in August 2024 revealing that fraud losses are highest in credit transfer and card payments across the European Economic Area (EEA).2

    Financial crime, of course, recognises no borders. And so, given the scale of the challenge which regulators and law enforcement agencies face, collective action – a harmonised response – is imperative. 

    Which is why the EU’s AML package is so important – it provides the framework and the agency (AMLA) through which we will collectively meet the challenge head on. 

    The AML package is by design technology neutral.  It applies to traditional banking/financial models equally as it applies to crypto-asset service providers (CASPs), crowd-funding platforms and intermediaries. It obliges all types of firms that come within its ambit to comply with a set of AML/CFT rules that have now been harmonised across Europe.  

    How these firms comply with the rules is up to them, via traditional AML/CFT compliance programmes or by using regtech tools. What’s essential is that the means used are effective, and that such effectiveness can be demonstrated to supervisors. 

    This will be the case both for the 40 obliged entities that will be directly supervised by AMLA and the firms supervised by national AML authorities.3  

    Not waiting for the wind to change, the EU has addressed a number of emerging risks in the package. 

    To give some examples, the use of AI is acknowledged under the package, with an obligation on firms to ensure that human oversight is applied to decisions proposed by AI tools that may impact customers in certain areas.

    Additionally, details of Virtual IBANs which are linked to other payment accounts will have to be recorded in member states’ Bank Account Registers. This will allow law enforcement to trace any funds being moved by such Virtual IBANs.  

    Finally, the package introduces the concept of Information Sharing Partnerships. Through these, credit and financial institutions will be enabled to share information relating to high risk customers, subject to important guardrails including data protection assessments.  

    The lack of an ability to share such information has long been pointed to as a real weak link in the system, which could allow someone who had an account closed by one bank on ML/TF grounds to seek to open an account in another.  

    It is hoped that these partnerships will be a real game-changer in the fight to keep bad actors from accessing the financial system in order to launder ill-gotten gains. Tech solutions, including tools which can allow information to be shared between financial institutions in a manner that complies with GDPR, will be essential here.

    The package is also forward-looking in respect of sanctions. 

    Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine exposed some fault lines in the EU’s Financial Sanctions Framework. The package seeks to remedy this by imposing obligations on obliged entities to put in place frameworks to prevent and detect attempted breaches of EU financial sanctions. 

    It also requires obliged entities to ensure that prospective customers, and any person who owns or controls such prospective customers, are screened against the financial sanctions list prior to onboarding. Here again, we see the importance of effective technological solutions – the use of screening tools will be imperative for firms seeking to protect themselves from the possibility of breaching sanctions.

    Developing a wider approach to preventing financial crime

    Money laundering pre-supposes a predicate crime which has generated assets for a criminal. Looking more widely across the landscape, more work is required to put in place a comprehensive financial crime preventative framework that includes fraud.   

    The EU and member states have started thinking about fraud and money laundering more holistically, rather than two silos to be tackled independently. This is very welcome. 

    For our part, the Central Bank of Ireland is approaching AML, fraud, and sanctions through the lens of financial integrity of the system. We are building out a more integrated supervisory framework to look at risk in a more holistic way. We want to take a whole-of-sector, rather than piecemeal, approach, and so very much support emerging EU thinking in this area. 

    As a single market and economic and political union, the EU can point to work already under way and leverage further opportunities to confront the challenges involved. 

    Already, there are a number of other important EU developments aimed at protecting the financial integrity of the system and the citizens who depend on it. 

    PSD3 and the Payment Services Regulation will strengthen customer authentication rules and extending refund rights of consumers who have fallen victim to fraud, among other measures. 

    The EU’s Markets in Crypto Assets Regulation (MiCAR) includes rules relating to the information to be made available to prospective investors in crypto assets, partly in response to the proliferation of scams involving crypto asset issuance. 

    The amended Fund Transfer Regulation ensures that transfers of crypto assets by CASPs must now be accompanied by information on the sender and recipient, in the same way that credit transfers between banks must be.  

    The Instant Payments Regulation (IPR) obliges providers of standard and instant credit transfers to verify the payee at no additional charge to the payer. It also obliges PSPs offering instant credit transfers to screen their customer base against targeted financial sanctions lists at least daily. 

    The various regulatory and policy developments to tackle financial crime cannot succeed in isolation. For this reason, supervisors have been on a steady march away from reliance on traditional supervisory tools and are increasingly exploring ways to transform technology from an enabler of financial crime to a tool in the detection, disruption and successful prosecution of financial crime. 

    In that context, I’d like to mention a significant milestone in the Central Bank of Ireland’s innovation journey – the launch of our Innovation Sandbox Programme last December on the specific theme of Combatting Financial Crime. 

    About the sandbox

    This initiative offers a structured environment for firms to develop innovative solutions in a collaborative environment, ensuring that new technologies are introduced safely and effectively into the financial sector.

    The seven participants in the programme are employing new technologies and innovative methods to develop solutions that tackle financial crime, for the benefit of both the financial system and consumers.

    Participants are representative of a diverse spectrum of innovators from Ireland, across Europe and the UK and feature start-ups, scaling firms, partnerships and established financial services firms.

    Although it is still at an early stage in the programme, several key areas of focus have been identified such as:

    • The use of AI, machine learning, and pattern recognition to detect and prevent fraud; and
    • The use of technology to enable data sharing without compromising sensitive information, allowing real-time verification of identities and other credentials while ensuring full compliance with data protection regulations and the development of digital identity verification tools.

    The Central Bank is organising workshops for participating firms on specific topics relevant to theme of combating financial crime, facilitating bespoke engagement with dedicated relationship managers, and providing access to a data platform offering data sets and tools relevant to the theme. This will allow participants to test and develop their innovation. 

    We are hugely excited about the programme and look forward to sharing the results of it in due course. 

    Conclusion

    In conclusion, I was greatly struck by something Elizabeth McCaul of the ECB Supervisory Board previously said: “Technology is fundamentally a human activity- technology is neither good nor bad, but humans make it so.” 4 

    The reality is that no piece of legislation can contemplate every financial crime risk or typology or close every loophole. We can’t wipe out financial crime – any more than we can wipe out car theft, shoplifting or burglary. But what we can do is to become as effective as possible at reducing its impact.

    Hence, as technology evolves, it behoves regulators and supervisors to evolve too – continually adapting to keep pace with these changes and ensure that, collectively and individually, we are the forefront of protecting the integrity of the financial system and those who use it. 

    Thank you.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Video: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General on Assessment Mission to Ukraine

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Mariano Grossi, is in Ukraine to assessing the damage to key electricity substations that are critical to the country’s nuclear safety. Grossi provides an overview of progress being made on new power plants being built in the Cherkasy a region in the centre of the country.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tcAO0fl3TLY

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – European marine fishing areas: The Black Sea – 06-02-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    The Black Sea’s natural characteristics, its isolated position and the high percentage of waters where no life is possible, make it a unique and vulnerable place. Fisheries in the region face a number of challenges, including environmental issues such as pollution, over-exploitation, eutrophication, invasive species and climate change, that are linked directly to the sector’s sustainability. The EU fleet comprises Bulgarian and Romanian vessels and is small compared with the other fleets in the region, consisting of Georgian, Russian, Turkish and Ukrainian vessels. The EU’s role in the management of Black Sea fisheries is limited, given that only two EU Member States are involved and are bound by EU legislation. Moreover, the EU’s membership in the regional sea convention is blocked. Cooperation between the countries around the Black Sea on transboundary issues is essential, but this has been rendered more difficult than ever by Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine. The European Parliament has repeatedly drawn attention to the fishery sector’s challenges in the Black Sea.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Backgrounder: Sanctions against individuals and entities in Belarus

    Source: Government of Canada News

    Canada is imposing sanctions against individuals and entities in relation to the Lukashenko regime’s ongoing gross and systematic human rights violations in Belarus, as well as its support of Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

    MIL OSI Canada News –

  • MIL-OSI: Teniz Capital to Lead Second Phase of Black Sea Trade and Development Bank Bond Placement on the Astana International Exchange

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Almaty, Kazakhstan, 6 February 2025 – Teniz Capital Investment Banking, a leading investment bank in Central Asia and the Middle East, will lead the second phase of bond placement for multilateral financial institution Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) on the Astana International Exchange (AIX).

    This follows a first tranche of 100 million USD, completed in 2024, in which Teniz Capital facilitated the transaction. 

    The second tranche will be directed to supporting BSTDB’s funding capacity and enhance investor participation in Central Asian markets.
     
    “Our objective is to open financial opportunities in the Caspian and Central Asia to Western investors. This second placement, which we expect will be closed quite soon, is a clear indicator of market interest in the region, and in its future economic growth,” the management committee of the entity said. 
     
    Founded in 1999, the BSTDB is an international financial institution based in Thessaloniki, Greece. The institution was created to accelerate regional development through financial instruments such as bond issuances. It has 11 member states, including Greece, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine.
     
    Teniz Capital employs 50 professionals, with its main headquarters in Almaty and additional offices in Astana’s International Finance Centre and Abu Dhabi.
     
    In 2023, Teniz Capital completed 13 bond transactions across in AIX as well the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange. These transactions included JSC AIFN Retam, Capitalleasing Group Ltd., Jet Group Ltd., Kisamos Shipping DMCC, several placements of Kazakhstan’s sovereign bonds, and underwriting complex, high-value transactions.
     
    Last year, on 29 August, the company announced the expansion of its operations with the launch of a sister company, Teniz Capital Brokerage Ltd.

    For further information, members of the media can contact teniz@definition.city

    This press release contains statements regarding the future of the company and its innovations. Statements regarding the future may be accompanied by words such as “anticipate”, “believe”, “estimate”, “will”, “anticipate”, “pretend”, “power”, “plan”, “potential”, the use of future time and other terms of similar meaning. No undue reliance should be placed on these claims. These statements involve risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those reflected in such statements, including uncertainty of the company’s commercial success, ability to protect our intellectual property rights, and other risks. These statements are based on current beliefs and forecasts and refer only to the date of this press release. The company assumes no obligation to publicly update its forward-looking statements, regardless of whether new information, future events or any other circumstance arise.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: OP Financial Group’s Financial Statements Bulletin 1 January–31 December 2024: Excellent business performance continued – full-year operating profit EUR 2,486 million

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    OP Financial Group
    Financial Statements Bulletin
    Stock Exchange Release 6 February 2025 9.00 am EET

    Financial Statements Bulletin 1 January–31 December 2024: Excellent business performance continued – full-year operating profit EUR 2,486 million 

    • Operating profit increased by 21% to EUR 2,486 million (2,050).

    • Income from customer business, or net interest income, insurance service result and net commissions and fees, increased to EUR 3,805 million (3,605). Net interest income grew by 5% to EUR 2,796 million (2,654). Insurance service result increased by 136% to EUR 192 million (81) and net commissions and fees decreased by 6% to EUR 818 million (870).

    • Impairment loss on receivables was EUR 96 million (269), or 0.09% (0.26) of the loan and guarantee portfolio.

    • Investment income increased by 20% to EUR 465 million (389).

    • Total expenses grew by 3% to EUR 2,262 million (2,201). The cost/income ratio improved to 47% (49).

    • The loan portfolio was at the previous year’s level at EUR 98.9 billion (98.9), while deposits grew by 4% year on year to EUR 77.7 billion (74.5).

    • The CET1 ratio was 21.5% (19.2), which exceeds the minimum regulatory requirement by 8.1 percentage points. The changes in the EU Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR3), which took effect on 1 January 2025, are expected to cause a slight reduction in the capital adequacy of OP Financial Group.

    • Retail Banking segment’s operating profit rose by 4% to EUR 1,275 million (1,223). Net interest income grew by 3% to EUR 2,112 million (2,041). Impairment loss on receivables decreased by EUR 78 million to EUR 95 million (173). Net commissions and fees decreased by 10% to EUR 619 million (686). The cost/income ratio was 51% (49). The loan portfolio decreased by 0.3% year on year, to EUR 70.7 billion (70.9). Deposits increased by 3% to EUR 62.9 billion (61.2).

    • Corporate Banking segment’s operating profit grew by 40% to EUR 572 million (408). Net interest income grew by 11% to EUR 657 million (591). Impairment loss on receivables decreased by EUR 96 million to EUR 0 million (96). Net commissions and fees increased by 4% to EUR 199 million (192). The cost/income ratio improved to 38% (41). In the year to December, the loan portfolio grew by 1% to EUR 28.3 billion (28.1). Deposits increased by 12% to EUR 15.4 billion (13.8).

    • Insurance segment’s operating profit grew by 39% to EUR 578 million (414). The insurance service result increased by EUR 110 million to EUR 192 million (81). Investment income increased by 10% to EUR 382 million (347). The combined ratio reported by non-life insurance improved to 92.3% (93.8).

    • Group Functions operating profit was EUR 19 million (-26). Net interest income increased by EUR 15 million to EUR 16 million (1).

    • OP Financial Group increased the OP bonuses to be earned by owner-customers for 2024 by 40% compared to the normal level of 2022. Additionally, owner-customers got daily banking services without monthly charges in 2024. Together, these benefits were estimated to add up to more than EUR 404 million in value for owner-customers in 2024. The benefits will be in force until the end of 2025.

    • Outlook: OP Financial Group’s operating profit for 2025 is expected to be at a good level but lower than that for 2023 and 2024. For more detailed information on the outlook, see “Outlook”.

    OP Financial Group’s key indicators

    € million Q1–4/2024 Q1–4/2023 Change, %
    Operating profit, € million         2,486         2,050         21.3
    Retail Banking         1,275         1,223         4.3
    Corporate Banking         572         408         40.4
    Insurance         578         414         39.4
    Group Functions         19         -26 –
    New OP bonuses accrued to owner-customers, € million         -314         -275         14.1
    Total income**         4,844         4,520         7.2
    Total expenses         -2,262         -2,201         2.8
    Cost/income ratio, %**         46.7         48.7 -2.0*
    Return on equity (ROE), %         11.6         10.6 0.9*
    Return on equity, excluding OP bonuses, %         13.0         12.0 1.0*
    Return on assets (ROA), %         1.24         0.98 0.26*
    Return on assets, excluding OP bonuses, %         1.39         1.11 0.28*
      31 Dec 2024 31 Dec 2023 Change, %
    CET1 ratio, %*         21.5         19.2 2.3*
    Loan portfolio, € billion         98.9         98.9         0.0
    Deposits, € billion         77.7         74.5         4.3
    Ratio of non-performing exposures to exposures, %         2.64         2.94 -0.30*
    Ratio of impairment loss on receivables to loan and guarantee portfolio, %         0.09         0.26 -0.17*
    Owner-customers (1,000) 2,115 2,094         1.0

    Comparatives for the income statement items are based on the corresponding figures in 2023. Unless otherwise specified, figures from 31 December 2023 are used as comparatives for balance-sheet and other cross-sectional items.
    * Change in ratio, percentage point(s).
    ** OP bonuses to owner-customers, which were previously shown on a separate line in the income statement, have been divided under the following items based on their accrual: interest income, interest expenses, and commission income from mutual funds. The line ‘OP bonuses to owner-customers’ is no longer shown in the income statement. Comparative information has been adjusted accordingly. For more detailed information on the change, see Note 1 to the Half-year Financial Report 1 January–30 June 2024, Accounting policies and changes in accounting policies and presentation.

    Comments by the President and Group Chief Executive Officer:

    Uncertainty overshadowed the business environment – Finland’s economy began to recover as the year ended

    In 2024, the exceptionally tense geopolitical situation of previous years continued to predominate in Finland’s neighbouring regions. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine approached its third year and the Middle East conflict spilled over into new areas. A tectonic shift is underway in international politics and the global economy, creating uncertainty in the economy and our broader business environment.

    Although the world economy grew by 3% last year, Europe’s grew by just over 1%. Finland’s economy contracted for the second year running. However, the economy began to recover gradually as the year ended and OP Financial Group expects Finland’s GDP to grow by a couple of per cent in 2025.

    Construction and the related sectors were particularly affected by the sluggish economy. Risks in the real estate sector remained high and the number of bankruptcies increased substantially on the previous year.

    Inflation in Finland fell markedly, from 3.6% to 0.7%, on the year before. On the other hand, unemployment rose, reaching 8.9% in December. Market interest rates fell almost continuously from early 2024 and the Euribor rates were clearly lower by the year’s end.

    Despite the pickup in late 2024, home sale volumes and demand for home loans fell considerably year on year. Home prices continued their downward trend.

    The fall in market rates boosted the stock markets, raising share prices on several stock exchanges. However, Nasdaq Helsinki’s stock indices ended 2024 in slightly negative territory for the year as a whole.

    OP Financial Group had an excellent year – strong earnings enable outstanding benefits for owner-customers

    OP Financial Group performed extremely well and operating profit increased by 21% year on year, to EUR 2,486 million in 2024.

    Our excellent earnings will enable us to continue providing our over 2.1 million owner-customers with considerable benefits in 2025. As in 2024, our owner-customers will get daily banking services without monthly charges and accrue 40% extra OP bonuses compared to the normal level of 2022. This is how we will help to ease the strain on households in these economically challenging times. The total value of higher benefits on OP bonuses and daily services will be around EUR 400 million in 2025, which is a significant overall financial benefit.

    Being customer-owned, OP Financial Group will continue to share its financial success through a range of financial and other benefits for its owner-customers.

    Income from OP Financial Group’s customer business grew to a record level of more than EUR 3.8 billion. The improvement in the insurance service result was particularly strong, being 136% higher than a year earlier. Growth in net interest income slowed to 5% and net commissions and fees decreased by 6% year on year, chiefly due to the benefit (provided for owner-customers) of zero monthly charges for daily banking services. Income from investment activities grew considerably from 2023’s level and OP Financial Group’s total income reached over EUR 4.8 billion – 7% higher than a year earlier.

    OP Financial Group’s costs grew by 3% year on year, due to rising personnel costs and higher investments in ICT development. Compared to the previous year, its cost/income ratio improved by two percentage points to 47%, an excellent level even in international terms.

    All three business segments performed extremely well

    All three business segments performed extremely well. The Retail Banking segment’s operating profit rose by 4% year on year, to EUR 1,275 million. Insurance recorded an operating profit of EUR 578 million, growing by 39% compared to a year ago. Corporate Banking’s operating profit was EUR 572 million, up by 40% over the previous year.

    Strong capital adequacy and excellent liquidity provide security and stability in an uncertain business environment

    OP Financial Group’s CET1 ratio improved again, to 21.5%, exceeding the minimum regulatory requirement by 8.1 percentage points. OP Financial Group is one of the most financially solid large banks in Europe. Excellent profitability, strong capital adequacy and liquidity are critical factors for banks and insurance companies, building trust among customers, partners and other stakeholders. In OP Financial Group, these factors are at an excellent level, providing the Group with an even stronger basis than before for meeting future challenges.

    Deposits grew substantially and the loan portfolio stopped shrinking – customers’ loan repayment capacity remained good

    OP Financial Group’s deposit portfolio grew by more than 4% from 2023. Household, corporate and institutional deposits were on an upward trend at the end of the year. OP Financial Group’s market share of deposits rose to over 40%.

    By late 2024, OP Financial Group’s loan portfolio had reached the same level as at the end of 2023. After a long decline, the loan portfolio began to grow again in the early autumn. OP Financial Group maintained its strong market position in the home loan and corporate loan markets. Our market share of home loans was 39%. For corporate loans, we had a market share of 38%.

    OP Financial Group’s home loan customers made home loan repayments punctually and meticulously in 2024. The situation was eased by the fall in market rates. The number of loan modification applications was lower than in recent years. The number of corporate loans under special monitoring declined in comparison to last year. Non-performing exposures decreased from 2.9% to 2.6%. Impairment loss on receivables decreased markedly year on year.

    Wealth management continued to grow rapidly throughout the year

    We aim to coach our customers in making better financial choices. Wealth management is one of our growth focus areas – we intend to make a clear growth leap in this business in the coming years.

    The number of OP Financial Group unitholders rose to over 1.4 million. Moreover, the number of new systematic investment agreements increased by a third. Mutual fund investors were particularly attracted by international and sustainability-themed investment opportunities. Sustainability is a priority for younger investors in particular. At EUR 111 billion in value at the year’s end, customers’ investment assets managed by OP Financial Group grew by 8%.

    OP-mobile was used more than 700 million times – use of artificial intelligence is growing fast

    OP Financial Group’s use of digital services grew substantially again. Personal and corporate customers increasingly use digital channels for banking and insurance. Last year, customers logged in to OP-mobile around 708 million times – an average of 59 million times per month. OP-mobile already has more than 1.7 million active users.

    We moved, with increasing speed, into using artificial intelligence to ease our customers’ daily lives and help our employees in their work.

    In June, we launched OP Aina, a personal assistant on OP-mobile. OP Aina helps our customers with a range of banking and insurance matters on a 24/7 basis. It is the first financial service in Finland to use artificial intelligence and alerts. Our customers have eagerly adopted the service, which already had around 6.25 million service interactions by the end of 2024. We use it to provide customers with even more personalised and readily available services than before.

    Cybersecurity and well-functioning digital services are at the core of our operations

    OP Financial Group’s digital services functioned extremely well all year, despite the rapidly growing number of denial of service attacks.

    We continued our significant investments in cybersecurity to ensure that our customers’ money and data remain secure under all circumstances. Our customers were subjected to a high number of phishing and scam attempts throughout the year, and we have taken active measures to protect them even more effectively from such threats.

    OP Financial Group fulfils its corporate responsibilities as one of Finland’s largest corporate taxpayers

    OP Financial Group is of major direct and indirect importance to Finland’s economic development. In accordance with our mission, we aim to create sustainable prosperity, security and wellbeing for our owner-customers and operating region.

    Being one of Finland’s largest payers of corporate tax, we contributed almost EUR 400 million for 2023 – over 5% of all corporate tax paid in the period.

    We want to point the way towards futures filled with hope for people living in Finland. The success of Finland and all those who live here is our number one priority now and in the future.

    In good shape going into 2025

    OP Financial Group is in great shape to support its customers as the Finnish economy slowly recovers. We provide competitive banking and insurance services for a range of needs.

    My warm thanks to all our customers for the trust you have shown in OP Financial Group in 2024. We want to continue being worthy of your trust in the year that has just begun. I would also like to thank our employees and governing bodies for the excellent work they did last year.

    Timo Ritakallio
    President and Group CEO

    January–December

    OP Financial Group’s operating profit was EUR 2,486 million (2,050), up by 21.3% or EUR 436 million year on year. Income from customer business (net interest income, net commissions and fees and the insurance service result) increased by a total of 5.6% to EUR 3,805 million (3,605). The cost/income ratio improved to 46.7% (48.7). New OP bonuses accrued to owner-customers, which are included in earnings, increased by 14.0% to EUR 307 million.

    Net interest income grew by 5.3% to EUR 2,796 million. Net interest income reported by the Retail Banking segment increased by 3.5% to EUR 2,112 million and that by the Corporate Banking segment increased by 11.3% to EUR 657 million. OP Financial Group’s loan portfolio was at the previous year’s level at EUR 98.9 billion, while deposits grew by 4.3% year on year, to EUR 77.7 billion. Household deposits increased by 2.8% year on year, to EUR 47.8 billion. New loans drawn down by customers during the reporting period totalled EUR 22.2 billion (22.0).

    Impairment loss on loans and receivables, which reduces earnings, totalled EUR 96 million (269). A year ago, expected credit losses concerning the real estate and construction sector increased the impairment loss on receivables. Final credit losses totalled EUR 200 million (77). In 2024, OP Financial Group enhanced the recognition process for final credit losses. After a loan has been transferred for legal collection, the loan principal is written down to the value of collateral. During the fourth quarter, a total of EUR 125 million of such credit losses were recognised. Correspondingly, stage 3 expected credit losses reversed totalled EUR 93 million. At the end of the reporting period, loss allowance was EUR 824 million (929), of which management overlay accounted for EUR 77 million (109). Non-performing exposures accounted for 2.6% (2.9) of total exposures. Impairment loss on loans and receivables accounted for 0.1% (0.3) of the loan and guarantee portfolio.

    Net commissions and fees decreased by 6.0% to EUR 818 million. Owner-customers have received daily banking services without monthly charges since October 2023. This contributed to the decrease in payment transfer net commissions and fees. Net commissions and fees for payment transfer services decreased by EUR 56 million to

    EUR 291 million, and those for residential brokerage by EUR 6 million to EUR 63 million.

    Insurance service result increased by EUR 110 million to EUR 192 million. Insurance service result includes EUR 529 million (485) in operating expenses. Non-life insurance net insurance revenue, including the reinsurer’s share, grew by 6.1% to EUR 1,760 million. Net claims incurred after the reinsurer’s share grew by 4.4% to EUR 1,116 million. The combined ratio reported by non-life insurance improved to 92.3% (93.8).

    Investment income (net investment income, net insurance finance expenses and income from financial assets held for trading) increased by a total of 19.5% to EUR 465 million. Investment income grew as a result of the increase in the value of equity investments in particular. Net investment income together with net finance income describe investment profitability in the insurance business. The combined return on investments at fair value of OP Financial Group’s insurance companies was 7.6% (3.4).

    Net income from financial assets recognised at fair value through profit or loss, or notes and bonds, shares and derivatives, totalled EUR 1,975 million (1,706). Net income from investment contract liabilities totalled EUR 851 million (642). Net insurance finance expenses totalled EUR 727 million (722).

    In banking, net income from financial assets held for trading decreased by 19.1% to EUR 44 million due to the decrease in interest income from notes and bonds.

    Other operating income increased to EUR 44 million (40).

    Total expenses grew by 2.3% to EUR 2,262 million. Personnel costs rose by 12.1% to EUR 1,081 million. The increase was affected by headcount growth and pay increases. OP Financial Group’s personnel increased by approximately 1,000 year on year. The number of employees increased in areas such as sales, customer service, service development, risk management and compliance. Depreciation/amortisation and impairment loss on PPE and intangible assets decreased by 35.5% to EUR 146 million.

    A year ago, impairment loss recognised mainly for information systems and property in own use totalled EUR 60 million. Other operating expenses increased by 2.4% to EUR 1,036 million. ICT costs totalled EUR 514 million (460). Development costs were EUR 349 million (294) and capitalised development expenditure EUR 58 million (62). Charges of financial authorities fell by EUR 61 million to EUR 16 million. The EU’s Single Resolution Board (SRB) did not collect stability contributions from banks for 2024. In 2023, OP Financial Group paid a total of EUR 62 million in stability contributions.

    At EUR 307 million (269), OP bonuses for owner-customers are included in earnings and are divided under the following items based on their accrual: EUR 160 million (150) under interest income, EUR 82 million (67) under interest expenses, EUR 48 million (38) under commission income from mutual funds, and EUR 17 million (15) under the insurance service result.

    Income tax amounted to EUR 499 million (408). OP Financial Group paid EUR 397 million in corporate tax for 2023. The effective tax rate for the reporting period was 20.1% (19.9). Comprehensive income after tax totalled EUR 2,067 million (1,719).

    OP Financial Group’s equity amounted to EUR 18.1 billion (16.3). Equity included EUR 3.3 billion (3.3) in Profit Shares, terminated Profit Shares accounting for EUR 0.4 billion (0.4).

    OP Financial Group’s funding position and liquidity are strong. The Group’s LCR was 193% (199), and its NSFR was 129% (130).

    Outlook

    Finland’s economy contracted in 2024. However, the economy began to recover as the year progressed and preliminary figures suggest that GDP grew in the second half compared to the same period in 2023. Slower inflation and lower interest rates provide a basis for the recovery to continue. Risks associated with the economic outlook are still higher than usual. The escalation of geopolitical crises or a rise in trade barriers may affect capital markets and the economic environment.

    OP Financial Group’s operating profit for 2025 is expected to be at a good level but lower than that for 2023 and 2024.

    The most significant uncertainties affecting OP Financial Group’s earnings performance are associated with developments in the business environment, changes in the interest rate and investment environment and developments in impairment loss on receivables. All forward-looking statements in this Financial Statements Bulletin expressing the management’s expectations, beliefs, estimates, forecasts, projections and assumptions are based on the current view on developments in the economy, and actual results may differ materially from those expressed in the forward-looking statements.

    Press conference

    OP Financial Group’s financial performance will be presented to the media by President and Group Chief Executive Officer Timo Ritakallio in a press conference on 6 February 2025 at 11am at Gebhardinaukio 1, Vallila, Helsinki.

    Media enquiries: OP Corporate Communications, tel. +358 10 252 8719, viestinta@op.fi

    OP Corporate Bank plc and OP Mortgage Bank will publish their own financial statements bulletins.

    Time of publication of 2024 reports:

    Report by the Board of Directors (incl. Sustainability Report) and Financial Statements 2024 Week 11
    OP Financial Group’s Corporate Governance Statement 2024 Week 11
    OP Financial Group’s Annual Report 2024 Week 11
    OP Amalgamation Pillar 3 Disclosures 2024 Week 11
    OP Financial Group’s Remuneration Report for Governing Bodies 2024 Week 11
    Remuneration Policy for Governing Bodies at OP Financial Group Week 11

    Schedule for Interim Reports and Half-year Financial Report in 2025:

    Interim Report 1 January–31 March 2025 7 May 2025
    Half-year Financial Report 1 January–30 June 2025 30 July 2025
    Interim Report 1 January–30 September 2025 28 October 2025
    OP Amalgamation Pillar 3 Disclosures 31 March 2025 Week 19
    OP Amalgamation Pillar 3 Disclosures 30 June 2025 Week 33
    OP Amalgamation Pillar 3 Disclosures 30 September 2025 Week 45

    Helsinki, 6 February 2025

    OP Cooperative
    Board of Directors

    For additional information, please contact:

    Timo Ritakallio, President and Group CEO, tel. +358 10 252 4500
    Mikko Timonen, Chief Financial Officer, tel. +358 10 252 1325
    Piia Kumpulainen, Chief Communications Officer, tel. +358 10 252 7317

    www.op.fi 

    DISTRIBUTION 
    Nasdaq Helsinki Oy 
    Euronext Dublin (Irish Stock Exchange) 
    LSE London Stock Exchange 
    Major media
    op.fi  

    OP Financial Group is Finland’s largest financial services group, with more than two million owner-customers and over 14,000 employees. We provide a comprehensive range of banking and insurance services for personal and corporate customers. OP Financial Group consists of OP cooperative banks, its central cooperative OP Cooperative, and the latter’s subsidiaries and affiliates. Our mission is to promote the sustainable prosperity, security and wellbeing of our owner-customers and operating region. Together with our owner-customers, we have been building Finnish society and a sustainable future for 120 years now. www.op.fi

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: ING posts full-year 2024 net profit of €6,392 million and outstanding commercial growth

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ING posts full-year 2024 net profit of €6,392 million and outstanding commercial growth

    Full-year profit before tax of €9,300 million, supported by growing customer base and increase in lending and deposits
    • Mobile primary customer base rises by 1.1 million in 2024 to 14.4 million
    • Net core lending growth of €28 billion, or 4%, and net core deposits growth of €47 billion (7%)
    • Total income of €22.6 billion; double-digit growth in fee income, surpassing €4 billion for the first time
    • Full-year return on equity of 13.0%; proposed final cash dividend of €0.71 per share
     
    4Q2024 profit before tax of €1,771 million with a CET1 ratio of 13.6%
    • Increase of 434,000 mobile primary customers in the fourth quarter, with growth in all markets
    • Total income resilient year-on-year, supported by continuously strong fee income
    • Risk costs remain below our through-the-cycle average, reflecting strong asset quality
    • CET1 ratio decreases to 13.6% following the shareholder distribution announced in October
     

    CEO statement

    “In 2024, we have made very good progress in the implementation of our strategy. We have accelerated growth, diversified our income, provided superior value to customers and continued to play a leading role in supporting our clients’ sustainable transition,” said ING CEO Steven van Rijswijk. “We’re pleased with our strong results and are on track to make the targets as communicated on our Capital Markets Day in June. We have continued to invest in the growth of our business, resulting in a larger customer base and higher revenues, while continuously executing our plans to drive operational efficiencies.

    “We have increased the number of our mobile primary customers by 1.1 million, resulting in a total of 14.4 million mobile primary customers, with Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland especially contributing to the growth. Core lending has also grown across all markets, by €28 billion, with particularly strong growth of €19 billion in our mortgage portfolio, especially in Germany and the Netherlands. Our deposit base has risen by €47 billion, again with contributions from all Retail countries and our Wholesale business. In Wholesale Banking, we have seen strong results from Financial Markets and we have continued investing in our front office and building our product foundations.

    “Total income has increased to a record €22.6 billion and we have posted a net result of €6.4 billion, maintaining a high level after a very strong 2023. Fee income has increased 11% year-on-year, following an increase in both assets under management and in customer trading activity in Retail. Fee income growth in Wholesale Banking was mainly driven by a higher number of capital markets issuance deals for our clients.

    “Sustainability is a priority for our clients and for ING. We have increased our sustainable volume mobilised to €130 billion, up from €115 billion in 2023, showing strong progress against our 2027 target of €150 billion per annum. During the year, we have engaged with more than 1,600 of our Wholesale Banking clients on their transition plans. In Retail Banking, including in Germany, the Netherlands and Australia, we have supported our customers with sustainable mortgages, renovation loans and digital tools, allowing them to identify possible energy upgrades to their homes and connecting them with accredited home renovators.

    “For the coming year, we remain vigilant as we foresee ongoing geopolitical volatility and a fragmented economic outlook. We are confident that we have the right strategy to deliver value to all of our stakeholders by growing our customer base, continuing to diversify our income and supporting clients in their sustainable transitions. I would like to take this opportunity to thank our shareholders for their continued support, our clients for their continued trust and our employees for their hard work and collaboration.”
     
    Further information
    All publications related to ING’s Full year and 4Q 2024 results can be found at the quarterly results page on ING.com. For more on investor information, go to www.ing.com/investors.

    A short ING ON AIR video with CEO Steven van Rijswijk discussing our FY/4Q2024 results is available on Youtube.

    For further information on ING, please visit www.ing.com. Frequent news updates can be found in the Newsroom or via the @ING_news feed on X. Photos of ING operations, buildings and its executives are available for download at Flickr.
     
    Investor conference call, Media meeting and webcasts
    Steven van Rijswijk, Tanate Phutrakul and Ljiljana Čortan will discuss the results in an Investor conference call on 6 February 2025 at 9:00 a.m. CET. Members of the investment community can join the conference call at +31 20 708 5074 (NL), or +44 330 551 0202 (UK) (registration required via invitation) and via live audio webcast at www.ing.com.

    Steven van Rijswijk, Tanate Phutrakul and Ljiljana Čortan will also discuss the results in a media meeting on 6 February 2024 at 11:00 a.m. CET. Journalists are welcome at ING’s Cedar office, Bijlmerdreef 106, Amsterdam. Alternatively, they can dial-in in listen-only mode via +31 20 708 5073 (NL), or +44 330 551 0200 (UK) – quote ING Media Call 4Q2024 when prompted by the operator. The meeting can also be followed via live audio webcast at www.ing.com.
     
    Investor enquiries
    E: investor.relations@ing.com

    Press enquiries

    T: +31 20 576 5000
    E: media.relations@ing.com
     
    ING Profile
    ING is a global financial institution with a strong European base, offering banking services through its operating company ING Bank. The purpose of ING Bank is: empowering people to stay a step ahead in life and in business. ING Bank’s more than 60,000 employees offer retail and wholesale banking services to customers in over 100 countries.

    ING Group shares are listed on the exchanges of Amsterdam (INGA NA, INGA.AS), Brussels and on the New York Stock Exchange (ADRs: ING US, ING.N).

    ING aims to put sustainability at the heart of what we do. Our policies and actions are assessed by independent research and ratings providers, which give updates on them annually. ING’s ESG rating by MSCI was reconfirmed by MSCI as ‘AA’ in August 2024 for the fifth year. As of December 2023, in Sustainalytics’ view, ING’s management of ESG material risk is ‘Strong’. Our current ESG Risk Rating, is 17.2 (Low Risk). ING Group shares are also included in major sustainability and ESG index products of leading providers. Here are some examples: Euronext, STOXX, Morningstar and FTSE Russell.

    Important legal information
    Elements of this press release contain or may contain information about ING Groep N.V. and/ or ING Bank N.V. within the meaning of Article 7(1) to (4) of EU Regulation No 596/2014 (‘Market Abuse Regulation’).

    ING Group’s annual accounts are prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards as adopted by the European Union (‘IFRS- EU’). In preparing the financial information in this document, except as described otherwise, the same accounting principles are applied as in the 2023 ING Group consolidated annual accounts. The Financial statements for 2024 are in progress and may be subject to adjustments from subsequent events. All figures in this document are unaudited. Small differences are possible in the tables due to rounding.

    Certain of the statements contained herein are not historical facts, including, without limitation, certain statements made of future expectations and other forward-looking statements that are based on management’s current views and assumptions and involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance or events to differ materially from those expressed or implied in such statements. Actual results, performance or events may differ materially from those in such statements due to a number of factors, including, without limitation: (1) changes in general economic conditions and customer behaviour, in particular economic conditions in ING’s core markets, including changes affecting currency exchange rates and the regional and global economic impact of the invasion of Russia into Ukraine and related international response measures (2) changes affecting interest rate levels (3) any default of a major market participant and related market disruption (4) changes in performance of financial markets, including in Europe and developing markets (5) fiscal uncertainty in Europe and the United States (6) discontinuation of or changes in ‘benchmark’ indices (7) inflation and deflation in our principal markets (8) changes in conditions in the credit and capital markets generally, including changes in borrower and counterparty creditworthiness (9) failures of banks falling under the scope of state compensation schemes (10) noncompliance with or changes in laws and regulations, including those concerning financial services, financial economic crimes and tax laws, and the interpretation and application thereof (11) geopolitical risks, political instabilities and policies and actions of governmental and regulatory authorities, including in connection with the invasion of Russia into Ukraine and the related international response measures (12) legal and regulatory risks in certain countries with less developed legal and regulatory frameworks (13) prudential supervision and regulations, including in relation to stress tests and regulatory restrictions on dividends and distributions (also among members of the group) (14) ING’s ability to meet minimum capital and other prudential regulatory requirements (15) changes in regulation of US commodities and derivatives businesses of ING and its customers (16) application of bank recovery and resolution regimes, including write down and conversion powers in relation to our securities (17) outcome of current and future litigation, enforcement proceedings, investigations or other regulatory actions, including claims by customers or stakeholders who feel misled or treated unfairly, and other conduct issues (18) changes in tax laws and regulations and risks of non-compliance or investigation in connection with tax laws, including FATCA (19) operational and IT risks, such as system disruptions or failures, breaches of security, cyber-attacks, human error, changes in operational practices or inadequate controls including in respect of third parties with which we do business and including any risks as a result of incomplete, inaccurate, or otherwise flawed outputs from the algorithms and data sets utilized in artificial intelligence (20) risks and challenges related to cybercrime including the effects of cyberattacks and changes in legislation and regulation related to cybersecurity and data privacy, including such risks and challenges as a consequence of the use of emerging technologies, such as advanced forms of artificial intelligence and quantum computing (21) changes in general competitive factors, including ability to increase or maintain market share (22) inability to protect our intellectual property and infringement claims by third parties (23) inability of counterparties to meet financial obligations or ability to enforce rights against such counterparties (24) changes in credit ratings (25) business, operational, regulatory, reputation, transition and other risks and challenges in connection with climate change and ESG-related matters, including data gathering and reporting (26) inability to attract and retain key personnel (27) future liabilities under defined benefit retirement plans (28) failure to manage business risks, including in connection with use of models, use of derivatives, or maintaining appropriate policies and guidelines (29) changes in capital and credit markets, including interbank funding, as well as customer deposits, which provide the liquidity and capital required to fund our operations, and (30) the other risks and uncertainties detailed in the most recent annual report of ING Groep N.V. (including the Risk Factors contained therein) and ING’s more recent disclosures, including press releases, which are available on www.ING.com.

    This document may contain ESG-related material that has been prepared by ING on the basis of publicly available information, internally developed data and other third-party sources believed to be reliable. ING has not sought to independently verify information obtained from public and third-party sources and makes no representations or warranties as to accuracy, completeness, reasonableness or reliability of such information.

    Materiality, as used in the context of ESG, is distinct from, and should not be confused with, such term as defined in the Market Abuse Regulation or as defined for Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) reporting purposes. Any issues identified as material for purposes of ESG in this document are therefore not necessarily material as defined in the Market Abuse Regulation or for SEC reporting purposes. In addition, there is currently no single, globally recognized set of accepted definitions in assessing whether activities are “green” or “sustainable.” Without limiting any of the statements contained herein, we make no representation or warranty as to whether any of our securities constitutes a green or sustainable security or conforms to present or future investor expectations or objectives for green or sustainable investing. For information on characteristics of a security, use of proceeds, a description of applicable project(s) and/or any other relevant information, please reference the offering documents for such security.

    This document may contain inactive textual addresses to internet websites operated by us and third parties. Reference to such websites is made for information purposes only, and information found at such websites is not incorporated by reference into this document. ING does not make any representation or warranty with respect to the accuracy or completeness of, or take any responsibility for, any information found at any websites operated by third parties. ING specifically disclaims any liability with respect to any information found at websites operated by third parties. ING cannot guarantee that websites operated by third parties remain available following the publication of this document, or that any information found at such websites will not change following the filing of this document. Many of those factors are beyond ING’s control.

    Any forward-looking statements made by or on behalf of ING speak only as of the date they are made, and ING assumes no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information or for any other reason.

    This document does not constitute an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to purchase, any securities in the United States or any other jurisdiction.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senators Coons, Lankford, Kaine, and Tillis reintroduce bipartisan resolution supporting international religious freedom

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Delaware Christopher Coons

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators Chris Coons (D-Del.) and James Lankford (R-Okla.) introduced a bipartisan resolution to express support for international religious freedom as a fundamental right and a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy amid concern over increased attacks on religious freedom worldwide. This effort is cosponsored by Senators Tim Kaine (D-Va.) and Thom Tillis (R-N.C.). This bill was previously introduced in the 118th Congress.

    In just the past two years, there have been thousands of incidents where religious freedom was violated around the world, including violence against Rohingya Muslims in Burma, attacks on Uyghurs in China, and persecution of clergy by Russians in Ukraine, according to the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). In 2023, USCIRF identified more than 2,200 individuals—Christians, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, and Sikhs alike—targeted by 27 different countries and entities for their religious beliefs. As of 2024, there are 96 countries with legislation criminalizing blasphemy used to enforce arbitrary limitations on religious freedoms. 

    The resolution urges the State Department to expand its support for religious freedom around the world as threats and violence worsen. This effort would leverage all diplomatic and sanctions tools available to hold violators of religious freedom accountable and would encourage the State Department to promote religious freedom as a central tenet of U.S. foreign policy implementation.

    “As Co-Chair of the Senate Human Rights Caucus, I have fiercely defended the religious freedom of all Americans, but our work can’t stop at home,” said Senator Coons. “Whether you’re a member of a religious minority or a non-believer, far too many people around the world are unfairly targeted and even persecuted for their beliefs and practices. I’m proud to once again lead this bipartisan effort to highlight the importance of promoting religious freedom for our nation’s foreign policy and standing.”

    “The fundamental right of every person to have a faith, live your faith, change your faith, or have no faith at all must be recognized throughout the world. Countries like China, Russia, and Iran continue to target and persecute citizens for living this most basic freedom. The United States must continue its international leadership to defend religious freedom, which is why we are reaffirming our commitment to fight for religious freedom around the world,” said Senator Lankford.

    “In 1786, the Virginia General Assembly passed a statute instituting religious freedom in the Commonwealth, establishing the basis of religious freedom for the whole of the United States. Today, individuals throughout the world who live in countries where religious freedom is threatened or non-existent see the U.S. as a beacon of hope that people of all beliefs can live in the same neighborhoods, attend the same schools, and work side by side,” said Senator Kaine. “Amid the horrifying rise in attacks on faith-based communities, I’m joining my colleagues in sending a clear message that we must work together to protect religious freedom in every corner of the globe.”

    “The United States must maintain our steadfast commitment to standing up for religious liberty,” said Senator Tillis. “This resolution expresses our unwavering support for victims of religious persecution and reaffirms our support for safeguarding religious freedom worldwide.”

    The full text of this resolution is available here.

    Senator Coons and Senator Tillis are Co-Chairs of the Senate Human Rights Caucus.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Durbin Joins Senate Democrats To Speak Out Against Russell Vought’s Nomination To Lead OMB

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Dick Durbin

    February 05, 2025

    Durbin: Placing Mr. Vought in charge of OMB would be irresponsible

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL) today joined Senate Democrats in speaking out against President Trump’s nominee to lead the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Russell Vought. In a speech on the Senate floor, Durbin outlined why Mr. Vought is unfit for the job, including his actions as Director of OMB during the first Trump administration and his part in crafting Project 2025— a policy proposal written by a conservative think tank outlining a sweeping, extreme vision forAmerica.

    “Mr. Vought has been nominated by President Trump to run this agency… its job is to oversee federal agencies and administer the federal budget. Most of the time, when we are called on to evaluate nominations, we do our best to take a look and review the nominee’s qualifications and experience,” Durbin said. “But for Mr. Vought, there is no need for imagination. He already has served as Director of OMB during the last half of President Trump’s first term in office, and I believe he proved who he was in that period of time.”

    Durbin continued, “When he served as Director of OMB during President Trump’s first term, Mr. Vought illegally refused to release hundreds of millions of dollars in security assistance to Ukraine and delayed $20 billion in disaster aid for Puerto Rico… And when he left that role, Mr. Vought went on to become a key architect of ‘Project 2025’—a policy proposal written by a conservative a think tank outlining a sweeping, extreme vision for America’s future. Project 2025 included policies to consolidate power in the executive branch and undermine critical services that the federal government provides to the American families.”

    During his speech, Durbin also slammed the Trump Administration for their decision to issue an OMB memo last week to “temporarily pause all activities related to obligation or disbursement” of trillions of dollars of Federal financial assistance, which caused mass confusion about the funding and operations of hundreds of government-funded programs ranging from Medicaid, to Head Start, to Violence Against Women Act grants.

    Shortly before the federal funding freeze was set to begin, U.S. District Court Judge Loren L. Alikhan, who was confirmed under Durbin’s tenure as Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, temporarily blocked the move by the Trump Administration. Another judge issued a temporary restraining order blocking President Trump’s measure. The Trump Administration rescinded the memo but claimed that the federal funding freeze would still take place. 

    “This latest attempt to put a sweeping freeze on federal funds is far from the first time Mr. Vought has broken the law and undermined Congress’s power of the purse that is set forth in the Constitution. It is clear from Mr. Vought’s comments and actions that he has contempt for Congress as a co-equal branch of government,” Durbin said. “It is appalling that so many of my Republican Senate friends voted to advance his nomination as he actively attempts to strip Congress of our Congressional authorities.”

    Durbin continued, “We [Democrats] are not opposing Mr. Vought solely because he poses a threat to our ability to do our jobs in Congress. Mr. Vought has made it clear that he is targeting working families across the country. Both in his previous tenure as OMB Director and in policy proposals, Mr. Vought has proposed budget cuts that slash the social safety net for resources for tax cuts for the wealthy.”

    Durbin concluded, “To my Republican colleagues—for the sake of the institution in which we work, the constituents we were elected to serve, and the constitutional foundations of our nation, please don’t vote for Mr. Vought. Maya Angelou once said: ‘When someone shows you who they are…believe them the first time.’ Well, from his tenure running OMB to his authorship of Project 2025, Mr. Vought has shown us exactly who he is and what he believes. He is a man with little respect for the Constitution and limited understanding of the plight of real working Americans. Giving Mr. Vought the reins of OMB is an invitation to a policy battle at the expense of our Constitution.”

    Video of Durbin’s remarks on the Senate floor is available here.

    Audio of Durbin’s remarks on the Senate floor is available here.

    Footage of Durbin’s remarks on the Senate floor is available here for TV Stations.

    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Russia, Ukraine swap 300 prisoners of war

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Russia and Ukraine have swapped 300 prisoners of war in their latest swap mediated by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the Russian defense ministry said Wednesday.

    The released Russian soldiers are receiving medical care in Belarus and will soon return to Russia, according to the ministry.

    Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that 150 Ukrainians had returned home from Russia as part of the swap.

    Zelensky thanked the UAE for its mediation.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: One Year from Expiration of New START Nuclear Treaty, Sen. Markey Introduces Resolution to Avoid New Arms Race with Russia and China

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts Ed Markey

    Resolution Text (PDF)

    Washington (February 5, 2025) – Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), Senate co-chair of the bicameral Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group, today introduced a resolution to recommit the United States to arms control agreements to prevent a new nuclear arms race, one year before the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia will expire. Unless a new agreement is in place by early 2026, there will be no legal limits on U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces, reversing decades of work to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Representatives Bill Foster (IL-11), John Garamendi (CA-08), and Don Beyer (VA-08) are leading the resolution in the House. Reps. Garamendi and Beyer are the House co-chairs of the Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group.

    “The Trump administration has an historic opportunity to initiate high-level talks for a new pact and prevent a dangerous and costly nuclear arms race,” said Senator Markey. “I urge President Trump to work with Russia to replace New START and to talk with China about arms control. We are just one year away from losing New START and with it, all legal limits on Russian nuclear forces. There is no time to wait.”

    “As a physicist, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons has always been one of my top priorities,” said Representative Foster. “Russia’s suspension of the New START Treaty and Putin’s rhetoric about the potential use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine should have the entire international community on high alert and should serve as the impetus for us to pursue substantive nuclear arms control dialogue. American leadership is desperately needed to prevent escalation and avoid an unrestrained nuclear arms race.”

    “For far too long, nuclear weapons have threatened our country. Our leadership has long recognized that arms control is the most effective way to ensure American security. In today’s environment, it’s more important than ever that we begin to treat arms control with the same dedication we give our nuclear modernization and begin a constructive dialogue for a New START Treaty. We must strive for a more peaceful future, one without the existential threat of nuclear weapons,” said Representative Garamendi.

    “Now more than ever, it is absolutely critical that we redouble our commitment to nuclear nonproliferation,” said Representative Beyer. “The New START treaty is our last major nuclear arms control agreement, and with rising instability overseas the ingredients are there for a runaway nuclear arms race that endangers us all.  This resolution demonstrates broad bicameral support for a renewal of New START and further arms control talks with other nuclear arms states that will help avert the potential global catastrophe that is a nuclear exchange.”

    On May 17, 2024, the Working Group co-chairs led their colleagues in a letter to President Joe Biden urging support for commonsense limits on the world’s two largest nuclear stockpiles, and to continue renewed efforts to restart arms control talks with the Russian Federation and other nuclear states.  

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Murray Joins Colleagues in Holding Senate Floor All Night to Send Stark Warning Against Confirming Russ Vought to Lead OMB

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington State Patty Murray
    ***VIDEO HERE*** 
    Murray: “Why on earth would any one of us confirm someone whose entire game plan is to break the law and dare the world to stop him?”
    Washington, D.C. — Today, U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee and a senior member and former Chair of the Senate Budget Committee, helped lead Senate Democrats in holding the Senate floor for a full 30 hours ahead of a final confirmation vote on Russell Vought to serve as Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
    Senator Murray delivered an hour-long floor speech and her remarks below touch specifically on Vought’s long history of extremism and advocacy for illegally blocking enacted funds due to go out to communities across the country. She warned her colleagues that as OMB Director, Vought would not implement the laws they pass, and that it will be much harder to work in a bipartisan way if Senators cannot trust OMB to respect enacted law and get duly passed funds to states and to programs families rely on.
    Senator Murray has repeatedly warned of Vought’s extremism and the threat he poses. At a recent Senate Budget Committee hearing, she grilled him on his views and whether he would, as OMB Director, simply follow the law and ensure funding Congress passed makes it to the families and communities it intended. Vought repeatedly refused to commit to following the law despite admitting that no court in the land has ever found the Impoundment Control Act to be unconstitutional.
    “The Senate should not vote to confirm as the head of OMB—or to any important role for that matter—someone who does not respect the constitutional authority of the Senate and, thus, the people we represent.
    “We should not entrust someone to implement our laws who has made clear, time and again through his past actions in this same role during President Trump’s first term, through his work as head architect of Project 2025, and through his own words in hearings and meetings that he will not follow the laws—that he will not send our communities the funding that we all worked together to pass.”
    “We know if Russ Vought gets his way, and gets his hands on the nation’s funding again, he won’t just draw blood, he will cut programs families rely on to the bone: SNAP cuts that leave families hungry, policies to cut people off from their health care, cuts to disability benefits that veterans have earned through their service, thousands of public servants forced out of roles serving the American people—all while he works with Trump to dole out more tax breaks to billionaires and the biggest corporations.”
    Senator Murray concluded her hour long remarks by emphasizing, once again, that Vought would be a dangerous, lawless OMB Director.
    “Before us, right now, is a nominee who has made clear he will not respect the authority of Congress and the people who voted us in—nominated by a President who is not respecting the authority of Congress and the people who voted us in.
    “We have to say we will not stand for it. We have to say the law is the law. And one simple way we can send that message is by rejecting Russ Vought’s nomination outright. And so, I strongly urge my colleagues to join me in doing just that.”
    The full text of Senator Murray’s remarks on Vought during her speech can be found below, and video can be found HERE.
    “M. President, I rise to urge all of my colleagues to vote against Russ Vought’s nomination to lead the Office of Management and Budget.
    “The Senate should not vote to confirm as the head of OMB—or to any important role for that matter—someone who does not respect the constitutional authority of the Senate and, thus, the people we represent.
    “We should not entrust someone to implement our laws who has made clear, time and again through his past actions in this same role during President Trump’s first term, through his work as head architect of Project 2025, and through his own words in hearings and meetings that he will not follow the laws—that he will not send our communities the funding we pass!
    “Why on earth would any one of us confirm someone whose entire game plan is to break the law and dare the world to stop him?
    “That’s it—that is how Russ Vought plans to run the OMB. It is not a secret, it is a very public fact—he has put this on the record time and again.
    “Just look at what happened last time Russ Vought served as Director of the OMB. He tried to break the law to give President Trump unilateral authority he does not possess to hold up security assistance to Ukraine and override the spending decisions of Congress. And he has not given up on that idea! He has written about it many, many times in the years since.
    “As a chief architect of Project 2025, Vought doubled down on lawlessness and charted a blatantly unconstitutional plan for the President to ignore the will of Congress—which led him to being named in the first Articles of Impeachment Against President Trump.
    “He mapped out a lawless path that—as I will detail shortly—President Trump is already barreling down at full speed.
    “But if you still weren’t convinced that Russ Vought will trample all over the separation of powers, will ignore the authority of Congress, will hurt the American people by holding back funds they rely on—well, you’re in luck, because, at our hearing with him, I asked Vought directly, point blank: ‘Will you follow the law?’
    “That should not be a hard question. Even if you disagree with a law, you don’t ignore it. Maybe you don’t like the 25 mile-an-hour speed limit in a school zone, but unless it’s changed, or struck down, you still have to follow it. It’s true for speed limits—and it is certainly true for the Constitution.
    “That is something almost every single American understands—except, apparently, Russ Vought and Donald Trump. Because, today the Impoundment Control Act is the law of the land. Despite Vought’s own wishes and feelings—it has not been changed and it has not been struck down in court.
    “Despite what Vought pretends is true, the reality is the Constitution gives Congress—not the President—the power of the purse. And yet, Russ Vought will not say he will follow the law.
    “And look, Vought is not just lawless—he is extreme. Let me just drive this home for a second. Let’s take abortion for example. Project 2025 already calls for ripping away birth control, allowing states to deny women life-saving emergency care, and effectively banning all abortion nationwide.
    “That is already a dangerous Republican fever dream—far out of line, by the way, with the American people. But Vought wants to go further! On abortion, he is for, quote: ‘abolition.’ You know what that means?
    “It means a national abortion ban without any exemptions or exceptions—even in cases of rape or when a woman’s life is at risk. That is as far right as it gets!
    “And abortion is not the only issue where Vought has made statements that are deeply alarming. He has stated he believes the 2020 election was, quote: ‘rigged.’ That is not just out of touch with America—that is dangerously out of touch with reality.
    “He has said he wants to ‘traumatize’ our federal workers—that means all the people who work really hard to help in our communities inspecting food, reviewing the safety of drugs, or keeping travel safe, or strengthening our infrastructure, or fostering innovation and small business, or getting care to veterans, or supporting to tribes, and so much more.
    “Vought has even said we live in a, quote, ‘post-constitutional’ time. M. President, it really doesn’t get any clearer than that. A post-constitutional time. That’s what he believes we are in. Do my colleagues agree? Do they think it’s time to shred the Constitution? That’s what is at stake with this confirmation vote.
    “Because Vought has made all too clear that as OMB director, he will put everything on the chopping block—from programs people rely on to the checks and balances our democracy is founded on. Again, he has put it down on paper—in black and white.
    “We know he wants to cut Medicare, and in particular, Medicaid, by hundreds of billions of dollars.
    “We know he wants to find ‘significant savings’ from eligibility changes to veterans’ health care and disability benefits. We don’t even need Project 2025 to see that! He laid some of that out in his budgets from Trump’s first term!
    “Vought’s goals are not secret, nor are they subtle—we do not have to decipher anything here. There is no mystery. We know he is planning for cuts beyond anything this country has ever seen.
    “And we know if Russ Vought gets his way, and gets his hands on the nation’s funding again, he will not just draw blood, he will cut programs families rely on to the bone—SNAP cuts that leave families hungry, policies to cut people off from their health care, cuts to disability benefits that veterans have earned through their service to America, thousands of public servants forced out of roles serving the American people—all while he works with Trump to dole out more tax breaks to billionaires and the biggest corporations.
    “And here’s another thing—we don’t have to imagine just how painful and chaotic Vought’s lawless ideas would be in practice because Vought is actually already putting his agenda in place, which frankly raises another question: why should the Senate vote to confirm someone who is already secretly doing the job behind our backs?
    “Because guess what—those Executive Orders that Trump still has in effect? Those orders which are, right now, illegally blocking money our communities need? That is right out of the Project 2025 playbook.
    “Or the effort now to get rid of thousands of federal workers through illegal firings and now scam buyout offers that have no basis in law to carry out, or trying to illegally abolish entire agencies with the stroke of a pen? That has Project 2025 written all over it.
    “And it’s not just a parallel in ideas here—when OMB issued its blatantly illegal guidance and attempted to block trillions in federal dollars Congress, all of us, passed, there were digital fingerprints all over that document linking right back to Project 2025. And in the chaos that followed—do you know who reportedly met with OMB staffers about how to respond? Russ Vought. So, let’s not pretend we have no idea just how lawless this guy is. Let’s not pretend we have no idea what sort of damage he will cause if he is put back in power.”
    […]
    “Now, Mr. President, before I conclude, I just want to hit once more on what is at stake with Mr. Vought’s nomination—we are talking about hundreds of billions of dollars in federal spending that Congress, us, passed, that our communities are counting on, and that Mr. Vought has made painfully clear he will not think twice about illegally blocking.
    “Giving this man the power to enact his illegal schemes will do real harm to folks back home. It will cut people off from help getting groceries and making rent. It will cut families off from child care and health care. It will cut veterans and their survivors off from disability and education benefits they earned through their service to our country. It will cut off breakthrough medical research, and help for people struggling with opioid addiction. It will cut off communities working to build bridges, improve roads, and strengthen their energy infrastructure.
    “That will have serious consequences we cannot overlook—we are here to fight for our families. But there is also another serious consequence here—one that cuts to the heart of what makes this Senate work, and that makes our democracy work.
    “Confirming Russ Vought to OMB makes it that much harder to negotiate our spending bills. It is much harder to reach a bipartisan deal with my colleagues, whom I respect and trust and have worked with for years, if that deal is going to be implemented by someone in whom I have zero trust—someone who has made clear that despite our laws, he is going to block any funding we pass.
    “And why should any Senator vote to confirm someone who has made it perfectly clear—he would undermine their authority to help their constituents.
    “M. President, as I’ve said, our system of checks and balances does not work on its own—we have to actually do our part here in Congress to be the check on Presidential abuse of power. And we have an opportunity—no, actually it’s an obligation—right now, to do just that.
    “Before us, right now, is a nominee who has made it very clear he will not respect the authority of Congress, of all of us, and all the people who voted us in—nominated by a President who is not respecting the authority of Congress and the people who voted us in.
    “We have to say we will not stand for it. We have to say the law is the law. And one simple way we can send that message is by rejecting Russ Vought’s nomination outright. And so, M. President, I am here today to strongly urge my colleagues to join me in doing just that.”

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI: Weatherford Announces Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    • Fourth quarter revenue of $1,341 million decreased 5% sequentially and 2% year-over-year; full year revenue of $5,513 million increased 7% from prior year, driven by international revenue growth of 10%
    • Fourth quarter operating income of $198 million decreased 19% sequentially and 8% year-over-year; full year operating income of $938 million increased 14% from prior year
    • Fourth quarter net income of $112 million, an 8.4% margin, decreased 29% sequentially and 20% year-over-year; full year net income of $506 million, a 9.2% margin, increased by 21% from prior year
    • Fourth quarter adjusted EBITDA* of $326 million, a 24.3% margin, decreased 8%, or 88 basis points, sequentially and increased 2%, or 74 basis points, year-over-year; full year adjusted EBITDA* of $1,382 million, a 25.1% margin, increased 17%, or 197 basis points, from prior year
    • Fourth quarter cash provided by operating activities of $249 million and adjusted free cash flow* of $162 million; full year cash provided by operating activities of $792 million and adjusted free cash flow* of $524 million
    • Shareholder return of $67 million for the quarter, which included dividend payments of $18 million and share repurchases of $49 million
    • Board approved quarterly cash dividend of $0.25 per share, payable on March 19, 2025, to shareholders of record as of February 21, 2025

    *Non-GAAP – refer to the section titled Non-GAAP Financial Measures Defined and GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Measures Reconciled

    HOUSTON, Feb. 05, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Weatherford International plc (NASDAQ: WFRD) (“Weatherford” or the “Company”) announced today its results for the fourth quarter of 2024 and full year 2024.

    Revenues for the fourth quarter of 2024 were $1,341 million, a decrease of 5% sequentially and 2% year-over-year. Operating income was $198 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, compared to $243 million in the third quarter of 2024 and $216 million in the fourth quarter of 2023. Net income in the fourth quarter of 2024 was $112 million, with an 8.4% margin, a decrease of 29%, or 279 basis points, sequentially, and a decrease of 20%, or 193 basis points, year-over-year. Adjusted EBITDA* was $326 million, a 24.3% margin, a decrease of 8%, or 88 basis points, sequentially, and an increase of 2%, or 74 basis points, year-over-year. Basic income per share in the fourth quarter of 2024 was $1.54 compared to $2.14 in the third quarter of 2024 and $1.94 in the fourth quarter of 2023. Diluted income per share in the fourth quarter of 2024 was $1.50 compared to $2.06 in the third quarter of 2024 and $1.90 in the fourth quarter of 2023.

    Fourth quarter 2024 cash flows provided by operating activities were $249 million, compared to $262 million in the third quarter of 2024, and $375 million in the fourth quarter of 2023. Adjusted free cash flow* was $162 million, a decrease of $22 million sequentially, and $153 million year-over-year. Capital expenditures were $100 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, compared to $78 million in the third quarter of 2024, and $67 million in the fourth quarter of 2023.

    Revenue for the full year 2024 was $5,513 million, compared to revenues of $5,135 million in 2023. Operating income for the full year was $938 million, compared to $820 million in 2023. The Company’s full year 2024 net income was $506 million, compared to $417 million in 2023. Full year cash flows provided by operations were $792 million, compared to $832 million in 2023. Adjusted free cash flow* for the full year was $524 million compared to $651 million in 2023. Capital expenditures for the full year 2024 were $299 million, compared to $209 million in 2023.

    Girish Saligram, President and Chief Executive Officer, commented, “The fourth quarter witnessed a significant drop in activity levels in Latin America and a more cautious tone in a few key geographies. Despite a challenging environment in the fourth quarter, the overall full year 2024 was another one of setting new operational highs, and I would like to express my gratitude to the One Weatherford team for that. We ended the year with the best safety record we have ever had, strong margin expansion and solid cash generation.

    While the activity outlook continues to evolve, margins and cash flow performance continue to be the cornerstone of our financial and strategic objectives. We are well-positioned to deliver another year of strong cash flow generation in 2025. While there is some temporary activity reduction, we continue to believe in the industry’s mid to long-term resilience and remain committed to our goal of achieving EBITDA margins in the high 20’s over the next few years.”

    *Non-GAAP – refer to the section titled Non-GAAP Financial Measures Defined and GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Measures Reconciled

    Operational & Commercial Highlights

    • ADNOC awarded Weatherford a three-year contract for the provision of rigless services as part of the reactivation of ADNOC’s onshore strings.
    • Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) awarded Weatherford a Managed Pressure Drilling (MPD) services contract focused on improving operational efficiency, enhancing safety, accelerating well-delivery timelines, and reducing costs by deploying Weatherford’s innovative VictusTM Intelligent MPD system.
    • KOC awarded Weatherford a one-year contract to provide and operate two onshore Real Time Decision Centers.
    • A National Oil Company (NOC) in Qatar awarded Weatherford a five-year contract to provide fishing and drilling tools, with a five-year extension option.
    • An NOC in Asia awarded Weatherford a three-year contract for the provision of Wireline conveyance and tooling services and a three-year contract for Tubular Running Services (TRS) in onshore India.
    • OMV Petrom awarded Weatherford a two-year contract for openhole and cased-hole logging services in Romania.
    • A major operator in Asia awarded Weatherford a three-year contract for providing ModusTM MPD services for two zones in North and South Sumatra, and awarded a five-year contract to provide openhole and cased-hole Wireline in onshore Indonesia.
    • Khalda awarded Weatherford a three-year contract to deploy up to 300 wells in Egypt using CygNet® SCADA and ForeSite® platform.
    • Azule Energy awarded Weatherford a three-year contract to provide TRS for the NGC Project in offshore Angola. This is in addition to the recently awarded TRS contract in block 15/06 in the deepwater block.
    • PTTEP awarded Weatherford a 24-month contract to provide openhole Wireline Services in onshore Thailand.
    • A major operator in Asia awarded Weatherford with a four-year contract to provide Rotating Control Devices to enable MPD in offshore Indonesia.
    • Shell Petroleum Development Company awarded Weatherford a three-year contract to provide Well Completions and other related specialized services in onshore Nigeria.

    Technology Highlights
    On January 14, 2025, at the annual IKTVA forum held at Dahan Dharan Expo, Weatherford signed an agreement with SPARK, a fully integrated industrial ecosystem aimed at making Saudi Arabia a global energy hub. This strategic partnership, aligned with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, enhances Weatherford’s local presence, boosts production capabilities, and supports the region’s energy goals. By advancing local content, fostering talent, and driving innovation, Weatherford demonstrates its commitment to economic growth and to supporting Saudi Arabia’s leadership in energy innovation.

    • Drilling & Evaluation (“DRE”)
      • In the North Sea, Weatherford successfully deployed the world’s first Dual Advanced Kickover Tool for Equinor. The unique solution enables gas lift valve replacements in just a single run, which significantly increases efficiency and reduces cost of conventional systems.
      • In Saudi Arabia, Weatherford deployed its compact wireline logging tools with shuttle technology to achieve a record total depth for Aramco. This extended reach well features the longest horizontal section, measuring 23,000 feet.
    • Well Construction and Completions (“WCC”)
      • In deepwater Brazil, Weatherford successfully installed the first OptiRoss® RFID Multi-Cycle Sliding Sleeve Valve for a major operator. The system enhances acid stimulation efficiency, improving production and boosting the reservoir’s oil recovery factor.
      • In the Middle East, Weatherford successfully deployed its market-leading Optimax Tubing Retrievable Safety Valve for an NOC. This deployment enabled gas lift valve replacements in a single run, significantly increasing efficiency and reducing costs compared to conventional systems.
    • Production and Intervention (“PRI”)
      • In the Middle East, Weatherford’s Alpha1Go remote re-entry system was deployed for an NOC, optimizing rig site operations by significantly reducing whipstock preparation time and minimizing red-zone exposure. This deployment improved both efficiency and safety, demonstrating the system’s effectiveness in facilitating well re-entry operations and real-time team collaboration in various rig environments.
      • In US land operations, Weatherford successfully deployed its first Reclaim Dual Barrier Plug and Abandon (P&A) system for a major operator. This innovative dual barrier P&A system safely and reliably abandons wells without the need to pull tubing. By eliminating the requirement for conventional drilling rigs, it significantly reduces costs and minimizes the carbon footprint.

    Shareholder Return

    During the fourth quarter of 2024, Weatherford repurchased shares for approximately $49 million and paid dividends of $18 million, resulting in total shareholder return of $67 million. Since the inception of the shareholder return program introduced earlier in 2024, the Company repurchased shares for approximately $99 million and paid dividends of $36 million, resulting in total shareholder return of $135 million.

    On January 29, 2025, our Board declared a cash dividend of $0.25 per share of the Company’s ordinary shares, payable on March 19, 2025, to shareholders of record as of February 21, 2025.

    Results by Reportable Segment

    Drilling and Evaluation (“DRE”)

        Three Months Ended   Variance     Twelve Months Ended   Variance
    ($ in Millions)   Dec 31,
    2024    		   Sep 30,
    2024    		   Dec 31,
    2023    		   Seq.     YoY   Dec 31,
    2024    		   Dec 31,
    2023    		   YoY
    Revenue   $ 398     $ 435     $ 382     (9 )%   4 %   $ 1,682     $ 1,536     10 %
    Segment Adjusted EBITDA   $ 96     $ 111     $ 97     (14 )%   (1 )%   $ 467     $ 422     11 %
    Segment Adj EBITDA Margin     24.1 %     25.5 %     25.4 %   (140) bps   (127) bps     27.8 %     27.5 %   29 bps

    Fourth quarter 2024 DRE revenue of $398 million decreased by $37 million, or 9% sequentially, primarily from lower activity in Latin America, partly offset by higher international Wireline activity. Year-over-year DRE revenues increased by $16 million, or 4%, primarily from higher activity in North America and higher international Wireline activity, partly offset by lower activity in Latin America.

    Fourth quarter 2024 DRE segment adjusted EBITDA of $96 million decreased by $15 million, or 14% sequentially, primarily driven by lower activity in Latin America, partly offset by higher international Wireline activity. Year-over-year DRE segment adjusted EBITDA decreased by $1 million, or 1%, primarily due to lower activity in Latin America, partly offset by improved performance in Middle East/North Africa/Asia.

    Full year 2024 DRE revenues of $1,682 million increased by $146 million, or 10% compared to 2023, as higher Wireline and Drilling-related services activity were partly offset by lower Drilling Services in Latin America.

    Full year 2024 DRE segment adjusted EBITDA of $467 million increased by $45 million, or 11% compared to 2023, as higher MPD and Wireline activity were partly offset by lower activity in Latin America.

    Well Construction and Completions (“WCC”)

        Three Months Ended   Variance     Twelve Months Ended   Variance
    ($ in Millions)   Dec 31,
    2024    		   Sep 30,
    2024    		   Dec 31,
    2023    		   Seq.     YoY   Dec 31,
    2024    		   Dec 31,
    2023    		   YoY
    Revenue   $ 505     $ 509     $ 480     (1 )%   5 %   $ 1,976     $ 1,800     10 %
    Segment Adjusted EBITDA   $ 148     $ 151     $ 131     (2 )%   13 %   $ 564     $ 455     24 %
    Segment Adj EBITDA Margin     29.3 %     29.7 %     27.3 %   (36) bps   202 bps     28.5 %     25.3 %   326 bps

    Fourth quarter 2024 WCC revenue of $505 million decreased by $4 million, or 1% sequentially, primarily due to lower activity in Europe/Sub-Sahara Africa/Russia, partly offset by higher Completions and TRS activity in Middle East/North Africa/Asia. Year-over-year WCC revenues increased by $25 million, or 5%, primarily due to higher activity in Middle East/North Africa/Asia and higher Liner Hangers and Well Services activity in Latin America, partly offset by lower activity in North America.

    Fourth quarter 2024 WCC segment adjusted EBITDA of $148 million decreased by $3 million, or 2% sequentially, primarily due to lower activity in Europe/Sub-Sahara Africa/Russia, partly offset by higher Completions and TRS activity in Middle East/North Africa/Asia. Year-over-year WCC segment adjusted EBITDA increased by $17 million, or 13%, primarily due to higher activity in Middle East/North Africa/Asia, partly offset by lower activity in Europe/Sub-Sahara Africa/Russia.

    Full year 2024 WCC revenues of $1,976 million increased by $176 million, or 10% compared to 2023, primarily from higher activity in Middle East/North Africa/Asia and Latin America, partly offset by lower activity in North America.

    Full year 2024 WCC segment adjusted EBITDA of $564 million increased by $109 million, or 24% compared to 2023, primarily due to improved fall through in major product lines across all geographies.

    Production and Intervention (“PRI”)

        Three Months Ended   Variance       Twelve Months Ended   Variance  
    ($ in Millions)   Dec 31,
    2024    		   Sep 30,
    2024    		   Dec 31,
    2023    		   Seq.     YoY     Dec 31,
    2024    		   Dec 31,
    2023    		   YoY  
    Revenue   $ 364     $ 371     $ 386     (2 )%   (6 )%   $ 1,452     $ 1,472     (1 )%
    Segment Adjusted EBITDA   $ 78     $ 83     $ 88     (6 )%   (11 )%   $ 319     $ 323     (1 )%
    Segment Adj EBITDA Margin     21.4 %     22.4 %     22.8 %   (94) bps   (137) bps     22.0 %     21.9 %   3 bps

    Fourth quarter 2024 PRI revenue of $364 million decreased by $7 million, or 2% sequentially, primarily due to lower activity in Latin America and lower Intervention Services and Drilling Tools (ISDT) activity in Europe/Sub-Sahara Africa/Russia and North America. Year-over-year PRI revenue decreased by $22 million, or 6%, as lower activity in Middle East/North Africa/Asia and Latin America was partly offset by higher Artificial Lift activity in North America.

    Fourth quarter 2024 PRI segment adjusted EBITDA of $78 million, decreased by $5 million, or 6% sequentially, primarily from lower activity in Latin America and lower ISDT activity in Europe/Sub-Sahara Africa/Russia and North America, partly offset by higher Artificial Lift activity in Middle East/North Africa/Asia. Year-over-year PRI segment adjusted EBITDA decreased by $10 million, or 11% year-over-year, primarily due to lower activity in Latin America and Europe/Sub-Sahara Africa/Russia, partly offset by better ISDT and Artificial Lift fall through in North America.

    Full year 2024 PRI revenues of $1,452 million decreased by $20 million, or 1% compared to 2023, primarily due to lower international Pressure Pumping and Digital Solutions activity, partly offset by higher ISDT activity in Europe/Sub-Sahara Africa/Russia and Middle East/North Africa/Asia.

    Full year 2024 PRI segment adjusted EBITDA of $319 million decreased by $4 million, or 1% compared to 2023, as lower activity in international Pressure Pumping and Digital Solutions was partly offset by improved performance in Artificial Lift.

    Revenue by Geography

        Three Months Ended   Variance   Twelve Months Ended   Variance
    ($ in Millions)   Dec 31,
    2024    		   Sep 30,
    2024    		   Dec 31,
    2023    		   Seq.   YoY   Dec 31,
    2024    		   Dec 31,
    2023    		   YoY
    North America   $ 261   $ 266   $ 248   (2 )%   5 %   $ 1,046   $ 1,068   (2 )%
                                     
    International   $ 1,080   $ 1,143   $ 1,114   (6 )%   (3 )%   $ 4,467   $ 4,067   10 %
    Latin America     312     358     342   (13 )%   (9 )%     1,393     1,387   — %
    Middle East/North Africa/Asia     542     542     547   — %   (1 )%     2,123     1,815   17 %
    Europe/Sub-Sahara Africa/Russia     226     243     225   (7 )%   — %     951     865   10 %
    Total Revenue   $ 1,341   $ 1,409   $ 1,362   (5 )%   (2 )%   $ 5,513   $ 5,135   7 %


    North America

    Fourth quarter 2024 North America revenue of $261 million decreased by $5 million, or 2% sequentially, primarily due to activity decreases in the North and South regions, partly offset by activity increase offshore in the Gulf of Mexico. Year-over-year, North America increased by $13 million, or 5%, primarily from higher Artificial Lift and Wireline activity, partly offset by a decrease in activity across the WCC segment.

    Full year 2024 North America revenue of $1,046 million decreased by $22 million, or 2%, compared to 2023, primarily due to lower activity in the WCC and PRI segments, partly offset by higher Wireline activity.

    International

    Fourth quarter 2024 international revenue of $1,080 million decreased 6% sequentially and decreased 3% year-over-year, and full year 2024 international revenue of $4,467 million increased 10%, compared to 2023.

    Fourth quarter 2024 Latin America revenue of $312 million decreased by $46 million, or 13% sequentially, primarily due to lower Drilling-related Services, partly offset by higher Liner Hangers activity. Year-over-year, Latin America revenue decreased by $30 million, primarily due to lower activity in the DRE and PRI segments, partly offset by higher activity in Liner Hangers and Well Services.

    Full year 2024 Latin America revenue of $1,393 million was largely flat, compared to 2023.

    Fourth quarter 2024 revenue of $542 million in Middle East/North Africa/Asia was flat sequentially, as higher activity from Completions and Artificial Lift were largely offset by lower MPD and Integrated Services & Projects. Year-over-year, the Middle East/North Africa/Asia revenue decreased by $5 million, or 1%, primarily due to lower activity in the PRI segment, partly offset by higher Drilling-related services and Completions activity.

    Full year 2024 revenue of $2,123 million in Middle East/North Africa/Asia increased by $308 million, or 17%, compared to 2023, mainly due to increased activity in the DRE and WCC segments, partly offset by lower activity in Digital Solutions, Artificial Lift and Pressure Pumping.

    Fourth quarter 2024 Europe/Sub-Sahara Africa/Russia revenue of $226 million decreased by $17 million, or 7%, sequentially, mainly driven by lower Completions and ISDT activity, partly offset by higher Wireline activity. Year-over-year Europe/Sub-Sahara Africa/Russia revenue was largely flat due to increased activity in the DRE segment, largely offset by lower activity in the WCC and PRI segments.

    Full year 2024 Europe/Sub-Sahara Africa/Russia revenue of $951 million increased by $86 million, or 10% compared to 2023, due to increased activity in the DRE and WCC segments, partly offset by lower Pressure Pumping and Artificial Lift activity.

    About Weatherford
    Weatherford delivers innovative energy services that integrate proven technologies with advanced digitalization to create sustainable offerings for maximized value and return on investment. Our world-class experts partner with customers to optimize their resources and realize the full potential of their assets. Operators choose us for strategic solutions that add efficiency, flexibility, and responsibility to any energy operation. The Company conducts business in approximately 75 countries and has approximately 19,000 team members representing more than 110 nationalities and 330 operating locations. Visit weatherford.com for more information and connect with us on social media.

    Conference Call Details

    Weatherford will host a conference call on Thursday, February 6, 2025, to discuss the Company’s results for the fourth quarter ended December 31, 2024. The conference call will begin at 8:30 a.m. Eastern Time (7:30 a.m. Central Time).

    Listeners are encouraged to download the accompanying presentation slides which will be available in the investor relations section of the Company’s website.

    Listeners can participate in the conference call via a live webcast at https://www.weatherford.com/investor-relations/investor-news-and-events/events/ or by dialing +1 877-328-5344 (within the U.S.) or +1 412-902-6762 (outside of the U.S.) and asking for the Weatherford conference call. Participants should log in or dial in approximately 10 minutes prior to the start of the call.

    A telephonic replay of the conference call will be available until February 20, 2025, at 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time. To access the replay, please dial +1 877-344-7529 (within the U.S.) or +1 412-317-0088 (outside of the U.S.) and reference conference number 9530137. A replay and transcript of the earnings call will also be available in the investor relations section of the Company’s website.

    Contacts
    For Investors:
    Luke Lemoine
    Senior Vice President, Corporate Development & Investor Relations
    +1 713-836-7777
    investor.relations@weatherford.com

    For Media:
    Kelley Hughes
    Senior Director, Communications & Employee Engagement
    media@weatherford.com

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This news release contains projections and forward-looking statements concerning, among other things, the Company’s quarterly and full-year revenues, adjusted EBITDA*, adjusted EBITDA margin*, adjusted free cash flow*, net leverage*, shareholder return program, forecasts or expectations regarding business outlook, prospects for its operations, capital expenditures, expectations regarding future financial results, and are also generally identified by the words “believe,” “project,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “estimate,” “outlook,” “budget,” “intend,” “strategy,” “plan,” “guidance,” “may,” “should,” “could,” “will,” “would,” “will be,” “will continue,” “will likely result,” and similar expressions, although not all forward-looking statements contain these identifying words. Such statements are based upon the current beliefs of Weatherford’s management and are subject to significant risks, assumptions, and uncertainties. Should one or more of these risks or uncertainties materialize, or underlying assumptions prove incorrect, actual results may vary materially from those indicated in our forward-looking statements. Readers are cautioned that forward-looking statements are only predictions and may differ materially from actual future events or results, based on factors including but not limited to: global political disturbances, war, terrorist attacks, changes in global trade policies and tariffs, weak local economic conditions and international currency fluctuations; general global economic repercussions related to U.S. and global inflationary pressures and potential recessionary concerns; various effects from conflicts in the Middle East and the Russia Ukraine conflict, including, but not limited to, nationalization of assets, extended business interruptions, sanctions, treaties and regulations imposed by various countries, associated operational and logistical challenges, and impacts to the overall global energy supply; cybersecurity issues; our ability to comply with, and respond to, climate change, environmental, social and governance and other sustainability initiatives and future legislative and regulatory measures both globally and in specific geographic regions; the potential for a resurgence of a pandemic in a given geographic area and related disruptions to our business, employees, customers, suppliers and other partners; the price and price volatility of, and demand for, oil and natural gas; the macroeconomic outlook for the oil and gas industry; our ability to generate cash flow from operations to fund our operations; our ability to effectively and timely adapt our technology portfolio, products and services to remain competitive, and to address and participate in changes to the market demands, including for the transition to alternate sources of energy such as geothermal, carbon capture and responsible abandonment, including our digitalization efforts; our ability to effectively execute our capital allocation framework; our ability to return capital to shareholders, including those related to the timing and amounts (including any plans or commitments in respect thereof) of any dividends and share repurchases; and the realization of additional cost savings and operational efficiencies.

    These risks and uncertainties are more fully described in Weatherford’s reports and registration statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including the risk factors described in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K and Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q. Accordingly, you should not place undue reliance on any of the Company’s forward-looking statements. Any forward-looking statement speaks only as of the date on which such statement is made, and the Company undertakes no obligation to correct or update any forward-looking statement, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by applicable law, and we caution you not to rely on them unduly.

    *Non-GAAP – refer to the section titled Non-GAAP Financial Measures Defined and GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Measures Reconciled

    Weatherford International plc
    Selected Statements of Operations (Unaudited)
                         
        Three Months Ended   Year Ended
    ($ in Millions, Except Per Share Amounts)   December
    31, 2024    		   September
    30, 2024    		   December
    31, 2023    		   December
    31, 2024    		   December
    31, 2023
    Revenues:                    
    DRE Revenues   $ 398     $ 435     $ 382     $ 1,682     $ 1,536  
    WCC Revenues     505       509       480       1,976       1,800  
    PRI Revenues     364       371       386       1,452       1,472  
    All Other     74       94       114       403       327  
    Total Revenues     1,341       1,409       1,362       5,513       5,135  
                         
    Operating Income:                    
    DRE Segment Adjusted EBITDA[1]   $ 96     $ 111     $ 97     $ 467     $ 422  
    WCC Segment Adjusted EBITDA[1]     148       151       131       564       455  
    PRI Segment Adjusted EBITDA[1]     78       83       88       319       323  
    All Other[2]     11       23       13       84       38  
    Corporate[2]     (7 )     (13 )     (8 )     (52 )     (52 )
    Depreciation and Amortization     (83 )     (89 )     (83 )     (343 )     (327 )
    Share-based Compensation     (10 )     (10 )     (9 )     (45 )     (35 )
    Other Charges     (35 )     (13 )     (13 )     (56 )     (4 )
    Operating Income     198       243       216       938       820  
                         
    Other Expense:                    
    Interest Expense, Net of Interest Income of $12, $13, $12, $56 and $59     (25 )     (24 )     (31 )     (102 )     (123 )
    Loss on Blue Chip Swap Securities     —       —       —       (10 )     (57 )
    Other Expense, Net     (4 )     (41 )     (36 )     (87 ) —   (134 )
    Income Before Income Taxes     169       178       149       739       506  
    Income Tax Provision     (45 )     (12 )     (2 )     (189 )     (57 )
    Net Income     124       166       147       550       449  
    Net Income Attributable to Noncontrolling Interests     12       9       7       44       32  
    Net Income Attributable to Weatherford   $ 112     $ 157     $ 140     $ 506     $ 417  
                         
    Basic Income Per Share   $ 1.54     $ 2.14     $ 1.94     $ 6.93     $ 5.79  
    Basic Weighted Average Shares Outstanding     72.6       73.2       72.1       73.0       71.9  
                         
    Diluted Income Per Share[3]   $ 1.50     $ 2.06     $ 1.90     $ 6.75     $ 5.66  
    Diluted Weighted Average Shares Outstanding     74.5       75.2       73.9       74.9       73.7  
                                             
    [1]   Segment adjusted EBITDA is our primary measure of segment profitability under U.S. GAAP ASC 280 “Segment Reporting” and represents segment earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization, share-based compensation and other adjustments. Research and development expenses are included in segment adjusted EBITDA.
    [2]   All Other includes results from non-core business activities (including integrated services and projects), and Corporate includes overhead support and centrally managed or shared facilities costs. All Other and Corporate do not individually meet the criteria for segment reporting.
    [3]   Included the maximum potentially dilutive shares contingently issuable for an acquisition consideration during the three months ended September 30, 2024, the value of which was adjusted out of Net Income Attributable to Weatherford in calculating diluted income per share.
    Weatherford International plc
    Selected Balance Sheet Data (Unaudited)
           
    ($ in Millions) December 31, 2024   December 31, 2023
    Assets:      
    Cash and Cash Equivalents $ 916   $ 958
    Restricted Cash   59     105
    Accounts Receivable, Net   1,261     1,216
    Inventories, Net   880     788
    Property, Plant and Equipment, Net   1,061     957
    Intangibles, Net   325     370
           
    Liabilities:      
    Accounts Payable   792     679
    Accrued Salaries and Benefits   302     387
    Current Portion of Long-term Debt   17     168
    Long-term Debt   1,617     1,715
           
    Shareholders’ Equity:      
    Total Shareholders’ Equity   1,283     922
               
    Weatherford International plc
    Selected Cash Flows Information (Unaudited)
                         
        Three Months Ended   Year Ended
    ($ in Millions)   December
    31, 2024    		   September
    30, 2024    		   December
    31, 2023    		   December
    31, 2024    		   December
    31, 2023
    Cash Flows From Operating Activities:                    
    Net Income   $ 124     $ 166     $ 147     $ 550     $ 449  
    Adjustments to Reconcile Net Income to Net Cash Provided By Operating Activities:                    
    Depreciation and Amortization     83       89       83       343       327  
    Foreign Exchange Losses (Gain)     (2 )     35       43       56       116  
    Loss on Blue Chip Swap Securities     —       —       —       10       57  
    Gain on Disposition of Assets     (2 )     (1 )     —       (35 )     (11 )
    Deferred Income Tax Provision (Benefit)     —       (19 )     (19 )     8       (86 )
    Share-Based Compensation     10       10       9       45       35  
    Changes in Accounts Receivable, Inventory, Accounts Payable and Accrued Salaries and Benefits     24       30       151       (120 )     (84 )
    Other Changes, Net     12       (48 )     (39 )     (65 )     29  
    Net Cash Provided By Operating Activities     249       262       375       792       832  
                         
    Cash Flows From Investing Activities:                    
    Capital Expenditures for Property, Plant and Equipment     (100 )     (78 )     (67 )     (299 )     (209 )
    Proceeds from Disposition of Assets     13       —       7       31       28  
    Purchases of Blue Chip Swap Securities     —       —       —       (50 )     (110 )
    Proceeds from Sales of Blue Chip Swap Securities     —       —       —       40       53  
    Business Acquisitions, Net of Cash Acquired     —       (15 )     —       (51 )     (4 )
    Other Investing Activities     1       1       (71 )     36       (47 )
    Net Cash Used In Investing Activities     (86 )     (92 )     (131 )     (293 )     (289 )
                         
    Cash Flows From Financing Activities:                    
    Repayments of Long-term Debt     (23 )     (5 )     (80 )     (287 )     (386 )
    Distributions to Noncontrolling Interests     (20 )     (10 )     (31 )     (39 )     (52 )
    Tax Remittance on Equity Awards     (22 )     —       (2 )     (31 )     (56 )
    Share Repurchases     (49 )     (50 )     —       (99 )     —  
    Dividends Paid     (18 )     (18 )     —       (36 )     —  
    Other Financing Activities     (1 )     (6 )     (13 )     (19 )     (20 )
    Net Cash Used In Financing Activities   $ (133 )   $ (89 )   $ (126 )   $ (511 )   $ (514 )

                      

    Weatherford International plc
    Non-GAAP Financial Measures Defined (Unaudited)

    We report our financial results in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). However, Weatherford’s management believes that certain non-GAAP financial measures (as defined under the SEC’s Regulation G and Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K) may provide users of this financial information additional meaningful comparisons between current results and results of prior periods and comparisons with peer companies. The non-GAAP amounts shown in the following tables should not be considered as substitutes for results reported in accordance with GAAP but should be viewed in addition to the Company’s reported results prepared in accordance with GAAP.

    Adjusted EBITDA* – Adjusted EBITDA* is a non-GAAP measure and represents consolidated income before interest expense, net, income taxes, depreciation and amortization expense, and excludes, among other items, restructuring charges, share-based compensation expense, as well as other charges and credits. Management believes adjusted EBITDA* is useful to assess and understand normalized operating performance and trends. Adjusted EBITDA* should be considered in addition to, but not as a substitute for consolidated net income and should be viewed in addition to the Company’s reported results prepared in accordance with GAAP.

    Adjusted EBITDA Margin* – Adjusted EBITDA margin* is a non-GAAP measure which is calculated by dividing consolidated adjusted EBITDA* by consolidated revenues. Management believes adjusted EBITDA margin* is useful to assess and understand normalized operating performance and trends. Adjusted EBITDA margin* should be considered in addition to, but not as a substitute for consolidated net income margin and should be viewed in addition to the Company’s reported results prepared in accordance with GAAP.

    Adjusted Free Cash Flow* – Adjusted Free Cash Flow* is a non-GAAP measure and represents cash flows provided by (used in) operating activities, less capital expenditures plus proceeds from the disposition of assets. Management believes adjusted free cash flow* is useful to understand our performance at generating cash and demonstrates our discipline around the use of cash. Adjusted free cash flow* should be considered in addition to, but not as a substitute for cash flows provided by operating activities and should be viewed in addition to the Company’s reported results prepared in accordance with GAAP.

    Net Debt* – Net Debt* is a non-GAAP measure that is calculated taking short and long-term debt less cash and cash equivalents and restricted cash. Management believes the net debt* is useful to assess the level of debt in excess of cash and cash and equivalents as we monitor our ability to repay and service our debt. Net debt* should be considered in addition to, but not as a substitute for overall debt and total cash and should be viewed in addition to the Company’s results prepared in accordance with GAAP.​

    Net Leverage* – Net Leverage* is a non-GAAP measure which is calculated by dividing by taking net debt* divided by adjusted EBITDA* for the trailing 12 months. Management believes the net leverage* is useful to understand our ability to repay and service our debt. Net leverage* should be considered in addition to, but not as a substitute for the individual components of above defined net debt* divided by consolidated net income attributable to Weatherford and should be viewed in addition to the Company’s reported results prepared in accordance with GAAP.

    *Non-GAAP – as defined above and reconciled to the GAAP measures in the section titled GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Measures Reconciled

    Weatherford International plc
    GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Measures Reconciled (Unaudited)
     
                         
        Three Months Ended   Year Ended
    ($ in Millions, Except Margin in Percentages)   December
    31, 2024    		   September
    30, 2024    		   December
    31, 2023    		   December
    31, 2024    		   December
    31, 2023
    Revenues   $ 1,341     $ 1,409     $ 1,362     $ 5,513     $ 5,135  
    Net Income Attributable to Weatherford   $ 112     $ 157     $ 140     $ 506     $ 417  
    Net Income Margin     8.4 %     11.1 %     10.3 %     9.2 %     8.1 %
    Adjusted EBITDA*   $ 326     $ 355     $ 321     $ 1,382     $ 1,186  
    Adjusted EBITDA Margin*     24.3 %     25.2 %     23.6 %     25.1 %     23.1 %
                         
    Net Income Attributable to Weatherford   $ 112     $ 157     $ 140     $ 506     $ 417  
    Net Income Attributable to Noncontrolling Interests     12       9       7       44       32  
    Income Tax Provision     45       12       2       189       57  
    Interest Expense, Net of Interest Income of $12, $13, $12, $56 and $59     25       24       31       102       123  
    Loss on Blue Chip Swap Securities     —       —       —       10       57  
    Other Expense, Net     4       41       36       87       134  
    Operating Income     198       243       216       938       820  
    Depreciation and Amortization     83       89       83       343       327  
    Other Charges[1]     35       13       13       56       4  
    Share-Based Compensation     10       10       9       45       35  
    Adjusted EBITDA*   $ 326     $ 355     $ 321     $ 1,382     $ 1,186  
                         
    Net Cash Provided By Operating Activities   $ 249     $ 262     $ 375     $ 792     $ 832  
    Capital Expenditures for Property, Plant and Equipment     (100 )     (78 )     (67 )     (299 )     (209 )
    Proceeds from Disposition of Assets     13       —       7       31       28  
    Adjusted Free Cash Flow*   $ 162     $ 184     $ 315     $ 524     $ 651  
    [1]   Other charges in the three and twelve months ended December 31, 2024, primarily included severance and restructuring costs and fees to third-party financial institutions related to collections of certain receivables from our largest customer in Mexico.
         

    *Non-GAAP – as reconciled to the GAAP measures above and defined in the section titled Non-GAAP Financial Measures Defined

    Weatherford International plc
    GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Measures Reconciled Continued (Unaudited)
     
                   
         
    ($ in Millions)   December
    31, 2024    		   September
    30, 2024    		   December
    31, 2023    		  
    Current Portion of Long-term Debt   $ 17   $ 21   $ 168  
    Long-term Debt     1,617     1,627     1,715  
    Total Debt   $ 1,634   $ 1,648   $ 1,883  
                   
    Cash and Cash Equivalents   $ 916   $ 920   $ 958  
    Restricted Cash     59     58     105  
    Total Cash   $ 975   $ 978   $ 1,063  
                   
    Components of Net Debt              
    Current Portion of Long-term Debt   $ 17   $ 21   $ 168  
    Long-term Debt     1,617     1,627     1,715  
    Less: Cash and Cash Equivalents     916     920     958  
    Less: Restricted Cash     59     58     105  
    Net Debt*   $ 659   $ 670   $ 820  
                   
    Net Income for trailing 12 months   $ 506   $ 534   $ 417  
    Adjusted EBITDA* for trailing 12 months   $ 1,382   $ 1,377   $ 1,186  
                   
    Net Leverage* (Net Debt*/Adjusted EBITDA*)     0.48 x   0.49 x   0.69 x
                         

    *Non-GAAP – as reconciled to the GAAP measures above and defined in the section titled Non-GAAP Financial Measures Defined

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Security: International Arms Dealer Charged with Exporting U.S. Firearms to Russia

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    Defendant Unlawfully Exported Semi-Automatic Rifle-Pistols from U.S. Company Through JFK International Airport

    Earlier today, an indictment was filed in federal court in Brooklyn charging Sergei Zharnovnikov, an arms dealer and citizen of Kyrgyzstan, with conspiring to export firearms from the United States to Russia without the necessary licenses and with illegal smuggling.  Zharnovnikov traveled from Kyrgyzstan to the United States last month and was arrested on January 24, 2025 in Las Vegas, Nevada, where he was attending the Shooting, Hunting, and Outdoor Trade (SHOT) Show to meet with U.S. arms dealers.  Zharnovnikov has been detained pending trial and will be arraigned in the Eastern District of New York at a later date.

    John J. Durham, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Devin DeBacker, head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, James E. Dennehy, Assistant Director in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York Field Office (FBI) and Jonathan Carson, Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Export Enforcement, New York Field Office (BIS-OEE), announced the arrest and charges.

    “As alleged, the defendant operated a sophisticated scheme to circumvent export controls and to export semi-automatic firearms and send them to Russia,” stated United States Attorney Durham.  “Today’s indictment sends a message to the world that we will vigorously enforce statutes that control and restrict the export of items that could be detrimental to the foreign policy or national security of the United States, in this case, preventing U.S.-made firearms from getting into the wrong hands.”

    Mr. Durham thanked the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Nevada for its assistance with the case.

    “Violations of export control laws carry significant consequences for perpetrators in the U.S. and abroad,” said DeBacker, head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division.  “The Department of Justice is committed to working with our partners to hold accountable those who violate our laws to smuggle firearms to prohibited destinations such as Russia.”

    “Attempting to illegally sell arms to Russia using multiple companies may seem like a method to evade United States sanctions, it is however a definite way to end up under arrest.  Sergei Zharnovnikov is alleged to have knowingly conspired with others to violate the export control laws of the United States to provide U.S made firearms to Russian companies.  The FBI will continue to enforce the export control laws enacted to safeguard our national security.”

    “The Bureau of Industry and Security is committed to aggressively investigating the illegal transshipment of US firearms to adversaries like Russia through third countries,” said BIS-OEE Special Agent in Charge Carson.  “Companies that provide false information to BIS to obtain export authorizations to circumvent our controls will be found out and held accountable.”

    As alleged in the indictment and other court filings, since at least March 2020, the defendant, together with others, conspired to export firearms on the United States DOC Control List from the U.S. to Russia.  The defendant, the General Director and owner of an arms dealer located in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyzstan Company-1), entered into a five-year, $900,000 contract with a company located in Chesapeake, Virginia (U.S. Company‑1) to purchase and export U.S. Company-1 firearms to Kyrgyzstan.  DOC issued a license for U.S. Company-1 to export firearms to Kyrgyzstan Company-1, but the license prohibited the export or re-export of the firearms to Russia.  Nevertheless, the defendant exported and re-exported U.S. Company‑1 firearms to Russia via Kyrgyzstan.  These illegally exported firearms included semi‑automatic hybrid rifle-pistols from U.S. Company-1.

    As alleged, after Kyrgyzstan Company-1 entered into a contract with U.S. Company-1, a second arms dealer company in Bishkek associated with the defendant (Kyrgyzstan Company-2) entered a contract with a Russian arms dealer (Russian Company-1) located in Moscow.  The contract between Russian Company-1 and Kyrgyzstan Company-2 provided that Kyrgyzstan Company‑2 would export “Goods” to Russian Company-1 in the amount of $10 million and noted that the “Goods” could be delivered in batches.  In correspondence in 2018, Russian Company-1 described the defendant’s company, Kyrgyzstan Company-1, as its “partner company.” 

    On or about February 3, 2021, U.S. Company-1 received an export license from DOC to export over $800,000 worth of firearms and parts to Kyrgyzstan Company-1.  The license stated that items within the scope of the license “may not be reexported or transferred (in-country),” subject to certain exceptions not applicable here.

    On or about July 2, 2022, the defendant emailed his banker: “Make payment according to the invoice attached to the letter,” and attached a commercial invoice from U.S. Company-1, which listed, among other things, 25 semi-automatic rifle-pistols with 25 unique serial numbers.  Two days later, on or about July 4, 2022, Kyrgyzstan Company‑2, sent $67,000 to Kyrgyzstan Company-1.  The next day, on or about July 5, 2022, Kyrgyzstan Company‑1 paid U.S. Company-1 $65,564—the full amount listed in the invoice from U.S. Company-1.

    According to an Electronic Export Information (EEI) made on July 7, 2022, Company-1 exported semi-automatic rifles from John F. Kennedy International Airport to Kyrgyzstan Company-1 pursuant to its February 3, 2021 export license on or about July 10, 2022. According to the EEI filing, the value of the export from U.S. Company-1 to Kyrgyzstan Company-1 was over $59,000.  The EEI filing’s corresponding license application indicated that the firearms were for “commercial resale in Kyrgyzstan.”

    On or about August 8, 2022, the defendant received a spreadsheet titled “Supply [U.S. Company-1] ([Russian Company-1]) weapon numbers.”  Russian Company-1 is a Russian company, and the DOC license did not authorize the export or re-export of the U.S. Company-1 firearms to Russia.  The spreadsheet listed the same semi-automatic rifle-pistol the defendant purchased from U.S. Company-1 and serial numbers matching the U.S. Company‑1 Invoice.

    On or about November 14, 2022, the General Director of Russian Company‑1 executed a form used by tax authorities of the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union, which includes both Kyrgyzstan and Russia.  The form listed the seller as Kyrgyzstan Company‑2 and the buyer as Russian Company-1 with an address in Moscow, Russia, and identified the goods as the same semi‑automatic rifle‑pistols that U.S. Company-1 exported to Kyrgyzstan Company‑1, the defendant’s company.  The defendant did not apply for, obtain or possess a license to export or re-export the semi‑automatic pistol-rifles to Russia.

    The charges in the indictment are allegations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.  If convicted of the charges, the defendant faces up to 30 years’ imprisonment.

    The government’s case is being handled by the Office’s National Security and Cybercrime Section.  Assistant United States  Attorney Ellen H. Sise is in charge of the prosecution, along with Trial Attorney Leslie Esbrook of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section (CES), with assistance from Litigation Analyst Rebecca Roth and CES Trial Attorney Scott Claffee.

    The case was coordinated through the Justice Department’s Task Force KleptoCapture, an interagency law enforcement task force dedicated to enforcing the sweeping sanctions, export restrictions and economic countermeasures that, beginning in 2014, the United States, along with its foreign allies and partners, has imposed in response to Russia’s unprovoked military invasion of Ukraine.  Announced by the Attorney General on March 2, 2022, and under the leadership of the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the task force will continue to leverage all of the Department’s tools and authorities to combat efforts to evade or undermine the collective actions taken by the U.S. government in response to Russian military aggression.

    The Defendant:

    SERGEI ZHARNOVNIKOV
    Age:  46
    Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan

    E.D.N.Y. Docket No. 25-CR-45 (ENV)

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Philip R. Lane: A middle path for ECB monetary policy

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)

    Washington, D.C., 5 February 2025

    It is a pleasure to be here at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE): your impressive research on a wide range of topics is extremely valuable for policymakers.[1]

    At last week’s monetary policy meeting, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to lower the deposit facility rate – the rate through which we steer the monetary policy stance – by 25 basis points from 3.0 per cent to 2.75 per cent. In cumulative terms, the deposit facility rate has declined by 125 basis points since last June. The decision reflected our updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission.

    In what follows, I will explain in more detail the basis for this decision. I will review inflation developments, economic developments, our risk assessment, and financial and monetary conditions. Finally, I explain why pursuing a middle path for monetary policy is best suited to the current environment.

    Inflation developments

    The disinflation process remains well on track. Inflation has continued to develop broadly in line with the staff projections and is set to return to our two per cent medium-term target in the course of this year. Most measures of underlying inflation suggest that inflation will settle at around our target on a sustained basis. The Persistent and Common Component of Inflation (PCCI), which has the best predictive power among underlying inflation indicators for future headline inflation, continued to hover around two per cent in the December data, indicating that headline inflation is set to stabilise around our target.

    Domestic inflation, at 4.2 per cent, stayed well above all the other indicators in December mostly because wages and prices in certain sectors are still adjusting to the past inflation surge with a substantial delay. However, the PCCI for services, which should act as an underlying attractor for services inflation and domestic inflation, fell to 2.3 per cent.

    The anticipation of a downward shift in services inflation in the coming months also relates to the expected deceleration in wage growth in the course of 2025. Wages have been adjusting to the past inflation surges with a substantial delay, but the ECB wage tracker and the latest surveys point to a significant moderation in wage pressures this year. According to the latest results of the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE), firms expect wages to grow by 3.3 per cent on average over the next twelve months, down from 4.5 per cent this time last year. Similarly, the latest Corporate Telephone Survey indicates that wage growth should decelerate from 4.6 per cent in 2024 to 3.3 per cent in 2025 and 2.9 per cent in 2026. This assessment is shared broadly among forecasters. Consensus Economics, for example, foresees a decline in wage growth by about one percentage point between 2024 and 2025.

    Most measures of longer-term inflation expectations continue to stand at around two per cent, despite an uptick at shorter horizons that may reflect the recent rise in energy prices. While the inflation expectations of firms have stabilised at three per cent across horizons, according to the SAFE, larger firms that are aware of the ECB’s inflation target show convergence towards two per cent. Consumer inflation expectations have edged up recently, especially for the near term, which can at least be partly explained by their higher sensitivity to the recent uptick in realised inflation. Inflation expectations of professionals – as captured by the latest vintages of the Survey of Professional Forecasters and Survey of Monetary Analysts – as well as market-based measures of inflation compensation have ticked up for the near term but, over longer horizons, remain stable at levels consistent with our medium-term target of two per cent.

    Economic developments

    On a fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter basis, the 2024 growth rate came in at 0.9 per cent, constituting a material improvement in momentum relative to the 2023 growth rate of 0.1 per cent. While 2024 saw a modest recovery in consumption, investment remained weak and exporters continued to suffer competitiveness challenges. In terms of the quarterly profile, growth stagnated in the final quarter following a comparatively robust third quarter.

    The incoming survey indicators suggest that the euro area economy is set to remain subdued in the near term. While unemployment remained low at 6.3 per cent in December, there has been some softening in labour demand, as reflected in lower vacancies and lower employment growth.

    At the same time, our baseline assessment is that the conditions for a recovery remain in place. Higher incomes, lower interest rates and stronger household balance sheets should allow a faster pick-up in consumption. More affordable credit should also boost housing and business investment over time. Exports should also support the recovery as global demand rises, although this is highly conditional on developments in international trade policies.

    Financial and monetary conditions

    Global and euro area bond yields have increased significantly since our last meeting. Amongst other factors, the spillover impact of the rise in US and global longer-term rates has contributed to the steepening of the euro area yield curve.

    Our past interest rate cuts are gradually making it less expensive for firms and households to borrow. The cost of borrowing for firms has declined by 92 basis points and mortgage rates have declined by 62 basis points since their peaks in autumn 2023. However, the interest rates on existing corporate and household loan books remain high, especially in real terms, with pre-2022 debt still re-pricing at higher rates as fixation periods expire.

    In overall terms, financing conditions remain tight. While credit is expanding, lending to firms and households remains subdued relative to historical norms. Growth in bank lending to firms rose to 1.5 per cent in December. In part, the pick-up in December reflects firms substituting market-based long-term financing for bank-based borrowing amidst tightening market conditions and increasing upcoming redemptions of long-term corporate bonds. Overall external debt financing of firms increased by 1.9 per cent in December, but remained well below the historical average of 4.9 per cent.[2] Loans to households continued to rise gradually, driven by mortgages, but remained muted overall, with an annual growth rate of 1.1 per cent in December, notably below the long-term average of 4.2 per cent.

    According to the latest bank lending survey, the demand for loans by firms increased slightly in the fourth quarter. At the same time, credit standards for loans to firms have tightened again, after having broadly stabilised over the previous four quarters. The renewed tightening of credit standards for firms was driven by the fact that banks see higher risks to the economic outlook and have lower tolerance for taking on credit risk. This finding is consistent with the results from the SAFE, in which firms reported a small decline in the availability of bank loans and more demanding non-rate lending conditions. In terms of households, the demand for mortgages increased strongly, mostly on the back of more attractive interest rates and better prospects for the property market. Credit standards for housing loans remained unchanged overall.

    Risk assessment

    Risks to economic growth remain tilted to the downside. In addition to trade policy uncertainty, lower confidence could prevent consumption and investment from recovering as fast as expected. This could be amplified by geopolitical risks, such as Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East, which could disrupt energy supplies and further weigh on global trade. Growth could also be lower if the lagged effects of monetary policy tightening last longer than expected. In the other direction, growth could be higher if easier financing conditions and falling inflation allow domestic consumption and investment to rebound faster.

    We take a two-sided approach to assessing inflation risk. Inflation could turn out higher if wages or profits increase by more than expected. Upside risks to inflation also stem from the heightened geopolitical tensions, which could push energy prices and freight costs higher in the near term and disrupt global trade. Moreover, extreme weather events, and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly, could drive up food prices by more than expected. By contrast, inflation may surprise on the downside if low confidence and concerns about geopolitical events prevent consumption and investment from recovering as fast as expected, if monetary policy dampens demand by more than expected, or if the economic environment in the rest of the world worsens unexpectedly. Greater friction in global trade would make the euro area inflation outlook more uncertain.

    A middle path for monetary policy

    Taken together, the incoming data since our previous meeting meant that it was clear that we should take a further step in monetary easing by lowering the deposit facility rate to 2.75 per cent. By excessively dampening demand, the alternative of holding the deposit facility rate at the level of 3.0 per cent would not have been consistent with the set of rate paths that would best ensure that inflation stabilises sustainably at our two per cent medium-term target. At the same time, the new level for the deposit facility rate at 2.75 per cent preserves considerable optionality in responding to shocks. In particular, the rate path can adjust as appropriate in the event of material upside or downside shocks to the inflation outlook and/or to economic momentum.

    While our baseline is that inflation should decline from 2.5 per cent in January to around our target in the coming months, it is still important to take into account that this deceleration might take longer than expected and that new upside risks to inflation could emerge, including due to external developments. These considerations explain why we have taken a step-by-step approach to rate cutting since last June.

    At the same time, an excessive abundance of caution in monetary easing could threaten the recovery in domestic demand that is needed to support the pricing environment compatible with our medium-term two per cent target. Under this too-cautious path, a below-target inflation dynamic could take hold, which would then require a more sizeable policy response to ensure inflation returns to our symmetric two per cent medium-term target.

    Balancing these considerations suggest a middle path is appropriate, which neither over-weighs upside risk nor over-weighs downside risk. That is, a robust monetary policy approach should balance the risks of moving too slowly against the risks of moving too quickly. Accordingly, it is prudent to maintain agility in adjusting the stance as appropriate on a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting basis and to not pre-commit to any particular rate path.

    In closing, let me comment on two much-discussed concepts: restrictiveness and neutrality.

    When inflation is materially above target and requires a monetary response to ensure that it returns to target in a timely manner and that inflation expectations remain anchored, the monetary stance must be clearly restrictive. As inflation returns close to target, policymakers need to shift their focus to adjusting monetary policy in line with the incoming economic and financial data and the evolving risk assessment to deliver the two per cent target over the medium term. In other words, policymakers should deliver the monetary stance that is appropriate to the situation.

    In exiting a restrictive phase, much energy could be diverted towards creating a summary “restrictiveness” index. Any such index would have to incorporate at least nine factors: (i) the still-important rolling off of super-cheap debt that was taken out in the “low for long” era that is now being re-financed at higher rates; (ii) in the other direction, the transmission of the easing since the peak of the hiking cycle; (iii) the impact of the anticipation of future rate cuts on current financing conditions; (iv) the evolving contribution of quasi-exogenous influences on financing conditions (such as global upward pressure on term premia); (v) the dynamics of bond and equity risk premia; (vi) the evolution of credit standards in bank lending; (vii) the different timelines for market-based and bank-based transmission; (viii) the responsiveness of consumption and investment to shifting monetary conditions; and (ix) the responsiveness of price setting to shifting monetary conditions.

    All of these factors enter our calibration of monetary policy (our assessment of the strength of monetary policy transmission has been highlighted as central to our reaction function) and cannot be summarised by a single indicator such as comparing the prevailing policy rate to a highly-uncertain estimate of the so-called neutral rate.[3]

    In terms of policy making, uncertainty about the level of the neutral rate and, more generally, about the strength of monetary transmission inescapably sits alongside uncertainty about the inflation outlook and uncertainty about the economic outlook.

    This is why our 2021 monetary policy strategy statement highlights that our decisions are based on an integrated assessment of all relevant factors. Over the last two years, we have emphasised in particular the importance of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary transmission as particularly relevant in complementing our analysis of the inflation outlook. More generally, it is essential that all relevant risks are incorporated in monetary policy decisions.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Trade liberalisation with Ukraine – E-002594/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    To support the Ukrainian economy following Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU liberalised all imports from Ukraine for which the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine[1] limited trade concessions to tariff-rate quotas, by Regulation (EU) 2022/870[2] of 30 May 2022. The measures were prolonged twice[3] and the current iteration will expire on 5 June 2025.

    These measures concern agricultural products and processed agricultural products. Under their last iteration from mid-2024, and in order to protect European farmers from growing import levels, automatic safeguards were introduced to limit duty-free imports for the most sensitive sectors, namely sugar, poultry, eggs, maize, honey, oats and groats.

    The Commission estimates that the value of Ukrainian agricultural products and processed agricultural products not subject to duties thanks to the measures[4] was around EUR 2.1 billion in 2023 out of the total of Ukraine’s agricultural exports to the EU, which amounted about EUR 12 billion.

    In 2024, the value of Ukrainian duty-free exports of agricultural products and processed agricultural products not subject to duties thanks to the measures is estimated at EUR 1.8 billion, a reduction due to the activation of automatic safeguards.

    Specifically for eggs and egg products , the value of Ukrainian duty-free exports to the EU in 2023 and 2024 is estimated at EUR 74 million and EUR 38 million, respectively.

    • [1] Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014A0529%2801%29-20231201
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/870/oj
    • [3] Regulation (EU) 2023/1077 of 31 May 2023; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1077/oj and Regulation (EU) 2024/1392 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1392/oj
    • [4] Based on Eurostat trade data.
    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: B10-0061/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
    Members responsible: Martin Häusling, Biljana Borzan, Anja Hazekamp

    B10‑0061/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP910521 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (D102174/03 – (2024/3010(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP910521 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (D102174/03),

    – having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed[1], and in particular Article 7(3) and Article 19(3) thereof,

    – having regard to the vote of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed referred to in Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, on 22 November 2024, at which no opinion was delivered, and the vote of the Appeal Committee on 17 December 2024, at which again no opinion was delivered,

    – having regard to Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers[2],

    – having regard to the opinion adopted by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) on 19 June 2024, and published on 1 August 2024[3],

    – having regard to its previous resolutions objecting to the authorisation of genetically modified organisms (‘GMOs’)[4],

    – having regard to Rule 115(2) and (3) of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety,

    A. whereas on 27 June 2022, Corteva Agriscience Belgium B.V., based in Belgium, on behalf of Corteva Agriscience LLC, based in the United States, submitted an application to the national competent authority of the Netherlands for the placing on the market of foods, food ingredients and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP910521 (the ‘GM maize’);

    B. whereas the GM maize produces the Cry1B.34 toxin and is resistant to the herbicide glufosinate;

    C. whereas glufosinate is classified as toxic to reproduction 1B and therefore meets the ‘cut-off criteria’ set out in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council[5]; whereas the approval of glufosinate for use in the Union expired on 31 July 2018;

    D. whereas Cry1B.34 is a synthetic fusion protein combining Cry1B, Cry1Ca1 and Cry9Db1, engineered for insect resistance against lepidopteran pests, without demonstrated specificity to target species;

    E. whereas the genetic modification includes a two-step process using CRISPR/Cas9 to insert a ‘landing pad’, followed by microprojectile bombardment for gene expression cassette insertion;

    Lack of assessment of the complementary herbicide

    F. whereas Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 503/2013[6] requires an assessment of whether the expected agricultural practices influence the outcome of the studied endpoints; whereas, according to that Implementing Regulation, this is especially relevant for herbicide-tolerant plants;

    G. whereas the vast majority of GM crops have been genetically modified so that they are tolerant to one or more ‘complementary’ herbicides which can be used throughout the cultivation of the GM crop, without the crop dying, as would be the case for a non-herbicide tolerant crop; whereas a number of studies show that herbicide-tolerant GM crops result in a higher use of complementary herbicides, in large part because of the emergence of herbicide-tolerant weeds[7];

    H. whereas herbicide-tolerant GM crops lock farmers into a weed management system that is largely or wholly dependent on herbicides, and does so by charging a premium for GM seeds that can be justified only if farmers purchasing such seeds also spray the complementary herbicides; whereas heightened reliance on complementary herbicides on farms planting the GM crops accelerates the emergence and spread of weeds resistant to those herbicides, thereby triggering the need for even more herbicide use, a vicious circle known as ‘the herbicide treadmill’;

    I. whereas the adverse impacts stemming from excessive reliance on herbicides will worsen as regards soil health, water quality, and above and below ground biodiversity, and lead to increased human and animal exposure, potentially also via increased herbicide residues on food and feed;

    J. whereas assessment of herbicide residues and metabolites found on GM plants is considered outside the remit of the EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (‘EFSA GMO Panel’) and is therefore not undertaken as part of the authorisation process for GMOs;

    Outstanding questions concerning Bt toxins

    K. whereas a number of studies show that side effects have been observed that may affect the immune system following exposure to Bt toxins and that some Bt toxins may have adjuvant properties[8], meaning that they can increase the allergenicity of other proteins with which they come into contact;

    L. whereas a scientific study found that the toxicity of Bt toxins may also be increased through interaction with residues from spraying with herbicides, and that further studies are needed on the combinatorial effects of ‘stacked’ events (GM crops which have been modified to be herbicide-tolerant and to produce insecticides in the form of Bt toxins)[9]; whereas assessment of the potential interaction of herbicide residues and their metabolites with Bt toxins is, however, considered to be outside the remit of the EFSA GMO Panel and is, therefore, not undertaken as part of the risk assessment;

    Bt crops: effects on non-target organisms

    M. whereas, unlike the use of insecticides, where exposure is at the time of spraying and for a limited period afterwards, the use of Bt GM crops leads to continuous exposure of the target and non-target organisms to Bt toxins;

    N. whereas the assumption that Bt toxins exhibit a single target-specific mode of action can no longer be considered correct and effects on non-target organisms cannot be excluded; whereas an increasing number of non-target organisms are reported to be affected in many ways;

    Member State and stakeholder comments

    O. whereas Member States submitted many critical comments to EFSA during the three-month consultation period[10], including that the list of relevant studies, identified in the literature review of the applicant, did not include studies on the fate of Bt proteins in the environment or on potential effects of Btcrop residues on non-target organisms even though such studies exist;

    P. whereas field trials conducted for compositional and phenotypic analysis of the GM maize failed to consider diverse environmental conditions and genetic backgrounds relevant to its cultivation, particularly in countries like Brazil;

    Q. whereas the toxicity assessment of Cry1B.34 does not account for combinatorial effects with plant constituents or residues from herbicide applications;

    R. whereas glufosinate, the complementary herbicide, is associated with significant risks to biodiversity, soil and water quality, and long-term ecosystem health;

    S. whereas the risk of gene flow to wild relatives such as teosinte, reported in Spain and France, raises concerns about transgene persistence and environmental impacts;

    T. whereas the monitoring requirements under Implementing Regulation (EU) No 503/2013 are inadequately addressed, with no independent verification of data provided;

    Ensuring a global level playing field and upholding the Union’s international obligations

    U. whereas the conclusions of the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture[11] call on the Commission to reassess its approach on market access for agri-food imports and exports, given the challenge of diverging standards of the Union and its trading partners; whereas fairer trade relations, on a global level, coherent with goals for a healthy environment, were one of the main demands of farmers during the demonstrations of 2023 and 2024;

    V. whereas a 2017 report by the United Nations’ (UN) Special Rapporteur on the right to food found that, particularly in developing countries, hazardous pesticides have catastrophic impacts on health[12]; whereas the UN Sustainable Development Goal (‘UN SDG’) Target 3.9 aims by 2030 to substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and contamination[13];

    W. whereas the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, agreed at the COP15 of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (‘UN CBD’) in December 2022, includes a global target to reduce the risk of pesticides by at least 50 % by 2030[14];

    X. whereas Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 states that GM food or feed must not have adverse effects on human health, animal health or the environment, and requires the Commission to take into account any relevant provisions of Union law and other legitimate factors relevant to the matter under consideration when drafting its decision; whereas such legitimate factors should include the Union’s obligations under the UN SDGs and the UN CBD;

    Reducing dependency on imported feed

    Y. whereas one of the lessons from the COVID-19 crisis and the still ongoing war in Ukraine is the need for the Union to end the dependencies on some critical materials; whereas in the mission letter to Commissioner Christophe Hansen, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen asks him to look at ways to reduce imports of critical commodities[15];

    Undemocratic decision-making

    Z. whereas, in its eighth term, Parliament adopted a total of 36 resolutions objecting to the placing on the market of GMOs for food and feed (33 resolutions) and to the cultivation of GMOs in the Union (three resolutions); whereas, in its ninth term, Parliament adopted 38 resolutions objecting to placing GMOs on the market and has adopted another 8 resolutions objecting to placing GMOs on the market already in the current 10th term ;

    AA. whereas despite its own acknowledgement of the democratic shortcomings, the lack of support from Member States and the objections of Parliament, the Commission continues to authorise GMOs;

    AB. whereas no change of law is required for the Commission to be able not to authorise GMOs when there is no qualified majority of Member States in favour in the Appeal Committee[16];

    AC. whereas the vote on 22 November 2024 of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed referred to in Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 delivered no opinion, meaning that the authorisation was not supported by a qualified majority of Member States; whereas the vote on 17 December 2024 of the Appeal Committee again delivered no opinion;

    1. Considers that the draft Commission implementing decision exceeds the implementing powers provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003;

    2. Considers that the draft Commission implementing decision is not consistent with Union law, in that it is not compatible with the aim of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, which is, in accordance with the general principles laid down in Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council[17], to provide the basis for ensuring a high level of protection of human life and health, animal health and welfare, and environmental and consumer interests, in relation to GM food and feed, while ensuring the effective functioning of the internal market;

    3. Calls on the Commission to withdraw its draft implementing decision and to submit a new draft to the committee;

    4. Calls on the Commission to ensure convergence of standards between the Union and its partners in free trade agreement negotiations, in order to meet Union safety standards;

    5. Calls on the Commission not to authorise the GM maize due to the increased risks to biodiversity, food safety and workers’ health in line with the One Health approach;

    6. Expects the Commission, as matter of urgency, to deliver on its commitment[18] to come forward with a proposal to ensure that hazardous chemicals banned in the Union are not produced for export;

    7. Welcomes the fact that the Commission finally recognised, in a letter of 11 September 2020 to Members, the need to take sustainability into account when it comes to authorisation decisions on GMOs[19]; expresses its deep disappointment, however, that, since then the Commission has continued to authorise GMOs for import into the Union, despite ongoing objections by Parliament and a majority of Member States voting against;

    8. Urges the Commission, again, to take into account the Union’s obligations under international agreements, such as the Paris Climate Agreement, the UN CBD and the UN SDGs; reiterates its call for draft implementing acts to be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum explaining how they uphold the principle of ‘do no harm’[20];

    9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Political and humanitarian situation in Mozambique – E-002782/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Peace Facility (EPF) is a EUR 17 billion instrument to assist partners worldwide in military and defence matters. Although it is the successor instrument of the African Peace Facility, the EPF’s geographic scope was never limited to the African continent.

    Excluding aid to Ukraine, 80% of the value of all EPF assistance measures benefit African partners. Mozambique is one of the largest EPF beneficiaries, with EUR 89 million allocated to non-lethal equipment and training of its armed forces through the EU Training Mission in Mozambique.

    On 1 September 2024, the mission was renamed EU Military Assistance Mission Mozambique and got an additional allocation of EUR 14.1 million.

    In addition, the EPF is supporting the deployment of the Rwanda Defence Force to Mozambique with EUR 40 million and has supported the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique with another EUR 15 million.

    The EPF is a needs-based and beneficiary-driven instrument. Priorities are proposed by the High Representative on an annual basis and agreed by Member States.

    The equipment to be provided to a given beneficiary corresponds to operational needs and is defined in close cooperation with the end-user units. EPF support to Ukraine is now financed through a dedicated EUR 5 billion Ukraine Assistance Fund and through extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian assets (windfall profits).

    As noted above, the EPF is a global instrument and support to Ukraine does not come at the expense of African, or other partners. The standards laid out in the EPF Council Decision[1] apply equally to all EPF beneficiaries.

    • [1] Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2021/509/oj/eng
    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: At a Glance – EU regions bordering Russia: Targeted support – 05-02-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Owing to their remote nature, all the European Union’s external border regions suffer from geographic, demographic, socio economic and structural handicaps that are detrimental to their development. The situation of the eastern European Union (EU) regions bordering Russia has, however, become even more critical since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the subsequent war. During its February plenary session Parliament is due to debate this issue following a Commission statement on the matter.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB Board approves €2.4 billion of financing for business innovation, energy grids, flood resilience and transport

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • Discussion of EIB Global strategic reorientation and support for European electricity grids
    • Energy-saving for businesses across Europe
    • Financing to expand hydrogen refuelling in Europe and rebuild damaged heating infrastructure in Ukraine

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) today approved €2.4 billion of new financing for business investment, clean energy, transport, telecommunications and flood protection in Europe.

    The EIB Board of Directors also discussed the strategic orientation of EIB Global. Reflecting the changing geopolitical context and even better aligning with EU external policy priorities, the Bank’s investments outside of the EU will continue contribute to a stronger Europe in a more stable, more prosperous and sustainable world.

    The Board examined ways to further increase support for electricity networks in Europe. In 2024, the Bank mobilised over €100 billion of additional investment for energy and financed a record high of €8.5 billion for electricity grids, which mobilised 40% of total EU investment in electricity grids.

    “We are ahead of the investment targets of the RePowerEU programme to bring cheaper and clean energy to European households and businesses. Last year the EIB marked a record in investment in energy grids and inter connectors, to bolster Europe’s competitiveness and security”, said EIB Group President Nadia Calviño.

    Energy networks, flood defences

    The first EIB Board of Directors of the year approved financing totalling €791 million to expand hydrogen production for transport, strengthen electricity distribution, and improve flood protection in Poland.

    This includes funding to boost research into and development of hydrogen and to increase the number of hydrogen refueling stations for cars and trucks.

    In support of Ukraine, the Board paved the way for financing of €100 million to repair damaged municipal heating infrastructure in the country.

    Outside the EU, the EIB agreed to provide financing to upgrade and extend electricity distribution in Panama. The goal is to increase renewable/energy use, bolster grids and expand power distribution to unserved communities in the country.

    Green innovation

    The Board also approved financing totalling €879 million for innovation and investment by businesses to improve energy efficiency and environmental sustainability.

    This includes backing automotive-component research and development at 15 manufacturing sites across Europe and low-carbon glass production in France and Spain.

    The EIB endorsed a new securitisation scheme to support Dutch business investment in climate action and environmental sustainability.

    Better connections

    The Board agreed €768 million in financing for transport and telecom networks in the EU and beyond.

    In Colombia, the Board approved EUR 418 million for construction of and the acquisition of trains for Metro Line 1 in the capital Bogota – a service expected to carry more than 1 million passengers a day when operational.

    The Board also gave the green light for financing of €350 million to expand mobile-phone networks across Italy.

    Background information  

    EIB 

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, we finance investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, high-impact investments outside the European Union, and the capital markets union.  

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.  

    All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, as pledged in our Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and a healthier environment.  

    Fostering market integration and mobilising investment, the Group supported a record of over €100 billion in new investment for Europe’s energy security in 2024 and mobilised €110 billion in growth capital for startups, scale-ups and European pioneers

    Approximately half of the EIB’s financing within the European Union is directed towards cohesion regions, where per capita income is lower than the EU average.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Philip R. Lane: A middle path for ECB monetary policy

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)

    Washington, D.C., 5 February 2025

    It is a pleasure to be here at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE): your impressive research on a wide range of topics is extremely valuable for policymakers.[1]

    At last week’s monetary policy meeting, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to lower the deposit facility rate – the rate through which we steer the monetary policy stance – by 25 basis points from 3.0 per cent to 2.75 per cent. In cumulative terms, the deposit facility rate has declined by 125 basis points since last June. The decision reflected our updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission.

    In what follows, I will explain in more detail the basis for this decision. I will review inflation developments, economic developments, our risk assessment, and financial and monetary conditions. Finally, I explain why pursuing a middle path for monetary policy is best suited to the current environment.

    Inflation developments

    The disinflation process remains well on track. Inflation has continued to develop broadly in line with the staff projections and is set to return to our two per cent medium-term target in the course of this year. Most measures of underlying inflation suggest that inflation will settle at around our target on a sustained basis. The Persistent and Common Component of Inflation (PCCI), which has the best predictive power among underlying inflation indicators for future headline inflation, continued to hover around two per cent in the December data, indicating that headline inflation is set to stabilise around our target.

    Domestic inflation, at 4.2 per cent, stayed well above all the other indicators in December mostly because wages and prices in certain sectors are still adjusting to the past inflation surge with a substantial delay. However, the PCCI for services, which should act as an underlying attractor for services inflation and domestic inflation, fell to 2.3 per cent.

    The anticipation of a downward shift in services inflation in the coming months also relates to the expected deceleration in wage growth in the course of 2025. Wages have been adjusting to the past inflation surges with a substantial delay, but the ECB wage tracker and the latest surveys point to a significant moderation in wage pressures this year. According to the latest results of the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE), firms expect wages to grow by 3.3 per cent on average over the next twelve months, down from 4.5 per cent this time last year. Similarly, the latest Corporate Telephone Survey indicates that wage growth should decelerate from 4.6 per cent in 2024 to 3.3 per cent in 2025 and 2.9 per cent in 2026. This assessment is shared broadly among forecasters. Consensus Economics, for example, foresees a decline in wage growth by about one percentage point between 2024 and 2025.

    Most measures of longer-term inflation expectations continue to stand at around two per cent, despite an uptick at shorter horizons that may reflect the recent rise in energy prices. While the inflation expectations of firms have stabilised at three per cent across horizons, according to the SAFE, larger firms that are aware of the ECB’s inflation target show convergence towards two per cent. Consumer inflation expectations have edged up recently, especially for the near term, which can at least be partly explained by their higher sensitivity to the recent uptick in realised inflation. Inflation expectations of professionals – as captured by the latest vintages of the Survey of Professional Forecasters and Survey of Monetary Analysts – as well as market-based measures of inflation compensation have ticked up for the near term but, over longer horizons, remain stable at levels consistent with our medium-term target of two per cent.

    Economic developments

    On a fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter basis, the 2024 growth rate came in at 0.9 per cent, constituting a material improvement in momentum relative to the 2023 growth rate of 0.1 per cent. While 2024 saw a modest recovery in consumption, investment remained weak and exporters continued to suffer competitiveness challenges. In terms of the quarterly profile, growth stagnated in the final quarter following a comparatively robust third quarter.

    The incoming survey indicators suggest that the euro area economy is set to remain subdued in the near term. While unemployment remained low at 6.3 per cent in December, there has been some softening in labour demand, as reflected in lower vacancies and lower employment growth.

    At the same time, our baseline assessment is that the conditions for a recovery remain in place. Higher incomes, lower interest rates and stronger household balance sheets should allow a faster pick-up in consumption. More affordable credit should also boost housing and business investment over time. Exports should also support the recovery as global demand rises, although this is highly conditional on developments in international trade policies.

    Financial and monetary conditions

    Global and euro area bond yields have increased significantly since our last meeting. Amongst other factors, the spillover impact of the rise in US and global longer-term rates has contributed to the steepening of the euro area yield curve.

    Our past interest rate cuts are gradually making it less expensive for firms and households to borrow. The cost of borrowing for firms has declined by 92 basis points and mortgage rates have declined by 62 basis points since their peaks in autumn 2023. However, the interest rates on existing corporate and household loan books remain high, especially in real terms, with pre-2022 debt still re-pricing at higher rates as fixation periods expire.

    In overall terms, financing conditions remain tight. While credit is expanding, lending to firms and households remains subdued relative to historical norms. Growth in bank lending to firms rose to 1.5 per cent in December. In part, the pick-up in December reflects firms substituting market-based long-term financing for bank-based borrowing amidst tightening market conditions and increasing upcoming redemptions of long-term corporate bonds. Overall external debt financing of firms increased by 1.9 per cent in December, but remained well below the historical average of 4.9 per cent.[2] Loans to households continued to rise gradually, driven by mortgages, but remained muted overall, with an annual growth rate of 1.1 per cent in December, notably below the long-term average of 4.2 per cent.

    According to the latest bank lending survey, the demand for loans by firms increased slightly in the fourth quarter. At the same time, credit standards for loans to firms have tightened again, after having broadly stabilised over the previous four quarters. The renewed tightening of credit standards for firms was driven by the fact that banks see higher risks to the economic outlook and have lower tolerance for taking on credit risk. This finding is consistent with the results from the SAFE, in which firms reported a small decline in the availability of bank loans and more demanding non-rate lending conditions. In terms of households, the demand for mortgages increased strongly, mostly on the back of more attractive interest rates and better prospects for the property market. Credit standards for housing loans remained unchanged overall.

    Risk assessment

    Risks to economic growth remain tilted to the downside. In addition to trade policy uncertainty, lower confidence could prevent consumption and investment from recovering as fast as expected. This could be amplified by geopolitical risks, such as Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East, which could disrupt energy supplies and further weigh on global trade. Growth could also be lower if the lagged effects of monetary policy tightening last longer than expected. In the other direction, growth could be higher if easier financing conditions and falling inflation allow domestic consumption and investment to rebound faster.

    We take a two-sided approach to assessing inflation risk. Inflation could turn out higher if wages or profits increase by more than expected. Upside risks to inflation also stem from the heightened geopolitical tensions, which could push energy prices and freight costs higher in the near term and disrupt global trade. Moreover, extreme weather events, and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly, could drive up food prices by more than expected. By contrast, inflation may surprise on the downside if low confidence and concerns about geopolitical events prevent consumption and investment from recovering as fast as expected, if monetary policy dampens demand by more than expected, or if the economic environment in the rest of the world worsens unexpectedly. Greater friction in global trade would make the euro area inflation outlook more uncertain.

    A middle path for monetary policy

    Taken together, the incoming data since our previous meeting meant that it was clear that we should take a further step in monetary easing by lowering the deposit facility rate to 2.75 per cent. By excessively dampening demand, the alternative of holding the deposit facility rate at the level of 3.0 per cent would not have been consistent with the set of rate paths that would best ensure that inflation stabilises sustainably at our two per cent medium-term target. At the same time, the new level for the deposit facility rate at 2.75 per cent preserves considerable optionality in responding to shocks. In particular, the rate path can adjust as appropriate in the event of material upside or downside shocks to the inflation outlook and/or to economic momentum.

    While our baseline is that inflation should decline from 2.5 per cent in January to around our target in the coming months, it is still important to take into account that this deceleration might take longer than expected and that new upside risks to inflation could emerge, including due to external developments. These considerations explain why we have taken a step-by-step approach to rate cutting since last June.

    At the same time, an excessive abundance of caution in monetary easing could threaten the recovery in domestic demand that is needed to support the pricing environment compatible with our medium-term two per cent target. Under this too-cautious path, a below-target inflation dynamic could take hold, which would then require a more sizeable policy response to ensure inflation returns to our symmetric two per cent medium-term target.

    Balancing these considerations suggest a middle path is appropriate, which neither over-weighs upside risk nor over-weighs downside risk. That is, a robust monetary policy approach should balance the risks of moving too slowly against the risks of moving too quickly. Accordingly, it is prudent to maintain agility in adjusting the stance as appropriate on a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting basis and to not pre-commit to any particular rate path.

    In closing, let me comment on two much-discussed concepts: restrictiveness and neutrality.

    When inflation is materially above target and requires a monetary response to ensure that it returns to target in a timely manner and that inflation expectations remain anchored, the monetary stance must be clearly restrictive. As inflation returns close to target, policymakers need to shift their focus to adjusting monetary policy in line with the incoming economic and financial data and the evolving risk assessment to deliver the two per cent target over the medium term. In other words, policymakers should deliver the monetary stance that is appropriate to the situation.

    In exiting a restrictive phase, much energy could be diverted towards creating a summary “restrictiveness” index. Any such index would have to incorporate at least nine factors: (i) the still-important rolling off of super-cheap debt that was taken out in the “low for long” era that is now being re-financed at higher rates; (ii) in the other direction, the transmission of the easing since the peak of the hiking cycle; (iii) the impact of the anticipation of future rate cuts on current financing conditions; (iv) the evolving contribution of quasi-exogenous influences on financing conditions (such as global upward pressure on term premia); (v) the dynamics of bond and equity risk premia; (vi) the evolution of credit standards in bank lending; (vii) the different timelines for market-based and bank-based transmission; (viii) the responsiveness of consumption and investment to shifting monetary conditions; and (ix) the responsiveness of price setting to shifting monetary conditions.

    All of these factors enter our calibration of monetary policy (our assessment of the strength of monetary policy transmission has been highlighted as central to our reaction function) and cannot be summarised by a single indicator such as comparing the prevailing policy rate to a highly-uncertain estimate of the so-called neutral rate.[3]

    In terms of policy making, uncertainty about the level of the neutral rate and, more generally, about the strength of monetary transmission inescapably sits alongside uncertainty about the inflation outlook and uncertainty about the economic outlook.

    This is why our 2021 monetary policy strategy statement highlights that our decisions are based on an integrated assessment of all relevant factors. Over the last two years, we have emphasised in particular the importance of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary transmission as particularly relevant in complementing our analysis of the inflation outlook. More generally, it is essential that all relevant risks are incorporated in monetary policy decisions.

    MIL OSI Economics –