NewzIntel.com

Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI Global: Belarus election: how ‘Europe’s last dictator’ held onto power as his opponents were jailed or exiled

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stephen Hall, Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics, University of Bath

    The acclamation of Alexander Lukashenko as Belarus president for a seventh straight term was confirmed on January 26. The electoral authorities announced that the man known as “Europe’s last dictator” – the only president the country has had since it held its first “democratic” election in 1994 – had won 87% of the vote.

    Most western leaders have dismissed the result as a “sham”. Germany’s foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, posted on X that “the people of Belarus had no choice”, while the Polish foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski, commented that he was surprised “only” 87.6% of the electorate had voted for Lukashenko: “Will the rest fit inside the prisons?” he asked.

    But the result was never really in doubt. Sikorski’s barb about jailing opponent figures is right on the money. Many of Belarus’s main opposition figures are already behind bars and the rest are in exile. And, just to make sure of things, well before the campaign started – in January 2024 – Lukashenko changed the law so that only those people who were had lived permanently in Belarus for 20 years could stand for the presidency. This meant that the most prominent opposition leader not now in prison in Belarus, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, was ineligible.

    Tsikhanouskaya fled after the election to avoid the fate of her husband, Sergei Tsikhanouski, who was arrested in 2020, two days after declaring his candidacy for the election. He has since been jailed for 18 years on charges of “preparation of mass disorder” and “incitement to hatred”. Tsikhanouskaya was herself tried in absentia and sentenced to 15 years for high treason, inciting social hatred, attempts to seize power, forming an “extremist” group and harming national security.

    So with no real opposition allowed to stand, Lukashenko’s reelection was pretty much a foregone conclusion. A survey conducted by the think tank Chatham House at the end of 2024 found that about one-third of Belarusians said they supported Lukashenko – and most of these people also commented they thought the country was going in the right direction.

    Keeping Belarus out of the war was a major factor for these voters. A further 41% professed to be neutral. When it came to electoral integrity, 36% agreed or somewhat agreed that the result was predetermined. Among pro-democracy voters that number rose to 77%.

    Government in exile

    Tsikhanouskaya leads a government in exile from Lithuania, heading what her team has called a “united transitional cabinet”, tasked with “ensuring the transition of power from dictatorship to democracy, and promoting fair and free elections”. The cabinet is supported by a national coordinating council of 70 members which is elected on a two-yearly basis and who main function is to establish the ground rules for a “ democratic and rule-of-law-based state”.

    Tsikhanouskaya’s efforts have been supported by a range of countries, including the US which, in August 2020, urged the Lukashanko regime to “actively engage Belarusian society, including through the newly established National Coordination Council, in a way that reflects what the Belarusian people are demanding, for the sake of Belarus’ future, and for a successful Belarus”.

    But being a leader in exile means it is difficult to bridge the barrier to Belarusians at home.

    Political prisoners

    Other opposition figures are mainly still in prison. Sergei Tsikhanouski was recently was charged with violating prison rules, which will increase his existing 18-year sentence.

    His fellow opposition leader, Viktar Babaryka – who was also arrested in the run-up to the 2020 election – was given 14 years on trumped-up up charges. His assistant Maria Kolesnikova, who took over from him as a protest leader, was jailed after publicly destroying her passport so she could not be forcibly exiled by the authorities.

    Although not part of the political opposition another prominent figure, Ales Bialiatski, a human rights activist who won the Nobel peace prize in 2022 was sentenced to ten years in jail in 2023 for smuggling and allegedly financing the 2020 protests.

    Overtures to the west

    Since the summer of 2024, 200 political prisoners have been released, a possible sign that Lukashenko wants to reset relations with the west. He did something similar in 2015, the year after Russia annexed Crimea.

    At the time his release of six opposition activists was seen as a possible sign the Belarus leader was concerned his country could be at risk from Russian aggression and he was looking to keep with the EU and the US.

    Kolesnikova was recently allowed a prison visit from her father for the first time in nearly two years. Meanwhile a journalist was given access to Babaryka in jail and allowed to record a video of the jailed dissident for his daughter.

    If the release of prisoners and reappearance of the two jailed dissidents are indeed an attempt to reset relations with the west, the fact he still has more than 1,000 political prisoners behind bars will give Lukashenko plenty of diplomatic leeway.

    But given Lukashenko’s close alignment with Russian president Vladimir Putin and the fact that he allowed Belarus to be used as a launch pad for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it is unlikely that many western countries will be won over.

    Lukashenko has shown himself to be an irritant many times over the years. In 2021, the year before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Belarus leader was roundly criticised for trying to spark a migrant crisis in neighbouring Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. Belarus was reportedly flying Iraqi and Afghan migrants from the Middle East and bussing them to the border where Belarusian troops were trying to push them across.

    As far as armed resistance to Lukashenko is concerned, the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment, a group of Belarusian volunteers has been fighting as part of Ukraine’s armed forces since March 2022. The regiment’s stated aim is to help Ukraine fight off Russia and become part of the EU and Nato and to strive for Belarus to do the same.

    The next election is due to be held in 2030. Alexander Lukashenko will be 75.

    Stephen Hall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Belarus election: how ‘Europe’s last dictator’ held onto power as his opponents were jailed or exiled – https://theconversation.com/belarus-election-how-europes-last-dictator-held-onto-power-as-his-opponents-were-jailed-or-exiled-248962

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Prime Minister to travel to Paris and Brussels to strengthen transatlantic co-operation and advance global progress on AI

    Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

    The Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, today announced that he will travel to Paris, France, and to Brussels, Belgium, from February 8 to 12, 2025, to strengthen transatlantic co-operation and advance global progress on artificial intelligence (AI).

    In Paris, the Prime Minister will participate in the AI Action Summit hosted by the President of France, Emmanuel Macron. He will engage with leaders across business and public policy about how we can power the next generation of AI to unlock good-paying jobs and opportunities. Canada is at the centre of this shift, accelerating the innovation and economic potential of AI, while being thoughtful about navigating trust and safety. Seizing this moment is important for the future of Canadian innovation, economic productivity, and our economic security. At the Summit, the Prime Minister will deliver a keynote speech underscoring Canada’s role as a global leader in AI and highlight the importance of working in partnership to develop these technologies responsibly and safely.

    As this year’s G7 President, Canada is committed to working alongside international partners in the face of geopolitical instability and threats against the rules-based international order – challenges that have been accelerated by technology, disinformation, and climate change. On the margins of the Summit, Prime Minister Trudeau will meet with other world leaders to tackle these challenges and renew progress on shared priorities, including international trade, peace and security, and global economic stability.

    Prime Minister Trudeau will then travel to Brussels for a Canada-European Union (EU) Leaders’ Meeting, where he will join his EU counterparts to help secure a strong, prosperous future for people on both sides of the Atlantic. The leaders will discuss ways to advance our collective efforts to strengthen transatlantic security, protect the rules-based international order, continue supporting Ukraine, and create opportunities for our peoples, building on the success of the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). While in Brussels, the Prime Minister will also meet with the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Mark Rutte, and reaffirm Canada’s commitment to working with the Alliance to uphold democracy, peace, and security.

    Throughout the trip, Prime Minister Trudeau will strengthen and deepen transatlantic co-operation, advance efforts to solve the world’s most pressing challenges, and deliver on the priorities of Canadians.

    Quote

    “Transatlantic collaboration – in defence and security, in innovation and energy, in business and trade – are essential to Canada’s success. In Paris and Brussels, we will strengthen Canada’s alliances and partnerships, and put Canadians at the forefront of every opportunity, including artificial intelligence.”

    Quick Facts

    • This will be Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s 11th official visit to France.
    • France is a key ally for Canada on the international stage. France is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the G7, and the G20, as well as a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, a founding member of the European Union (EU), and a leading partner in La Francophonie.
    • In 2023, France was Canada’s third-largest merchandise export market in the EU and its 12th-largest trading partner globally, with two-way merchandise trade totalling $12.9 billion.
    • The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Action Summit in Paris is the third global summit of its kind. It follows the AI Seoul Summit, which Prime Minister Trudeau attended virtually last year, and the AI Safety Summit that was hosted by the UK in 2023.
    • Representatives from Canada’s federal research granting agencies will be participating in the AI Action Summit.
    • In Budget 2024, the Government of Canada announced a $2.4 billion package of measures to secure Canada’s AI advantage. These investments will accelerate job growth in Canada’s AI sector and beyond, boost productivity by helping researchers and businesses develop and adopt AI, and ensure this is done responsibly.
    • This will be Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s sixth official visit to Belgium.
    • Canada and the EU share a strong partnership and a long history of close people-to-people ties, commercial relations, and institutional co-operation. We work together on trade, international peace and security, digital innovation, the fight against climate change, and migration, among other priorities.
    • With its 27 Member States, the EU as a group is Canada’s second-largest destination for goods and services exports, after the United States of America. In 2023, trade between Canada and the EU reached a total of $157.3 billion in combined goods and services.
    • The Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) was signed in 2016 and has been provisionally applied since 2017. Since then, bilateral merchandise trade between Canada and the EU has grown by more than 60 per cent.
    • Canada is a founding member of NATO. The Alliance is a cornerstone of Canadian security and defence policy and an important platform for Canada’s contributions to international peace and security.

    Associated Links

    MIL OSI Canada News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Press release: PM call with Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada: 5 February 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Prime Minister’s Office 10 Downing Street

    The Prime Minister spoke to the Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau this afternoon.

    The Prime Minister spoke to the Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau this afternoon.

    The leaders began by reflecting on the close and historic relationship between the UK and Canada. From global security to clean energy and growth, they agreed on the importance of shared values between the two nations. 

    Discussing recent global events, the Prime Minister said he welcomed an international conversation on the importance of trade and collaboration between allies and partners. The Prime Minister also paid tribute to Prime Minister Trudeau’s leadership, including his focus on stemming the deadly drug trade across Canada’s borders.

    The leaders also discussed the strong trading relationship between the UK and Canada, worth £26 billion, and how together both countries could go further to support growth and deliver for the hardworking Canadian and British people.

    As the third-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine approaches, both leaders underlined their commitment to ensuring Ukraine is in the strongest possible position. 

    On Syria, they agreed on the necessity of a political transition process leading to an inclusive, non-sectarian and representative government. 

    They looked forward to speaking soon.

    Updates to this page

    Published 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: PM call with Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada: 5 February 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    The Prime Minister spoke to the Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau this afternoon.

    The Prime Minister spoke to the Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau this afternoon.

    The leaders began by reflecting on the close and historic relationship between the UK and Canada. From global security to clean energy and growth, they agreed on the importance of shared values between the two nations. 

    Discussing recent global events, the Prime Minister said he welcomed an international conversation on the importance of trade and collaboration between allies and partners. The Prime Minister also paid tribute to Prime Minister Trudeau’s leadership, including his focus on stemming the deadly drug trade across Canada’s borders.

    The leaders also discussed the strong trading relationship between the UK and Canada, worth £26 billion, and how together both countries could go further to support growth and deliver for the hardworking Canadian and British people.

    As the third-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine approaches, both leaders underlined their commitment to ensuring Ukraine is in the strongest possible position. 

    On Syria, they agreed on the necessity of a political transition process leading to an inclusive, non-sectarian and representative government. 

    They looked forward to speaking soon.

    Updates to this page

    Published 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: InnovateUkraine opens second round of investment for clean energy projects

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Additional £17m will foster UK-Ukraine collaboration in the clean energy field.

    • InnovateUkraine’s second round will focus on low-carbon solutions to boost Ukraine’s energy resilience

    • First InnovateUkraine cohort preparing for demonstration and accelerator stage

    The UK will invest £17 million in innovative energy projects to support the recovery and future sustainability of Ukraine’s energy system. The funding announced during the visit of Foreign Secretary David Lammy to Kyiv will support the second round of the InnovateUkraine competition, a challenge fund to pilot low-carbon solutions tailored to Ukraine’s energy needs.

    The second round of InnovateUkraine will spur innovative collaborations between British, Ukrainian and international businesses and research institutions, to develop the scalable and sustainable energy innovations of the future.

    InnovateUkraine 2 will focus on the following technologies: 

    • Smart green grids
    • Renewable generation
    • Renewable heat
    • Green fuels
    • Low-carbon buildings and homes
    • Industrial decarbonisation
    • Repurposing existing energy infrastructure

    The British Ambassador to Ukraine, Martin Harris said:

    I am proud that the UK is further increasing its funding to the Ukrainian energy sector. This latest contribution underpins our commitments under the 100-Year Partnership, signed by the Prime Minister and President Zelenskyy in January.

    These projects, led jointly by British and Ukrainian business, universities, and civil society, will help both our countries develop clean and sustainable energy solutions for the future.

    InnovateUkraine is a showcase for the forward-looking partnership between our countries. The UK is standing shoulder-to-shoulder with Ukraine for the next century.

    Applications for InnovateUkraine Round 2 will open in mid-March 2025. Once they have undergone screening, successful projects will run for 24 months from late 2025. The teams will receive support and guidance from an accelerator programme, to help with attracting further investment.

    InnovateUkraine’s first cohort of projects is already transforming the lives of the Ukrainian people by creating reliable and novel methods of heating and powering buildings, as well as fuelling the imagination of the next generation of scientists and innovators.

    These projects include: a new, locally manufacturable battery storage technology which potentially undercuts and outperforms existing technologies; a technology which allows the upcycling of waste concrete to dramatically reduce the embodied emissions of new buildings and structures; and a new tool to make production of geothermal energy in Ukraine more efficient and ripe for investment.

    To find out more about the scope and eligibility requirements, please visit: www.innovateukraine.io

    Updates to this page

    Published 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Ukraine has every right to determine its own future: UK Statement to the OSCE

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    UK Military Advisor, Joby Rimmer, says Russia’s war of aggression has achieved little except the catastrophic loss of life, the loss of Russia’s military credibility, and the loss of Russia’s international reputation.

    Thank you, Mr Chair. Sadly, we have started this year like the last, and the overwhelming concern of this forum remains: Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine. The UK remains resolutely committed to supporting the people of Ukraine as they defend their homeland. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, the UK has provided over £3 billion per year in military, humanitarian and financial assistance, and this support will continue for as long as necessary to ensure Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are fully restored.

    What has Russia accomplished so far? Russia’s full-scale invasion has been nothing short of a disaster. The Russian state’s bold assertion that the subjugation of Ukraine would be accomplished within a matter of days was made almost three years ago. Having failed in pursuit of its own strategic aims, the campaign has achieved little except the catastrophic loss of life on both sides, the loss of Russia’s military credibility, and the loss of Russia’s international reputation.

    The UN estimates that more than 12,000 Ukrainian civilians and some 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed as a direct result of Russian aggression. Independent reports suggest approximately 830,000 Russian casualties, a number that demonstrates President Putin’s disregard for his own countrymen sent to fight in a war they did not choose. On 29th January alone, the Russian military lost 1,670 men with Russian casualties for January averaging over 1,500 per day. At the current rate of loss, Russia will have suffered over 1 million casualties by June 2025. As Russian casualties mount, Russian recruitment in Moscow has reduced, with military recruitment currently at 40 personnel a day, five times lower than the Summer-Autumn 2024 average of 200 recruits a day. Half of these recruits are reportedly indebted Russians and foreign nationals. The direct participation of DPRK troops in combat operations is another dangerous expansion of Putin’s illegal war. Of the 11,000 DPRK troops deployed in Kursk, reporting indicates that 4,000 are already casualties, including 1,000 fatalities.

    What has Russia accomplished militarily? Reports from the region paint a stark image of Russian military mediocrity. Russia has reportedly now lost over 3,700 Main Battle Tanks, over 8,000 armoured vehicles and 1,800 pieces of artillery. Any marginal Russian gains around Donetsk, Toretsk and Pokrovsk have been extremely costly, with progress augmented through the cynical use of glide bombs, drone and missile attacks, causing widespread damage to local housing, medical facilities and critical infrastructure. Independent reports state that Russia launched over 1,250 aerial bombs and over 1,000 attack drones into Ukraine in the last week of January. Nearly all resulted in civilian casualties.

    Last week, the Ukrainian army’s general staff reported that Russian forces bombed a boarding school in an area of Kursk under Ukrainian control, where civilians were sheltering and preparing to evacuate. Four people were killed and dozens injured. Russia’s continued disregard for human life cannot, and will not, be overlooked.

    Russia is also suffering the cost to its international reputation. The war in Ukraine clearly violates the UN Charter and contravenes our shared commitments of the Helsinki Final Act – respecting sovereignty, territorial integrity and the non-use of force. This full-scale invasion is not just an illegal act that contravenes international law; it is a serious miscalculation and one that fundamentally represents loss; most appallingly, the loss of human life, the loss of Russia’s international reputation, and the loss of Russia’s military credibility.

    Finally, the UK remains firm in its belief that any path to peace must be grounded in a position of strength for Ukraine. Ukraine must not be coerced into peace talks under duress or pressure from the aggressor. Ukraine has every right to determine its future, and its right to self-determination must be upheld. The UK is proud to be a steadfast friend of Ukraine and will not rest until Ukraine achieves peace on its own terms – Russia must cease hostilities in Ukraine and remove its forces from Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders. Thank you, Mr Chair.

    Updates to this page

    Published 5 February 2025

    Invasion of Ukraine

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Why is Trump’s preferential treatment of Russia shifting? Because there’s nothing in it for him

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser University

    When Donald Trump assumed power in the United States for a second time, it was initially assumed that it didn’t bode well for Ukraine.

    During his first term, Trump maintained questionable connections to Russia. Furthermore, his claim that he would end the Russia-Ukraine conflict in a day — with Russia still occupying much of Ukraine — led many analysts to believe that any such policy would favour the Russians.



    Read more:
    Can Trump deliver on his promise to end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?

    These fears, at least so far, have not come to pass. In Trump’s inaugural address, many of the items he highlighted on the campaign trail figured prominently.

    Noticeably absent, however, was Ukraine. When it comes to Trump’s “America First,” philosophy, Ukraine and Russia have seemingly lost significance.

    Strategy of distraction

    Trump, with his bombastic nature, dominates the media cycle. His proclamations, social media statements threats and insults occur with such regularity that it’s difficult for anyone to keep pace.

    Just as one news item comes into focus, a new comment or ultimatum overtakes it.

    In many ways, this works to Trump’s advantage. People can be too distracted by the latest outlandish statement to pay close attention as Trump pursues his ambitious domestic policy goals. Lost in the media turmoil of Trump’s executive orders, tariff threats and heightened deportation campaign has been a shift on Russia and Ukraine.

    Ukraine, for Trump, is a secondary concern. His priorities, first and foremost, are domestic and aimed at remaking America.

    As such, rather than being driven by any foreign policy goals, Trump’s engagement with Ukraine and Russia will be determined by how he perceives he can benefit domestically in return. His calculations, in this regard, appear to have shifted.

    Complicated relationship with Ukraine

    Trump’s relationship with Ukraine during his first term was, to put it mildly, difficult. His infatuation with Russian leader Vladimir Putin, and Russia’s open disdain for Ukraine, caused him to largely ignore the country.

    When he did pay attention to Ukraine, it was as part of an effort to acquire information to damage his presumed political rival, former president Joe Biden. This effort resulted in Trump withholding aid from Ukraine unless it acquiesced to his demands.

    Trump’s position on Ukraine, however, has shifted over time. His antagonistic relationship with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has seemingly improved.

    While there are still tension points, most notably when Zelenskyy visited Pennsylvania during the U.S. presidential election campaign, Trump has moderated his comments on his Ukrainian counterpart. Ukraine’s purchase of American equipment and ammunition, furthermore, supports Trump’s focus on domestic production.

    Lastly, Trump has expressed interest in accessing Ukraine’s rare earth metals. China currently dominates the rare earth metal market, which puts the U.S. at a disadvantage due to the minerals’ importance for future technological innovation. That means Trump has a stake in Ukraine’s future.

    These developments don’t mean the relationship is perfect. Instead, Trump is unlikely to be a burden to Ukraine, and this development is in part due to his declining view of Putin.

    Trump/Putin relationship

    The initial assumption of many analysts when Trump came to power again was that he would immediately favour Putin. The close relationship between the two is well-documented, and has been open to considerable speculation as to why Trump courted such favour with Putin in his first term.

    Trump, however, has upped his rhetoric against Russia since assuming the presidency. First, he threatened Putin with additional economic sanctions. Second, he stated that he would like OPEC to increase oil production and therefore inhibit Russia’s war effort by undermining its primary source of revenue.

    Why the pivot? It likely goes to the core foundation of Trump’s persona: he likes winners. Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war, Russia and Putin have displayed considerable weakness in execution during the war. The Russian military, once feared globally, has largely proven to be a paper tiger.

    While Russia still has several advantages in the war, it is only doing so by leveraging its future. According to Trump, Russia is in “big trouble” in terms of its economic woes. Trump is not alone in this view. Analysts, as well as perhaps Putin himself, recognize the serious challenges facing the Russian economy.

    It’s not just economically that Russia has leveraged its future. To avoid straining the Russian people, Putin has reached a deal with North Korea, which is providing soldiers for the war against Ukraine.



    Read more:
    Amid the West’s wavering aid to Ukraine, North Korea backs Russia in a mutually beneficial move

    Furthermore, Russia has deepened ties with Iran in exchange for Iranian drones.

    What Putin has provided North Korea and Iran in exchange for these soldiers is unclear. That said, Russia can only provide any technological exchanges for these soldiers and drones one time, as once shared, the same technology cannot be part of other arrangements. This reality limits Russia’s influence in the years ahead.

    The new art of the deal?

    Trump, almost certainly, wants to make a peace deal on Ukraine. It would burnish his reputation as a statesman while simultaneously demonstrating American strength and influence to the world at a minimal cost to the U.S.

    The terms of that deal, however, have shifted in the face of Russian weakness.

    That’s why it’s not surprising that the mercurial Trump has pivoted his stance on Russia. Until Russia can display the strength that Trump thought it possessed, he’s unlikely to do the Russians any favours in the future.

    James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Why is Trump’s preferential treatment of Russia shifting? Because there’s nothing in it for him – https://theconversation.com/why-is-trumps-preferential-treatment-of-russia-shifting-because-theres-nothing-in-it-for-him-248365

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Ukraine: prospects for peace are slim unless Europe grips the reality of Trump’s world

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

    When EU leaders gathered for their first ever meeting solely dedicated to defence issues on February 3, in Brussels, the war in Ukraine was uppermost on their minds. Yet, three weeks before the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine is only the tip of an iceberg of security challenges that Europe faces.

    War on a scale not seen in Europe since 1945 has returned to the continent. Russian sabotage of everything from critical infrastructure to elections is at levels reminiscent of the cold war. And the future of the EU’s most important defence alliance, Nato, is uncertain.

    In light of these challenges alone, let alone the ongoing instability in the Middle East, western Balkans and south Caucasus, it’s hard to disagree with the observation by EU council president António Costa that: “Europe needs to assume greater responsibility for its own defence.”

    But it’s hardly a groundbreaking statement. And at the end of proceedings, the outcome of what was ultimately only an informal meeting, was underwhelmingly summarised by Costa as “progress in our discussions on building the Europe of defence”.

    This does not bode well for Ukraine. US support is unlikely to continue at the levels reached during the final months of the Biden administration. In fact, ongoing debates in the White House on Ukraine policy have already caused some disruption to arms shipments from Washington to Kyiv.

    Building blocs

    If there is a silver lining for Ukraine here, it is Trump’s continuous search for a good deal. His latest idea is that Ukraine could pay for US support with favourable concessions on rare earths, and potentially other strategic resources.

    These would include preferential deals to supply the US with titanium, iron ore and coal, as well as critical minerals, including lithium. Whether this is a sustainable basis for US support in the long term is as unclear as whether it will make any material difference to Trump thinking beyond a ceasefire.

    The other ray of hope for Ukraine is that there is a much greater recognition in EU capitals now about the need for a common European approach to defence. A greater focus on building a “coalition of the willing” including non-EU members UK and Norway is a potentially promising path.

    But hope, as they say, is not a winning strategy. In a Trump-like transactional fashion, Brussels – in exchange for a deal on defence with London – is insisting on UK concessions on youth mobility and fishing rights. It’s unlikely that this will prove an insurmountable stumbling bloc, but it will create yet more delays at a moment when time is of the essence for Europe as a whole to signal determination about security and defence.

    This is further complicated by two factors. On the one hand, there is the looming threat of a trade war between the US and the EU. That the UK may still be able to avoid a similar fate, according to Trump, feels like good news for London. But it will also put the UK in a potentially awkward position as it seeks an ambitious post-Brexit reset with the EU and harbours hopes to improve relations with China.

    With Trump clearly hostile towards both Brussels and Beijing, this may become an impossible balancing act for the British government to pull off.

    Europe’s fragile unity

    On the other hand, EU unity has become more fragile. Trump’s victory has emboldened other populist leaders in Europe – notably the significantly more pro-Russian Slovak and Hungarian prime ministers, Robert Fico and Viktor Orbán. The same applies to the UK, where Nigel Farage, leader of the Reform UK party – which has overtaken the ruling Labour party in the latest public opinion polls – is known for his Ukraine-sceptical views.

    To that equation add a weak government in France and the likelihood of protracted coalition negotiations in Germany after hotly contested parliamentary elections at the end of February. The prospects for decisive EU and wider European action on strengthening its own security and defence capabilities right now appear vanishingly slim.

    Seen in the light of such multiple and complex challenges, it is astonishing how much the EU is still trapped in a wishful thinking exercise – and one that appears more and more disconnected from reality. Contrary to Costa’s fulsome pronouncements after the EU leaders’ meeting, there is little evidence that the US under Trump will remain Europe’s friend, ally and partner.

    There’s also little to suggest that the American president shares the values and principles that once underpinned the now rapidly dismantling international order. Other countries’ national sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of their borders are not at the forefront of Trump’s foreign policy doctrine.

    If, as Costa proclaimed, “peace in Europe depends on Ukraine winning a comprehensive, just and lasting peace”, then the future looks bleak indeed for Europe and Ukraine. At this point the EU and its member states are a long way off from being able to provide Ukraine with the support it needs to win. This is not just because they lack the military and defence-industrial capabilities. They also lack a credible, shared vision of how to acquire them while navigating a Trumpian world.

    Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

    – ref. Ukraine: prospects for peace are slim unless Europe grips the reality of Trump’s world – https://theconversation.com/ukraine-prospects-for-peace-are-slim-unless-europe-grips-the-reality-of-trumps-world-248911

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: As Trump tries to slash US foreign aid, here are 3 common myths many Americans mistakenly believe about it

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Joannie Tremblay-Boire, Assistant Professor of Public Policy, University of Maryland

    U.S. lawmakers and employees and supporters of the U.S. Agency for International Development speak outside the agency’s headquarters on Feb. 3, 2025. Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images

    U.S. foreign aid is in disarray.

    The Trump administration froze most aid disbursements on Jan. 20. According to billionaire Elon Musk, an adviser to President Donald Trump with “special government employee status,” the U.S. Agency for International Development, widely known as USAID, had been shut down as of Feb. 3, 2025.

    Although the Trump administration lacks the legal authority to do this, hundreds of people on the agency’s staff have been put on unpaid leave or fired, according to news reports.

    And the agency’s official website wasn’t working. A partial replacement, however, had appeared within the State Department’s website.

    I’m a scholar of public policy who researches nonprofits, which in the foreign aid sphere are often called nongovernmental organizations. These groups are responsible for carrying out many programs funded by foreign aid from governments such as the United States.

    In light of the Trump administration’s attack on the government’s main foreign aid agency and the disruption of this funding, I believe it’s important to debunk three common myths:

    1. The U.S. spends too much on foreign aid.
    2. The U.S. spends more than its fair share on foreign aid compared with other countries.
    3. Corrupt governments squander U.S. foreign aid.

    What is foreign aid?

    Foreign aid consists of money, goods and services – such as training – that government agencies provide to other countries. Foreign aid falls into two broad categories: economic assistance and military – sometimes called security – aid.

    Economic assistance includes all programs with development or humanitarian objectives. That tends to include projects related to health, disaster relief, the promotion of civil society, agriculture and the like. Most U.S. economic aid dollars come from the State Department budget, including spending allocated by USAID, which has operated as an independent agency since the Kennedy administration.

    On Feb. 3, Secretary of State Marco Rubio declared that he was serving as USAID’s acting director, indicating that the agency was no longer independent of the State Department.

    While U.S. taxpayers have long spent just a few bucks each on foreign aid every year, the impact is profound, saving millions of people from hunger, averting the worst of natural disasters such as droughts and flooding, tackling life-threatening diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria, and more.

    Myth No. 1: US spends too much on foreign aid

    The United States consistently spends only about 1% of its budget on foreign aid, including military and economic support. The 2023 aid managed by USAID totaled about US$40 billion.

    Americans tend to believe that their government spends a far bigger share of its budget on foreign aid than it does.

    In a survey the Kaiser Family Foundation conducted in 2015, it found that, on average, Americans believed that foreign aid accounts for nearly one-third of the budget. Only 3% of those polled answered correctly that foreign aid constituted 1% or less of total federal spending.

    Myth No. 2: US spends more than its fair share

    According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United States is by far the leading national source of economic assistance dollars. In 2023, it contributed $64.7 billion in overseas development assistance, far outpacing the $37.9 billion spent by Germany, the second-biggest source of that kind of aid. Some of this assistance is managed by USAID, some by the Department of State, and a small portion by other government agencies, such as the Treasury and Health and Human Services departments.

    That tells only part of the story, however. The United States spends very little on foreign aid relative to the size of its economy, particularly compared with other rich countries. The U.S. spent about 0.24% of its gross national income on overseas development assistance in 2023. By comparison, Norway, the top contributor by this metric, gave 1.09% of its gross national income in overseas development aid that year. The United States ranks toward the bottom of OECD countries, close to Portugal and Spain, by this measurement.

    In 1970, the United Nations General Assembly agreed that “economically advanced countries” would aim to direct at least 0.7% of their national income to overseas development assistance. Although developed countries have repeatedly mentioned this target in agreements and at summits since then, very few countries have reached that goal. In 2023, only five countries met the 0.7% target.

    The OECD average was just 0.37% in 2023 – far higher than the 0.24% the U.S. provided that year.

    Myth No. 3: Corrupt governments squander US aid

    You may think that foreign aid consists of government-to-government transfers of money. But governments channel most aid through nonprofits such as Catholic Relief Services, public-private partnerships, private companies such as Chemonics International and Deloitte, and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations and the World Bank.

    In fact, according to the Congressional Research Service, between 2013 and 2022, most U.S. foreign assistance bypassed governments altogether: NGOs received 24% of the money, for-profit companies 21%, multilateral organizations 34%, and other organizations, such as universities, research institutes and faith-based organizations, 7%.

    When the political scientist Simone Dietrich researched this question, she found that the United States outsources a lot of its foreign aid to NGOs. This is especially the case with the support it provides countries with bad governance and rampant corruption such as Sudan and Sri Lanka, which could be likely to squander or swipe those funds.

    To be sure, corrupt governments sometimes do squander U.S. foreign aid. But it is important to understand that most aid never enters the coffers of those corrupt governments in the first place.

    Even without Trump’s proposed cuts, US fails to lead

    Even if Trump fails at his current bid to greatly reduce foreign aid spending, other countries, including the United Kingdom and Denmark, are spending far more on economic assistance for the world’s poorest people, as a share of their economies, than the U.S. does.

    Slashing foreign aid would damage U.S. credibility with American allies, reduce U.S. influence around the globe and – as a group of more than 120 retired generals and admirals predicted when Trump tried to slash foreign aid in his first administration – make Americans less safe.

    Parts of this article appeared in a story first published on April 6, 2017, and have been updated.

    Joannie Tremblay-Boire does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. As Trump tries to slash US foreign aid, here are 3 common myths many Americans mistakenly believe about it – https://theconversation.com/as-trump-tries-to-slash-us-foreign-aid-here-are-3-common-myths-many-americans-mistakenly-believe-about-it-248979

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: VATICAN/GENERAL AUDIENCE – Pope Francis: memory, mercy and promise are key words for the action of God in history

    Source: Agenzia Fides – MIL OSI

    Wednesday, 5 February 2025

    Vatican Media

    Vatican City (Agenzia Fides) – Memory, mercy, promise: these are the three key words for those who, like the Virgin Mary, recognize the action of God the Father in the history of humanity, said Pope Francis during today’s general audience in the Paul VI Hall.The Pope, who had a cold, did not read the text of the catechesis himself: “I apologize,” explained Pope Francis, “because with this severe cold it is difficult for me to speak.” A member of the Secretariat of State read the address for the Pope, which dealt with the themes “Blessed is she who believed,” the Visitation and the Magnificat.When the Virgin Mary visits Saint Elizabeth, the Bishop of Rome said, “it is above all Jesus who visits his people in the womb of his mother… Mary sets out, she does not choose to protect herself from the world, she does not fear danger or the judgment of others, but goes out to meet people.” Because “when you feel loved, you experience a strength that carries love forward. As the Apostle Paul says, ‘the love of Christ compels us’ (2 Cor 5:14), it pushes us, it moves us.”The meeting of the two women, Mary and Elizabeth, “has an astonishing effect: the voice of the ‘full of grace’ who greets Elizabeth provokes a prophetic movement in the child in her womb and causes Elizabeth to pronounce a double blessing (“Blessed are you among women, and blessed is the fruit of your womb”). And a beatitude (“Blessed is she who believed that what the Lord had spoken to her would be fulfilled”). “In the face of the recognition of the messianic identity of her Son and her own vocation as a mother, Mary does not speak of herself but of God. She raises a hymn full of faith, hope and joy, a song that resounds daily in the evening prayer of the Church: the Magnificat,” said the Pope.This praise “is permeated with biblical echoes, a sign that Mary does not want to ‘fall out of line’ but rather to harmonize with the Fathers and to praise God’s mercy for the humble.” The strong presence of the Easter motif makes the Magnificat “also a song of redemption. The verbs are all in the past,” explained the Pope, because they are “permeated by a loving memory that fills the present with faith and illuminates the future with hope: Mary sings of the grace of the past, but she is also the woman of the present who carries the future in her womb.”And while the first part of the canticle “praises the action of God in Mary, who, as a microcosm of the people of God, follows the covenant perfectly”, the second part expands “to the work of the Father in the macrocosm of the history of his children” and “unfolds around three key concepts: memory – mercy – promise”.God has indeed “saved his people, beginning with the Exodus, and has let a continuous stream of merciful love flow over his covenant people ‘from generation to generation’, and now reveals the fullness of salvation in his Son, whom he sent to redeem his people from their sins. From Abraham to Jesus Christ and to the community of believers, Easter appears as the key hermeneutical dimension to understand each subsequent liberation, up to that accomplished by the Messiah in the fullness of time”, the Pope concluded.Only at the end of the audience, during the greetings in Italian, did the Pope take the floor again to repeat the appeal for peace in the clearest possible terms: “Let us think of the countries where war is raging: the tormented Ukraine, Israel, Sudan, so many countries that are suffering there. Let us think of the displaced people in Palestine and let us pray for them,” said the Pope. Shortly before, in the greetings in Polish, Don Giroli read another prayer intention of the Pope for peace: “I encourage you to pray for the priests and consecrated men and women who carry out their ministry in poor and war-torn countries, especially in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Democratic Republic of Congo. For many, this presence is proof that God is thinking of them.” (F.B.) (Agenzia Fides, 5/2/2025)
    Share:

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Luis de Guindos: Interview with Hospodárske Noviny

    Source: European Central Bank

    Interview with Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB, conducted by Mário Blaščák

    5 February 2025

    The ECB lowered its interest rates by 25 basis points last week. How low can rates go given the current inflation and growth outlook?

    We have been very clear that we are not following any predetermined path and will decide meeting by meeting, based on the incoming economic data. This is because the level of uncertainty is huge. Now that we see inflation approaching our 2% target, we have been reducing the restriction of our monetary policy. How much lower rates will go depends on the data confirming that inflation is converging towards our target in a sustainable manner. We are confident that this will happen this year, but there are still a number of uncertainties, particularly surrounding the geopolitical situation, that we need to take into account. So, even if our current trajectory under the current circumstances is clear, nobody knows the level at which interest rates will end up.

    At the press conference, ECB President Christine Lagarde described the current level of interest rates as being in restrictive territory. Národná banka Slovenska Governor Peter Kažimír recently suggested that rates would decline to a neutral level close to 2%. Do you agree?

    I usually agree with my friend Peter Kažimír on a lot of things [laughs]. The neutral rate is an interesting concept from an academic standpoint. However, using it as a reference for monetary policy decisions is not the right approach, in my view. The range of the neutral rate, based on different models, can be very ample. Our bank lending surveys provide a much better indicator of the restrictiveness of our monetary policy, by showing how banks are easing or tightening financing conditions. For policy decisions we need to consider all relevant incoming data and a vast range of indicators to form our assessment of the inflation outlook, underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. So while the neutral rate makes for an interesting academic concept, it is not very useful from a policymaking standpoint.

    Why don’t academic concepts hold up? Are we living through unusual times?

    Academic research is crucial for the conceptual framework of the things we do. But the high level of uncertainty we are now dealing with potentially calls for a more pragmatic approach, placing less weight on unobservable variables or model-based estimates with shortcomings and results expressed in wide ranges.

    Services inflation is double the target level and wage growth is near 5%. How confident are you that the projected moderation in inflation will actually materialise?

    As we can clearly see at the moment, not all the components of inflation evolve in parallel. You are right that while goods inflation stands at 0.5%, services inflation is at 4%. It is important that services inflation starts to decelerate. We believe this will happen because services are very wage-sensitive, and we expect wage growth to start to decelerate. We also see our corporate surveys confirming our belief that wage dynamics will start to slow down, so we expect this to help bring down services inflation.

    How is inflation expected to evolve over the next few months?

    On average, we may see an increase in headline inflation over the next couple of months because of base effects, mostly due to energy prices. Nevertheless, we are convinced that headline inflation will start to decelerate later on in the spring and converge towards our 2% target on a sustainable basis.

    Is there any time lag between the projected moderation in wage growth and services inflation?

    There is always a certain delay in that respect. But looking only at wage growth data is like looking into a rear-view mirror. Looking ahead, we pay attention to expectations about inflation, which are firmly anchored. At the same time, there is the crucial “catch-up” process, which is almost complete. While the purchasing power of workers’ wages in the euro area fell during the period of high inflation, it has now recovered. These two elements lead us to believe that wage increases will start to decelerate.

    Eurostat released data on GDP growth in the euro area, which has been stagnating. Forward-looking indicators point to an economic slowdown, affecting wages and, in turn, consumer demand. Is that the reason why you are expecting weak growth in household consumption?

    You raised a very important issue. In order to understand what will happen to the economy, consumer behaviour is key. Right now, we don’t see consumption picking up even though the moderation in inflation has restored households’ purchasing power. It is likely that this is related to consumer confidence. The impact of past shocks like the pandemic, the post-pandemic period and the energy shock, as well as the current geopolitical situation and the general level of uncertainty worldwide, is moderating consumption. But we believe that confidence will be restored over time, as real wages recover.

    A recovery in consumption will be key for a rebound of euro area economic growth. The lack of consumer confidence is one of the reasons why this has not been the case yet.

    What would happen if the war in Ukraine were to end tomorrow? Would it change everything we think about the economy and the course of monetary policy?

    From a human standpoint, a peace agreement would obviously be very positive. And generally speaking, an end to the war would also benefit the economy. But this would depend on how the war is resolved and whether the terms of the settlement are good for Ukraine and for the rest of Europe.

    In its pursuit of price stability, the ECB targets inflation, but what role did weak economic growth play in your decision to lower interest rates?

    Even though we target inflation, our decision-making of course involves a broader perspective. We consider a wide range of indicators, such as consumer demand, investment, energy prices and exchange rate developments, as well as actual and potential economic growth. We calibrate all of these components on an ongoing basis to produce the most accurate projection of inflation over time in order to support our decisions.

    Slovakia is an automotive power. However, the car sector has been struggling in the wake of the green transition. After your dinner with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last week, how do you see the green transition evolving?

    This question would be better put to the European Commission. Ms von der Leyen explained the main features of the Competitiveness Compass, with simplification and flexibility being major drivers. This means looking at decarbonisation targets also through the lens of the competitiveness of European industries.

    Slovakia is one of Europe’s fiscal sinners, but it has implemented consolidation measures, including income tax and VAT hikes and the introduction of a transaction tax. Do you think it will be enough if small euro area countries take action while large countries do not?

    Every country needs to do their part to comply with the new fiscal framework. The new rules need to be implemented fully, faithfully and by all countries, because the credibility of fiscal policy is crucial. This does not apply to Europe alone, but to other countries in the world too. Markets are monitoring each country’s fiscal position very closely, and any doubts about the sustainability of public finances are quickly reflected in increased government bond yields, as we have seen in the United States and the United Kingdom. An increase in government bond yields is detrimental to growth and financial stability. That is why we must maintain the credibility of the new fiscal framework, as this a prerequsite for keeping long-term yields at a low level, which is vital for the economic recovery. The new fiscal rules are flexible to allow sustainable deficit cuts and they will not jeopardise efforts to invest in areas such as climate change or defence.

    Global debt is on track to hit 100% of world GDP this year. Is this alarming? And who is the biggest debt sinner?

    I won’t name any countries, because the figures are already out there. In general, the policy response to the pandemic played a big part in increasing sovereign debt, as there was a combination of very loose fiscal and monetary policy. But this was an exceptional situation – extraordinary times require extraordinary measures.

    That being said, many countries have seen their fiscal positions deteriorate. Public debt ratios are now high, and a number of countries have increased their structural deficits. This is why it is so important to implement the new fiscal governance framework in its entirety. This means not only reducing the fiscal deficit and the public debt-to-GDP ratio, but also implementing structural reforms.

    Do you view the consolidation measures adopted by the Slovak Government as positive?

    It is not for us to assess the fiscal measures of individual countries. Looking at Slovakia’s fiscal profile, we see that its debt is below the euro area average, at around 60% of GDP. The budget deficit is higher, which means that Slovakia is subject to an excessive deficit procedure. In general, it’s important to reduce the deficit in a way that ensures the sustainability of public finances. This can be done through a combination of cutting expenditure and increasing tax revenue. But how to do that, and by how much, is for each country to decide.

    12 years ago, Italy’s fiscal sustainability triggered a crisis. Today, France is under the spotlight of the markets and its government bond yields are on the rise. Does this pose a threat to the stability of the euro area?

    We have seen an increase in yields in several countries. In the case of France, this may have been somewhat stronger, mainly because of the political situation. But the plans submitted to the European Commission are fully compliant with the new fiscal framework. So what I hope for France, and for other euro area countries, is political stability, and for them to be able to implement the plans approved by the European Commission.

    Mortgages are very important for people in Slovakia, as Slovaks prefer to live in their own homes. But interest rates went from levels below 1% all the way up to 5.3% in November 2023. In view of the monetary policy easing cycle, is the ECB a messenger of good news for Slovaks?

    We are trying to do our job. When inflation was high, we increased interest rates, and now that it is falling, we are reducing them. On average, inflation peaked at above 10% in October 2022 and it now stands at 2.5%, which is why we have cut interest rates by 125 basis points since June last year. This has an impact on financing conditions and on mortgage rates, but the structure of the mortgage market is also important in determining how quickly our monetary policy is transmitted. In countries where most of the mortgage market is at variable rates, interest rate cuts are rapidly reflected in household mortgage payments. In countries where there are more fixed-rate mortgages, this process is slower. But the transmission of monetary policy easing will eventually be reflected in mortgages across the board, and people will feel that they are less costly than before we started to reduce rates.

    So monetary policy is a bit of a bittersweet symphony? Bitter in bad times and sweet in good times?

    Yes, bitter when inflation is high and we need to tighten financing conditions, and sweet when it is low. Now that inflation is declining, and if it continues to do so, we will adjust our monetary policy accordingly. If inflation had not declined, we would not have cut rates.

    How big a threat are Donald Trump’s economic policies to the ECB’s inflation target?

    With regard to tariffs, our analyses suggest that the main impact will be on growth. If the world embarks on the path towards a trade war, this will have an extremely negative impact on the growth prospects of the global economy. Increases in tariffs and quotas are a negative supply shock, especially if accompanied by retaliation. This vicious circle should be avoided. Estimating the impact on inflation is more difficult owing to the dampening effect of tariffs on demand and growth, as well as the fact that selective tariffs can lead to trade being redirected and diverted.

    Are you concerned about stagflation, i.e. a stagnation in growth accompanied by rising prices, which the ECB’s monetary policy cannot reach? Could it lead to a reversal of the monetary policy stance?

    If inflation moves according to our projections, the path of our monetary policy is clear. Although there are always some external factors affecting the economy, and potentially shocks, our baseline scenario sees inflation on track to converge towards our target this year, with a slight recovery in economic growth. We expect euro area GDP growth to reach 1.1% this year, following 0.7% last year.

    To support the economic recovery, we will need a growth-oriented fiscal policy that also guarantees the fiscal sustainability of public finances, as well as structural reforms. This is where the European Commission’s Competitiveness Compass will play a key role. To achieve real unity, we need to simplify processes and integrate markets in Europe. That means the Single Market, the capital markets union and the banking union. These will be key elements in improving the growth prospects and growth potential of the euro area.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Luis de Guindos: Interview with Hospodárske Noviny

    Source: European Central Bank

    Interview with Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB, conducted by Mário Blaščák

    5 February 2025

    The ECB lowered its interest rates by 25 basis points last week. How low can rates go given the current inflation and growth outlook?

    We have been very clear that we are not following any predetermined path and will decide meeting by meeting, based on the incoming economic data. This is because the level of uncertainty is huge. Now that we see inflation approaching our 2% target, we have been reducing the restriction of our monetary policy. How much lower rates will go depends on the data confirming that inflation is converging towards our target in a sustainable manner. We are confident that this will happen this year, but there are still a number of uncertainties, particularly surrounding the geopolitical situation, that we need to take into account. So, even if our current trajectory under the current circumstances is clear, nobody knows the level at which interest rates will end up.

    At the press conference, ECB President Christine Lagarde described the current level of interest rates as being in restrictive territory. Národná banka Slovenska Governor Peter Kažimír recently suggested that rates would decline to a neutral level close to 2%. Do you agree?

    I usually agree with my friend Peter Kažimír on a lot of things [laughs]. The neutral rate is an interesting concept from an academic standpoint. However, using it as a reference for monetary policy decisions is not the right approach, in my view. The range of the neutral rate, based on different models, can be very ample. Our bank lending surveys provide a much better indicator of the restrictiveness of our monetary policy, by showing how banks are easing or tightening financing conditions. For policy decisions we need to consider all relevant incoming data and a vast range of indicators to form our assessment of the inflation outlook, underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. So while the neutral rate makes for an interesting academic concept, it is not very useful from a policymaking standpoint.

    Why don’t academic concepts hold up? Are we living through unusual times?

    Academic research is crucial for the conceptual framework of the things we do. But the high level of uncertainty we are now dealing with potentially calls for a more pragmatic approach, placing less weight on unobservable variables or model-based estimates with shortcomings and results expressed in wide ranges.

    Services inflation is double the target level and wage growth is near 5%. How confident are you that the projected moderation in inflation will actually materialise?

    As we can clearly see at the moment, not all the components of inflation evolve in parallel. You are right that while goods inflation stands at 0.5%, services inflation is at 4%. It is important that services inflation starts to decelerate. We believe this will happen because services are very wage-sensitive, and we expect wage growth to start to decelerate. We also see our corporate surveys confirming our belief that wage dynamics will start to slow down, so we expect this to help bring down services inflation.

    How is inflation expected to evolve over the next few months?

    On average, we may see an increase in headline inflation over the next couple of months because of base effects, mostly due to energy prices. Nevertheless, we are convinced that headline inflation will start to decelerate later on in the spring and converge towards our 2% target on a sustainable basis.

    Is there any time lag between the projected moderation in wage growth and services inflation?

    There is always a certain delay in that respect. But looking only at wage growth data is like looking into a rear-view mirror. Looking ahead, we pay attention to expectations about inflation, which are firmly anchored. At the same time, there is the crucial “catch-up” process, which is almost complete. While the purchasing power of workers’ wages in the euro area fell during the period of high inflation, it has now recovered. These two elements lead us to believe that wage increases will start to decelerate.

    Eurostat released data on GDP growth in the euro area, which has been stagnating. Forward-looking indicators point to an economic slowdown, affecting wages and, in turn, consumer demand. Is that the reason why you are expecting weak growth in household consumption?

    You raised a very important issue. In order to understand what will happen to the economy, consumer behaviour is key. Right now, we don’t see consumption picking up even though the moderation in inflation has restored households’ purchasing power. It is likely that this is related to consumer confidence. The impact of past shocks like the pandemic, the post-pandemic period and the energy shock, as well as the current geopolitical situation and the general level of uncertainty worldwide, is moderating consumption. But we believe that confidence will be restored over time, as real wages recover.

    A recovery in consumption will be key for a rebound of euro area economic growth. The lack of consumer confidence is one of the reasons why this has not been the case yet.

    What would happen if the war in Ukraine were to end tomorrow? Would it change everything we think about the economy and the course of monetary policy?

    From a human standpoint, a peace agreement would obviously be very positive. And generally speaking, an end to the war would also benefit the economy. But this would depend on how the war is resolved and whether the terms of the settlement are good for Ukraine and for the rest of Europe.

    In its pursuit of price stability, the ECB targets inflation, but what role did weak economic growth play in your decision to lower interest rates?

    Even though we target inflation, our decision-making of course involves a broader perspective. We consider a wide range of indicators, such as consumer demand, investment, energy prices and exchange rate developments, as well as actual and potential economic growth. We calibrate all of these components on an ongoing basis to produce the most accurate projection of inflation over time in order to support our decisions.

    Slovakia is an automotive power. However, the car sector has been struggling in the wake of the green transition. After your dinner with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last week, how do you see the green transition evolving?

    This question would be better put to the European Commission. Ms von der Leyen explained the main features of the Competitiveness Compass, with simplification and flexibility being major drivers. This means looking at decarbonisation targets also through the lens of the competitiveness of European industries.

    Slovakia is one of Europe’s fiscal sinners, but it has implemented consolidation measures, including income tax and VAT hikes and the introduction of a transaction tax. Do you think it will be enough if small euro area countries take action while large countries do not?

    Every country needs to do their part to comply with the new fiscal framework. The new rules need to be implemented fully, faithfully and by all countries, because the credibility of fiscal policy is crucial. This does not apply to Europe alone, but to other countries in the world too. Markets are monitoring each country’s fiscal position very closely, and any doubts about the sustainability of public finances are quickly reflected in increased government bond yields, as we have seen in the United States and the United Kingdom. An increase in government bond yields is detrimental to growth and financial stability. That is why we must maintain the credibility of the new fiscal framework, as this a prerequsite for keeping long-term yields at a low level, which is vital for the economic recovery. The new fiscal rules are flexible to allow sustainable deficit cuts and they will not jeopardise efforts to invest in areas such as climate change or defence.

    Global debt is on track to hit 100% of world GDP this year. Is this alarming? And who is the biggest debt sinner?

    I won’t name any countries, because the figures are already out there. In general, the policy response to the pandemic played a big part in increasing sovereign debt, as there was a combination of very loose fiscal and monetary policy. But this was an exceptional situation – extraordinary times require extraordinary measures.

    That being said, many countries have seen their fiscal positions deteriorate. Public debt ratios are now high, and a number of countries have increased their structural deficits. This is why it is so important to implement the new fiscal governance framework in its entirety. This means not only reducing the fiscal deficit and the public debt-to-GDP ratio, but also implementing structural reforms.

    Do you view the consolidation measures adopted by the Slovak Government as positive?

    It is not for us to assess the fiscal measures of individual countries. Looking at Slovakia’s fiscal profile, we see that its debt is below the euro area average, at around 60% of GDP. The budget deficit is higher, which means that Slovakia is subject to an excessive deficit procedure. In general, it’s important to reduce the deficit in a way that ensures the sustainability of public finances. This can be done through a combination of cutting expenditure and increasing tax revenue. But how to do that, and by how much, is for each country to decide.

    12 years ago, Italy’s fiscal sustainability triggered a crisis. Today, France is under the spotlight of the markets and its government bond yields are on the rise. Does this pose a threat to the stability of the euro area?

    We have seen an increase in yields in several countries. In the case of France, this may have been somewhat stronger, mainly because of the political situation. But the plans submitted to the European Commission are fully compliant with the new fiscal framework. So what I hope for France, and for other euro area countries, is political stability, and for them to be able to implement the plans approved by the European Commission.

    Mortgages are very important for people in Slovakia, as Slovaks prefer to live in their own homes. But interest rates went from levels below 1% all the way up to 5.3% in November 2023. In view of the monetary policy easing cycle, is the ECB a messenger of good news for Slovaks?

    We are trying to do our job. When inflation was high, we increased interest rates, and now that it is falling, we are reducing them. On average, inflation peaked at above 10% in October 2022 and it now stands at 2.5%, which is why we have cut interest rates by 125 basis points since June last year. This has an impact on financing conditions and on mortgage rates, but the structure of the mortgage market is also important in determining how quickly our monetary policy is transmitted. In countries where most of the mortgage market is at variable rates, interest rate cuts are rapidly reflected in household mortgage payments. In countries where there are more fixed-rate mortgages, this process is slower. But the transmission of monetary policy easing will eventually be reflected in mortgages across the board, and people will feel that they are less costly than before we started to reduce rates.

    So monetary policy is a bit of a bittersweet symphony? Bitter in bad times and sweet in good times?

    Yes, bitter when inflation is high and we need to tighten financing conditions, and sweet when it is low. Now that inflation is declining, and if it continues to do so, we will adjust our monetary policy accordingly. If inflation had not declined, we would not have cut rates.

    How big a threat are Donald Trump’s economic policies to the ECB’s inflation target?

    With regard to tariffs, our analyses suggest that the main impact will be on growth. If the world embarks on the path towards a trade war, this will have an extremely negative impact on the growth prospects of the global economy. Increases in tariffs and quotas are a negative supply shock, especially if accompanied by retaliation. This vicious circle should be avoided. Estimating the impact on inflation is more difficult owing to the dampening effect of tariffs on demand and growth, as well as the fact that selective tariffs can lead to trade being redirected and diverted.

    Are you concerned about stagflation, i.e. a stagnation in growth accompanied by rising prices, which the ECB’s monetary policy cannot reach? Could it lead to a reversal of the monetary policy stance?

    If inflation moves according to our projections, the path of our monetary policy is clear. Although there are always some external factors affecting the economy, and potentially shocks, our baseline scenario sees inflation on track to converge towards our target this year, with a slight recovery in economic growth. We expect euro area GDP growth to reach 1.1% this year, following 0.7% last year.

    To support the economic recovery, we will need a growth-oriented fiscal policy that also guarantees the fiscal sustainability of public finances, as well as structural reforms. This is where the European Commission’s Competitiveness Compass will play a key role. To achieve real unity, we need to simplify processes and integrate markets in Europe. That means the Single Market, the capital markets union and the banking union. These will be key elements in improving the growth prospects and growth potential of the euro area.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Video: DRC, Guest Tomorrow, Occupied Palestinian Territory & other topics – Daily Press Briefing

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    – Democratic Republic of the Congo
    – Guest Tomorrow
    – Occupied Palestinian Territory
    – Syria
    – Sudan
    – Libya
    – Haiti
    – Horst Köhler
    – Ukraine
    – Human Fraternity
    – Honour Roll

    DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
    The Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for the DRC, Bruno Lemarquis, called today for the urgent reopening of the airport in Goma.
    Mr. Lemarquis stressed that the airport is a lifeline and that the survival of thousands of people depends on its reopening to facilitate evacuation of injured people, delivery of medical supplies and arrival of humanitarian reinforcements.
    The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that thousands of civilians are still on the move in and around Goma.
    Figures remain difficult to verify, but reports indicate significant numbers of people have left displacement sites along the Kanyaruncinya road and moved towards the area of Rutshuru. Other displaced people are also moving towards the Minova area.
    Hundreds of thousands of people remain displaced, living in displacement sites or with host communities in North Kivu, including on the Goma-Sake axis, where large numbers of displaced people remain in displacement sites.
    OCHA and its partners have been visiting displacement sites outside Goma over the last several days to assess conditions. These efforts are ongoing.

    GUEST TOMORROW
    Tomorrow, the guest at the Noon briefing will be Vivian van de Perre, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Protection and Operations.
    She will brief reporters live virtually from Goma.

    OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
    Turning to the Middle East. Tom Fletcher, our Emergency Relief Coordinator and head of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, is continuing his visit to Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory. Today, he was in Nir Oz in southern Israel, where one-quarter of all residents were killed or taken hostage in the Hamas-led attack on 7 October 2023.
    In a social media post, Mr. Fletcher stressed that the ceasefire must hold, that all civilians must be protected, and that all hostages must be freed.
    He also held several meetings with Israeli officials last night and again today.
    They discussed ways to sustain the surge of humanitarian support to Gaza, as well as the ongoing challenges in the West Bank that we have been reporting.
    As of earlier today, we and our our humanitarian partners estimate that more than 565,000 people have crossed from the south of Gaza to the north since 27 January. More than 45,000 people have been observed moving from the north to the south.
    Meanwhile, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs tells us that we and our partners are working to mitigate the impact of the widespread destruction of critical water, sanitation and hygiene infrastructure that is taking place throughout the Gaza Strip.
    Some 40 new water points have already been established over the past week, and partners are now trucking water to 272 water points throughout North Gaza governorate alone. Through that, they were able to deliver more than 1,000 cubic metres of safe drinking water and nearly 900 cubic metres of domestic water to about 177,000 people each day.
    To address the water shortages, our colleagues at UNOPS, the UN Office for Project Services delivered 40,000 litres of fuel to Gaza City yesterday to power water pumps and facilitate trucking – and we hope to have the Executive Director of UNOPS brief you on the situation in Gaza next week. Meanwhile, the World Food Programme is also expanding fuel storage capacity in the Strip.
    Efforts are also ongoing to dispatch water pipes purchased by UNICEF to northern Gaza to prevent key facilities from overflowing before it rains.
    We also have an update for you on the winter response in Gaza. Between Thursday and Sunday, our partners distributed tarpaulins and winter clothing to more than 2,000 households in northern Gaza.  In southern Gaza, 10,000 tarpaulins were distributed between 25 January and 2 February, with an additional 200 tarpaulins distributed in the Gaza governorate.
    Over the past two days, one of our humanitarian partners also distributed 600 tarpaulins to 300 households in the Khan Younis area.

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=04%20February%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VwI2OXgmKj4

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump wants the US to ‘take over’ Gaza and relocate the people. Is this legal?

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Tamer Morris, Senior lecturer, international law, University of Sydney

    In an astonishing news conference in Washington, US President Donald Trump proposed the United States “take over” the Gaza Strip and permanently relocate the nearly two million Palestinians living there to neighbouring countries.

    Trump has previously called on Egypt and Jordan to resettle Palestinians from Gaza, which both countries firmly rejected.

    His new comments – and the possibility of a US takeover of a sovereign territory – were immediately met with criticism and questions about the legality of such a move.

    When asked what authority would allow the US to do this, Trump did not have an answer. He only noted it would be a “long-term ownership position”. He also did not rule out using US troops.

    So, what does international law say about this idea?

    Can the US take over a sovereign territory?

    The quick answer is no – Trump can’t just take over someone else’s territory.

    Since the end of the second world war in 1945, the use of force has been prohibited in international law. This is one of the foundations of international law since the creation of the United Nations.

    The US could only take control of Gaza with the consent of the sovereign authority of the territory. Israel can’t cede Gaza to the US. The International Court of Justice has ruled that Gaza is an occupied territory – and that this occupation is illegal under international law.

    So, for this to happen legally, Trump would require the consent of Palestine and the Palestinian people to take control of Gaza.

    And what about removing a population?

    One of the biggest obligations of an occupying power comes under Article 49 of the Geneva Conventions. This prohibits an occupying power from forcibly transferring or removing people from a territory.

    All other states also have an obligation not to assist an occupying power in violating international humanitarian law. So that means if the US wanted to move the population of Gaza by force, Israel could not assist in this action. And likewise, the US cannot assist Israel in violating the rules.

    Occupying powers are allowed to remove a population for the reason of safety.

    Trump and his Middle East envoy who visited Gaza last week have repeatedly referenced how dangerous it is. Trump questioned how people could “want to stay” there, saying they have “no alternative” but to leave.

    However, removing people for this reason has to only be temporary. Once it’s fine for someone to return, they must be returned.

    What if people voluntarily leave?

    Transferring a population has to be consensual. But in this specific case, it would mean the consent of all Palestinians in Gaza. The US could not force anyone to move who does not want to.

    Further to this, a government, such as the Palestinian Authority, cannot give this consent on behalf of a people. People have a right to self-determination – the right to determine their own future.

    A perfect example is migration – if a person migrates from one state to another, that is their right. It’s not displacement. But forcefully displacing them is not permitted.

    And using what sounds like a threat would arguably not be consensual, either. This could be saying, for instance, “If you stay, you’ll die because there’s only going to be more war. But if you leave, there’s peace.” This is the threat of force.

    Would forcing people to leave be ethnic cleansing?

    Ethnic cleansing has not been defined in any treaty or convention.

    However, most international law experts rely on the definition in the Commission of Experts report on the former state of Yugoslavia to the UN Security Council in 1994. It defined ethnic cleansing as:

    rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.

    So, under that definition, what is being suggested by Trump could be classified as ethnic cleansing – removing the Palestinian people from a certain geographical area through force or intimidation.

    What can be done if Trump follows through?

    If Trump follows through with this plan, it would be a violation of what is known as jus cogens, or the paramount, foundational rules that underpin international law.

    And international law dictates that no country is allowed to cooperate with another in violating these rules and all countries must try to stop or prevent any potential violations. This could include placing sanctions on a country or not providing support to that country, for example, by selling it weapons.

    A perfect example of this is when Russia illegally annexed Crimea in 2014, very few countries recognised the move. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was then followed by sanctions and the freezing of Russian assets, among other actions.

    If Trump pursued this course of action, he too could be personally liable under international criminal law if he’s the one instigating the forcible transfer of a population.

    The International Criminal Court has already issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the former Israeli defence minister and a Hamas commander in relation to the conflict.

    The risk of this kind of language

    One of the dangers of this kind of rhetoric is the potential to dehumanise the enemy, or the other side.

    Trump does this through statements such as, “You look over the decades, it’s all death in Gaza”, and resettling people in “nice homes where they can be happy” instead of being “knifed to death”. This language implies the situation in Gaza is due to the “uncivilised” nature of the population.

    The risk at the moment, even if Trump doesn’t do what he says, is that the mere vocalisation of his proposal is dehumanising to the Palestinian people. And this, in turn, could lead to more violations of the rules of war and international humanitarian law.

    The nonchalant way Trump is discussing things such as taking over a territory and moving a population gives the impression these rules can easily be broken, even if he doesn’t break them himself.

    Tamer Morris does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Trump wants the US to ‘take over’ Gaza and relocate the people. Is this legal? – https://theconversation.com/trump-wants-the-us-to-take-over-gaza-and-relocate-the-people-is-this-legal-249143

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Trump wants the US to ‘take over’ Gaza and relocate the people. Is this legal?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Tamer Morris, Senior lecturer, international law, University of Sydney

    In an astonishing news conference in Washington, US President Donald Trump proposed the United States “take over” the Gaza Strip and permanently relocate the nearly two million Palestinians living there to neighbouring countries.

    Trump has previously called on Egypt and Jordan to resettle Palestinians from Gaza, which both countries firmly rejected.

    His new comments – and the possibility of a US takeover of a sovereign territory – were immediately met with criticism and questions about the legality of such a move.

    When asked what authority would allow the US to do this, Trump did not have an answer. He only noted it would be a “long-term ownership position”. He also did not rule out using US troops.

    So, what does international law say about this idea?

    Can the US take over a sovereign territory?

    The quick answer is no – Trump can’t just take over someone else’s territory.

    Since the end of the second world war in 1945, the use of force has been prohibited in international law. This is one of the foundations of international law since the creation of the United Nations.

    The US could only take control of Gaza with the consent of the sovereign authority of the territory. Israel can’t cede Gaza to the US. The International Court of Justice has ruled that Gaza is an occupied territory – and that this occupation is illegal under international law.

    So, for this to happen legally, Trump would require the consent of Palestine and the Palestinian people to take control of Gaza.

    And what about removing a population?

    One of the biggest obligations of an occupying power comes under Article 49 of the Geneva Conventions. This prohibits an occupying power from forcibly transferring or removing people from a territory.

    All other states also have an obligation not to assist an occupying power in violating international humanitarian law. So that means if the US wanted to move the population of Gaza by force, Israel could not assist in this action. And likewise, the US cannot assist Israel in violating the rules.

    Occupying powers are allowed to remove a population for the reason of safety.

    Trump and his Middle East envoy who visited Gaza last week have repeatedly referenced how dangerous it is. Trump questioned how people could “want to stay” there, saying they have “no alternative” but to leave.

    However, removing people for this reason has to only be temporary. Once it’s fine for someone to return, they must be returned.

    What if people voluntarily leave?

    Transferring a population has to be consensual. But in this specific case, it would mean the consent of all Palestinians in Gaza. The US could not force anyone to move who does not want to.

    Further to this, a government, such as the Palestinian Authority, cannot give this consent on behalf of a people. People have a right to self-determination – the right to determine their own future.

    A perfect example is migration – if a person migrates from one state to another, that is their right. It’s not displacement. But forcefully displacing them is not permitted.

    And using what sounds like a threat would arguably not be consensual, either. This could be saying, for instance, “If you stay, you’ll die because there’s only going to be more war. But if you leave, there’s peace.” This is the threat of force.

    Would forcing people to leave be ethnic cleansing?

    Ethnic cleansing has not been defined in any treaty or convention.

    However, most international law experts rely on the definition in the Commission of Experts report on the former state of Yugoslavia to the UN Security Council in 1994. It defined ethnic cleansing as:

    rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.

    So, under that definition, what is being suggested by Trump could be classified as ethnic cleansing – removing the Palestinian people from a certain geographical area through force or intimidation.

    What can be done if Trump follows through?

    If Trump follows through with this plan, it would be a violation of what is known as jus cogens, or the paramount, foundational rules that underpin international law.

    And international law dictates that no country is allowed to cooperate with another in violating these rules and all countries must try to stop or prevent any potential violations. This could include placing sanctions on a country or not providing support to that country, for example, by selling it weapons.

    A perfect example of this is when Russia illegally annexed Crimea in 2014, very few countries recognised the move. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was then followed by sanctions and the freezing of Russian assets, among other actions.

    If Trump pursued this course of action, he too could be personally liable under international criminal law if he’s the one instigating the forcible transfer of a population.

    The International Criminal Court has already issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the former Israeli defence minister and a Hamas commander in relation to the conflict.

    The risk of this kind of language

    One of the dangers of this kind of rhetoric is the potential to dehumanise the enemy, or the other side.

    Trump does this through statements such as, “You look over the decades, it’s all death in Gaza”, and resettling people in “nice homes where they can be happy” instead of being “knifed to death”. This language implies the situation in Gaza is due to the “uncivilised” nature of the population.

    The risk at the moment, even if Trump doesn’t do what he says, is that the mere vocalisation of his proposal is dehumanising to the Palestinian people. And this, in turn, could lead to more violations of the rules of war and international humanitarian law.

    The nonchalant way Trump is discussing things such as taking over a territory and moving a population gives the impression these rules can easily be broken, even if he doesn’t break them himself.

    Tamer Morris does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Trump wants the US to ‘take over’ Gaza and relocate the people. Is this legal? – https://theconversation.com/trump-wants-the-us-to-take-over-gaza-and-relocate-the-people-is-this-legal-249143

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI: Credit Agricole SA : CONTINUED STRONG EARNINGS MOMENTUM IN 2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    CONTINUED STRONG EARNINGS MOMENTUM IN 2024
    CASA AND CAG STATED AND UNDERLYING DATA Q4-2024
               
      CRÉDIT AGRICOLE S.A.   CRÉDIT AGRICOLE GROUP
        Stated   Underlying     Stated   Underlying
    Revenues   €7,092m
    +17.4% Q4/Q4    		   €7,116m
    +18.2% Q4/Q4    		     €9,817m
    +11.9% Q4/Q4    		   €9,840m
    +13.4% Q4/Q4
    Expenses   -€3,917m
    +5.6% Q4/Q4    		   -€3,878m
    +4.4% Q4/Q4    		     -€5,863m
    +3.2% Q4/Q4    		   -€5,824m
    +2.4% Q4/Q4
    Gross Operating Income   €3,175m
    +36.2% Q4/Q4    		   €3,238m
    +40.4% Q4/Q4    		     €3,954m
    +28.0% Q4/Q4    		   €4,017m
    +34.3% Q4/Q4
    Cost of risk   -€594m
    +35.0% Q4/Q4    		   -€594m
    +35.0% Q4/Q4    		     -€867m
    +13.9% Q4/Q4    		   -€867m
    +13.9% Q4/Q4
    Net income group share   €1,689m
    +26.6% Q4/Q4    		   €1,730m
    +32.8% Q4/Q4    		     €2,149m
    +24.6% Q4/Q4    		   €2,190m
    +33.7% Q4/Q4
    C/I ratio   55.2%
    -6.2 pp Q4/Q4    		   54.5%
    -7.2 pp Q4/Q4    		     59.7%
    -5.1 pp Q4/Q4    		   59.2%
    -6.4 pp Q4/Q4
    ALL OF THE FINANCIAL TARGETS OF THE 2025 AMBITIONS PLAN EXCEEDED AS OF 2024

    STRONG INCREASE IN QUARTERLY AND FULL-YEAR EARNINGS

    • Record quarterly and full-year revenues, fuelled by the excellent performance by Asset Gathering and Large Customers
    • High profitability: low cost/income ratio (increase in recurring expenses contained at +3.0% Q4/Q4) and 14.0% return on tangible equity in 2024
    • Cost of risk rose in Q4-24, driven by provisions for performing loans related to model effects at Crédit Agricole CIB and Crédit Agricole Personal Finance & Mobility (CAPFM)

    PROPOSED 2024 DIVIDEND INCREASE TO €1.10 PER SHARE (+5% VS. 2023)

    STRONG ACTIVITY IN ALL BUSINESS LINES

    • Robust growth in retail banking and consumer finance driven by multiple factors: continued upturn in the home loan business in France (up +18%), higher corporate loan production, thriving international lending business, consumer finance stability at a high level and confirmed stabilisation of the deposit mix in France
    • Record CIB, asset management and insurance business, reflected in the record level in insurance revenues with contributions from all activities, high net inflows and record level of assets under management, as well as a new quarterly and full-year record reached by CIB

    CAPITAL OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIC PROJECTS

    • Instruments finalised to acquire an additional 5.2% in Banco BPM
    • Signing of an agreement for the acquisition of Santander’s 30.5% stake in CACEIS
      • Acquisition of aixigo, European leader in Wealth Tech
      • Finalization of the acquisition of 50% of GAC Leasing in China by CAPFM

    SOLID CAPITAL AND LIQUIDITY POSITIONS

    • Crédit Agricole S.A.’s phased-in CET1 at 11.7% and Group phased-in CET1 at 17.2%

    CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THE ENERGY TRANSITION

    • Phased withdrawal from fossil energies and reallocation of investments to renewable energy
    • Decarbonisation pathways in line with targets (oil & gas, power and automotive)

    At the meeting of the Board of Directors of Crédit Agricole S.A. on 4 february 2025, SAS Rue La Boétie informed the company of its intention to purchase Crédit Agricole S.A. shares on the market for a maximum amount of 500 million euros in line with the operations announced in August 2023 and in November 2022. Details of the transaction are provided in a press release issued today by SAS Rue La Boétie.

     

    Dominique Lefebvre,
    Chairman of SAS Rue La Boétie and Chairman of the Crédit Agricole S.A. Board of Directors

    « The Group’s excellent results illustrate our overall capacity to support all our customers in a global and loyal relationship over the long term. Three-quarters of these results are retained to serve the development of the economy. I would like to thank all of our employees who work every day with professionalism and commitment. »
     
     

    Philippe Brassac,
    Chief Executive Officer of Crédit Agricole S.A.

    « Driven by its unique Group model based on utility and universality, the Crédit Agricole Group reports excellent results in 2024. Crédit Agricole S.A. has once again exceeded all the financial objectives of its strategic plan, one year ahead of schedule. »

    		  

    This press release comments on the results of Crédit Agricole S.A. and those of Crédit Agricole Group, which comprises the Crédit Agricole S.A. entities and the Crédit Agricole Regional Banks, which own 62.4% of Crédit Agricole S.A. Please see the appendices to this press release for details of specific items, which are restated in the various indicators to calculate underlying income.

    Crédit Agricole Group

    Group activity

    The Group’s commercial activity during the quarter continued at a steady pace across all business lines, with a good level of customer capture. During 2024, the Group added +1 900,000 new customers in Retail Banking and grew its customer base by +214,000 customers. More specifically, over the year, the Group gained +1 500,000 new customers for Retail Banking in France and +400,000 new International Retail Banking customers (Italy and Poland). The customer base also grew (+126,000 and +88,000 customers, respectively).

    At 31 December 2024, retail banking on-balance sheet deposits totalled €837 billion, up +1.8% year-on-year in France and Italy (+0.5% for Regional Banks and LCL and +1.7% in Italy). Outstanding loans totalled €880 billion, up +0.4% year-on-year in France and Italy (+0.3% for Regional Banks and LCL and +1.7% in Italy). Home loan production picked up gradually in France during this quarter, recording an increase of +1% for the Regional Banks and +11% for LCL compared to the third quarter of 2024, and +7.8% and +59% respectively compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. Although high, home loan production by CA Italia was down -6.3% compared with an already high Q4 2023. The property and casualty insurance equipment rate1 rose to 43.9% for the Regional Banks (+0.8 percentage points compared with the third quarter of 2023), 27.9% for LCL (+0.4 percentage point) and 20.0% for CA Italia (+1.2 percentage point).

    In asset management, inflows remained strong at +€20.5 billion, fuelled by strong medium/long-term assets, excluding JVs (+€17.9 billion) and at the JVs. In insurance, savings/retirement gross inflows rose to a record €8.3 billion over the quarter (+17% year-on-year), with the unit-linked rate in production staying at a high 37.4%. Net inflows were positive at +€2.4 billion, growing for both euro-denominated and unit-linked contracts. The strong performance in property and casualty insurance was driven by price changes and portfolio growth (16.7 million contracts at end-December 2024, +5.3% year-on-year). Assets under management totalled €2,867 billion, up +12.1% in the year for all three segments: asset management rose 10% over the year to €2,240 billion; life insurance was up +5.1% to €347.3 billion; and wealth management (Indosuez Wealth Management and LCL Private Banking) increased 46.9% year-on-year to €279 billion, notably with the positive impact of the consolidation of Degroof Petercam (€69 billion in assets under management consolidated in the second quarter of 2024).

    Business in the SFS division was stable. At CAPFM, consumer finance outstandings increased to €119.3 billion, up +5.6% compared with the end of December 2023, buoyed by car loans, which accounted for 53%2 of total outstandings. New loan production decreased slightly, by -2.9% compared with the same period in 2023, mainly due to the Chinese market. Regarding Crédit Agricole Leasing & Factoring (CAL&F), production of lease financing outstandings was up +7.2% vs. December 2023 to 20.3%, with a particularly strong contribution from property leasing and renewable energy financing.

    Large Customers again posted record results for both the quarter and the full year in Corporate and Investment Banking. Capital Markets and Investment Banking held up well with a strong performance by the repo and securitisation businesses, while Financing activities reaped the benefits of growth in commercial activities. Asset Servicing recorded a high level of assets under custody of €5,291 billion and assets under administration of €3,397 billion (+12.1% and +3%, respectively, compared with the end of December 2023), with good sales momentum and positive market effects over the quarter.

    Each of the Group’s business lines posted strong activity (see Infra).

    Roll-out of strategic plan

    Crédit Agricole S.A.’s model offers constantly renewed potential for organic growth. This model is based on three pillars: customer acquisition, customer equipment and the development of new offers. Gross customer capture amounts to 1.9 million new customers on average since 2022, which marked the roll-out of the Horizon 2025 plan. Customer equipment is growing steadily across our various offers. The bank’s market share in household loans stood structurally at 30%3 helping to drive the market shares for our other offerings. These currently stand at 28% in asset management,3 27% in payment services,3 23% in individual death and disability insurance,4 19% in creditor insurance,4 15% in life insurance,4 7% in property and casualty insurance,4 and 4% in property services.4 Lastly, in line with our universal banking model, we are steadily expanding our customer offers: the new CA Transitions et Energies (CATE) and CA Santé et Territoires (CAST) business lines have been rolled out for the large-scale financing of renewable energy projects as well as the production and supply of electricity, and to offer solutions to improve access to healthcare and support for the elderly.

    This model is complemented by a steady stream of self-financed acquisitions and partnerships, through the consolidation of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s business lines in their markets to build the universal bank. Following on from acquisitions in the period 2019 to 2021 for a total of €3.3 billion, all of which were successful with some €1.3 billion5 in revenues generated, and a cost/income ratio of 52%, acquisitions and partnerships during the period covered by the Medium-Term Plan were in five main areas of development. The total investment was €7.2 billion6 (against €1.4 billion in disposals),7 generating around €3 billion in revenues.

    First of all, transactions to consolidate our business lines and strengthen our expertise were carried out in France and Europe, in particular: Private Banking through the transaction under way with Degroof Petercam, and a 70% stake in the capital of Wealth Dynamix8; Asset Servicing with the creation of Uptevia9, a common company with BNP Paribas, the acquisition of RBC Investor Services’ European businesses and the purchase of Santander’s minority interest in CACEIS; and Asset Management with the acquisitions of Alpha Associates10 and aixigo11; and finally, Leasing and factoring activity accelerate its development in Germany with the acquisition of Merca Leasing12. Crédit Agricole S.A. is also structuring its property services through the acquisition of property management business of Casino (Sudeco), and more recently the ones of Nexity.

    At the same time, the bank has expanded its distribution networks through new partnerships, notably by taking a stake in Banco BPM; signing a new distribution agreement between Crédit Agricole Assurances and Banco BPM for non-life and creditor insurance in Italy; partnership in automobile insurance with Mobilize Financial Services, subsidiary of Renault13; and entering into a distribution agreement between Amundi US and Victory Capital14.

    In addition, Specialised Financial Services division developed a comprehensive mobility with: the joint venture Leasys, created with Stellantis to become the European leader in long-term car rental; 100% of CA Auto Bank was acquired, in order to develop partnerships with smaller manufacturers and with independent distributors; six European subsidiaries of ALD and LeasePlan were acquired; and lastly, CA Mobility Services was formed, to create 20 service offers by 2026, mainly through the acquisition of a minority stake in WATEA15, the creation of a joint venture with Opteven16, the acquisition of a stake in HiFlow17, and the commercial partnership with FATEC18. More recently, Credit Agricole Personal Finance & Mobility strengthens its partnership with the car manufacturer GAC with, on the one hand a financial partnership aimed at entrusting CA Auto Bank the financing of vehicules from the Chinese manufacturer in Europe, and on the other end, the acquisition of 50% of the capital of GAC Leasing in order to offer from 2025 financial and operational leasing on the Chinese market.

    In addition, Crédit Agricole S.A. has acquired a stake in Worklife19 and formed a partnership with Wordline20 as part of its drive to accelerate digitisation and innovation. In January 2024, Crédit Agricole S.A. announced its acquisition of a 7% non-controlling interest in Worldline.

    Lastly, to support the transitions in the new CATE and CAST business lines, Crédit Agricole S.A. acquired minority stakes of 40% in R3 (energy transition consultancy) and 43% in Selfee (energy production and supply), and become a reference shareholder in the capital of Office Santé21 and Cette Famille22. In addition, Crédit Agricole Assurances acquired majority stakes of 93% in Omedys23 and 86% in Medicalib23.

    These two pillars of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s universal banking model ensure steady, high growth in revenues and high profitability. Revenues have grown every year between 2015 and 2024 regardless of the environment at an average annual rate of +5.6%. Operational efficiency has also steadily improved with the cost/income ratio falling -15 percentage points in the period 2015 to 2024. Profitability has also risen significantly over the past 10 years. ROTE was 14% at the end of 2024, the highest since 2015, offering even more attractive shareholder remuneration: the dividend per share has tripled in the 10-year period.

    Continued support for the energy transition

    The Group is continuing the mass roll-out of financing and investment to promote the transition. The Crédit Agricole Group increased its exposure to low-carbon energy financing24 by +141% between the end of 2020 and the end of 2024, with €26.3 billion in financing at 31 December 2024.

    Investments by Crédit Agricole Assurances25 and Amundi Transition Energétique in low-carbon energy totalled €6 billion at 31 December 2024. What is more, Crédit Agricole Assurances hit its target of 14 GW of renewable energy production capacity financed one year ahead of schedule.

    At the same time, as a universal bank, Crédit Agricole is supporting the transition of all its customers. Crédit Agricole CIB’s green loan portfolio26 grew by +75% between the end of 2022 and December 2024, and represented €21.7 billion at 31 December 2024. The Group also continues to encourage low-carbon mobility. 37% of new vehicles financed by CAPFM in 2024 were electric or hybrid vehicles. The target for the end of 2025 is 50%.

    In addition, the Group is continuing on its pathway to exit the financing of carbon-based energies and is disclosing progress at end 2024 in three sectors, in line with their 2030 targets (vs. a 2020 baseline). Financed emissions in the oil and gas sector were reduced by -70% at end 2024 working towards a target of -75% by the end of 2030. The intensity of financed emissions in the power sector27 was down by -29% at end 2024, for a target of -58% by the end of 2030, and by -21% in the automotive sector, for a target of -50% by 2030.

    The Group’s phased withdrawal from financing fossil fuel extraction resulted in a -40% decrease in outstandings in the period 2020 to 2024, equating to €5.6 billion at 31 December 2024. At the same time, large-scale financing of low-carbon energies, with outstandings of €26.3 billion, will increase their relative share of the energy mix financed from 54% in 2020 to 82% by the end of 2024.

    Group results

    In the fourth quarter of 2024, Crédit Agricole Group’s stated net income Group share came to €2,149 million, up +24.6% compared with the fourth quarter of 2023.

    Specific items in the fourth quarter of 2024 had a negative net impact of -€42 million on the net income Group share of the Crédit Agricole Group. These items comprise the following recurring accounting items: recurring accounting volatility items, namely the DVA (Debt Valuation Adjustment), the issuer spread portion of the FVA, and secured lending for -€19 million in net income Group share from Capital Markets and Investment Banking, and the hedging of the loan book in Large Customers for +€1 million in net income Group share. In addition to these recurring items, there were other items specific to this quarter: ISB integration costs of
    -€15 million in the net income Group share of Large Customers and the Degroof Petercam integration costs of
    -€9 million in the net income Group share of Asset Gathering.

    Specific items for the fourth quarter of 2023 had a combined impact of +€86 million on net income Group share and included +€69 million in recurring accounting items and +€17 million in non-recurring items. The recurring items mainly corresponded to the reversal of the Home Purchase Saving Plans provision of +€64 million (+€5 million for LCL, +€4 million for the Corporate Centre and +€55 million for the Regional Banks); the other recurring items (+€5 million) are split between the issuer spread portion of the FVA28 and secured lending (+€4 million) and loan book hedging (+€1 million). The non-recurring items related to the ongoing reorganisation of the Mobility activities29 in the SFS division (+€18 million).

    Excluding these specific items, Crédit Agricole Group’s underlying net income Group share30 amounted to €2,190 million, up +33.7% compared to fourth quarter 2023.

    Crédit Agricole Group – Stated and underlying results, Q4-24 and Q4-23

    €m Q4-24
    stated    		 Specific items Q4-24
    underlying    		 Q4-23
    stated    		 Specific items Q4-23
    underlying    		 ∆ Q4/Q4
    stated    		 ∆ Q4/Q4
    underlying
                     
    Revenues 9,817 (24) 9,840 8,769 93 8,677 +11.9% +13.4%
    Operating expenses excl.SRF (5,863) (39) (5,824) (5,682) 4 (5,686) +3.2% +2.4%
    SRF – – – – – – n.m. n.m.
    Gross operating income 3,954 (63) 4,017 3,088 97 2,991 +28.0% +34.3%
    Cost of risk (867) 0 (867) (762) – (762) +13.9% +13.9%
    Equity-accounted entities 80 – 80 73 – 73 +9.9% +9.9%
    Net income on other assets (20) (1) (19) (19) – (19) +7.5% +2.2%
    Change in value of goodwill 4 – 4 2 12 (9) +60.4% n.m.
    Income before tax 3,150 (64) 3,214 2,382 109 2,274 +32.2% +41.4%
    Tax (784) 16 (799) (455) (23) (432) +72.4% +85.1%
    Net income from discont’d or held-for-sale ope. – – – (10) – (10) (100.0%) (100.0%)
    Net income 2,366 (48) 2,414 1,918 86 1,832 +23.4% +31.8%
    Non controlling interests (217) 7 (224) (194) – (194) +12.2% +15.6%
    Net income Group Share 2,149 (42) 2,190 1,724 86 1,638 +24.6% +33.7%
    Cost/Income ratio excl.SRF (%) 59.7%   59.2% 64.8%   65.5% -5.1 pp -6.4 pp

    In the fourth quarter of 2024, underlying revenues amounted to €9,840 million, up +13.4% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, driven by favourable results from most of the business lines. Underlying revenues were up in French Retail Banking, while the Asset Gathering division benefited from good business momentum and the integration of Degroof Petercam, the Large Customers division enjoyed a high level of revenues across all of its business lines and the Specialised Financial Services division benefited from a positive price effect. In addition, International Retail Banking revenues were stable. Underlying operating expenses were up +2.4% in fourth quarter 2024, totalling €5,824 million. Overall, the Group saw its underlying cost/income ratio reach 59.2% in the fourth quarter of 2024, a -6.4 percentage point improvement. As a result, the underlying gross operating income came to €4,017 million, up +34.3% compared to the fourth quarter 2023.

    The underlying cost of credit risk stood at -€867 million, an increase of +13.9% compared to fourth quarter 2023. This figure comprises an amount of -€363 million to prudential provisions on performing loans (stages 1 and 2) and an amount of -€489 million for the cost of proven risk (stage 3). There was also an addition of
    -€16 million for other risks. The provisioning levels were determined by taking into account several weighted economic scenarios and by applying some flat-rate adjustments on sensitive portfolios. The weighted economic scenarios for the fourth quarter were updated from the third quarter, with a favourable scenario (French GDP at +1.1% in 2024, +1.3% in 2025) and an unfavourable scenario (French GDP at +1.1% in 2024 and -0.1% in 2025). The cost of risk/outstandings31reached 27 basis points over a four rolling quarter period and 29 basis points on an annualised quarterly basis32.

    Underlying pre-tax income stood at €3,214 million, a year-on-year increase of +41.4% compared to fourth quarter 2023. This includes the contribution from equity-accounted entities for €80 million (up +9.9%) and net income on other assets, which came to -€19 million over this quarter. The underlying tax charge was up +85.1% over the period, with the tax rate this quarter rising by +6.0 percentage points to 25.5%. Underlying net income before non-controlling interests was up +31.8% to €2,414 million. Non-controlling interests rose +15.6%. Lastly, underlying net income Group share was €2,190 million, +33.7% higher than in the fourth quarter of 2023.

    Crédit Agricole Group – Stated and underlying results 2024 and 2023

    En m€ 2024
    stated    		 Specific items 2024
    underlying    		 2023
    stated    		 Specific items 2023
    underlying    		 ∆ 2024/2023
    stated    		 ∆ 2024/2023
    underlying
                     
    Revenues 38,060 93 37,967 36,492 851 35,641 +4.3% +6.5%
    Operating expenses excl.SRF (22,729) (123) (22,606) (21,464) (14) (21,450) +5.9% +5.4%
    SRF – – – (620) – (620) (100.0%) (100.0%)
    Gross operating income 15,332 (30) 15,362 14,408 837 13,572 +6.4% +13.2%
    Cost of risk (3,191) (20) (3,171) (2,941) (84) (2,856) +8.5% +11.0%
    Equity-accounted entities 283 (0) 283 263 (39) 302 +7.6% (6.1%)
    Net income on other assets (39) (24) (15) 88 89 (1) n.m. x 18.9
    Change in value of goodwill 4 – 4 2 12 (9) +60.4% n.m.
    Income before tax 12,388 (74) 12,462 11,821 814 11,007 +4.8% +13.2%
    Tax (2,888) 12 (2,900) (2,748) (203) (2,545) +5.1% +13.9%
    Net income from discont’d or held-for-sale ope. – – – (3) – (3) (100.0%) (100.0%)
    Net income 9,500 (62) 9,562 9,071 611 8,459 +4.7% +13.0%
    Non controlling interests (860) 23 (883) (813) (0) (813) +5.8% +8.7%
    Net income Group Share 8,640 (39) 8,679 8,258 611 7,647 +4.6% +13.5%
    Cost/Income ratio excl.SRF (%) 59.7%   59.5% 58.8%   60.2% +0.9 pp -0.6 pp

    For full-year 2024, stated net income Group share amounted to €8,640 million, compared with €8,258 million for full-year 2023, an increase of +4.6%.

    Specific items for full-year 2024 include the specific items of the Regional Banks (+€47 million in reversals of Home Purchase Savings Plan provisions) and Crédit Agricole S.A. specific items, which are detailed in the Crédit Agricole S.A. section.

    Excluding specific items, underlying net income Group share reached €8,679 million, up +13.5% compared with full-year 2023.

    Underlying revenues totalled €37,967 million, up +6.5% compared with full-year 2023, driven by all business lines (excluding Corporate Centre).

    Underlying operating expenses amounted to -€22,606 million, up +5.4% excluding SRF compared to full-year 2023, mainly due to higher compensation in an inflationary environment, support for business development, IT expenditure and scope effects as detailed for each division. The underlying cost/income ratio for full-year 2024 was 59.5%, a -0.6 percentage point improvement compared to full-year 2023 excluding SRF. The SRF stood at
    -€620 million in 2023.

    Underlying gross operating income totalled €15,362 million, up +13.2% compared to full-year 2023.

    The underlying cost of risk for full-year 2024 rose to -€3,171 million (of which -€540 million in cost of risk on performing loans (stages 1 and 2), -€2,637 million in cost of proven risk, and +€6 million in other risks corresponding mainly to reversals of legal provisions), i.e. an increase of +11.0% compared to full-year 2023.

    As at 31 December 2024, risk indicators confirm the high quality of Crédit Agricole Group’s assets and risk coverage level. The diversified loan book is mainly geared towards home loans (45% of gross outstandings) and corporates (33% of gross outstandings). Loan loss reserves amounted to €21.3 billion at the end of December 2024 (€11.7 billion for Regional Banks), 42.2% of which represented provisioning of performing loans (47.3% for Regional Banks). The prudent management of these loan loss reserves meant that the Crédit Agricole Group’s overall coverage ratio for doubtful loans at the end of December 2024 was 84.9%.

    Underlying net income on other assets stood at -€15 million for full-year 2024 versus -€1 million for full-year 2023. Underlying pre-tax income before discontinued operations and non-controlling interests rose by +13.2% to €12,462 million. The tax charge was -€2,900 million, up +13.9%, with an underlying effective tax rate of 23.8%, stable compared to full-year 2023. Underlying net income before non-controlling interests was therefore up by +13.0%. Non-controlling interests amounted to -€883 million for full-year 2024, up +8.7%.

    Underlying net income Group share for full-year 2024 thus stood at €8,679 million, up 13.5% compared to full-year 2023.

    Regional banks

    Gross customer capture stands at +273,000 new customers and the customer base grew by +10,000 new customers over the same period. The percentage of customers using demand deposits as their main account and those who use digital tools continued to increase. Credit market share (total credits) stands at 22.7% (at the end of September 2024, source Banque de France). Loan production was up +7.4% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, reflecting the +7.8% rise in home loans and specialised markets. Home loan production has been gradually recovering since the beginning of the year. The average production rate for home loans stood at 3.35%33 over October and November 2024, -12 basis points lower than in the third quarter of 2024. By contrast, the global loan stock rate showed a gradual improvement (+16 basis points compared to the fourth quarter of 2023). Outstanding loans totalled €648 billion at the end of December 2024, stable year-on-year across all markets but up slightly by +0.2% over the quarter.
    Customer assets were up +2.6% year-on-year to reach €910.9 billion at the end of December 2024. This growth was driven both by on-balance sheet deposits, which reached €605.9 billion (+1.7% year-on-year), and off-balance sheet deposits, which reached €305 billion (+4.4% year-on-year) benefiting from strong inflows in life insurance. The mix of on-balance sheet deposits for the quarter remained almost unchanged, with demand deposits and term deposits fluctuating by -0.5% and +0.1%, respectively, from end-September 2024. The market share of balance sheet collection is up compared to last year and stands at 20.3% (Source Banque de France, data at the end of September 2024, i.e. +0.4 percentage points compared to September 2023). The equipment rate for property and casualty insurance34 was 43.9% at the end of December 2024 and continues to rise (up +0.8 percentage point compared to the end of December 2023). In terms of payment instruments, the number of cards rose by +1.6% year-on-year, as did the percentage of premium cards in the stock, which increased by 1.6 percentage points year-on-year to account for 16.4% of total cards.
    In the fourth quarter of 2024, the Regional Banks’ consolidated revenues including the SAS Rue La Boétie dividend35 stood at €3,247 million, up +0.7% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, notably impacted by a base effect of +€73.6 million related to the reversal of the Home Purchase Savings Plan provision in the fourth quarter of 202336. Excluding this item, revenues were up +3.1% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, the rise in the net interest margin (+9.8% excluding Home Purchase Savings36) and good momentum of fee and commission income (+1.6%) in insurance, account management and payment instruments offsetting the drop in portfolio revenues (-10.0%). Operating expenses were stable (+0.7%), below inflation. Gross operating income was up +0.8% year-on-year (+11.6% excluding the Home Purchase Savings Plan base effect36). The cost of risk was down -24.6% compared with the fourth quarter of 2023 to -€242 million. The cost of risk/outstandings (over four rolling quarters) remained under control at 20 basis points (a -1 basis point drop compared to third quarter 2024).
    The Regional Banks’ consolidated net income, including the SAS Rue La Boétie dividend35 amounted to €419 million, up +19.9% compared to the fourth quarter 2023 (+42.1% excluding the base effect36).
    The Regional Banks’ contribution to net income Group share was €403 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, up +20.3% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023.
    In full-year 2024, revenues including the SAS Rue La Boétie dividend were up +1.9% compared to the same period in 2023. Operating expenses rose by +1.4%, resulting in a rise in gross operating income of +2.7%. Finally, with a cost of risk up +14.0%, the Regional Banks’ net income Group share, including the SAS Rue La Boétie dividend, amounted to €3,470 million, up +2.5% compared to full-year 2023 (+5.5% excluding the Home Purchase Savings Plan base effect36).The Regional Banks’ contribution to the results of Crédit Agricole Group in full-year 2024 amounted to €1,423 million in stated net income Group share (-18.9% compared to the same period in 2023), with revenues of €13,110 million (-1.1%), expenses of -€9,956 (+2.6%) and a cost of risk of -€1,319 million (+14.5%).

    Crédit Agricole S.A.

    Results

    Crédit Agricole S.A.’s Board of Directors, chaired by Dominique Lefebvre, met on 4 February 2025 to examine the financial statements for the fourth quarter of 2024.

    Crédit Agricole S.A. – Stated and underlying results, Q4-24 and Q4-23

    €m Q4-24
    stated    		 Specific items Q4-24
    underlying    		 Q4-23
    stated    		 Specific items Q4-23
    underlying    		 ∆ Q4/Q4
    stated    		 ∆ Q4/Q4
    underlying
                     
    Revenues 7,092 (24) 7,116 6,040 19 6,021 +17.4% +18.2%
    Operating expenses excl.SRF (3,917) (39) (3,878) (3,710) 4 (3,714) +5.6% +4.4%
    SRF – – – – – – n.m. n.m.
    Gross operating income 3,175 (63) 3,238 2,330 24 2,307 +36.2% +40.4%
    Cost of risk (594) 0 (594) (440) – (440) +35.0% +35.0%
    Equity-accounted entities 62 – 62 61 – 61 +2.4% +2.4%
    Net income on other assets (9) (1) (8) (17) – (17) (45.9%) (51.9%)
    Change in value of goodwill – – – 2 12 (9) n.m. (100.0%)
    Income before tax 2,634 (64) 2,698 1,937 35 1,902 +36.0% +41.9%
    Tax (681) 16 (697) (369) (4) (365) +84.7% +91.0%
    Net income from discont’d or held-for-sale ope. – – – (10) – (10) n.m. n.m.
    Net income 1,953 (48) 2,001 1,558 32 1,527 +25.3% +31.1%
    Non controlling interests (264) 7 (271) (224) (0) (224) +17.8% +21.1%
    Net income Group Share 1,689 (41) 1,730 1,334 31 1,303 +26.6% +32.8%
    Earnings per share (€) 0.52 (0.01) 0.54 0.41 0.01 0.40 +26.8% +33.4%
    Cost/Income ratio excl. SRF (%) 55.2%   54.5% 61.4%   61.7% -6.2 pp -7.2 pp

    In the fourth quarter of 2024, Crédit Agricole S.A.’s stated net income Group share came to €1,689 million, up +26.6% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, having benefited from non-recurring items related to reversals of Home Purchase Savings Plan and Cheque Image Exchange fine provisions and from the end of the reorganisation of the Mobility activities (see below). This was an excellent result for the fourth quarter of 2024, based on high revenues (exceeding €7 billion) and a cost/income ratio kept at a low level.

    Specific items for this quarter had a cumulative impact of -€41 million on net income Group share, and included the following recurring accounting items: recurring accounting volatility items in revenues, such as the DVA (Debt Valuation Adjustment), the issuer spread portion of the FVA and secured lending for -€19 million in net income Group share in the Large Customers segment, and the hedging of the loan book in the Large Customers segment for +€1 million in net income Group share. In addition to these recurring items, there were a number of items specific to this quarter: Degroof Petercam integration costs of -€8 million in the net income Group share in Asset Gathering; ISB integration costs for -€15 million in the net income Group share in Large Customers.

    Specific items for the fourth quarter 2023 had a cumulative impact of +€31 million on net income Group share, and included recurring accounting items for +€14 million and non-recurring items for +€17 million. The recurring items mainly corresponded to the reversal of the Home Purchase Savings Plans provision of +€8 million (+€4 million for LCL and +€4 million for the Corporate Centre); the other recurring items – the issuer spread portion of the FVA and secured lending (+€4 million) and loan book hedging (+€1 million) – offset each other. The non-recurring items related to the ongoing reorganisation of the Mobility activities in the SFS division (+€17 million).

    Excluding specific items, underlying net income Group share37 stood at €1,730 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, up +32.8% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023.

    In the fourth quarter of 2024, underlying revenues were at a high level, standing at €7,116 million. They were up sharply by +18.2% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. This growth was driven by growth in the Asset Gathering division (+31.6%) which in turn was driven by the rise in outstandings across all business lines, including the integration of Degroof Petercam38. There was a positive base effect relating to very high weather-related claims in the fourth quarter of 2023. Large Customer division revenues (+10.6%) were driven by good results from all business lines with continued revenue growth in corporate and investment banking in the fourth quarter, in addition to an improvement in the net interest margin and fee and commission income within CACEIS. Specialised Financial Services division revenues (+4.0%) benefited mainly from positive price effects in the Personal Finance and Mobility business line. French Retail Banking growth (+0.8%) was driven by the rise in fee and commission income which offset the drop in NIM, and International Retail Banking revenues (-0.5%) were stable. Corporate Centre revenues were up +€362 million, positively impacted by the dividend and the revaluation of the equity interest in Banco BPM of +€294 million.

    Underlying operating expenses totalled -€3,878 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, an increase of +4.4% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, reflecting the support given to business line development. The -€164 million year-on-year rise in expenses was mainly due to a -€132 million scope effect39.

    The underlying cost/income ratio in fourth quarter 2024 stood at 54.5%, a decrease of -7.2 percentage points compared to fourth quarter 2023.

    Underlying gross operating income in the fourth quarter of 2024 stood at €3,238 million, an increase of +40.4% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023.

    As at 31 December 2024, risk indicators confirm the high quality of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s assets and risk coverage level. The diversified loan book is mainly geared towards home loans (26% of gross outstandings) and corporates (44% of Crédit Agricole S.A. gross outstandings). The Non-Performing Loans ratio was down
    -0.2 point from the previous quarter and remains low at 2.3%. The coverage ratio40 was high at 74.1%, up +2.7 percentage points over the quarter. Loan loss reserves amounted to €9.6 billion for Crédit Agricole S.A., relatively unchanged from end September 2024. Of those loan loss reserves, 35.8% were for performing loans (percentage up +1.5% from the previous quarter).

    The underlying cost of risk showed a net addition of -€594 million, up +35.0% from the fourth quarter of 2023, including a -€278 million addition for performing loans (stages 1 and 2) (versus a reversal of -€1 million in the fourth quarter of 2023) and -€297 million in provisioning for proven risks (stage 3) (versus -€373 million in the fourth quarter of 2023). Also note a provision of -€18 million for other items (legal provisions), primarily for the SFS business line (-€30 million in legal provisions). By business line, 52% of the net addition for the quarter came from Specialised Financial Services (an increase from end-December 2023, unchanged from September 2024), 13% from LCL (22% at end-September 2023), 17% from International Retail Banking (23% at end-December 2023), 16% from Large Customers (9% at end-December 2023) and 1% from the Corporate Centre (3% at end-December 2023). The provisioning levels were determined by taking into account several weighted economic scenarios and by applying some flat-rate adjustments on sensitive portfolios. The weighted economic scenarios for the fourth quarter were updated relative to the third quarter, with a favourable scenario (French GDP at +1.1% in 2024, +1.3% in 2025) and an unfavourable scenario (French GDP at +1.1% in 2024 and -0.1% in 2025). In the fourth quarter of 2024, the cost of risk/outstandings was 34 basis points over a rolling four-quarter period41 and 44 basis points on an annualised quarterly basis42 (a deterioration of 1 basis point and 10 basis points, respectively, versus the fourth quarter of 2023 for both bases).

    The underlying contribution from equity-accounted entities amounted to €62 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, up +2.4% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, mainly due to the growth of equity-accounted entities in the personal finance and mobility business line.

    Underlying income43before tax, discontinued operations and non-controlling interests was up +41.9% to €2,698 million. The underlying effective tax rate stood at 26.4%, up +6.7 percentage points on fourth quarter 2023. The underlying tax charge was -€697 million, a +91% increase chiefly due to a positive base effect. Underlying net income before non-controlling interests was up +31.1% to €2,001 million. Non-controlling interests amounted to -€271 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, an increase of +21.1%.

    Underlying earnings per share in fourth quarter 2024 came to €0.54, up +33.4% compared to fourth quarter 2023.

    Crédit Agricole S.A. – Stated and underlying results, 2024 and 2023

    En m€ 2024
    stated    		 Specific items 2024
    underlying    		 2023
    stated    		 Specific items 2023
    underlying    		 ∆ 2024/2023
    stated    		 ∆ 2024/2023
    underlying
                     
    Revenues 27,181 30 27,151 25,180 617 24,563 +7.9% +10.5%
    Operating expenses excl.SRF (14,895) (123) (14,772) (13,632) (14) (13,618) +9.3% +8.5%
    SRF – – – (509) – (509) (100.0%) (100.0%)
    Gross operating income 12,286 (94) 12,379 11,039 603 10,436 +11.3% +18.6%
    Cost of risk (1,850) (20) (1,830) (1,777) (84) (1,693) +4.1% +8.1%
    Equity-accounted entities 194 (0) 194 197 (39) 235 (1.5%) (17.6%)
    Net income on other assets (4) (24) 20 85 89 (4) n.m. n.m.
    Change in value of goodwill – – – 2 12 (9) (100.0%) (100.0%)
    Income before tax 10,625 (138) 10,763 9,546 580 8,966 +11.3% +20.0%
    Tax (2,472) 28 (2,500) (2,201) (153) (2,047) +12.3% +22.1%
    Net income from discont’d or held-for-sale ope. – – – (3) – (3) n.m. n.m.
    Net income 8,153 (109) 8,263 7,343 427 6,916 +11.0% +19.5%
    Non controlling interests (1,067) 24 (1,090) (995) (2) (992) +7.3% +9.9%
    Net income Group Share 7,087 (86) 7,172 6,348 425 5,923 +11.6% +21.1%
    Earnings per share (€) 2.11 (0.03) 2.14 1.94 0.14 1.80 +8.5% +18.5%
    Cost/Income ratio excl.SRF (%) 54.8%   54.4% 54.1%   55.4% +0.7 pp -1.0 pp

    Over year 2024, stated net income Group share amounted to €7,087 million, versus €6,348 million for full-year 2023, an increase of +11.6%.

    Specific items for 2024 had a negative impact of -€86 million on stated net income Group share and comprise +€21 million in recurring accounting items and -€107 million in non-recurring items. The recurring items mainly correspond to the reversals of and additions to the Home Purchase Savings Plans provisions for +€1 million net, as well as the accounting volatility items of the Large Customers division (the DVA for +€15 million and loan book hedging for +€6 million). Non-recurring items relate to the integration and acquisition costs of Degroof Petercam (-€35 million) within the Asset Gathering division, the costs of integrating ISB (-€52 million) within the Large Customers division and an additional provision for risk in Ukraine (-€20 million) within the International Retail Banking division.

    Excluding specific items, underlying net income Group share reached €7,172 million, up +21.1% compared to full-year 2023.

    Underlying revenues were up +10.5% year-on-year, driven by all business lines. Underlying operating expenses excluding SRF were +8.5% higher than in 2023, essentially reflecting the development of the Group’s business lines and the integration of scope effects, partially offset by the end of the SRF44 building-up period. The underlying cost/income ratio excluding SRF for the period was 54.4%, a decrease of 1 percentage point compared to the same period in 2023. Underlying gross operating income totalled €12,379 million, up +18.6% compared to full-year 2023. The underlying cost of risk increased by +8.1% over the period to
    -€1,830 million, versus -€1,693 million in 2023. Lastly, underlying contributions from equity-accounted entities amounted to €194 million, down -17.6% over the period.

    Underlying earnings per share stood at €2.14 per share for full-year 2024, up 18.5% from full-year 2023.

    Underlying RoTE45, which is calculated on the basis of an annualised Underlying Net Income Group Share46 and IFRIC charges linearised over the year, net of annualised Additional Tier 1 coupons (return on equity Group share excluding intangibles) and net of foreign exchange impact on reimbursed AT1, and restated for certain volatile items recognised in equity (including unrealised gains and/or losses), reached 14.0% in 2024, up +1.4 percentage point compared to 2023.

    Analysis of the activity and the results of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s divisions and business lines

    Activity of the Asset Gathering division

    In the fourth quarter of 2024, assets under management in the Asset Gathering division (AG) stood at

    €2,867 billion, up +€58 billion over the quarter (or +2.1%), mainly due to a positive market effect and strong net inflows in the three business lines – Asset Management, Insurance and Wealth Management. Over the year, assets under management rose by +12.1%.

    Insurance activity (Crédit Agricole Assurances) was very dynamic with total premium income of €10.9 billion – a record level for a fourth quarter – up +14.2% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, and up in all three segments: savings/retirement, property and casualty, and death & disability/creditor/group insurance. In total for the year, overall premium income also stood to a record €43.6 billion, up +17.2% vs. 2023.

    In Savings/Retirement, fourth-quarter premium income stood at €8.3 billion, up +17.3% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. Business was driven by euro payment bonus campaigns in France, launched during the first quarter, which boosted gross euro inflows, as well as by a confirmed upturn in international business. Unit-linked contracts accounted for 37.4% of gross inflows47, down -12.8 percentage points over the year, reflecting the reduced appeal of unit-linked bond products. The quarter’s net inflows47 totalled +€2.4 billion (up +€0.8 billion compared to the third quarter of 2024), comprised of +€1.4 billion net inflows from unit-linked contracts and +€1.1 billion from euro funds. In total, Savings/Retirement premium income amounted to €32.1 billion, up +21.5% compared to the end of December 2023.

    Assets under management (savings, retirement and funeral insurance) continued to grow and came to €347.3 billion (up +€17.0 billion year-on-year, or +5.1%). The growth of assets under management was supported by positive market effects and positive net inflows. Unit-linked contracts accounted for 30.0% of outstandings, up +1.1 percentage point compared to the end of December 2023.

    The profit sharing rate on Predica’s euro-denominated life insurance policies in 2024 remained stable compared to 2023.48 The Policy Participation Reserve (PPE49) amounted to €7.5 billion at 31 December 2024, representing 3.3% of total euro outstandings.

    In property and casualty insurance, premium income rose to €1.2 billion in the fourth quarter of 2024, up +9.9%50 compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. Growth stemmed from a price effect, with the increase in the average premium benefiting from revised rates and changes in the product mix, and a volume effect, with a portfolio of close to €16.7 million51 policies at the end of December 2024 (an increase of +5.3% over the year). The combined ratio at end-December 2024 was 94.4%,52 an improvement of -2.7 percentage points year-on-year, related to a positive base effect due to lower claims in the fourth quarter of 2024 compared with the same period one year earlier, which was impacted by fierce storms. In total, at the end of December 2024, premium income stood at €6.2 billion, an increase of +8.2% compared to full-year 2023.

    In death & disability/creditor/group insurance, premium income for the fourth quarter of 2024 stood at €1.3 billion, up +1.4% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. The strong performance in individual death and disability insurance and group insurance (+9.9% and +22.1%, respectively, compared to fourth quarter 2023) offset a decline in creditor insurance of -4.9% in both consumer finance and mortgage lending. In total, at the end of December 2024, premium income from personal protection insurance stood at €5.3 billion, an increase of +4.6% compared to 2023.

    In Asset Management (Amundi), assets under management by Amundi increased by +2.2% and +10.0% respectively over the quarter and the year, reaching a new record of €2,240 billion at the end of December 2024, benefiting from the positive market effect, but also from a high level of inflows over the quarter and year.

    Over the quarter, net inflows amounted to +€20.5 billion, the highest level since 2021, driven by medium-long-term assets 53 (+€17.9 billion) in active management and, as in previous quarters, in ETFs. Third-party distributors also posted record inflows in 2024, which were well diversified and positive in all asset classes.

    The Retail segment recorded record net inflows in 2024 from third-party distributors, well diversified across all asset classes, and positive inflows from partner networks in France. The institutional segment continued to record solid commercial momentum, with net inflows driven by medium/long-term assets in the institutional and sovereign segments, and by treasury products in the corporate segment. Finally, JVs continue to benefit from the dynamic inflows of SBI MF in India. Thus, the increase in assets under management of +€48.5 billion over the quarter is linked to a good level of activity (net inflows of +€20.5 billion) and a positive market and foreign exchange effect of +€28.1 billion. In 2024, the increase in assets under management of +€203 billion is linked to record net inflows of +€55.4 billion, doubling compared to 2023, a favorable market effect of +€140.1 billion and a scope effect of +€7.9 billion in connection with the integration of Alpha Associate since the second quarter of 2024.

    In Wealth Management, total assets under management (CA Indosuez Wealth Management and LCL Private Banking) amounted to €279 billion at the end of December 2024, and were up +1.9% compared to September 2024 and +46,9% compared to December 2023.

    For Indosuez Wealth Management assets under management at the end of December stood at €215 billion54, up +2.6% compared to the end of September 2024, thanks to a good level of activity with net inflows of +€1.9 billion and a favourable market effect of +€3.7 billion. Compared to the end of December 2023, assets under management were up by +€87 billion (or +68.2%), taking into account a scope effect of €69 billion (integration of Degroof Petercam in June 2024). Also of note over the quarter was the continued integration of Degroof Petercam with several capital reorganisations in France and in Luxembourg, and the effective mergers of legal entities planned for Q3 2025. In 2025, Wealth Management projects in the region of €70-80 million in additional integration costs for Degroof Petercam.

    Results of the Asset Gathering division

    In the fourth quarter of 2024, the Asset Gathering division generated €2,045 million in revenues, up +31.6% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, driven by all the division’s business lines. Expenses increased +28% to -€930 million and gross operating income came to €1,116 million, +34.7% compared to fourth quarter of 2023. The cost/income ratio for the fourth quarter of 2024 stood at 45.5%, down -1.3 percentage points compared to the same period in 2023. Taxes amounted to -€315 million, up +82.3%, notably related to the scope of insurance activities. Net income Group share for Asset Gathering division was €695 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, up +27.4% compared to the same period in 2023.

    In full-year 2024, Asset Gathering generated €7,648 million in revenues, up +14.4% compared to the end of December 2023, driven by very high level of revenues in all three business lines – in Insurance, Asset Management and Wealth Management. Expenses excluding SRF increased +17.1%.to -€3,365 million, while gross operating income came to €4,284 million (up +12.5% compared to end-December 2023). As a result, the cost/income ratio excluding SRF stood at 44%, up +1.0 percentage points compared to the end of December 2023. The tax charge was -€973 million in 2024, up +11.7% on 2023. Finally, Asset Gathering net income Group share came to €2,875 million, up +13.1% compared to 2023, up in the three activities of the Asset Gathering division.

    At end-December 2024, the Asset Gathering, contributed 38% to the underlying net income Group share of the Crédit Agricole S.A. core businesses and 28% to underlying revenues (excluding the Corporate Centre division).

    As at 31 December 2024, equity allocated to the division amounted to €12.6 billion, including €10.4 billion for Insurance, €1.3 billion for Asset Management, and €0.9 billion for Wealth Management. The division’s risk-weighted assets amounted to €57.5 billion, including €34.5 billion for Insurance, €13.7 billion for Asset Management and €9.4 billion for Wealth Management.

    Underlying RoNE (return on normalised equity) stood at 26.9% at the end of December 2024.

    Insurance results

    In the fourth quarter of 2024, insurance revenues reached €715 million, up sharply by +37.1% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, benefiting from a favorable base effect (fourth quarter 2023 having been impacted by the high claims rate related to storms Ciaran and Domingos), dynamic activity and growth in assets under management. Revenues for the quarter include €540 million from savings/retirement55, €93 million from personal protection56 and €141 million from property and casualty insurance57.

    The CSM (Contractual Service Margin) stood at €25.2 billion at 31 December 2024, up 5.8% year-on-year, benefiting from the positive impact of the revaluation of the stock and the contribution of new business exceeding the CSM allocation. The CSM allocation factor was 7.7% in 2024. Non-attributable expenses for the quarter amounted to -€77 million, up +2.7% vs. the fourth quarter of 2023. As a result, gross operating income reached €638 million, up +42.9% compared to the same period in 2023. Taxes amounted to -€218 million, compared with -€79 million in the fourth quarter of 2023, in connection with the increase in the tax rate to 34.5% (+16.7 percentage points compared to the fourth quarter of 2023). This change is linked in particular to an upward reassessment of the tax rate including a decrease in the valuation of assets at a reduced rate. Non-controlling interests amounted to €3 million compared to €-32 million in the fourth quarter of 2023, impacted by the inclusion of accounting items related to the redemption of RT1 instruments. Net income Group share was €418 million, up +24.5% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023.

    Full year 2024 insurance revenues reached €2,845 million, up +11.9% compared to 2023, in line with dynamic activity, the increase in outstandings, as well as the lower claims experience in 2024 compared to 2023. Non-attributable expenses amounted to -€341 million, up +9.3%. The cost/income ratio is thus 12%, below the target ceiling set by the Medium-Term Plan of 15%. Gross operating income was €2,504 million (+12.2% compared to 2023). The tax expense was -€572 million, up +16.6% compared to 2023, in line with the lower contribution of reduced tax rate operations to the overall tax rate. As a result, net income Group share reached €1,884 million, up +14% compared to 2023.

    Insurance contributed 25% to the underlying net income Group share of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s business lines (excluding AHM) at the end of December 2024 and 10% to their underlying revenues.

    Crédit Agricole Assurances remains solid with a prudential Solvency 2 ratio superior to 200% as of 31 December 2024.

    Asset Management results

    In the fourth quarter of 2024, revenues reached €901 million, up +14.5% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, mainly driven by management and technology revenues. Net management fees posted sustained growth of +13.5% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, linked to the good level of activity and the increase in average assets under management. Performance fees were also up +67.6% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, benefiting from the good performance of active strategies, particularly rates and credit. Amundi Technology’s revenues continued their sustained growth and increased by +47,1% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, amplified this quarter by the first consolidation of aixigo, a European leader in Wealth Tech, whose acquisition was finalized in November 2024. Operating expenses amounted to €-506 million, up +16.2% compared to the fourth quarter of 2024, mainly explained by the effect of the first consolidation of Alpha Associates and aixigo, the acceleration of strategic investments, the growth of variable compensation revenues related to operational performance and acquisition-related integration costs.58 Restated for integration costs, the increase in expenses remains lower than the increase in revenues, thus generating a positive jaws effect. Gross operating income was €395 million, up +12.5% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, reflecting double-digit revenue growth. The contribution of associates, including the contribution of Amundi’s Asian joint ventures, amounted to €29 million, up +1.8% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. The tax expense amounted to -€80 million (down -9.6%). Net income before deduction of minority interests amounted to €341 million, up +18% compared to the same period in 2023. As a result, net income Group share was €226 million, +16.2% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023.

    In 2024, net banking income reached €3,406 million, up +9.1% in asset management, reflecting growth in management revenues, linked to the growth in average assets under management and the very good performance of active and passive management. Amundi Technology’s revenues also grew strongly, amplified by the acquisition of aixigo in the fourth quarter of 2024. Operating expenses excluding SRF amounted to -€1,890 million, an increase of +8.8%, explained by the first consolidation of Alpha Associates and aixigo, investments in growth areas, the increase in provisions for variable compensation in line with operational performance and integration costs58.The cost/income ratio excluding SRF stood at 55.5%, stable compared to 2023 (-0.2 percentage points). Thus, gross operating income increased by +9.7% compared to 2023, reflecting the increase in revenues. Profit from associates increased by +20.9%, mainly driven by the JV in India, which contributed more than €100 million for the first time to this result. In the end, net income Group share was €849 million, up +11.7% compared to 2023.

    Wealth Management results59

    In the fourth quarter of 2024, net banking income from wealth management amounted to €430 million, up +73.9% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, benefiting from the impact of the integration of Degroof Petercam in June 2024.60   Excluding this effect, revenues were supported by the good momentum of management fees in connection with the increase in outstandings, offsetting the anticipated decrease in the net interest margin on deposits. Expenses for the quarter amounted to -€347 million, up +60.4% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, impacted by a Degroof Petercam60 and -€12.8 million in integration costs. Restated for these impacts, the evolution of expenses is slightly lower than in the fourth quarter of 2023. The cost/income ratio for the fourth quarter of 2024 stood at 80.8%, down -6.8 percentage points compared to the same period in 2023. Restated for integration and acquisition costs, the cost/income ratio was 77.8%. Gross operating income reached €82 million, up sharply (x 2.7) compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. The cost of risk for the quarter remained moderate at -€3 million, in line with the fourth quarter of 2023 (-€5 million). Net income Group share reached €51 million, up sharply (x 3.3) compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. Restated for integration and acquisition costs61, net income Group share for the fourth quarter of 2024 amounted to €60 million.

    For the full year 2024, net banking income from the wealth management business amounted to €1,397 million, up +36.6% compared to the end of December 2023, benefiting in particular from the integration of Degroof Petercam in June 202462. Expenses excluding SRF were up +37.5% due to a Degroof Petercam62 scope effect and -€26.4 million in integration costs. Restated for these impacts, 2024 expenses are up slightly by +2.8% compared to 2023. Gross operating income increased by +35.0% to €264 million. The cost of risk at the end of 2024 was -€15 million, up -€11 million compared to the end of December 2023, related to the consideration of litigation and the provisioning of various cases. Net income on other assets amounted to -€23 million, mainly corresponding to acquisition costs for Degroof Petercam63, restated for specific items. Net income Group share for 2024 was €142 million, up 11.1% compared to 2023. Restated for integration and acquisition costs63, 2024 net income Group share amounted to €177 million.

    Wealth Management contributed 2% to the underlying net income Group share of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s business lines (excluding AHM) at the end of December 2024 and 5% of their underlying revenues.

    As of 31 December 2024, the equity allocated to Wealth Management amounted to €0.9 billion; risk weighted assets are €9.4 billion.

    Activity of the Large Customers division

    Once again in Q4 2024, Corporate and Investment Banking (CIB) posted an excellent performance across all its businesses (best fourth quarter and best year in terms of revenues). Asset servicing also recorded strong business momentum during the period.

    Corporate and Investment Banking’s fourth-quarter underlying revenues rose sharply to €1,596 million, an increase of +9.9% compared with the fourth quarter of 2023, driven by growth in its two business lines. Revenues from Financing activities were up +4.4% year-on-year to €898 million. This was mainly due to the strong performance recorded by Commercial Banking (+4.0% versus the fourth quarter of 2023), driven by good momentum in Corporate activities, especially in the Telecom sector, and strong revenues from asset financing and project financing, especially in Green energy and Aerospace. Capital Markets and Investment Banking also grew its revenues to €699 million, an increase of +18.0% compared with the fourth quarter of 2023. Growth was fuelled by the high revenues maintained by Capital Markets (+17.0% versus the fourth quarter of 2023), driven by the Repo and Securitisation businesses, and the strong performance recorded by Investment Banking (with growth of +23.0% compared with the fourth quarter of 2023) thanks to the strong performance of Structured Equities.

    In total, Corporate and Investment Banking’s underlying revenue rose a steep +6.5% year-on-year to €6,540 million, driven by growth in its two business lines. Revenues from Financing activities were up +5.7% compared to the total for 2023, at €3,355 million. Capital Markets and Investment Banking also grew its revenues by +7.3% compared with the end of December 2023, to total €3,185 million.

    Financing activities consolidated its leading position in syndicated loans (#1 in France64 and #2 in EMEA64). Crédit Agricole CIB reaffirmed its strong position in bond issues (#4 All bonds in EUR Worldwide64) and was ranked #2 in Green, Social & Sustainable bonds in EUR.65 Average regulatory VaR stood at €9.5 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, down from the €10.1 million recorded in the third quarter of 2024, reflecting changes in positions and the financial markets. It remained at a level that reflected prudent risk management.

    In Asset Servicing, buoyant sales and favourable market conditions boosted growth in assets over the year, which offset the planned withdrawal of ISB customers. The fourth quarter of 2024 saw the continued migration of ISB (formerly RBC Investor Services in Europe) client portfolios to CACEIS platforms, following the effective merger of the legal entities with those of CACEIS on 31 May 2024. Client migration is now practically complete. On 19 December 2024, Crédit Agricole S.A. announced the signature of an agreement to acquire Santander’s 30.5% non-controlling stake in CACEIS, with the aim of full ownership.

    Assets under custody increased by +4.5% at end-December 2024 compared with end September 2024, and by +12.1% compared with end December 2023, to reach €5,291 billion. Assets under administration also increased by +0.3% this quarter and were up +3.0% year-on-year, totalling €3,397 billion at end December 2024.

    Results of the Large Customers division

    In the fourth quarter of 2024, stated revenues of the Large Customers division once again reached a record level, with €2,108 million, up +8.9% compared with the fourth quarter of 2023, buoyed by an excellent performance in the Corporate and Investment Banking and Asset Servicing business lines.

    Operating expenses increased (+7.4%) compared with the fourth quarter of 2023, due to IT investments and business development. As a result, the division’s gross operating income was up +11.6% compared with the fourth quarter of 2023 to €810 million. The division recorded an overall net provision for cost of risk of -€93 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, compared with additions of -€39 million in the fourth quarter of 2023. Stated pre-tax income totalled €723 million, an increase over the period (+4.7%). The tax charge was -€166 million. Lastly, stated Net income Group share came to €512 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, compared with stated income of €525 million in Q4 2023.

    Over full-year 2024, stated revenues of the Large Customers division was a record high of €8,651 million, up +11.2% compared with the 2023 total. At -€5,039 million, operating expenses excluding SRF rose +11.8% compared with the same period in 2023, due mainly to IT investments and business development. Expenses for the year include ISB integration costs of -€97 million. Gross operating income stood at €3,612 million for full-year 2024, representing an increase of +22.0% compared to 2023. Over the period, the cost of risk recorded a net addition of -€117 million, compared to an addition of -€120 million in the same period in 2023. The business line’s contribution to stated Net income Group share was €2,448 million, a strong increase of +21.7% compared to full-year 2023.

    The business line contributed 32% to the underlying net income Group share of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s core businesses (excluding the Corporate Centre division) at end-December 2024 and 31% to underlying revenues excluding the Corporate Centre.

    At 31 December 2024, the equity allocated to the division was €14 billion and its risk-weighted assets were €147.8 billion.

    Underlying RoNE (return on normalised equity) stood at 17.7% at the end of December 2024.

    Corporate and Investment Banking results

    In the fourth quarter of 2024, Corporate and Investment Banking stated revenues reached a record at €1,573 million, up +7.7% from the fourth quarter of 2023. This was a record fourth quarter for Corporate and Investment Banking. The specific items had an impact of -€23.7 million in the fourth quarter of 2024 (compared to +€7.8 million in the fourth quarter of 2023) and comprised the DVA, the issuer spread portion of the FVA, and secured lending for -€25.6 million (compared to +€6.0 million in the fourth quarter of 2023) and loan book hedging totalling +€1.9 million (compared to +€1.8 million in the fourth quarter of 2023).

    Operating expenses rose by +6.3% to -€902 million, mainly due to IT investments and the development of business line activities. Gross operating income rose sharply by +9.7% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, taking it to a high level of +€671 million. The cost/income ratio was 57.4%, a slight change of -0.8 percentage point over the period. The cost of risk recorded a net addition of -€86 million, higher than the fourth quarter 2023 (-€32 million). This level of allocations is driven by model effects. The overall level remains low with a cost of risk/outstandings of 7 basis points66. Lastly, pre-tax income in the fourth quarter of 2024 stood at €586 million, versus €580 million in the fourth quarter of 2023 (up +1.0%). The tax charge stood at -€139 million. Lastly, stated net income Group share was down -7.1% at €437 million in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    In 2024, stated revenues were up +7.6% to a record level of €6,568 million for the year, with balanced growth between Corporate and Investment Banking and on a very good level recorded for full-year 2023. The specific items over the period had an impact of +€28.5 million (compared to -€38.9 million in 2023) and comprised the DVA, the issuer spread portion of the FVA, and secured lending for +€20.2 million (compared to -€14.6 million in 2023) and loan book hedging totalling +€8.2 million, (compared to -€24.3 million in 2023).

    Operating expenses excluding SRF rose +5.4%, mainly due to variable compensation and investments in IT and employees to support the development of the business lines. The cost/income ratio of 53.7% remained contained and below the MTP target. As a result, gross operating income of €3,040 million was up sharply (+22.3% compared with full-year 2023.) The cost of risk recorded a net addition of -€93 million for 2024, compared to a net addition of -€111 million for 2023. The income tax charge stood at -€748 million, up +29.4%. Lastly, stated net income Group share totalled €2,152 million for 2024, an increase of +22.7% over the period.

    Risk weighted assets at the end of December 2024 amounted to €136.9 billion, up by +€8.3 billion compared to the end of September 2024, notably due to an unfavourable foreign exchange impact and rating.

    Asset servicing results

    In the fourth quarter of 2024, the revenues of Asset Servicing were up +12.7% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, totalling €535 million. This rise was driven by high fee and commission income, itself driven by the increase in assets and by the favourable trend in net interest margin. Operating expenses rose by +9.8% to -€396 million, including -€2.7 million in scope effects linked to the consolidation of the remaining ISB entities and -€26.6 million in ISB integration costs restated as specific items (-€24.9 million in integration costs in the fourth quarter of 2023). Excluding these effects, the increase in expenses was +9.3% compared to the third quarter of 2023, linked to IT expenses and business growth. As a result, gross operating income was up by +21.7% to €139 million in the fourth quarter of 2024. Thus, the cost/income ratio stood at 74%, down -1.9 percentage point. Excluding ISB integration costs, it stood at 69.0%. Net income thus totalled €110 million, up +36.9% compared with the fourth quarter of 2023. Adjusted for the €35 million share of non-controlling interests, the business line’s contribution to net income Group share totalled €75 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, up +36.4% compared with the fourth quarter of 2023.

    In 2024, revenues totalled €2,083 million, up +24.2% compared to the same period in 2023, buoyed by the integration of ISB, strong commercial momentum and a favourable trend in the interest margin over the period. Costs excluding SRF increased by +30.1% and stood at €1,511 million. They included a scope effect of -€207 million over the first six months of 2024 and -€97 million in ISB integration costs. Gross operating income was up +20.4% compared to full year 2023. The cost/income ratio stood at 72.6%, up 3.3 points compared to 2023. Excluding ISB integration costs, the cost/income ratio stood at 67.9%. Net income thus rose by +15.8%. The overall contribution of the business line to net income Group share at the end of December 2024 was €296 million, representing a +15.1% increase compared to full year 2023.

    Specialised financial services activity

    The commercial production of Crédit Agricole Personal Finance & Mobility (CAPFM) totalled €11.7 billion in the fourth quarter of 2024. This represents a decrease, mainly due to the Chinese market, of -2.9% compared to fourth quarter 2023. The share of automotive financing67 in quarterly new business production stood at 50.2% this quarter. The average customer rate for production was up +5 basis points from the third quarter of 2024. CAPFM’s assets under management stood at €119.3 billion at the end of December 2024, up +5.6% compared to the end of December 2023, driven by all activities (Automotive +8.2%68 with Crédit Agricole Auto Bank and Leasys, LCL and Regional Banks +5.3%; Other entities +3.2%). Lastly, consolidated outstandings totalled €69.1 billion at the end of December 2024, up +3.3% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023.

    In January 2025, CAPFM announced the finalisation of the acquisition of 50% of GAC Leasing.

    Crédit Agricole Leasing & Factoring (CAL&F) commercial production increased by +15.7% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. It was driven by property leasing and renewable energy financing. Leasing outstandings rose +7.2% year-on-year, both in France (+5.9%) and internationally (+12.3%), to reach €20.3 billion at the end of December 2024 (of which €16.0 billion in France and €4.3 billion internationally). Commercial factoring production was up sharply, recording a twofold increase compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. It was driven by the signing of significant contracts both in France, where production increased by +32.5% in the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, and internationally, where production was multiplied by a factor of 3.5 in the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. Factoring outstandings at end-December 2024 were up +3.7% compared to end-December 2023, and factored revenues were up by +6.9% compared to the same period in 2023.

    Specialised financial services’ results

    The revenues of the Specialised Financial Services division were €915 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, up +4.0% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. Expenses amounted to -€447 million, down -0.5% versus fourth quarter 2023 and down -1.4% excluding the base effect69 related to the reorganisation of the Mobility activities at CAPFM in the fourth quarter of 2023. The cost/income ratio stood at 48.8%, up -2.2 percentage points compared to the same period in 2023. Gross operating income thus came to €468 million, up +8.6% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. Cost of risk amounted to -€306 million, up +66.2% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, with this quarter including model revisions at CAPFM, essentially leading to a -€50 million deterioration in unproven risk, and a -€30 million provision for legal risk of which UK car loans. Net income from equity-accounted entities rose +8.4% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023 to €43 million, with this quarter including around €14 million in non-recurring items. The change in value of goodwill was €0 million vs. €12 million in the fourth quarter of 2023, and excluding the base effect69 related to the reorganisation of Mobility activities at CAPFM, there was no change. The division’s Net income Group share amounted to €124 million, down -43.1% compared to the same period in 2023, and down -8.4% excluding the base effect69 related to the reorganisation of Mobility activities at CAPFM and excluding provisions for legal risks and model revisions in Q4-24 at CAPFM.

    Over 2024, revenues for the Specialised Financial Services division fell by -2.2%, but rose by +6.8% excluding the base effect70 related to the reorganisation of the Mobility activities at CAPFM, compared to 2023. This favourable trend was driven by a good performance in CAL&F (+6.8%) and by higher revenues for CAPFM excluding the base effect70 (+6.8%), benefiting from the scope effects linked to the strategic pivot around Mobility at CAPFM, which led to the 100% consolidation of Crédit Agricole Auto Bank from the second quarter of 2023 and of ALD and LeasePlan activities in six European countries, as well as the acquisition of a majority stake in the capital of Hiflow in the third quarter of 2023. Costs excluding SRF increased by +6.4% compared to 2023. Expenses excluding SRF, the base effect70 and scope effects rose by +2.3%. The cost/income ratio stood at 50.6%, or +4.1 percentage points versus the same period in 2023; excluding the base effect70, the change was +0.3 percentage points. Cost of risk increased by +10.1% compared to 2023, to -€958 million, and increased by +21.9% excluding the base effect70.This rise notably includes the impact of scope effects as well as -€50 million due to model revisions and a -€30 million provision for legal risk of which UK car loans in the fourth quarter of 2024 at CAPFM. The contribution from equity-accounted entities was down -3.3% versus the same period in 2023, and down -25.5% excluding the base effect70, due to the full consolidation of Crédit Agricole Auto Bank in the second quarter of 2023, which was previously accounted for using the equity method. Net income on other assets amounted to -€12 million at the end of December 2024, compared to €71 million at the end of December 2023 and -€18 million excluding the base effect70. The change in value of goodwill was €0 million for 2024 vs. €12 million for 2023, and excluding the base effect70 related to the reorganisation of the Mobility activities at CAPFM, there was no change. Net income Group share thus came to €625 million, down -26.6% compared to 2023, and down -7.5% excluding the base effect70 related to the reorganisation of the Mobility activities at CAPFM.

    The business line contributed 8% to the underlying net income Group share of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s core businesses (excluding the Corporate Centre division) at end-December 2024 and 13% to underlying revenues excluding the Corporate Centre.

    At 31 December 2024, the equity allocated to the division was €7.2 billion and its risk-weighted assets were €76.2 billion.

    The underlying RoNE (return on normalised equity) stood at 8.1% for the 12 months of 2024.

    Personal Finance and Mobility results

    CAPFM revenues reached €722 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, up +4.5% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, with a positive price effect thanks in particular to the production margin rate, which improved by +75 basis points in the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to the fourth quarter of 2023 (up +31 basis points compared to the third quarter of 2024), and with around €30 million in non-recurring items in the fourth quarter of 2024. Expenses were down by -0.7% and stood at -€347 million. They were down by -1.9% excluding the base effect71 related to the reorganisation of the Mobility activities compared to the same period in 2023. Gross operating income stood at €375 million, up +9.9%. The cost/income ratio stood at 48.1%, or -2.5 percentage points versus the same period in 2023 and -3.2 percentage points excluding the base effect71 related to the reorganisation of the Mobility activities. Cost of risk increased by +68.4% to -€286 million compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, with this quarter including model revisions leading essentially to a -€50 million deterioration in unproven risk, and a -€30 million provision for legal risk of which UK car loans. The cost of risk/outstandings thus stood at 127 basis points72, a deterioration of +6 basis points compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. The Non Performing Loans ratio was 4.7% at the end of December 2024, up +0.2 percentage point compared to the end of September 2024, while the coverage ratio reached 73.2%, down -1.0 percentage point compared to the end of September 2024. The contribution from equity-accounted entities rose by +9.7% compared to the same period in 2023. Excluding the base effect71 related to the reorganisation of the Mobility activities, the change in value of goodwill is zero, it stood at €12 million in the fourth quarter of 2023. As a result, net income Group share totalled €74 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, i.e. -56.2% compared to the same period the previous year. Excluding the base effect71 and excluding the legal provisions and model revisions, net income Group share was down -11.7%.

    In 2024, CAPFM’s revenues totalled €2,764 million, down -4.3% compared with 2023, but up +6.8% excluding the base effect related to the reorganisation of the Mobility activities73. Revenues benefited from scope effects related to the strategic pivot around Mobility that had resulted in the full consolidation of Crédit Agricole Auto Bank from the second quarter of 2023, the acquisition of ALD and LeasePlan activities in six European countries, and the acquisition of a majority stake in the capital of Hiflow in the third quarter of 2023. Expenses excluding SRF stood at -€1,382 million, an increase of +7.0% on 2023. Expenses excluding SRF, excluding the base effect73 and scope effects, were up +1.7%. Gross operating income therefore came in at €1,382 million, which was a drop of -12.8% but an increase of +6.4% excluding the base effect73. The cost/income ratio stood at 50.0%, or +5.3 percentage points versus the same period in 2023; excluding the base effect73, the change was +0.7 percentage points. Cost of risk increased by +8.6% compared with 2023, to -€877 million, and rose +21.3% when the base effect73 is excluded. This rise notably includes the impact of scope effects as well as a model revision leading essentially to a -€50 million deterioration in unproven risk, and a -€30 million provision for legal risk of which UK car loans. The contribution from equity-accounted entities was down -0.8% versus the same period in 2023, and down -22.9% excluding the base effect73 related to the scope effects of Crédit Agricole Auto Bank, which was fully consolidated in the second quarter of 2023 having previously been accounted for using the equity method. Net income on other assets was down -€82.1 million between 2024 and 2023. However, excluding the base effect73, it was up +€7 million. The change in value of goodwill was €0 million for 2024 against €12 million for 2023, and excluding the base effect73 related to the reorganisation of the Mobility activities, there was no change. As a result, net income Group share stood at €422 million for 2024, a decline of -37.5% from the same period one year earlier. Excluding the base effect73, net income Group share was down -15.4% from the same period in 2023.

    Leasing & Factoring results

    CAL&F’s revenues totalled €193 million, up +1.9% compared with the fourth quarter of 2023. This increase was driven by factoring, which benefited from positive volume effects (increase in factored revenues). Expenses remained stable with an increase of +0.4%, while the cost/income ratio stood at 51.7%, an improvement of -0.8 percentage points from the fourth quarter of 2023. Gross operating income rose +3.5% to €93 million, with a positive jaws effect of +1.5 percentage points. Cost of risk totalled -€20 million, up +40.1% compared to the same period in 2023. This rise was mainly due to the small business and SME markets. Cost of risk/outstandings stood at 24 basis points72, up +4 basis points compared to fourth quarter 2023. As a result, net income Group share was €50 million, up +1.7% compared with the fourth quarter of 2023.

    In 2024, revenues totalled €756 million, an increase of +6.8% compared to 2023. Costs excluding SRF increased by +4.3% to €398 million. Gross operating income rose significantly, +15.1% compared to 2023, to €358 million. The underlying cost/income ratio excluding SRF amounted to 52.6%, an improvement of -1.2 percentage points compared to 2023. The cost of risk increased by +29.7%, compared to the same period in 2023, to -€81 million. Net income Group share was €203 million, up +15.0% compared to the year 2023.

    Crédit Agricole S.A. Retail Banking activity

    Activity in Crédit Agricole S.A.’s Retail Banking business was solid during the quarter, with an increasing number of customers taking out insurance policies. Home loan production in France is steadily recovering, while continuing to rise for corporate loans. Outside France, loan activity was dynamic.

    Retail banking activity in France

    In the fourth quarter of 2024, activity remained strong with the upturn in mortgage lending and non-remunerated demand deposits which rose over the quarter. Customer acquisition is dynamic, with 60,000 new customers this quarter.

    The equipment rate for car, multi-risk home, health, legal, all mobile devices or personal accident insurance rose by +0.4 percentage points to stand at 27.9% at end-December 2024.

    Loan production totalled €8.5 billion, representing a year-on-year increase of +34.2%. The fourth quarter of 2024 confirmed the recovery in home loan production (+59.3% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023 and +10.6% compared to the third quarter of 2023), boosted by the proactive pricing policy. The average production rate for home loans came to 3.24%, down -14 basis points from the third quarter of 2024 and -92 basis points year on year. The home loan stock rate improved by +5 basis points over the quarter and by +18 basis points year on year. The strong momentum continued in the corporate market (+28.9% year on year) and the small business market (+19.3% year on year) but slowed for the consumer segment (-8.2%), in a challenging economic environment.

    Outstanding loans stood at €171 billion at end-December 2024, representing a +1.1% increase quarter-on-quarter and year-on-year (of which +1.3% for home loans, +0.8% for loans to professionals, +0.7% for loans to corporate). Customer assets totalled €255.0 billion at end-December 2024, up +3.0% year on year, driven by non-remunerated deposits and off-balance sheet funds. Customer assets also rose +0.7% during the quarter, thanks to the increase in demand deposit volumes (+1.1% compared with end-September 2024) in a still-uncertain environment, as well as term deposits (+1.2% compared with end-September 2024). Off-balance sheet deposits benefited from a positive year-on-year market effect across all segments and positive net inflows in life insurance.

    Retail banking activity in Italy

    In the fourth quarter of 2024, CA Italia posted gross customer capture of 45,000.

    Loan outstandings at CA Italia stood at €62.1 billion at end-December 202474, up +1.7% compared with end-December 2023. This was despite the downturn in the Italian market75, driven by the retail segment, which posted an increase in outstandings of 3.2%, and the corporate segment, which recorded an increase in outstandings of 3.6%. Loan production, buoyed by the solid momentum in all markets, rose +4.5% compared with the fourth quarter of 2023. Home loan production was good but nevertheless recorded a decline compared to a very high fourth quarter in 2023 (-6.3%). The loan stock rate fell by -20 bp on the third quarter of 2024, but was down less sharply than market rates.

    Customer assets at end-December 2024 totalled €120 billion, up +3.6% compared with end-December 2023; on-balance sheet deposits were relatively unchanged from the previous year at +0.5%, while the cost of ressources decreased. Lastly, off-balance sheet deposits rose +7.7%, benefiting from a market effect and positive net inflows.

    CA Italia’s equipment rate in car, multi-risk home, health, legal, all mobile devices or personal accident insurance increased to 20.0%, up 1.2 percentage points compared with the fourth quarter of 2023.

    Crédit Agricole Group activity in Italy76

    The Group’s business lines in Italy continued to grow throughout 2024. They served 6.1 million customers at end-December 2024, and the Group’s market share stood at 5%77 in Italy at end-2024.

    Crédit Agricole Italia has the best NPS among commercial banks.78 The Group’s business lines were ranked 2nd in consumer finance79, 3rd in asset management80, and 4th in life bancassurance81.

    Loans outstanding stood at €102 billion at end-December 2024 (+2% versus end-December 2023). Total customer assets stood at €340 billion at end-December 2024 (+2.7% compared to end-December 2023).

    International Retail Banking activity excluding Italy

    For International Retail Banking excluding Italy, loan outstandings were stable at -0.2% at current exchange rates at end-December 2024 compared with end-December 2023 (+5.2% at constant exchange rates). Customer assets rose by +1.2% over the same period at current exchange rates (+8,9% at constant exchange rates).

    In Poland in particular, loan outstandings increased by +3.8% versus December 2023 (+2.1% at constant exchange rates) and customer assets by +7.5% (+9.3% at constant exchange rates), against a backdrop of fierce competition for deposits. Loan production in Poland also remained strong, rising +9% compared with the fourth quarter of 2023 at current exchange rates (+6.3% at constant exchange rates).

    In Egypt, loan outstandings fell -16.4% between end-December 2024 and end-December 2023 (+29.3% at constant exchange rates). Over the same period, inflows fell by -26.8% but were still up +13.2% at constant exchange rates.

    The surplus of deposits over loans in Poland and Egypt amounted to €2.4 billion at 31 December 2024, and totalled €4.1 billion including Ukraine.

    French retail banking results

    In the fourth quarter of 2024, LCL’s revenues stood at €960 million, stable (+0.1%) compared with the fourth quarter of 2023 (+0.8% excluding the reversal of the provision for Home Purchase Saving Plans in the fourth quarter of 202382). The increase in fee and commission income (+8.4% Q4/Q4) was driven by all activities (excluding securities management), but mainly by strong momentum in cash flow and card premiums. NIM was down -7.7% Q4/Q4 (-6.6% excluding the reversal of the provision for Home Purchase Saving Plans in the fourth quarter of 202382). This quarter, the net interest margin was boosted by higher lending yields (stock repricing +18 bp Q4/Q4 and +5 bp Q4/Q3) making it possible to offset the increased cost of resources and a lower contribution from macro-hedging.

    Expenses were down by -1.1% and stood at -€647 million, benefiting in particular from a positive base effect (non-recurring items recorded in Q4 2023 including provisions on HR, property and IT components) making it possible to offset continued investments linked to IT and external expenditure (marketing, communication). The cost/income ratio stood at 67.4%, down 0.8 percentage point compared to fourth quarter 2023. Gross operating income rose by +2.7% to €313 million.

    The cost of risk was down -19.3% compared with the fourth quarter of 2023 to -€78 million (including -€42 million in cost of risk on performing loans, -€36 million in proven risk), cost of risk/outstandings remained stable at 22 basis points, in a context of a deterioration for SMEs and small businesses. The coverage ratio stood at 62.6% at end-December 2024 (+2.8 percentage point compared with end-September 2024). The non-performing loans ratio was 2.0% at end December 2024, -0.1 percentage point compared to end September 2024. As a result, net income Group share increased by +13.1% compared with the fourth quarter of 2024 (+16.3% excluding the Home Purchase Saving Plan base effect82).

    For the year 2024, LCL revenues were up +0.6% compared to 2023, totalling €3,872 million (+2.6% excluding the Home Purchase Saving Plan base effect83). The net interest margin was down -1.6% (+1.3% excluding the Home Purchase Saving Plan base effect83), benefiting from gradual loan repricing, making it possible to offset the increased cost of resources. Fee and commission income was up +2.7% compared to 2024 (+3.9% excluding the Cheque Image base effect84 in 2023), particularly on life insurance segments supported by the increase in assets in a positive market context, on non-life insurance linked to property and casualty insurance, and on payment instruments and account management. Costs excluding SRF were up +2.2% due to continued investments linked to IT and external expenditure (marketing, communication). The cost/income ratio excluding SRF stood at 63.2% (+1.0 percentage point compared with 2023). Gross operating income grew by +1.0% year on year. Cost of risk increased by +24.0%, impacted by the rise in proven risk on the corporate market, including corporate-specific files and on the retail market (small businesses and consumer finance). All in all, the business line’s contribution to net income Group share stood at €790 million, down -5.4% (+1.8% excluding the Home Purchase Saving Plan base effect and Cheque Image fine reversal)

    In all, the business line contributed 10% to the underlying net income Group share of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s core businesses (excluding the Corporate Centre division) in 2024 and 14% to underlying revenues excluding the Corporate Centre.

    At 31 December 2024, the equity allocated to the business line stood at €5.4 billion and risk-weighted assets amounted to €56.8 billion. LCL’s underlying return on normalised equity (RoNE) stood at 13.7% in 2024.

    International Retail Banking results85

    In the fourth quarter of 2024, revenues for International Retail Banking totalled
    €969 million, stable (-0.5% at current exchange rates, +2.8% at constant exchange rates) compared with the fourth quarter of 2023. Operating expenses were under control at €568 million, down -9.5% (-8.3% at constant exchange rates). Gross operating income consequently totalled €401 million, up +15.7% (+24.6% at constant exchange rates) for the period. Cost of risk amounted to -€100 million, down -2.5% compared with the fourth quarter of 2023 (-0.5% at constant exchange rates).

    All in all, net income Group share for CA Italia, CA Egypt, CA Poland and CA Ukraine amounted to €158 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, up +54% (+68.6% at constant exchange rates).

    For full-year 2024, International Retail Banking revenues rose by +2.8% to €4,059 million (+1.0% at constant exchange rates). Expenses excluding SRF were under control at -€2,148 million, an increase of +1.4% on 2023. Gross operating income totalled €1,911 million, up +6.7% (+5.3% at constant exchange rates). The cost of risk fell by -32.5% (-21.2% at constant exchange rates) -€313 million compared to 2023. All in all, net income Group share of International Retail Banking was €836 million, compared with €703 million in 2023.

    In full-year 2024 the International Retail Banking business line contributed 11% to the underlying net income Group share of Crédit Agricole S.A’s core businesses. (excluding the Corporate Centre) and 15% to underlying revenues excluding the Corporate Centre.

    As at 31 December 2024, the capital allocated to International Retail Banking was €4.5 billion and risk-weighted assets totalled €46.9 billion.

    Results in Italy

    In fourth quarter 2024, Crédit Agricole Italia’s revenues stood at €733 million, up +2.7% from fourth quarter 2023. The net interest margin was relatively stable from fourth quarter 2023 (-0.2% compared to fourth quarter 2023) and fee and commission income (-0.1%) benefited from the strong momentum of fee and commission income on assets under management (+18.8% compared to fourth quarter 2023). Operating expenses, excluding DGS, were stable at +0.8% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023.

    Cost of risk amounted to -€76 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, down -21.2% from the fourth quarter of 2023, and corresponded almost entirely to provisions for proven risk. Cost of risk/outstandings86 stood at 40 basis points, an improvement of four basis points compared with the third quarter of 2024. The Non Performing Loans ratio improved compared with the third quarter of 2024 to stand at 2.9%, while the coverage ratio was 75.1% (+1.5 percentage points compared with the third quarter of 2024). Net income Group share for CA Italia was €112 million, up +74.3% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023.

    In full-year 2024, revenues for Crédit Agricole Italia rose by +1.3% to €3,056 million. Expenses excluding SRF and DGS (deposit guarantee fund in Italy) were under control at €1,602 million, up +0.1% compared with full-year 2023. Gross operating income stood at €1,396 million, a slight increase of +6.1% compared to 2023. The cost of risk amounted to -€246 million, down -25.5% compared to 2023. As a result, the net income Group share of CA Italia totalled €608 million, an increase of +12.7% compared to 2023.

    CA Italy’s underlying RoNE (return on normalised equity) was 20,8% at 31 December 2024.

    Results for Crédit Agricole Group in Italy87

    For full-year 2024, the underlying net income Group share of entities in Italy was €1,254 million, up 20% compared to 2023. This reflects the ongoing momentum of the various business lines, particularly Retail Banking, Asset Gathering, and Large Customers. The breakdown by business line is as follows: Retail Banking 49%; Specialised Financial Services 18%; Asset Gathering and Insurance 21%; and Large Customers 12%. Lastly, Italy’s contribution to the net income Group share of Crédit Agricole S.A. in full-year 2024 was 16%.

    International Retail Banking results – excluding Italy

    In the fourth quarter of 2024, revenues for International Retail Banking excluding Italy totalled €236 million, up -9.3% (+3.3% at constant exchange rates) compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. Revenues in Poland were up +2.5% on the fourth quarter of 2023 (+0.1% at constant exchange rates), boosted by a higher net interest margin. Revenues in Egypt fell (-21.5% compared with the fourth quarter of 2023) due to foreign exchange rate movements (depreciation of the Egyptian pound) but were particularly buoyant at constant exchange rates (+25%), benefiting from a sharp increase in the interest margin. Operating expenses for International Retail Banking excluding Italy amounted to €126 million, down -1.3% compared with the fourth quarter of 2023 (+5.1% at constant exchange rates). Gross operating income amounted to €110 million, a decrease of -17.1% (+1.9% at constant exchange rates) compared with the fourth quarter of 2023. The cost of risk was stable at -€24 million, versus -€6 million in fourth quarter 2023. Furthermore, at end December 2024, the coverage ratio for loan outstandings remained high in Poland and Egypt, at 124% and 151% respectively. In Ukraine, the local coverage ratio remains prudent (409%). All in all, the contribution of International Retail Banking excluding Italy to net income Group share was €46 million, up 20.2% compared with the fourth quarter of 2023 at current exchange rates (+56.4% at constant exchange rates).

    In full-year 2024, revenues for International Retail Banking excluding Italy totalled €1,003 million, up +7.7% (+19.0% at constant exchange rates) compared to 2023, driven by the increase in the net interest margin. Revenues in Poland increased dynamically by +21% compared to 2023 (+15% at constant exchange rates) driven by net interest margin and commissions. Revenues in Egypt decreased slightly by -3% at current exchange rates compared to 2023, taking into account the evolution of exchange rates (in a context of devaluation of the EGP currency) but remain very well oriented at constant exchange rates (+43% compared to 2023), benefiting from a strong increase in the interest margin. Operating expenses amounted to -€488 million, up +6.9% compared with 2023 (+10.6% at constant exchange rates). The cost/income ratio at end-December 2024 was 48.6% (an improvement of 0.4 points on the cost/income ratio at end-December 2023). Thanks to strong growth in revenues, gross operating income came to €515 million, up 8.5% (+28.1% at constant exchange rates) from 2023. Cost of risk amounted to -€67 million, down -50.0% (-49.1% at constant exchange rates) compared to 2023. All in all, International Retail Banking excluding Italy contributed €228 million to net income Group share.

    The underlying RoNE (return on normalised equity) of Other IRB (excluding CA Italy) stood at 29.5% at 31 December 2024.

    At 31 December 2024, the entire Retail Banking business line contributed 21% to the underlying net income Group share of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s core businesses (excluding the Corporate Centre division) and 29% to underlying revenues excluding the Corporate Centre.

    At 31 December 2024, the division’s equity amounted to €9.9 billion. Its risk-weighted assets totalled €103.7 billion.

    Corporate Centre results

    The net income Group share of the Corporate Centre was +€18 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, up +€236 million compared with the fourth quarter of 2023. The positive contribution of the Corporate Centre division can be analysed by distinguishing between the “structural” contribution (-€26 million) and other items (+€44 million).
    The contribution of the “structural” component (-€26 million) was up by +€193 million compared with the fourth quarter of 2023 and can be broken down into three types of activity:

    • The activities and functions of the Corporate Centre of the Crédit Agricole S.A. Parent Company. This contribution amounted to -€354 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, down -€116 million, mainly due to a negative corporate income tax catch-up effect of -€91 million.
    • The business lines that are not part of the core businesses, such as CACIF (private equity), CA Immobilier, CATE and BforBank (equity-accounted). They contributed +€315 million in the fourth quarter 2024, up +€297 million from the fourth quarter of 2023. This was due to the negative impact of the revaluation of Banco BPM shares for +234 million in revenues (+€271m in the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to +€37m in the fourth quarter of 2023), as well as an interim dividend of +€60 in revenues.
    • Group support functions. Their contribution amounted to +€12 million this quarter (+€12 million compared with the fourth quarter of 2023).

    The contribution of “other items” was up +€43 million compared with the fourth quarter of 2023.
    The “internal margins” effect at the time of the consolidation of the insurance activity at the Crédit Agricole level was accounted for through the Corporate Centre. Over the quarter, the impact of internal margins was -€198 million in revenues and +€198 million in expenses.

    Over 2024, the underlying net income Group share of the Corporate Centre division was -€488 million, up +€105 million compared with 2023. The structural component contributed -€539 million, and other items of the division recorded a positive contribution of +€51 million over the year.
    The “structural” component contribution was up €160 million compared with 2023 and can be broken down into three types of activities:

    • The activities and functions of the Corporate Centre of the Crédit Agricole S.A. Parent Company. This contribution amounted to -€1,120 million in 2024, down -€202 million compared to 2023, including a base effect of -€171 million related the reversal of the provision for Home Purchase Saving Plans recognised in the third quarter of 2023 as well as -€42 million relating to the reversal of the Cheque Image Exchange fine in the second quarter of 2023;
    • Business lines not attached to the core businesses, such as CACIF (private equity) and CA Immobilier and BforBank: their contribution, which stood at +€549 million in 2024, was up +€343 on 2023. This increase was primarily due to the end of the SRF building-up period (+€77 million) and the impact of the valuation and dividend of Banco BPM shares for +€387 million;
    • The Group’s support functions: their contribution for 2024 was +€32 million, up +€19 million compared to 2023.

    The contribution of “other items” was down -€55 million compared to 2023.
    The “internal margins” effect at the time of the consolidation of the insurance activity at the Crédit Agricole level was accounted for through the Corporate Centre. Over the year, the impact of internal margins was -€832 million in revenues and +€832 million in expenses.

    At 31 December 2024, risk-weighted assets stood at €30.0 billion.

    Financial strength

    Crédit Agricole Group

    At 31 December 2024, the phased-in Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio of Crédit Agricole Group was 17.2%, a decrease of -0.2 percentage point compared to end-September 2024. Therefore, the Crédit Agricole Group posted a substantial buffer of 7.4 percentage points between the level of its CET1 ratio and the 9.8% SREP requirement. The fully loaded CET1 ratio was 17.1%.
    During the fourth quarter 2024:

    • The CET1 ratio benefited from an impact of +25 basis points related to retained earnings.
    • Changes in risk weighted assets related to business line organic growth impacted the Group’s CET1 ratio by -28 basis points (see below), mainly due to a rating effect of -15 basis points.
    • Methodology, M&A and other effects had a negative impact of -14 basis points and included, in particular, the -12 basis point Basel 4 impact relating to the consolidation of leasing activities.

    The phased-in Tier 1 ratio stood at 18.3%, while the phased-in total ratio was 20.9% at end-December 2024.
    The phased-in leverage ratio stood at 5.5%, remaining stable compared with end-September 2024, well above the regulatory requirement of 3.5%.
    Risk-weighted assets for the Crédit Agricole Group amounted to €653 billion, up +€17.5 billion compared with 30 September 2024. The change can be broken down by business line as follows: Retail Banking +6.9 billion (including +4.1 billion in negative rating effects on LCL and the Regional Banks, Asset Gathering -1.3 billion, Specialised Financial Services +4.3 billion, Large Customers +7.3 billion (impacted by foreign exchange and negative rating effects) and Corporate Centre +0.3 billion.

    Maximum Distributable Amount (MDA and L-MDA) trigger thresholds

    The transposition of Basel regulations into European law (CRD) introduced a restriction mechanism for distribution that applies to dividends, AT1 instruments and variable compensation. The Maximum Distributable Amount (MDA, the maximum sum a bank is allowed to allocate to distributions) principle aims to place limitations on distributions in the event the latter were to result in non-compliance with combined capital buffer requirements.

    The distance to the MDA trigger is the lowest of the respective distances to the SREP requirements in CET1 capital, Tier 1 capital and total equity.

    At 31 December 2024, Crédit Agricole Group posted a buffer of 666 basis points above the MDA trigger, i.e. €44 billion in CET1 capital.

    Failure to comply with the leverage ratio buffer requirement would result in a restriction of distributions and the calculation of a maximum distributable amount (L-MDA).

    At 31 December 2024, Crédit Agricole Group posted a buffer of 197 basis points above the L-MDA trigger, i.e. €43 billion in Tier 1 capital. At the Crédit Agricole Group level, it is the distance to the L-MDA trigger that determines the distance to distribution restriction.

    At 31 December 2024, Crédit Agricole S.A. posted a buffer of 296 basis points above the MDA trigger, i.e. 12 billion in CET1 capital. Crédit Agricole S.A. is not subject to the L-MDA requirement.

    TLAC

    Crédit Agricole Group must comply with the following TLAC ratio requirements at all times:

    • a TLAC ratio above 18% of risk-weighted assets (RWA), plus – in accordance with EU directive CRD 5 – a combined capital buffer requirement (including, for Crédit Agricole Group, a 2.5% capital conservation buffer, a 1% G-SIB buffer, the counter-cyclical buffer set at 0.77% and the 0.05% systemic risk buffer for CA Group at 31 December 2024). Considering the combined capital buffer requirement, Crédit Agricole Group must adhere to a TLAC ratio of above 22.3%;
    • a TLAC ratio of above 6.75% of the Leverage Ratio Exposure (LRE).

    The Crédit Agricole Group’s 2025 target is to maintain a TLAC ratio greater than or equal to 26% of RWA excluding eligible senior preferred debt.

    At 31 December 2024, Crédit Agricole Group’s TLAC ratio stood at 26.9% of RWA and 8.0% of leverage ratio exposure, excluding eligible senior preferred debt88, which is well above the requirements. The TLAC ratio, expressed as a percentage of risk-weighted assets, decreased by 40 basis points over the quarter, due to risk-weighted assets increasing more rapidly than equity and eligible items over the period. Expressed as a percentage of leverage exposure (LRE), the TLAC ratio was down 20 basis points compared with September 2024.

    The Group thus has a TLAC ratio excluding eligible senior preferred debt that is 460 basis points higher, i.e. €30 billion, than the current requirement of 22.3% of RWA.

    At end-December 2024, €10.4 billion equivalent had been issued in the market (senior non-preferred and Tier 2 debt) as well as €2.5 billion of AT1. The amount of Crédit Agricole Group senior non-preferred securities taken into account in the calculation of the TLAC ratio was €34.5 billion.

    MREL

    The required minimum levels are set by decisions of resolution authorities and then communicated to each institution, then revised periodically. At 31 December 2024, Crédit Agricole Group has to meet a minimum total MREL requirement of:

    • 22.01% of RWA, plus – in accordance with EU directive CRD 5 – a combined capital buffer requirement (including, for Crédit Agricole Group, a 2.5% capital conservation buffer, a 1% G-SIB buffer, the counter-cyclical buffer set at 0.77% and the 0.05% systemic risk buffer for CA Group at 31 December 2024). Considering the combined capital buffer requirement, the Crédit Agricole Group has to meet to a total MREL ratio of above 26.3%;
    • 6.25% of the LRE.

    At 31 December 2024, the Crédit Agricole Group had a total MREL ratio of 32.4% of RWA and 9.7% of leverage exposure, well above the requirement.

    An additional subordination requirement (“subordinated MREL”) is also determined by the resolution authorities and expressed as a percentage of RWA and LRE. At 31 December 2024, this subordinated MREL requirement for the Crédit Agricole Group was:

    • 18.25% of RWA, plus a combined capital buffer requirement. Considering the combined capital buffer requirement, the Crédit Agricole Group has to meet to a subordinated MREL ratio of above 22.6%;
    • 6.25% of leverage exposure.

    At 31 December 2024, Crédit Agricole Group had a subordinated MREL ratio of 26.9% of RWA and 8.0% of leverage exposure, well above the requirement.

    The distance to the maximum distributable amount trigger related to MREL requirements (M-MDA) is the lowest of the respective distances to the MREL, subordinated MREL and TLAC requirements expressed in RWA.

    At 31 December 2024, Crédit Agricole Group had a buffer of 430 basis points above the M-MDA trigger, i.e. €28 billion in CET1 capital; the distance to the M-MDA trigger corresponds to the distance between the subordinated MREL ratio and the corresponding requirement.

    Crédit Agricole S.A.

    At 31 December 2024, Crédit Agricole S.A.’s solvency ratio was higher than the Medium-Term Plan target, with a phased-in Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio of 11.7%, stable compared to end-September 2024. Crédit Agricole S.A. therefore had a comfortable buffer of 3.0 percentage points between the level of its CET1 ratio and the 8.6% SREP requirement. The fully loaded CET1 ratio was 11.6%.
    During the fourth quarter 2024:

    • The CET1 ratio benefited this quarter from a positive impact of +19 basis points linked to retained earnings. This impact corresponds to net income Group share net of AT1 coupons (impact of +38 basis points) and of the distribution of 50% of earnings, i.e. a provision for dividends of 27 euro cents per share in third quarter 2024 (-20 basis points).
    • Changes in risk-weighted assets related to business line organic growth impacted the CET1 ratio by -12 basis points, of which a rating effect of -10 basis points in Corporate and Investment Banking and French Retail Banking.
      • Methodology, M&A and other effects had a negative impact of -13 basis points and included, in particular, the -12 basis point Basel 4 impact relating to the consolidation of leasing activities.
    • The phased-in leverage ratio was 3.9% at end-December 2024, up +0.1 percentage point compared to end-September 2024 and above the 3% requirement.

    The phased-in Tier 1 ratio stood at 13.4% and the phased-in total ratio at 17.4% this quarter.
    Risk weighted assets for Crédit Agricole S.A. amounted to 415 billion at end of December 2024, up by +€12.9 billion compared to 30 September 2024. The change can be broken down by core business line as follows:

    • The Retail Banking divisions showed an increase of +€2.1 billion, particularly in France, with a rating effect at LCL of +€1.9 billion.
    • Asset Gathering posted a decrease of -€1.2 billion essentially for Insurance due to the impact of the interim dividend.
    • Specialised Financial Services increased by +€4.3 billion, due to the Basel 4 impact of consolidation of leasing activities
    • Large Customers recorded an increase in risk-weighted assets of +€7.4 billion over the quarter, mainly as a result of the growth of the Corporate and Investment Banking business lines, and negative foreign exchange effects (+€2.7 billion) and ratings (+€1.5 billion).
    • The Corporate Centre divisions posted an increase in risk-weighted assets of +€0.4 billion.

    Liquidity and Funding

    Liquidity is measured at Crédit Agricole Group level.

    Preliminary presentation information:

    At 31 December 2024, changes have been made to the liquidity balance sheet:

    • In assets, the section “Cash and Central Bank deposits (including mandatory reserves)”, eligible to LCR, was reduced to “Central Bank deposits (without Cash and mandatory reserves)”, for consistency with the presentation of Liquidity reserves, which exclude Cash and mandatory reserves. The latter have been reclassified under stable application of funds for the surplus of stable funding resources over stable application of funds, in the section “Net working capital” (see Infra). This methodological change had a negative impact on the indicator of €16 billion;
    • In assets, the sections “Interbank assets” and “Reverse repos (net) and other ST” in the banking book have been merged into a single section called “Treasury assets”;
    • In liabilities, the “Customer-related funds” section now only contains customer deposits eligible for the Stable Resources Position indicator89, and bonds issued by Group entities through its retail networks as well as national or supranational borrowings are now listed in the “LT debt” section (formerly called “MLT market funds”);
    • The sections “Tangible and intangible assets” previously in assets and “Equity and similar” previously in liabilities are netted in a single section called “Net working capital” in liabilities. The later now also includes the difference between accrued liabilities and accrued interests, which were historically included in the section “Reverse repos and other ST”. This reclassification had a positive impact on the surplus of stable funding resources over stable application of funds of €3 billion.

    In addition, the following changes have been made to the breakdown of long-term debt (considered within the meaning of banking activities) from the 31 December 2024:

    • Senior Preferred bonds issued by Group entities through its retail networks are classified within other debt with the same ranking issued on the market;
    • National or supranational borrowings are classified as senior secured debt.

    Comments on the liquidity position:

    Diversified and granular customer deposits has increased by +2% over the quarter (€1,152 billion at 31 December 2024). The stabilisation of the breakdown in deposits continues this quarter in France.

    The Group’s liquidity reserves, at market value and after haircuts90, amounted to €473 billion at 31 December 2024, up +€7 billion compared to 30 September 2024.

    Liquidity reserves (without Cash and Central Bank deposits) covered more than twice the short term debt net of treasury assets.

    This increase in liquidity reserves is notably explained by:

    • The increase in the securities portfolio (HQLA and non-HQLA) for +€24 billion, due to the subscription of additional securities (instead of Central Banks deposits, Cf. Infra) and to the change in haircuts to better reflect the economic reality of central bank value;
    • The decrease of collateral already pledged to Central Banks and unencumbered for -€12 billion since additional private non-financial corporate claims (ACC Corpo) are no longer eligible to ECB funding from Q4.

    Crédit Agricole Group also continued its efforts to maintain immediately available reserves (after recourse to ECB financing). Central bank eligible non-HQLA assets after haircuts amounted to €139 billion.

    Standing at €1,685 billion at 31 December 2024, the Group’s liquidity balance sheet shows a surplus of stable funding resources over stable application of funds of €177 billion, down -€12 billion compared with end-September 2024. This surplus remains well above the Medium-Term Plan target of €110bn-€130bn.

    Long term debt was €305 billion at 31 December 2024, up from pro-forma end-September 2024.

    This included:

    • Senior secured debt of €84 billion;
    • Senior preferred debt of €159 billion, up +€10 billion, of which €7.5 billion due to the consolidation of CAPFM’s car lease subsidiaries in compliance with CRR3 regulation;
    • Senior non-preferred debt of €37 billion;
    • And Tier 2 securities of €25 billion.

    Credit institutions are subject to a threshold for the LCR ratio, set at 100% on 1 January 2018.

    At 31 December 2024, the end of month LCR ratios were 127% for Crédit Agricole Group (representing a surplus of €66 billion) and 131% for Crédit Agricole S.A. (representing a surplus of €64 billion). They were higher than the Medium-Term Plan target (around 110%). The LCR ratio was lower in December given higher one-month net outflows weighing on the denominator of the ratio.

    In addition, the NSFR of Crédit Agricole Group and Crédit Agricole S.A. exceeded 100%, in accordance with the regulatory requirement applicable since 28 June 2021 and above the Medium-Term Plan target (>100%).

    The Group continues to follow a prudent policy as regards medium-to-long-term refinancing, with a very diversified access to markets in terms of investor base and products.

    At 31 December 2024, the Group’s main issuers raised the equivalent of €32.7 billion91in medium-to-long-term debt on the market, 81% of which was issued by Crédit Agricole S.A.

    In particular, the following amounts are noted for the Group excluding Crédit Agricole S.A.:  

    • Crédit Agricole Assurances issued €750 million in Tier 2 10-year bullet subordinated and made a tender offer on two subordinated perpetual issuances (FR0012444750 & FR0012222297) for €788.5 million in September;
    • Crédit Agricole Personal Finance & Mobility issued:
      • €2 billion equivalent in EMTN issuances and €0.9 billion in securitisations through Crédit Agricole Auto Bank (CAAB);
      • €0.7 billion in securitisations through Agos;
    • Crédit Agricole Italia issued two senior secured debt issuances for a total of €1.5 billion, of which €500 million in Green Bond format;
    • Crédit Agricole next bank (Switzerland) issued three tranches in senior secured format for a total of 300 million Swiss francs, of which 100 million Swiss francs in Green Bond format

    At 31 December 2024, Crédit Agricole S.A. raised the equivalent of €24.1 billion through the market92,93.

    The bank raised the equivalent of €24.1 billion, of which €7.3 billion in senior non-preferred debt and €3.1 billion in Tier 2 debt, as well as €7.2 billion in senior preferred debt and €6.5 billion in senior secured debt at end-December. The financing comprised a variety of formats and currencies, including:

    • €6.3 billion94,95;
    • 6.35 billion96 US dollars (€5.8 billion equivalent);
    • 1.1 billion pounds sterling (€1.3 billion equivalent);
    • 230 billion Japanese yen (€1.4 billion equivalent);
    • 0.8 billion Swiss francs (€0.8 billion equivalent);
    • 1.75 billion Australian dollars (€1.1 billion equivalent);
    • 7 billion renminbi (€0.9 billion equivalent).

    At end-December, Crédit Agricole S.A. had issued 64%97,98 of its funding plan in currencies other than the euro.

    In addition, on 2 January 2024, Crédit Agricole S.A. issued a PerpNC6 AT1 bond for €1.25 billion at an initial rate of 6.5% and, on 24 September 2024, a PerpNC10 AT1 bond for $1.25 billion at an initial rate of 6.7%.

    The 2025 MLT market funding programme was set at €20 billion, with equilibrium between senior preferred or senior secured debt and senior non-preferred or Tier 2 debt.

    The programme was 30% completed at 31 January 2025, with:

    • €0.5 billion in senior secured debt;
    • €0.3 billion equivalent in senior preferred debt;
    • €4.6 billion equivalent in senior non-preferred debt;
    • €0.7 billion equivalent in Tier 2 debt.

    Economic and financial environment

    2024 retrospective

    Continuing trend of disinflation and monetary easing

    The global context remained contentious and eruptive, marked by significant geopolitical tensions and ongoing open conflicts such as the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, which began in February 2022 and October 2023, respectively. On their emergence, these conflicts had caused tensions for upstream prices, particularly for grain, gas and maritime transport. These sharp price increases combined with sources of inflation arising from the post-Covid recovery: pressure on demand (recovering strongly) and supply (tight), problems or disruptions in supply, slow return of the participation rate on the labour market to its pre-pandemic level (labour shortage, wage pressures).
    This combination of shocks resulted in a sudden upturn in global inflation, which peaked at 10.3% in October 2022 (an annual average of 8.7% in 2022 after 3.8% in 2021). This high inflation and the need to anchor inflation expectations quickly, to avoid price-wage spirals and persisting very high levels of inflation, resulted in sharp monetary tightening. The Federal Reserve and the ECB also began, in March and July 2022, respectively, a powerful rate hike cycle (increases of 525 and 450 base points (bp), respectively, in around 15 months). Thanks to the resorption of shocks upstream, the normalisation of the labour markets and the effects of monetary tightening, disinflation occurred from 2023 (average global inflation at 6.9%); global growth held up well overall.
    2024 was marked by widespread continued disinflation (average global inflation at 5%, 4.5% year-on-year in December), despite the resilience of services prices being almost as widespread. After having kept their policy rates at high levels for some time, the major central banks started to make cuts in the summer. While the ECB reduced its deposit rate by 150 bp (to 3% for a refinancing rate of 3.15% in December 2024), the Fed reduced the federal funds target rate by 100 bp (upper bound at 4.50% in December 2024). Widely anticipated, this monetary easing provided support to still robust global growth (recession was avoided despite the high inflation followed by much stricter financial conditions) but for which the overall resilience still masks very mixed performances.
    Overall resilient growth masking mixed performances

    In the US, the economy once again demonstrated its robustness in 2024, with growth that continued to exceed expectations, coming in at an annual average of 2.8% (after 2.9% in 2023). Despite some pockets of weakness (households with low incomes, negative net equity, small businesses, vulnerable workers more exposed to high interest rates), the monetary and financial tightening did not have a widespread depressive effect thanks to an overall strengthening of balance sheets (corporate and household) after the financial crisis. While the employment market showed signs of a slowdown, this was more of a normalisation following a period of overheating rather than a deep deterioration. The unemployment rate rose only slightly, (4.1% at end-December 2024 vs 3.8% one year earlier). Lastly, confirming that the last mile of disinflation is the hardest, year-on-year inflation climbed very slowly from September to reach 2.9% in December.
    In China, the property market has not yet stabilised and support measures (lowering mortgage rates, lowering reserve requirement rates to free up liquidity, creating support funds to buy back certain vacant properties or properties under construction) have not generated the confidence boost expected. Households have preferred to maintain their precautionary savings, to the detriment of consumption, and weak domestic demand has continued to feed strong deflationary pressure. Thanks to better-than-expected growth in the last quarter (5.4% year-on-year), average annual growth reached the government target of “around 5%”. However, inflation (0.2% in 2024) remained far below the Central Bank’s 3% target.
    In France, growth came in at 1.1% in 2024, as in 2023. However, inflation dropped sharply, with an annual average of 2%, after 4.9% in 2023. This disinflation led to increased purchasing power for households, although this did not translate into a sharp rise in consumption. The savings rate for households therefore increased to 18%, as an annual average, compared to below 17% in 2023 and 14% before the health crisis (2015-2019). Employment proved very resilient in 2024 and the unemployment rate showed only a slight increase (7.4%). As the previous tightening of financial terms continued to weigh heavily on private investment, domestic demand decelerated and growth was driven by foreign trade and the public sector. While public consumer spending drove growth, on the other side of the coin, the public deficit significantly increased and should reach around 6.2% of GDP (after 5.5% in 2023).

    In Italy, the slowdown in activity continued in 2024, with growth limited to 0.5%. The disinflation process that began at the end of 2023 continued (average annual inflation of 1.1%) but was not enough to significantly boost the economy. A buoyant employment market (with an unemployment rate of 6.7%, down one point on 2023), low inflation and slight wage increases enabled an upturn in purchasing power after two years of decline. Despite this support, growth in household consumption remained moderate and the savings rate stabilised after its drop in 2023. Investment growth stagnated, driven solely by projects linked to the stimulus package, while productive investment declined sharply, particularly in the third quarter. Continued restrictive financing terms and insufficient demand, both domestically and internationally, have hampered supply, particularly in industry, which saw a marked drop. The construction sector, supported in the first six months by the delayed effect of the Super Bonus, then slowed.

    Financial markets

    Disinflation did not drive inflation rates to the targets set by the major central banks, but within their “comfort zones” and enabled them, during the summer, to ease their monetary policy. However, firstly, the “last mile” of disinflation has proved harder than the markets had anticipated and, secondly, the US election revived hopes of stronger growth but fears of higher inflation in the US. Consequently, investors have had to temper their hopes for monetary easing and bond rate cuts, particularly in the US.

    On the other side of the Atlantic, while two-year US Treasury yields fell back very slightly during the year (around 4.25% in December 2024), longer-term rates (US 10-year Treasuries) picked up by almost 65 bp (to almost 4.60%). In the eurozone, with a fairly depressed growth outlook and modest inflation, 2-year and 10-year swap rates fell by around 65 bp and 15 bp, respectively, over the year (to 2.20% and 2.35%). The trend in sovereign spreads reflected the relative economic, as well as political, performance of the economies. Whilst difficulties piled up in Germany, the European periphery enjoyed political stability and/or better economic growth. While the Bund rate (German 10-year rate) gained 30 bp over the year (to 2.35%, i.e. the 10-year swap rate level, having been nearly 50 bp below this level at the end of December 2023), peripheral spreads tightened. In France, political instability and concerns about the trajectory of French debt prompted the spread to widen. At the end of 2024, the Spanish, Italian and French 10-year yield spreads against the Bund were around 120, 70 and 80 bp, respectively, (i.e. variations of -25 bp, -50 bp and +30 bp over the year). France’s spread is now higher than Spain’s.

    In 2024, US economic performance far outstripped that of other major regions, notably Europe. Whilst US equity markets were again buoyed by the performance of the “Magnificent Seven” and the expected benefits of the US election, Europe suffered for a variety of reasons (depressed manufacturing sector, high energy costs, excessive regulation, Chinese competition, technology gap, political concerns in France and Germany etc.). Between the start and end of 2024, the S&P index rose by 24%, the Eurostoxx 50 was up 8% and the CAC was down 2%. Lastly, although stable on average over the year (at US$1.08), the euro fell against the dollar by 5.5% between January and December 2024.

    2025 Outlook

    A highly conditional scenario

    More than ever, the outlook is dependent on the future course of US geopolitics and economic policy. The assumptions made about the scale and timing of the measures to be taken by the new administration suggest that, in the US, the economy is likely to remain resilient, but also that inflation will pick up, monetary easing will be modest and long-term interest rates will come under upwards pressure. Moreover, these measures are only one explanation for the eurozone’s expected sluggish recovery, below potential.
    Outlining the US (and, by extension, global) scenario obviously involves making assumptions about both the scale of the measures likely to be implemented and their timing, depending on whether they fall under the purview of the President or require the approval of Congress. As far as tariffs are concerned, the US President’s threats seem to be tantamount to extreme pressure tactics. They call for an intermediate scenario consisting of substantial increases, but not as high as campaign proposals. Trade tariffs would likely rise to an average of 40% for China, from the second quarter of 2025, and to an average of 6% for the rest of the world, phased in over the second half of 2025. An aggressive fiscal policy, favouring tax cuts and maintaining extremely high deficits, would be implemented later. Its effects could be seen from 2026 onwards. In terms of immigration, restrictions could be applied from the start of the presidential term. They would be followed by a very sharp slowdown in immigration flows and, while deportations are to be expected, they would be selective as opposed to a massive and indiscriminate deportation of millions of people. Lastly, deregulation, from which the energy and finance sectors are likely to benefit the most, would have rather positive effects throughout the presidential term of office.

    In the US, these policy guidelines should, on the whole, favour growth. If the expected positive effect of an aggressive fiscal policy and deregulation exceeds the negative impact of tariffs and immigration restrictions, growth will follow. Given the resilience of the US economy, whose growth is still expected to outperform forecasts to settle at around 2.8% in 2024, this suggests that growth will remain strong, albeit slightly weaker. Due to a number of vulnerabilities (low-income households and small businesses are more exposed to high interest rates), our scenario assumes a slowdown to 1.9% in 2025, before a recovery to 2.2% in 2026, a trend that is likely to be accompanied by an upturn in inflation. The end of the disinflationary path to the 2% target is, in fact, the most arduous, and tariffs could result in price pressure ranging between 25 to 30 basis points. Headline inflation could therefore fall back to around 2% next spring, before rising to around 2.5% by the end of 2025 and then remain stable in 2026. The potential for monetary policy easing will be very limited.

    In the eurozone, growth is likely to be sluggish, with the economy still not meeting its growth potential and below the pace enjoyed by the US. Although the upturn in household consumption points to slightly stronger growth, the latest data regarding investment does not augur well for a marked acceleration. Falling inflation boosts purchasing power, as well as a rebuilding of real wealth, implying less saving, and lower interest rates help to restore property purchasing power. The ingredients are there for a continued recovery in household spending, albeit only at a very moderate pace, however, as fiscal consolidation and global uncertainty are likely to encourage a continued high savings rate. Our scenario therefore assumes a modest acceleration in consumption to 1.1% in 2025 and 1.2% in 2026, after 0.7% in 2024. After a sharp fall in 2024, investment in 2025 is likely to continue to be penalised by the delay in passing on the interest rate cuts and, above all, by weak domestic demand and growing uncertainty about foreign demand. Investment is expected to grow by just 1.5%, before firming slightly in 2026 (2%). The Trump administration’s policies are likely to have a moderately negative impact on growth in the eurozone, in the short term primarily due to uncertainty. Les politiques de l’administration Trump auraient un impact modérément négatif sur la croissance de la zone euro, dont le canal le plus important à court terme serait l’incertitude. In addition, the monetary and fiscal policy mix remains unfavourable to growth, with the central bank policy rate returning to neutral by mid-2025, while the reduction in the ECB’s balance sheet continues to reflect a restrictive stance. Our forecasts therefore place growth on a relatively soft acceleration trend, rising from 0.7% in 2024 to 1% in 2025, then 1.2% in 2026: growth potential would be attained, but the output gap, which is slightly negative, would not yet be closed, as the growth gap with the US economy would widen.
    In France, in 2025, assuming that a 2025 finance act is adopted at the beginning of the year (probably at the end of the first quarter) and that the recovery in public finances is weaker than forecast by the former Barnier government’s draft bill, growth would fall to 0.8%. Economic activity would be curbed, especially at the start of the year, by the uncertainty surrounding national politics and international trade policies. Households and businesses are likely to adopt a more wait-and-see attitude to consumption, investment and hiring. Household consumption is nevertheless set to rise as a result of the ongoing disinflation process, with inflation easing to 2.1% on an annual average basis (CPI), but only slightly. The household savings rate is not expected to fall until the second half of the year and will remain very high, while the unemployment rate is set to rise moderately. Private investment, meanwhile, is expected to remain stable, with an upturn postponed until 2026. Foreign trade is no longer expected to contribute to growth, as imports and exports are expected to grow at more or less the same rate. A slight re-stocking phenomenon is set to support growth, but budgetary efforts are likely to weaken. The public deficit is, however, only expected to fall slightly, to 6% of GDP. In Italy, a slight improvement is expected in 2025, with GDP growth forecast at 0.6%. Although a weakening labour market and slightly higher inflation are expected, consumption should become the main driver of the economy. Productive investment could benefit from a more favourable monetary environment. The construction sector will continue to be weakened by the after-effects of the boom of previous years, despite partial support from projects under the stimulus package.

    Regarding emerging countries, were it not for the difficulties associated with “Trump 2.0”, the situation would be improving, with lower US central bank policy rates conducive to global monetary easing, easing of downwards pressure on emerging currencies and, more generally, on external financing for emerging countries, with domestic growth buoyed by falling inflation and interest rate cuts and exports to developed countries (primarily the US) still buoyant. However, the effects of these supporting factors are at risk of being undermined by the probable repercussions of the measures taken by the new US administration. In addition to trade tariffs that are likely to make emerging country exports more expensive and more limited, there will be less monetary accommodation in the US and a probable reduction in US military and financial support for Ukraine, fuelling geopolitical uncertainty in Europe. It will therefore be preferable to be a large country with a low level of openness, such as India, Indonesia or Brazil, a commodity-exporting country or an economy that is well integrated with China, which is preparing for the Trump storm.

    In China, the last Politburo meeting concluded in December with a commitment by the authorities to implement a “more proactive” fiscal policy and a “sufficiently accommodating” monetary policy, in order to boost domestic demand and stabilise the property and equity markets. A period of trade tensions is looming and, apart from restrictions on exports of critical products (including rare earths), the means of retaliation are limited. It is difficult to respond by boosting the competitiveness of exports (the yuan is already historically low) or by reciprocally raising tariffs, which would risk penalising already very fragile domestic consumption. The authorities’ plans to provide more vocal support for domestic demand are commendable, but the effectiveness of this strategy will depend on household confidence. The upturn cannot be ordered by decree, and our scenario continues to predict a slowdown in growth in 2025.

    The market’s hopes of a sharp monetary easing have been refuted and are absolutely no longer on the agenda, especially in the US.

    In an economy that is expected to remain robust, with inflation holding above 2% and which could pick up again, the easing would be modest. After a total reduction of 100 basis points in 2024 (bp), the Fed could ease by a further 50 bp in total, taking the Fed funds rate (upper limit of the target range) to 4.00% in the first half of 2025, before pausing for a prolonged period. With inflation on target and no recession in sight, the ECB is likely to continue moderate easing via its central bank policy rates, while extending its quantitative tightening. After its four 25 bp cuts in 2024, the ECB is expected to cut rates by 25 bp at its meetings in January, March and April, then maintain its deposit rate at 2.25%, i.e. very slightly below the neutral rate estimate (2.50%).
    Everything points to a scenario of rising long-term interest rates. In the US, given the economic scenario (limited slowdown in growth and moderation in inflation concentrated at the beginning of the period) and modest monetary easing followed by an earlier pause, interest rates could fall slightly in the first half of 2025 before picking up. The new forecasts look to a ten-year Treasury rate nearing 4.50% at the end of 2025, then rising to around 5.00% at the end of 2026.

    In the eurozone, a number of factors lead to a scenario of rising sovereign interest rates: excessive monetary easing expectations by the markets, the correction of which could lead to a rise in swap rates, an increase in the volume of government securities linked to the ECB’s balance sheet reduction (Quantitative Tightening) as well as still-high net national issuance and the extension of the rise in US bond yields to their European equivalents. Whilst the German economy (where early elections will be held in February) continues to suffer, and the political situation in France is not any clearer, “peripheral” countries have seen their sound economic results (notably Spain) and their political stability (this applies to Italy and Spain) rewarded by a significant tightening of their spreads against the German 10-year rate in 2024. They should benefit from the same supportive factors in 2025. Our scenario therefore assumes German, French and Italian ten-year interest rates of 2.55%, 3.15% and 3.55%, respectively, at the end of 2025.

    Lastly, on the dollar front, a number of positive factors, including the increased attractiveness of the dollar in terms of yield, seem to have already been largely incorporated into its price. As a result, our scenario assumes that the greenback will remain close to its recent highs throughout 2025, without exceeding them for any long period.

    Appendix 1 – Specific items, Crédit Agricole Group and Crédit Agricole S.A.

    Crédit Agricole Group – Specific items

      Q4-24 Q4-23 2024 2023
    €m Gross
    impact*    		 Impact on
    Net income    		 Gross
    impact*    		 Impact on
    Net income    		 Gross
    impact*    		 Impact on
    Net income    		 Gross
    impact*    		 Impact on
    Net income
                     
    DVA (LC) (26) (19) 6 4 20 15 (15) (11)
    Loan portfolio hedges (LC) 2 1 2 1 8 6 (24) (18)
    Home Purchase Savings Plans (LCL) – – 6 5 1 1 58 43
    Home Purchase Savings Plans (CC) – – 5 4 (0) (0) 236 175
    Home Purchase Savings Plans (RB) – – 74 55 63 47 192 142
    Mobility activities reorganisation (SFS) – – – – – – 300 214
    Check Image Exchange penalty (CC) – – – – – – 42 42
    Check Image Exchange penalty (LCL) – – – – – – 21 21
    Check Image Exchange penalty (RB) – – – – – – 42 42
    Total impact on revenues (24) (18) 93 69 93 69 851 650
    Degroof Petercam integration costs (AG) (13) (10) – – (26) (19) – –
    ISB integration costs (LC) (27) (15) – – (97) (52) – –
    Mobility activitiesreorganisation (SFS) – – 4 3 – – (14) (10)
    Total impact on operating expenses (39) (25) 4 3 (123) (72) (14) (10)
    Mobility activities reorganisation (SFS) – – – – –   (85) (61)
    Provision for risk Ukraine (IRB) – – – – (20) (20) – –
    Total impact on cost of credit risk – – – – (20) (20) (85) (61)
    Mobility activities reorganisation (SFS) – – – – – – (39) (39)
    Total impact equity-accounted entities – – – – –   (39) (39)
    ISB integration costs (LC) (2) – – – (2) – – –
    Degroof Petercam acquisition costs (AG) 1 1 – – (22) (16) – –
    Mobility activities reorganisation (SFS) – – – – – – 89 57
    Total impact Net income on other assets (1) 1 – – (24) (16) 89 57
    Mobility activities reorganisation (SFS) – – 12 12 – – 12 12
    Total impact on change of value of goodwill – – 12 12 – – 12 12
    Mobility activities reorganisation (SFS) – – – 3 – – – 3
    Total impact on tax – – – 3 – – – 3
                     
    Total impact of specific items (64) (42) 109 86 (74) (39) 814 611
    Asset gathering (12) (9) – – (49) (36) – –
    French Retail banking – – 80 59 65 48 312 248
    International Retail banking – – – – (20) (20) – –
    Specialised financial services – – 16 17 – – 263 176
    Large customers (52) (33) 8 6 (70) (31) (39) (29)
    Corporate centre – – 5 4 (0) (0) 277 216

    * Impact before tax and before minority interests

    Crédit Agricole S.A. – Specific items

      Q4-24 Q4-23 2024 2023
    €m Gross
    impact*    		 Impact on
    Net income    		 Gross
    impact*    		 Impact on
    Net income    		 Gross
    impact*    		 Impact on
    Net income    		 Gross
    impact*    		 Impact on
    Net income
                     
    DVA (LC) (26) (19) 6 4 20 15 (15) (11)  
    Loan portfolio hedges (LC) 2 1 2 1 8 6 (24) (18)  
    Home Purchase Savings Plans (LCL) – – 6 4 3 2 58 41  
    Home Purchase Savings Plans (CC) – – 5 4 (2) (1) 236 175  
    Mobility activities reorganisation (SFS) – – – – – – 300 214
    Check Image Exchange penalty (CC) – – – – – – 42 42
    Check Image Exchange penalty (LCL) – – – – – – 21 20
    Total impact on revenues (24)            (17) 19 14 30 21 617 464
    Degroof Petercam integration costs (AG) (13) (9)    –    – (26) (19) – –  
    ISB integration costs (LC) (27) (15)    –     – (97) (52) – –  
    Mobility activities reorganisation (SFS)      –     –      4     3    –      – (14) (10)  
    Total impact on expenses               (39)              (25)             4        3 (123)               (71)       (14) (10)
    Provision for risk Ukraine (IRB) – – – – (20) (20) – –  
    Mobility activities reorganisation (SFS) – – – – –   (85) (61)  
    Total impact on cost of credit risk – – – – (20) (20) (85) (61)  
                     
    Mobility activities reorganisation (SFS) – – – – – – (39) (39)  
    Total impact equity-accounted entities – – – – –   (39) (39)  
    ISB integration costs (LC) (2) – – – (2) – – –  
    Degroof Petercam acquisition costs (AG) 1 1 – – (22) (16) – –  
    Mobility activities reorganisation (SFS) – – – – – – 89 57  
    Total impact Net income on other assets (1) 1 – – (24) (16) 89 57  
    Mobility activities reorganisation (SFS) – – 12 12 – – 12 12  
    Total impact on change of value of goodwill – – 12 12 – – 12 12  
    Mobility activities reorganisation (SFS) – – – 3 – – – 3  
    Total impact on tax – – – 3 – – – 3  
                     
    Total impact of specific items (64) (41) 35 31 (138) (86) 580 425  
    Asset gathering (12) (9) – – (49) (35) – –  
    French Retail banking – – 6 4 3 2 79 61  
    International Retail banking – – – – (20) (20) – –  
    Specialised financial services – – 16 17 – – 263 176  
    Large customers (52) (32) 8 6 (70) (32) (39) (28)  
    Corporate centre – – 5 4 (2) (1) 277 216  

    * Impact before tax and before minority interests

    Appendix 2 – Crédit Agricole Group: income statement by business line

    Crédit Agricole Group – Results by business line, Q4-23 and Q4-24

      Q4-24 (stated)
    €m RB LCL IRB AG SFS LC CC Total
                     
    Revenues 3,276 960 993 2,037 915 2,108 (472) 9,817
    Operating expenses excl. SRF (2,503) (647) (588) (930) (447) (1,298) 549 (5,863)
    SRF – – – – – – – –
    Gross operating income 773 313 405 1,107 468 810 77 3,954
    Cost of risk (263) (78) (97) (11) (306) (93) (19) (867)
    Equity-accounted entities 1 – – 29 43 7 – 80
    Net income on other assets (2) 1 0 (0) (9) (1) (10) (20)
    Income before tax 513 236 308 1,125 196 724 48 3,150
    Tax (110) (44) (100) (313) (49) (166) (2) (784)
    Net income from discont’d or held-for-sale ope. – – – – – – – –
    Net income 404 192 207 813 147 557 46 2,366
    Non controlling interests (1) (0) (31) (117) (24) (34) (11) (217)
    Net income Group Share 403 192 177 696 124 523 35 2,149
      Q4-23 (stated)
    €m RB LCL IRB AG SFS LC CC Total
                     
    Revenues 3,227 959 1,000 1,550 880 1,936 (782) 8,769
    Operating expenses excl. SRF (2,485) (654) (646) (726) (449) (1,209) 488 (5,682)
    SRF – – – – – – – –
    Gross operating income 742 305 353 824 431 727 (294) 3,088
    Cost of risk (321) (96) (98) (4) (184) (39) (20) (762)
    Equity-accounted entities (0) – (0) 29 40 5 – 73
    Net income on other assets (1) 0 2 (5) (11) (1) (4) (19)
    Income before tax 420 209 258 843 288 692 (328) 2,382
    Tax (85) (39) (104) (172) (53) (130) 128 (455)
    Net income from discont’d or held-for-sale ope. (0) – (10) – – – – (10)
    Net income 336 170 144 671 235 562 (200) 1,918
    Non controlling interests 0 0 (24) (123) (18) (25) (4) (194)
    Net income Group Share 336 170 120 548 217 537 (204) 1,724

    Crédit Agricole Group – Results by business line, 2024 et 2023

      2024 (stated)
    €m RB LCL IRB AG SFS LC CC Total
                     
    Revenues 13,110 3,872 4,153 7,633 3,520 8,652 (2,879) 38,060
    Operating expenses excl. SRF (9,956) (2,448) (2,225) (3,365) (1,780) (5,039) 2,084 (22,729)
    SRF – – – – – – – –
    Gross operating income 3,155 1,424 1,928 4,268 1,740 3,613 (795) 15,332
    Cost of risk (1,319) (373) (316) (29) (958) (117) (79) (3,191)
    Equity-accounted entities 8 – – 123 125 27 – 283
    Net income on other assets 1 5 0 (23) (12) 1 (13) (39)
    Income before tax 1,849 1,056 1,612 4,339 895 3,523 (887) 12,388
    Tax (423) (229) (536) (970) (187) (883) 341 (2,888)
    Net income from discont’d or held-for-sale ope. – – – – – – – –
    Net income 1,425 827 1,076 3,369 708 2,641 (546) 9,500
    Non controlling interests (2) (0) (160) (481) (82) (139) 4 (860)
    Net income Group Share 1,423 827 916 2,889 625 2,502 (542) 8,640
      2023 (stated)
    €m RB LCL IRB AG SFS LC CC Total
                     
    Revenues 13,259 3,850 4,040 6,693 3,597 7,780 (2,728) 36,492
    Operating expenses excl. SRF (9,702) (2,396) (2,189) (2,874) (1,673) (4,507) 1,877 (21,464)
    SRF (111) (44) (40) (6) (29) (312) (77) (620)
    Gross operating income 3,446 1,410 1,811 3,813 1,896 2,961 (928) 14,408
    Cost of risk (1,152) (301) (463) (5) (871) (120) (28) (2,941)
    Equity-accounted entities 9 – 1 102 130 21 – 263
    Net income on other assets 5 21 3 (10) 71 2 (5) 88
    Income before tax 2,308 1,130 1,353 3,900 1,237 2,865 (971) 11,821
    Tax (551) (256) (425) (868) (306) (691) 350 (2,748)
    Net income from discont’d or held-for-sale ope. (0) – (3) 1 (0) – – (3)
    Net income 1,756 874 924 3,033 931 2,174 (621) 9,071
    Non controlling interests (0) (0) (145) (466) (79) (118) (4) (813)
    Net income Group Share 1,756 874 780 2,566 851 2,056 (625) 8,258

    Appendix 3 – Crédit Agricole S.A.:   Results by business line

    Crédit Agricole S.A. – Results by business line, Q4-24 et Q4-23

      Q4-24 (stated)
    €m AG LC SFS FRB (LCL) IRB CC Total
                   
    Revenues 2,045 2,108 915 960 969 95 7,092
    Operating expenses excl. SRF (930) (1,298) (447) (647) (568) (28) (3,917)
    SRF – – – – – – –
    Gross operating income 1,116 810 468 313 401 67 3,175
    Cost of risk (11) (93) (306) (78) (100) (6) (594)
    Equity-accounted entities 29 7 43 – – (17) 62
    Net income on other assets (0) (1) (9) 1 0 (0) (9)
    Income before tax 1,133 723 196 236 302 44 2,634
    Tax (315) (166) (49) (44) (101) (7) (681)
    Net income from discont’d or held-for-sale ope. – – – – – – –
    Net income 819 557 147 192 201 37 1,953
    Non controlling interests (124) (45) (24) (9) (43) (19) (264)
    Net income Group Share 695 512 124 183 158 18 1,689
      Q4-23 (stated)  
    €m AG LC SFS FRB (LCL) IRB CC Total  
                   
    Revenues 1,555 1,935 880 959 974 (262) 6,040
    Operating expenses excl. SRF (726) (1,209) (449) (654) (627) (44) (3,710)
    SRF – – – – – – –
    Gross operating income 828 726 431 305 347 (306) 2,330
    Cost of risk (4) (39) (184) (96) (102) (14) (440)
    Equity-accounted entities 29 5 40 – (0) (12) 61
    Net income on other assets (5) (1) (11) 0 2 (3) (17)
    Income before tax 848 691 288 209 246 (345) 1,937
    Tax (173) (129) (53) (39) (103) 128 (369)
    Net income from discont’d or held-for-sale ope. – – – – (10) – (10)
    Net income 675 562 235 170 134 (217) 1,558
    Non controlling interests (130) (37) (18) (8) (31) (1) (224)
    Net income Group Share 546 525 217 162 103 (218) 1,334

    Crédit Agricole S.A. – Results by business line, 2024 et 2023

      2024 (stated)
    €m AG LC SFS FRB (LCL) IRB CC Total
                   
    Revenues 7,648 8,651 3,520 3,872 4,059 (570) 27,181
    Operating expenses excl. SRF (3,365) (5,039) (1,780) (2,448) (2,148) (116) (14,895)
    SRF – – – – – – –
    Gross operating income 4,284 3,612 1,740 1,424 1,911 (685) 12,286
    Cost of risk (29) (117) (958) (373) (313) (59) (1,850)
    Equity-accounted entities 123 27 125 – – (82) 194
    Net income on other assets (23) 1 (12) 5 0 23 (4)
    Income before tax – – – – – – –
    Tax 4,355 3,523 895 1,056 1,599 (803) 10,625
    Net income from discont’d or held-for-sale ope. (973) (883) (187) (229) (535) 336 (2,472)
    Net income – – – – – – –
    Non controlling interests 3,381 2,640 708 827 1,063 (466) 8,153
    Net income Group Share (506) (192) (82) (37) (227) (22) (1,067)
    Revenues 2,875 2,448 625 790 836 (488) 7,087
      2023 (stated)  
    €m AG LC SFS FRB (LCL) IRB CC Total  
                   
    Revenues 6,688 7,779 3,597 3,850 3,949 (683) 25,180
    Operating expenses excl. SRF (2,874) (4,507) (1,673) (2,396) (2,118) (64) (13,632)
    SRF (6) (312) (29) (44) (40) (77) (509)
    Gross operating income 3,808 2,960 1,896 1,410 1,791 (825) 11,039
    Cost of risk (5) (120) (870) (301) (464) (17) (1,777)
    Equity-accounted entities 102 21 130 – 1 (58) 197
    Net income on other assets (10) 2 71 21 3 (3) 85
    Income before tax – – 12 – – (9) 2
    Tax 3,894 2,864 1,237 1,130 1,332 (911) 9,546
    Net income from discont’d or held-for-sale ope. (872) (690) (306) (256) (422) 346 (2,201)
    Net income 1 – (0) – (3) – (3)
    Non controlling interests 3,024 2,174 931 874 906 (565) 7,343
    Net income Group Share (483) (162) (79) (39) (204) (28) (995)
    Revenues 2,541 2,011 852 835 703 (593) 6,348

    Appendix 4 – Data per share

    Crédit Agricole S.A. – Earnings p/share, net book value p/share and RoTE

    (€m)

    Q4-2024
    Q4-2023

    2024
    2023

    Net income Group share – stated

    1,689
    1,334

    7,087
    6,348
    – Interests on AT1, including issuance costs, before tax

    (112)
    (87)

    (463)
    (458)
    – Foreign exchange impact on reimbursed AT1

    –
    –

    (266)
    –
    NIGS attributable to ordinary shares – stated

    [A]
    1,577
    1,247

    6,358
    5,890
    Average number shares in issue, excluding treasury shares (m)

    [B]
    3,025
    3,032

    3,015
    3,031
    Net earnings per share – stated

    [A]/[B]
    0.52 €
    0.41 €

    2.11 €
    1.94 €
    Underlying net income Group share (NIGS)

    1,730
    1,303

    7,172
    5,923
    Underlying NIGS attributable to ordinary shares

    [C]
    1,618
    1,216

    6,443
    5,465
    Net earnings per share – underlying

    [C]/[B]
    0.54 €
    0.40 €

    2.14 €
    1.80 €

    (€m)

    31/12/2024
    31/12/2023
    Shareholder’s equity Group share

    74,710
    71,086
    – AT1 issuances

    (7,218)
    (7,220)
    – Unrealised gains and losses on OCI – Group share

    1,256
    1,074
    – Payout assumption on annual results*

    (3,327)
    (3,181)
    Net book value (NBV), not revaluated, attributable to ordin. sh.

    [D]

    65,421
    61,760
    – Goodwill & intangibles** – Group share

    (17,851)
    (17,347)
    Tangible NBV (TNBV), not revaluated attrib. to ordinary sh.

    [E]

    47,569
    44,413
    Total shares in issue, excluding treasury shares (period end, m)

    [F]

    3,025
    3,029

    NBV per share, after deduction of dividend to pay (€)
    Dividend to pay (€)
    TNBV per share, after deduction of dividend to pay (€)

    TNBV per sh., before deduct. of divid. to pay (€)

    €21.6 20,4 €
    €1.10 1,05 €
    €15.7 14,7 €
    €16.8 15,7 €
    20,4 €
    1,05 €
    14,7 €
    15,7 €
    €20.4
    €1.05
    €14.7
    €15.7

    * dividend proposed to the Board meeting to be paid
    ** including goodwill in the equity-accounted entities

    (€m)

    2024
    2023
    Net income Group share – stated

    [K]

    7,087
    6,348
    Impairment of intangible assets

    [L]

    0
    0
    Stated NIGS annualised

    [N] = ([K]-[L]-[M])*4/4+[M]

    7,087
    6,348
    Interests on AT1, including issuance costs, before tax, foreign exchange impact, annualised

    [O]

    -729
    -458
    Stated result adjusted

    [P] = [N]+[O]

    6,358
    5,890
    Tangible NBV (TNBV), not revaluated attrib. to ord. sh. – avg *** (3)

    [J]

    46,125
    43,281
    Stated ROTE adjusted (%)

    = [P] / [J]

    13.8%
    13.6%
    Underlying Net income Group share

    [Q]

    7,172
    5,923
    Underlying NIGS annualised

    [R] = ([Q]-[M])*4/4+[M]

    7,172
    5,923
    Underlying NIGS adjusted

    [S] = [R]+[O]

    6,443
    5,465
    Underlying ROTE adjusted(%)

    = [S] / [J]

    14.0%
    12.6%
    *** including assumption of dividend for the current exercise

    0.0%

    (1) Underlying: see appendixes for more details on specific items
    (2) Underlying ROTE calculated on the basis of an annualised underlying net income Group share and linearised IFRIC costs over the year
    (3) Average of the NTBV not revalued attributable to ordinary shares, calculated between 31/12/2023 and 31/12/2024 (line [E]), restated with an assumption of dividend for current exercises

    Alternative Performance Indicators99

    NBV Net Book Value (not revalued)
    The Net Book Value not revalued corresponds to the shareholders’ equity Group share from which the amount of the AT1 issues, the unrealised gains and/or losses on OCI Group share and the pay-out assumption on annual results have been deducted.

    NBV per share Net Book Value per share – NTBV Net Tangible Book Value per share
    One of the methods for calculating the value of a share. This represents the Net Book Value divided by the number of shares in issue at end of period, excluding treasury shares.

    Net Tangible Book Value per share represents the Net Book Value after deduction of intangible assets and goodwill, divided by the number of shares in issue at end of period, excluding treasury shares.

    EPS Earnings per Share
    This is the net income Group share, from which the AT1 coupon has been deducted, divided by the average number of shares in issue excluding treasury shares. It indicates the portion of profit attributable to each share (not the portion of earnings paid out to each shareholder, which is the dividend). It may decrease, assuming the net income Group share remains unchanged, if the number of shares increases.

    Cost/income ratio
    The cost/income ratio is calculated by dividing operating expenses by revenues, indicating the proportion of revenues needed to cover operating expenses.

    Cost of risk/outstandings
    Calculated by dividing the cost of credit risk (over four quarters on a rolling basis) by outstandings (over an average of the past four quarters, beginning of the period). It can also be calculated by dividing the annualised cost of credit risk for the quarter by outstandings at the beginning of the quarter. Similarly, the cost of risk for the period can be annualised and divided by the average outstandings at the beginning of the period.

    Since the first quarter of 2019, the outstandings taken into account are the customer outstandings, before allocations to provisions.

    The calculation method for the indicator is specified each time the indicator is used.

    Doubtful loan
    A doubtful loan is a loan in default. The debtor is considered to be in default when at least one of the following two conditions has been met:

    • a payment generally more than 90 days past due, unless specific circumstances point to the fact that the delay is due to reasons independent of the debtor’s financial situation.
    • the entity believes that the debtor is unlikely to settle its credit obligations unless it avails itself of certain measures such as enforcement of collateral security right.

    Impaired loan
    Loan which has been provisioned due to a risk of non-repayment.

    MREL
    The MREL (Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities) ratio is defined in the European “Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive” (BRRD). This Directive establishes a framework for the resolution of banks throughout the European Union, with the aim to provide resolution authorities with shared instruments and powers to pre-emptively tackle banking crises, preserve financial stability and reduce taxpayers’ exposure to losses. Directive (EU) 2019/879 of 20 May 2019 known as “BRRD2” amended the BRRD and was transposed into French law by Order 2020-1636 of 21 December 2020.

    The MREL ratio corresponds to an equity and eligible liabilities buffer required to absorb losses in the event of resolution. Under BRRD2, the MREL ratio is calculated as the amount of equity and eligible liabilities expressed as a percentage of risk weighted assets (RWA), as well as a leverage ratio exposure (LRE). Are eligible for the numerator of the total MREL ratio the Group’s regulatory equity, as well as eligible liabilities issued by the corporate centre and the Crédit Agricole network affiliated entities, i.e. subordinated notes, senior non-preferred debt instruments and certain senior preferred debt instruments with residual maturities of more than one year.

    Impaired (or non-performing) loan coverage ratio 
    This ratio divides the outstanding provisions by the impaired gross customer loans.

    Impaired (or non-performing) loan ratio 
    This ratio divides the impaired gross customer loans on an individual basis, before provisions, by the total gross customer loans.

    TLAC
    The Financial Stability Board (FSB) has defined the calculation of a ratio aimed at estimating the adequacy of the bail-in and recapitalisation capacity of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs). This Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) ratio provides resolution authorities with the means to assess whether G-SIBs have sufficient bail-in and recapitalisation capacity before and during resolution. It applies to Global Systemically Important Banks, and therefore to Crédit Agricole Group. Agricole. The TLAC ratio requirement was transposed into European Union law via CRR2 and has been applicable since 27 June 2019.

    The Group’s regulatory equity as well as subordinated notes and eligible senior non-preferred debt with residual maturities of more than one year issued by Crédit Agricole S.A. are eligible for the numerator of the TLAC ratio.

    Net income Group share
    Net income/(loss) for the financial year (after corporate income tax). Equal to net income Group share, less the share attributable to non-controlling interests in fully consolidated subsidiaries.

    Underlying Net income Group share
    The underlying net income Group share represents the stated net income Group share from which specific items have been deducted (i.e., non-recurring or exceptional items) to facilitate the understanding of the company’s actual earnings.

    Net income Group share attributable to ordinary shares
    The net income Group share attributable to ordinary shares represents the net income Group share from which the AT1 coupon has been deducted, including issuance costs before tax.

    RoTE Return on Tangible Equity
    The RoTE (Return on Tangible Equity) measures the return on tangible capital by dividing the Net income Group share annualised by the Group’s NBV net of intangibles and goodwill. The annualised Net income Group share corresponds to the annualisation of the Net income Group share (Q1x4; H1x2; 9Mx4/3) excluding impairments of intangible assets and restating each period of the IFRIC impacts in order to linearise them over the year.

    Disclaimer

    The financial information on Crédit Agricole S.A. and Crédit Agricole Group for the fourth quarter and the full year 2024 comprises this press release and the presentation and the attached appendices which are available on the website: https://www.credit-agricole.com/en/finance/finance/financial-publications.

    This presentation may include prospective information on the Group, supplied as information on trends. This data does not represent forecasts within the meaning of EU Delegated Act 2019/980 of 14 March 2019 (Chapter 1, article 1, d).

    This information was developed from scenarios based on a number of economic assumptions for a given competitive and regulatory environment. Therefore, these assumptions are by nature subject to random factors that could cause actual results to differ from projections. Likewise, the financial statements are based on estimates, particularly in calculating market value and asset impairment.

    Readers must take all these risk factors and uncertainties into consideration before making their own judgement.

    Applicable standards and comparability

    The figures presented for the twelve-month period ending 31 December 2024 have been prepared in accordance with IFRS as adopted in the European Union and applicable at that date, and with regulations currently in force.

    Note: The scopes of consolidation of the Crédit Agricole S.A. and Crédit Agricole Groups have not changed materially since the Crédit Agricole S.A. 2023 Universal Registration Document and its A.01 update (including all regulatory information about the Crédit Agricole Group) were filed with the AMF (the French Financial Markets Authority).

    The sum of values contained in the tables and analyses may differ slightly from the total reported due to rounding.

    At 30 June 2024, Indosuez Wealth Management had completed the acquisition of Degroof Petercam and now holds 65% of Banque Degroof Petercam alongside with CLdN Cobelfret, its historical shareholder, which would maintain a 20% stake in capital. As of 30 September 2024, Indosuez Wealth Management’s stake in Degroof Petercam has increased to 76%.

    At 30 June 2024, Amundi had completed the acquisition of Alpha Associates, an independent asset manager offering multi-management investment solutions in private assets.

    As of December 31, 2024, Amundi finalized the acquisition of aixigo, a European Wealth Tech player, to complete the ALTO platform’s offering.

    As of December 31, 2024, Crédit Agricole S.A. has entered into financial instruments for 5.2% of Banco BPM’s share capital.

    Financial Agenda

    30 April 2025                Publication of the 2025 first quarter results
    14 May 2025                General Meeting
    31 July 2025                Publication of the 2025 second quarter and the first half-year results
    30 October 2025                Publication of the 2025 third quarter and first nine months results

    Contacts

    CREDIT AGRICOLE PRESS CONTACTS

    CRÉDIT AGRICOLE S.A. INVESTOR RELATIONS CONTACTS

    Institutional investors + 33 1 43 23 04 31 investor.relations@credit-agricole-sa.fr
    Individual shareholders + 33 800 000 777 (freephone number – France only) relation@actionnaires.credit-agricole.com
         
    Cécile Mouton + 33 1 57 72 86 79 cecile.mouton@credit-agricole-sa.fr
     

    Equity investor relations:

    		    
    Jean-Yann Asseraf
    Fethi Azzoug    		 + 33 1 57 72 23 81
    + 33 1 57 72 03 75    		 jean-yann.asseraf@credit-agricole-sa.fr fethi.azzoug@credit-agricole-sa.fr
    Oriane Cante + 33 1 43 23 03 07 oriane.cante@credit-agricole-sa.fr
    Nicolas Ianna + 33 1 43 23 55 51 nicolas.ianna@credit-agricole-sa.fr
    Leila Mamou + 33 1 57 72 07 93 leila.mamou@credit-agricole-sa.fr
    Anna Pigoulevski + 33 1 43 23 40 59 anna.pigoulevski@credit-agricole-sa.fr
         
         
    Credit investor and rating agency relations:  
    Gwenaëlle Lereste + 33 1 57 72 57 84 gwenaelle.lereste@credit-agricole-sa.fr
    Florence Quintin de Kercadio + 33 1 43 23 25 32 florence.quintindekercadio@credit-agricole-sa.fr
         
         
         

    See all our press releases at: www.credit-agricole.com – www.creditagricole.info

             

    1 Car, home, health, legal, all mobile phones or personal accident insurance.
    2 CA Auto Bank, automotive JVs and automotive activities of other entities
    3 2024 market shares: CRCA and LCL household loans (source: Banque de France and internal); French UCITS (all customer segments); payments (in No. of transactions; source: Banque de France and internal)
    4 2023 market shares: insurance (Argus de l’Assurance and France Assureurs); property services
    5 Economic outlook to 2025
    6 Purchase price of transactions carried out since 2022. Includes shares acquired in Banco BPM and Worldline
    7 Disposal of Crédit du Maroc, La Médicale, Crédit Agricole Serbia and others
    8 Indosuez Wealth management acquires a 70% stake in Wealth Dynamix, a fintech specialising in client relationship management for private banks, wealth management and asset management actors across the world.
    9 Creation of Uptevia, held in equal shares by CACEIS and BNPP, wich brings together the activities for the issuers of the two banks.
    10 Independent asset manager offering private markets multi-manager investment solutions.
    11 Technology company of high value-added modular service for distributors of savings solutions.
    12 Acquisition of Merca Leasing, independent leasing company in Germany
    13 Commercial partnership for automobile insurance between Mobilize Financial Services, subsidiary of Renault Group, specialised in services facilitating access to automobiles, and Pacifica, Property and Casualty subsidiary of Credit Agricole Assurances
    14 Merge between Amundi and Victory Capital, acquisition of a participation of 26.1% in Victory Capital, and signature of distribution and services agreement lasting 15 years.
    15 Digital fleet management tool on monthly subscription
    16 Extended warranty
    17 Delivery of single vehicule
    18 Agreement allowing CA Autobank, Drivalia, Agilauto and Leasys to offer fatec fllet management services to their customers in France
    19 Employee benefits management tool
    20 Creation of a joint venture to develop innovative commercial offers.
    21 Leader in design, construction, and daily support for multidisciplinary collective primary care structures
    22 Credit Agricole Santé et Territoires and 10 regional banks enter the capital of Cette Famille, major player in inclusive housing for seniors in France.
    23         Omedys, specialist in assisted telemedicine, Medicalib, home care expert
    24 Low-carbon energy outstandings made up of renewable energy produced by the clients of all Crédit Agricole Group entities, including nuclear energy outstandings for Crédit Agricole CIB.
    25 Listed investments managed directly, listed investments managed under mandate and unlisted investments managed directly
    26 Crédit Agricole CIB green asset portfolio, in line with the eligibility criteria of the Group Green Bond Framework published in November 2023.
    27 Scope of power sector: CACIB and Unifergie (Crédit Agricole Transitions & Energies)
    28 DVA (Debt Valuation Adjustment)
    29Specific (one-off) items had impacted the fourth quarter of 2023 for the SFS division and for CACF as follows: +€17m in net income Group share, of which +€4m on operating expenses, +€12m on badwill and +€1m on tax.
    30 See Appendixes for more details on specific items.
    31 The cost of risk/outstandings (in basis points) on a four-quarter rolling basis is calculated on the cost of risk of the past four quarters divided by the average outstandings at the start of each of the four quarters
    32 The cost of risk/outstandings (in basis points) on an annualised basis is calculated on the cost of risk of the quarter multiplied by four and divided by the outstandings at the start of the quarter
    33 Average rate of loans to monthly production for October and November 2024.
    34 Equipment rate – Home-Car-Health policies, Legal, All Mobile/Portable or personal accident insurance
    35 SAS Rue La Boétie dividend paid annually in Q2
    36 Home Purchase Savings Plan base effect (reversal of the Home Purchase Savings Plan provision) in Q4-23 totalling +€73.6m in revenues and +€54.6m in net income Group share. 

    37 Underlying, excluding specific items.
    38 Scope effect of Degroof Petercam revenues: +€158 million in the fourth quarter of 2024.
    39 Scope effect in expenses in the fourth quarter of 2024: Degroof Petercam for -€120 million and miscellaneous others.

    40 Provisioning rate calculated with outstandings in Stage 3 as denominator, and the sum of the provisions recorded in Stages 1, 2 and 3 as numerator.
    41 The cost of risk/outstandings (in basis points) on a four-quarter rolling basis is calculated on the cost of risk of the past four quarters divided by the average outstandings at the start of each of the four quarters
    42 The cost of risk/outstandings (in basis points) on an annualised basis is calculated on the cost of risk of the quarter multiplied by four and divided by the outstandings at the start of the quarter
    43         See Appendixes for more details on specific items.
    44 SRF costs amounted to -€509 million over full-year 2023

    45 See Appendixes for details on the calculation of the RoTE (return on tangible equity)
    46 The annualised underlying net income Group share corresponds to the annualisation of the underlying net income Group share (Q1x4; H1x2; 9Mx4/3) by restating each period for IFRIC impacts to linearise them over the year
    47 In local standards
    48 Can reach up to 3.85% for the Anaé policy with a UL rate > 50% and benefiting from management fees of 0.5% 
    49 Scope “Life France”
    50 Property and casualty insurance premium income includes a scope: effect linked to the initial consolidation of CATU in Q2-24 (a property and casualty insurance entity in Poland): 9.4% Q4/Q4 increase in premium income at constant scope

    51 Scope: property and casualty in France and abroad
    52 Combined property & casualty ratio in France (Pacifica) including discounting and excluding undiscounting, net of reinsurance: (claims + operating expenses + fee and commission income)/gross premiums earned. Undiscounted ratio: 96.4% (-4.3 pp over the year)
    53 Excl. JVs
    54 Excluding assets under custody for institutional clients
    55 Amount of allocation of Contractual Service Margin (CSM) and Risk Adjustment (RA) including funeral guarantees
    56 Amount of allocation of CSM and RA
    57 Net of cost of reinsurance, excluding financial results
    58 Integration costs related to the acquisition of aixigo and the partnership with Victory Capital, which are expected to be completed towards the end of Q1 25, were recorded as operating expenses in the fourth quarter of 2024 for a total of -€14 million.
    59 Indosuez Wealth Management scope
    60 Degroof Petercam data for the quarter included in Wealth Management results: Revenues of €158m and expenses of -€120m (excluding integration costs partly borne by Degroof Petercam)
    61 In Q4 24: -€12.8 million of integration costs (impacting the operating expenses line); and +€0.8 million in acquisition costs (impacting the line gains and losses on other assets)
    62 2024 Degroof Petercam data included in the results of the Wealth Management business: NBI of €347 million and expenses of -€259 million (excluding integration costs partially borne by Degroof Petercam)
    63 In 2024: -€26.4 million in integration costs (impacting the operating expenses line); and -€22.2 million in acquisition costs (impacting the line gains and losses on other assets)
    64 Refinitiv LSEG
    65 Bloomberg in EUR
    66 Cost of risk for the last four quarters divided by the average of the outstandings at the start of all four quarters of the year
    67 CA Auto Bank, automotive JVs and auto activities of other entities
    68 CA Auto Bank and automotive JVs
    69 Q4-23 base effects related to the reorganisation of the Mobility activities (Expenses +€4m, Changes in value of goodwill +€12m, Corporate income tax +€1m and Net income Group share +€17m)
    70 12M-23 base effect linked to the reorganisation of Mobility activities (revenues €300m, expenses -€14m, cost of risk -€85m, equity-accounted entities -€39m, income on other assets €89m, Change in the value of goodwill +€12m, corporate tax €87m, net income Group share €176m)
    71 Q4-23 base effects related to the reorganisation of the Mobility activities (Expenses +€4m, Changes in value of goodwill +€12m, Corporate income tax +€1m and Net income Group share +€17m)
    72 Cost of risk for the last four quarters as a proportion of the average outstandings at the beginning of the period for the last four quarters.
    7312M-23 base effect related to the reorganisation of the Mobility activities (Revenues €300m, Expenses -€14m, Cost of risk -€85m, Equity-accounted entities -€39m, GPAI €89m, Changes in value of goodwill +€12m, Corporate income tax €87m and Net income Group share €176m)
    74 Net of POCI outstandings
    75 Source: Abi Monthly Outlook, January 2024: -1.0% Dec./Dec. for all loans
    76 At 31 December 2024, this scope corresponds to the aggregation of all Group entities present in Italy: CA Italy, CAPFM (Agos, Leasys, CA Auto Bank), CAA (CA Vita, CACI, CA Assicurazioni), Amundi, Crédit Agricole CIB, CAIWM, CACEIS, CALEF.
    77 In number of branches
    78 Net Promoter Score; source: Doxa survey, October 2023.
    79 Assofin publication, 30/04/2024 (excluding credit cards).
    80 Assets under management Source: Assogestioni, 31/05/2024
    81 Production. Source: IAMA, 30/04/2024
    82 Home Purchase Saving Plan base effect (reversal of the provision for Home Purchase Saving Plans) in Q4-23 of +€6.1 million in revenues and +€4.5 million in net income Group share versus 0 in Q4 2024.
    83 Home Purchase Saving Plan base effect (reversal of the provision for Home Purchase Saving Plans) in 2023 of +€57.9 million in revenues and +€41.2 million in net income Group share versus €3.1 million in revenues and +€2.2 million in net income Group share in 2024.
    84 Reversal of provision for Cheque Image Exchange Provision of + €21m in Q2-23
    85 At 31 December 2024 this scope includes the entities CA Italy, CA Polska, CA Egypt and CA Ukraine.

    86 Over a rolling four quarter period.
    87 At 31 December 2024, this scope corresponds to the aggregation of all Group entities present in Italy: CA Italy, CAPFM (Agos, Leasys, CA Auto Bank), CAA (CA Vita, CACI, CA Assicurazioni), Amundi, Crédit Agricole CIB, CAIWM, CACEIS, CALEF.
    88 As part of its annual resolvability assessment, Crédit Agricole Group has chosen in 2024 to continue waiving the possibility offered by Article 72ter(3) of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) to use senior preferred debt for compliance with its TLAC requirements over the resolvability period that will begin during 2025.
    89 Which excludes some client deposits from the asset custody business in coherence with the internal management.
    90Securities within liquidity reserves are valued after discounting idiosyncratic stress (previously systemic stress) to better reflect the economic reality of central bank value.
    91 Gross amount before buy-backs and amortisations
    92 Gross amount before buy-backs and amortisations
    93 Excl. AT1 issuances
    94 Gross amount before buy-backs and amortisations
    95 Excl. senior secured debt
    96 Gross amount before buy-backs and amortisations
    97 Gross amount before buy-backs and amortisations
    98 Excl. AT1 issuances
    99 APMs are financial indicators not presented in the financial statements or defined in accounting standards but used in the context of financial communications, such as underlying net income Group share or RoTE. They are used to facilitate the understanding of the company’s actual performance. Each APM indicator is matched in its definition to accounting data.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-Evening Report: In freezing foreign aid, the US leaves people to die – and allows China to come to the rescue

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Melissa Conley Tyler, Honorary Fellow, Asia Institute, The University of Melbourne

    One of the executive orders US President Donald Trump signed the day he was inaugurated was a 90-day pause in US foreign development assistance.

    The US Agency for International Development, USAID, was ordered to halt funding. Programs worldwide were issued with stop-work orders.

    All of a sudden, more than US$60 billion (around A$95 billion) of programs for the world’s most vulnerable people just stopped.

    So what happened? The world became less fair, and US soft power fizzled.

    What’s happened so far?

    We know this decision will cause deaths.

    Stop-work orders were delivered to programs that provide AIDS medication to patients. If you stop this, people die.

    Charities, many of which work on a shoestring, had no choice but immediately to lay off staff.

    Food and vaccines already in warehouses couldn’t be distributed.

    Programs providing landmine clearing and counterterrorism training ceased.

    Belatedly, the US walked this back to some extent by saying life-saving humanitarian programs would be exempted.

    But it doesn’t appear to have slowed the pace of layoffs, partly because of confusion.

    With USAID staff now either sacked, placed on forced leave or told to stay home – and the agency’s website taken down – USAID is essentially no longer operational.

    Agents from Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency have raided the offices of USAID and assumed control, with Musk posting on his X social network that “USAID is a criminal organization” and “it’s time for it to die”.

    Some of the people affected have gone public, including Australian organisations on behalf of their partners.

    But most in the sector can’t speak up if they hope for funding in the future. So the true extent of the impacts, including their knock-on effects, is likely much larger than has been publicly reported so far.

    A more unequal and unstable world

    With the halt in aid for the poorest, the world just became more unequal.

    Before this week, the US was the world’s largest aid donor.

    USAID was established by then-US president John F. Kennedy in 1961. Its programs focused on improving global health, alleviating poverty and providing emergency relief in response to natural disasters or conflict, as well as enhancing education and strengthening democratic institutions abroad.

    The countries that were receiving the most USAID assistance in 2023 were Ukraine, Ethiopia, Jordan, Afghanistan and Somalia.

    In the Indo-Pacific, the Lowy Institute’s aid maps show that the Pacific received US$249 million (about A$470 million) and SouthEast Asia received US$1 billion (almost A$1.6 billion) in US overseas development assistance annually in the most recent data.

    This funded 2,352 projects, including peacebuilding in Papua New Guinea, malaria control in Myanmar, early childhood development in Laos, and programs to improve the education, food security and health of school-age children across the region.

    All of these programs are now being reviewed to ensure they are “fully aligned with the foreign policy of the President of the United States”.

    Based on the first Trump administration, there seems no chance that programs on climate, gender equality, abortion and equity inclusion will be reinstated after the 90-day assessment period. Losing funds for climate adaptation and mitigation is a huge issue for the Pacific Islands.

    Assistance for survivors of gender-based violence, employment for people with disabilities and support for LGBTQIA+ youth will likely lose funding.

    In communities that received significant USAID funding, the sudden cut in programs and loss of community organisations will damage the fabric of society.

    An unequal world is a less stable one. Australia’s peak body for the non-government aid sector, the Australian Council for International Development, says the suspension of USAID programs “will work against efforts to build peace, safety, and economic stability for the world”.

    A power that’s no longer super

    Thinking of the impact on the US interests, there has been an enormous hit to US soft power from an entire pillar of US foreign policy suddenly disappearing.

    This is underlined by the fact the cuts apply equally to ally, partner and adversary nations alike.

    In the Pacific, the Biden Administration made a real effort to increase US presence, opening embassies and announcing USAID programs.

    All of this has now been squandered by withdrawing from this space. I am aware of a project for which China has come in to provide funding where US funding has gone. It is a spectacular setback for the US.

    What is most extraordinary is that this is self-inflicted damage. There were alternatives, such as continuing business as usual during a 90-day period of review, then giving notice to some programs that they would be discontinued.

    The performative and haphazard way in which the policy has been implemented suggests an administration that doesn’t care much about the world outside its borders and is more concerned about ideological battles within.

    Researcher Cameron Hill describes Trump as linking foreign aid “to the symbols and slogans of his domestic political coalition”. This is likely to continue beyond the demise of USAID to other agencies involved in foreign assistance, such as development finance.

    Australia needs to help fill the gap

    What does this mean for Australia? As a middle power, it has an opportunity to step up – and work with other development partners such as Japan, Korea, India, Indonesia, Canada and European donors in the face of a genuine emergency.

    For the Australian government this might mean an emergency increase in development funding or freeing up existing funding to keep the lights on.

    Australia will undoubtedly now need to step up on climate programs in the Pacific if US funding doesn’t return. Australia could seek to convene an urgent meeting through the Pacific Islands Forum to discuss.

    The first fortnight of the Trump administration has had global impact well beyond US politics. On the most important issue for the majority of the world – development – the US decided to withdraw, destroying in a few days what have taken decades to build.

    Melissa Conley Tyler is Executive Director at the Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy & Defence Dialogue (AP4D), an initiative funded by the foreign affairs and defence portfolios and hosted by the Australian Council for International Development.

    – ref. In freezing foreign aid, the US leaves people to die – and allows China to come to the rescue – https://theconversation.com/in-freezing-foreign-aid-the-us-leaves-people-to-die-and-allows-china-to-come-to-the-rescue-249024

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: New UK support for Ukraine drives forward 100 Year Partnership

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    The UK will boost Ukrainian grain supplies to Syria as the Foreign Secretary drives forward the 100 Year Partnership on visit to Kyiv.

    • The UK’s immediate support for Ukraine and the longer-term partnership between our two countries both top of the agenda in Foreign Secretary’s visit to Kyiv. 

    • New UK support totalling £55m will boost resilience and growth in the UK and Ukraine.

    Visiting Kyiv today, David Lammy will see first-hand how UK support is putting Ukraine in the strongest possible position as it enters its fourth year of Russia’s full-scale invasion. 

    Delivering on commitments made to President Zelenskyy by Prime Minister Keir Starmer two weeks ago, the UK is providing £3 million for deliveries of Ukrainian grain and other food produce to Syria.  

    Working with the World Food Programme, this planned support will provide a lifeline to the most vulnerable in Syria unlike Russian grain supplies to the brutal Assad regime which attempted to buy favour, loading costly debt on the Syrian state. 

    These malign efforts from Russia often likely used produce from illegally occupied Ukrainian land. Russia is estimated to be taking 4.3 million tonnes of grain each year from temporarily occupied territories. It comes after the Prime Minister announced a new Grain Verification Scheme to track stolen grain from occupied Ukrainian territories last month. The UK developed the new scheme following an ask from Ukraine to the G7 to help trace snatched grain from Ukraine fields under Russian control, which is then relabelled and sold on. 

    Russia has repeatedly attacked Ukrainian port infrastructure and ships in the Black Sea, delaying vital food and aid from reaching the global south. These attacks hinder food supplies from reaching the most in need and help drive up food and fuel prices around the world. 

    However, Ukraine’s navy continues to fight back, having destroyed or damaged roughly one quarter of the Black Sea Fleet’s major combatant vessels, denying Russia control of the western Black Sea.  

    As part of the Foreign Secretary’s visit, he will meet with President Zelenskyy, Foreign Minister Sybiha, Prime Minister Shmyhal, and Deputy Prime Minister Stefanishyna, to reiterate the UK’s ongoing support and discuss first-hand how the UK and international partners can put Ukraine into the strongest position possible. 

    In his second official visit to Kyiv, Mr Lammy will announce £17 million for innovative energy projects to support the recovery and sustainability of Ukraine’s energy system. The InnovateUkraine competition will spur collaborations between British, Ukrainian and international businesses and research institutions to find the resilient, scalable and sustainable energy solutions of the future.  

    Despite relentless Russian attacks on their energy system, Ukrainians have shown that with the right support and international collaboration, they can use ingenuity and innovation to keep the lights on and defend themselves against Russia’s illegal invasion. Producing clean, reliable and affordable energy is a vital part of the struggle for Ukraine’s freedom and its defense against Russian attempts to use energy as a weapon.  

    Shoring up Ukraine’s private sector and the resilience of small and medium businesses, the new economic recovery programme, announced by the Prime Minister as part of the 100 Year Partnership, will receive a £10 million boost to help renew, rebuild and reform Ukraine’s economy for the future.

    Foreign Secretary, David Lammy said:

    Our support for Ukraine remains unbreakable. We are determined to put Ukraine in the strongest possible position, both in its fight against Russia and beyond, with our long-term relationship cemented by the 100 Year Partnership. 

    We believe in building for the future between our two countries, as well as supporting Ukraine in the present, as Russia’s barbaric and relentless attacks on vital infrastructure, communities, and businesses continue. That is why we are announcing more support for innovation in Ukraine, to rebuild a more resilient and sustainable society for years to come. 

    Delivering change at home, against the backdrop of an increasingly volatile world, means we must bolster the resilience of our partners.

    A further £25 million of UK funding will support Ukraine to strengthen more inclusive, effective and efficient social systems and services. We will work with Ukraine to revitalise family and community-based services that meet the needs of women, children, people with disabilities and marginalised groups and ensure a safe and loving family for every child.  

    The UK’s SPIRIT programme will bolster Ukraine’s resilience against Russian aggression by helping Ukraine build a more resilient, prosperous and barrier-free future for all. 

    Announcements made today will open up opportunities for British business, by harnessing UK expertise, creating trade and investment opportunities, and building links between the UK and Ukraine for years to come. 

    Support announced today builds on the UK’s strong record as a leading bilateral donor, having committed £977 million in support, including £477 million in humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and the region since the start of the full-scale invasion. We will provide £282 million in support for 2024-25, in addition to the Prime Minister’s commitment to provide £3billion of military support to Ukraine, this year and for as long as it takes.

    Background

    • More information on the UK’s support to Ukraine can be found here

    • More information on the 100 Year Partnership can be found here

    • The UK provided £35 million in emergency support for energy and most vulnerable in Ukraine in December

    Updates to this page

    Published 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Security: VIDEO: IAEA Director General in Ukraine

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi is in Ukraine to assess damage to key electricity infrastructure that is critical to the country’s nuclear safety.

    This is the 11th mission to Ukraine led personally by the Director General since the conflict began almost three years ago, demonstrating the IAEA’s unwavering commitment to assist Ukraine in ensuring nuclear safety and security.

    Read the latest IAEA update on the situation here. 

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI: Landmark Bancorp, Inc. Announces 6.3% Increase in Net Earnings for the Year Ended December 31, 2024, and Fourth Quarter Earnings Per Share of $0.57. Declares Cash Dividend of $0.21 per Share

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Manhattan, KS, Feb. 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Landmark Bancorp, Inc. (“Landmark”; Nasdaq: LARK) reported diluted earnings per share of $0.57 for the three months ended December 31, 2024, compared to $0.68 per share in the third quarter of 2024 and $0.46 per share in the same quarter last year. Net income for the fourth quarter totaled $3.3 million, compared to $2.6 million in the fourth quarter of 2023 and $3.9 million in the prior quarter. For the three months ended December 31, 2024, the return on average assets was 0.83%, the return on average equity was 9.54% and the efficiency ratio was 70.0%.

    For the year ended December 31, 2024, diluted earnings per share totaled $2.26 compared to $2.13 during 2023. Net earnings for 2024 totaled $13.0 million, compared to $12.2 million in 2023, or an increase of 6.3%. For the year ended December 31, 2024, the return on average assets was 0.83%, the return on average equity was 10.01% and the efficiency ratio was 69.1%.

    2024 Performance Highlights

      ● Fourth quarter loan growth totaled $50.5 million or an annualized increase of 20.1% over the prior quarter.
      ● For the year, gross loans grew $103.7 million or 10.9%.
      ● Net interest margin improved 21 basis points to 3.51% compared to 3.30% in prior quarter.
      ● Deposits increased $53.3 million, or 16.6% annualized, from the prior quarter.
      ● Total borrowings decreased $34.7 million in the fourth quarter.
      ● A pre-tax loss of $1.0 million was realized in the fourth quarter to reposition a portion of the investment portfolio.
      ● Credit quality remained good with net charge-offs totaling $219,000 in the fourth quarter.
         

    In making this announcement, Abby Wendel, President and Chief Executive Officer of Landmark, commented, “During 2024, we experienced strong loan demand, especially for residential mortgages and commercial real estate loans. In the fourth quarter 2024, we saw strong growth in virtually all loan categories, with total gross loans increasing by $51 million or 20% (annualized). Total deposits also increased in the fourth quarter by more than $53 million, mostly due to seasonal growth in money market and interest checking accounts. The increase in deposits coupled with investment securities sales and maturities this quarter helped fund loan growth and reduce expensive short-term borrowings. For the year, net interest income grew 5.6% over the previous year while in the fourth quarter 2024 our net interest margin improved to 3.51%. Strategic investments in our people and product offerings resulted in higher non-interest expenses, particularly in the fourth quarter. Credit quality remained solid overall.”

    Landmark’s Board of Directors declared a cash dividend of $0.21 per share, to be paid March 5, 2025, to common stockholders of record as of the close of business on February 19, 2025. On December 16, 2024, the Company issued a 5% stock dividend to common stockholders, representing the 24th consecutive year that a stock dividend has been paid.

    Management will host a conference call to discuss the Company’s financial results at 10:00 a.m. (Central time) on Wednesday, February 5, 2025. Investors may participate via telephone by dialing (833) 470-1428 and using access code 296482. A replay of the call will be available through February 12, 2025, by dialing (866) 813-9403 and using access code 817329.

    Net Interest Income

    Net interest income in the fourth quarter of 2024 amounted to $12.4 million representing an increase of $795,000, or 6.9%, compared to the previous quarter. The increase in net interest income was due mainly to lower interest expense on deposits and other borrowed funds. The net interest margin increased to 3.51% during the fourth quarter from 3.30% during the prior quarter. Compared to the previous quarter, interest income on loans increased $22,000 to $16.0 million due to higher average balances but partially offset by lower yields on loans. Average loan balances increased $24.5 million while the average tax-equivalent yield on the loan portfolio decreased 15 basis points to 6.28%. Interest on investment securities declined slightly due to lower balances while partially offset by higher earning rates. Compared to the third quarter 2024, interest on deposits decreased $480,000, or 8.2% mainly due to lower rates, while interest on other borrowed funds declined by $363,000, due to lower rates and balances. The average rate on interest-bearing deposits decreased 23 basis points to 2.25% while the average rate on other borrowed funds decreased 51 basis points to 5.10% in the fourth quarter.

    Non-Interest Income

    Non-interest income totaled $3.4 million for the fourth quarter of 2024, a decrease of $882,000 from the previous quarter. The decrease in non-interest income during the fourth quarter of 2024 was primarily due to a $1.0 million loss on the sales of lower yielding investment securities mentioned above, while the third quarter of 2024 did not include any sales of investment securities. Additionally, lower sales of residential mortgages this quarter resulted in a decline of $182,000 in gains on sales of these mortgages. The decline in other non-interest income of $221,000 this quarter compared to the prior quarter resulted from sales of premises, equipment and foreclosed assets that did not re-occur in the current quarter. Partially offsetting those declines was an increase of $722,000 in bank owned life insurance income.

    Non-Interest Expense

    During the fourth quarter of 2024, non-interest expense totaled $11.9 million, an increase of $1.3 million compared to the prior quarter. The increase in non-interest expense was primarily due to increases of $470,000 in professional fees and $461,000 in compensation and benefits. The increase in professional fees this quarter was primarily due to higher consulting costs on several initiatives. The increase in compensation and benefits was attributable to an increase in employees and higher incentive compensation costs.

    Income Tax Expense (Benefit)

    Landmark recorded an income tax benefit of $886,000 in the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to income tax expense of $867,000 in the prior quarter. The effective tax rate was (37.0%) in the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to 18.1% in the third quarter of 2024. The fourth quarter of 2024 included the recognition of $1.0 million of previously unrecognized tax benefits, which reduced the effective tax rate.

    Balance Sheet Highlights

    As of December 31, 2024, gross loans totaled $1.1 billion, an increase of $50.5 million, or 20.1% annualized since September 30, 2024. During the quarter, loan growth was primarily comprised of commercial real estate (growth of $21.1 million), commercial (growth of $10.7 million), agriculture (growth of $8.6 million) and one-to-four family residential real estate (growth of $7.8 million) loans. Investment securities decreased $38.5 million during the fourth quarter of 2024 and included sales of $36.0 million in low-rate U.S. treasury securities offset by purchases of $18.0 million in market rate U.S. treasury securities. Pre-tax unrealized net losses on the investment securities portfolio increased from $13.3 million at September 30, 2024 to $20.9 million at December 31, 2024 mainly due to higher market rates for these securities at year end.

    Period end deposit balances increased $53.3 million to $1.3 billion at December 31, 2024. The increase in deposits was mainly driven by an increase in money market and checking (increase of $71.3 million) but partially offset by declines in certificates of deposit (decrease of $9.2 million) and non-interest-bearing demand deposits (decrease of $8.6 million). The increase in money market and checking accounts was mainly driven by seasonal growth in public fund deposit account balances. Total borrowings decreased $34.7 million during the fourth quarter 2024. At December 31, 2024, the loan to deposits ratio was 78.2% compared to 77.6% in the prior quarter.

    Stockholders’ equity decreased to $136.2 million (book value of $23.59 per share) as of December 31, 2024, from $139.7 million (book value of $24.18 per share) as of September 30, 2024. The decrease in stockholders’ equity was due to an increase in accumulated other comprehensive losses as the unrealized net losses on investments securities increased during the fourth quarter. The ratio of equity to total assets decreased to 8.65% on December 31, 2024, from 8.93% on September 30, 2024.

    The allowance for credit losses totaled $12.8 million, or 1.22% of total gross loans on December 31, 2024, compared to $11.5 million, or 1.15% of total gross loans on September 30, 2024. Net loan charge-offs totaled $219,000 in the fourth quarter of 2024, compared to $9,000 during the third quarter of 2024. A provision for credit losses for loans of $1.5 million was recorded in the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to $650,000 in the third quarter of 2024.

    Non-performing loans totaled $13.1 million, or 1.25% of gross loans at December 31, 2024 compared to $13.4 million, or 1.34% of gross loans at September 30, 2024. Loans 30-89 days delinquent declined to $6.2 million, or 0.59% of gross loans, as of December 31, 2024, compared to $7.3 million, or 0.73% of gross loans, as of September 30, 2024.

    About Landmark

    Landmark Bancorp, Inc., the holding company for Landmark National Bank, is listed on the Nasdaq Global Market under the symbol “LARK.” Headquartered in Manhattan, Kansas, Landmark National Bank is a community banking organization dedicated to providing quality financial and banking services. Landmark National Bank has 29 locations in 23 communities across Kansas: Manhattan (2), Auburn, Dodge City (2), Fort Scott (2), Garden City, Great Bend (2), Hoisington, Iola, Junction City, La Crosse, Lawrence (2), Lenexa, Louisburg, Mound City, Osage City, Osawatomie, Overland Park, Paola, Pittsburg, Prairie Village, Topeka (2), Wamego and Wellsville, Kansas. Visit www.banklandmark.com for more information.

    Contact:
    Mark A. Herpich
    Chief Financial Officer
    (785) 565-2000

    Special Note Concerning Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release may contain forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 with respect to the financial condition, results of operations, plans, objectives, future performance and business of Landmark. Forward-looking statements, which may be based upon beliefs, expectations and assumptions of our management and on information currently available to management, are generally identifiable by the use of words such as “believe,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “plan,” “intend,” “estimate,” “may,” “will,” “would,” “could,” “should” or other similar expressions. Additionally, all statements in this press release, including forward-looking statements, speak only as of the date they are made, and Landmark undertakes no obligation to update any statement in light of new information or future events. A number of factors, many of which are beyond our ability to control or predict, could cause actual results to differ materially from those in our forward-looking statements. These factors include, among others, the following: (i) the strength of the local, national and international economies, including the effects of changing inflationary pressures and supply chain constraints on such economies; (ii) changes in state and federal laws, regulations and governmental policies concerning banking, securities, consumer protection, insurance, monetary, trade and tax matters, including changes in interpretation or prioritization; (iii) changes in interest rates and prepayment rates of our assets; (iv) increased competition in the financial services sector and the inability to attract new customers, including from non-bank competitors such as credit unions and “fintech” companies; (v) timely development and acceptance of new products and services; (vi) changes in technology and the ability to develop and maintain secure and reliable electronic systems; (vii) our risk management framework; (viii) interruptions in information technology and telecommunications systems and third-party services; (ix) changes and uncertainty in benchmark interest rates, including the timing of additional rate changes, if any, by the Federal Reserve; (x) the economic effects of severe weather, natural disasters, widespread disease or pandemics, or other external events; (xi) the loss of key executives or employees; (xii) changes in consumer spending; (xiii) integration of acquired businesses; (xiv) unexpected outcomes of existing or new litigation; (xv) changes in accounting policies and practices, such as the implementation of the current expected credit losses accounting standard; (xvi) the economic impact of past and any future terrorist attacks, acts of war, including the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the conflict in Ukraine, or threats thereof, and the response of the United States to any such threats and attacks; (xvii) the ability to manage credit risk, forecast loan losses and maintain an adequate allowance for loan losses; (xviii) fluctuations in the value of securities held in our securities portfolio; (xix) concentrations within our loan portfolio, large loans to certain borrowers, and large deposits from certain clients; (xx) the concentration of large deposits from certain clients who have balances above current FDIC insurance limits and may withdraw deposits to diversify their exposure; (xxi) the level of non-performing assets on our balance sheets; (xxii) the ability to raise additional capital; (xxiii) cyber-attacks; (xxiv) declines in real estate values; (xxv) the effects of fraud on the part of our employees, customers, vendors or counterparties; and (xxvi) any other risks described in the “Risk Factors” sections of reports filed by Landmark with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These risks and uncertainties should be considered in evaluating forward-looking statements, and undue reliance should not be placed on such statements. Additional information concerning Landmark and its business, including additional risk factors that could materially affect Landmark’s financial results, is included in our filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

    LANDMARK BANCORP, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    Consolidated Balance Sheets (unaudited)

        December 31,     September 30,     June 30,     March 31,     December 31,  
    (Dollars in thousands)   2024     2024     2024     2024     2023  
    Assets                                        
    Cash and cash equivalents   $ 20,275     $ 21,211     $ 23,889     $ 16,468     $ 27,101  
    Interest-bearing deposits at other banks     4,110       4,363       4,881       4,920       4,918  
    Investment securities available-for-sale, at fair value:                                        
    U.S. treasury securities     64,458       83,753       89,325       93,683       95,667  
    Municipal obligations, tax exempt     107,128       112,126       114,047       118,445       120,623  
    Municipal obligations, taxable     71,715       75,129       74,588       75,371       79,083  
    Agency mortgage-backed securities     129,211       140,004       142,499       149,777       157,396  
    Total investment securities available-for-sale     372,512       411,012       420,459       437,276       452,769  
    Investment securities held-to-maturity     3,672       3,643       3,613       3,584       3,555  
    Bank stocks, at cost     6,618       7,894       9,647       7,850       8,123  
    Loans:                                        
    One-to-four family residential real estate     352,209       344,380       332,090       312,833       302,544  
    Construction and land     25,328       23,454       30,480       24,823       21,090  
    Commercial real estate     345,159       324,016       318,850       323,397       320,962  
    Commercial     192,325       181,652       178,876       181,945       180,942  
    Agriculture     100,562       91,986       84,523       86,808       89,680  
    Municipal     7,091       7,098       6,556       5,690       4,507  
    Consumer     29,679       29,263       29,200       28,544       28,931  
    Total gross loans     1,052,353       1,001,849       980,575       964,040       948,656  
    Net deferred loan (fees) costs and loans in process     (307 )     (63 )     (583 )     (578 )     (429 )
    Allowance for credit losses     (12,825 )     (11,544 )     (10,903 )     (10,851 )     (10,608 )
    Loans, net     1,039,221       990,242       969,089       952,611       937,619  
    Loans held for sale, at fair value     3,420       3,250       2,513       2,697       853  
    Bank owned life insurance     39,056       39,176       38,826       38,578       38,333  
    Premises and equipment, net     20,220       20,976       20,986       20,696       19,709  
    Goodwill     32,377       32,377       32,377       32,377       32,377  
    Other intangible assets, net     2,578       2,729       2,900       3,071       3,241  
    Mortgage servicing rights     3,061       3,041       2,997       2,977       3,158  
    Real estate owned, net     167       428       428       428       928  
    Other assets     26,855       23,309       28,149       29,684       28,988  
    Total assets   $ 1,574,142     $ 1,563,651     $ 1,560,754     $ 1,553,217     $ 1,561,672  
                                             
    Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity                                        
    Liabilities:                                        
    Deposits:                                        
    Non-interest-bearing demand     351,595       360,188       360,631       364,386       367,103  
    Money market and checking     636,963       565,629       546,385       583,315       613,613  
    Savings     145,514       145,825       150,996       154,000       152,381  
    Certificates of deposit     194,694       203,860       192,470       191,823       183,154  
    Total deposits     1,328,766       1,275,502       1,250,482       1,293,524       1,316,251  
    FHLB and other borrowings     53,046       92,050       131,330       74,716       64,662  
    Subordinated debentures     21,651       21,651       21,651       21,651       21,651  
    Repurchase agreements     13,808       9,528       8,745       15,895       12,714  
    Accrued interest and other liabilities     20,656       25,229       20,292       20,760       19,480  
    Total liabilities     1,437,927       1,423,960       1,432,500       1,426,546       1,434,758  
    Stockholders’ equity:                                        
    Common stock     58       55       55       55       55  
    Additional paid-in capital     95,051       89,532       89,469       89,364       89,208  
    Retained earnings     56,934       60,549       57,774       55,912       54,282  
    Treasury stock, at cost     –       (396 )     (330 )     (249 )     (75 )
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss     (15,828 )     (10,049 )     (18,714 )     (18,411 )     (16,556 )
    Total stockholders’ equity     136,215       139,691       128,254       126,671       126,914  
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity   $ 1,574,142     $ 1,563,651     $ 1,560,754     $ 1,553,217     $ 1,561,672  


    LANDMARK BANCORP, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    Consolidated Statements of Earnings (unaudited)

        Three months ended,     Year ended,  
        December 31,     September 30,     December 31,     December 31,     December 31,  
    (Dollars in thousands, except per share amounts)   2024     2024     2023     2024     2023  
    Interest income:                                        
    Loans   $ 15,955     $ 15,933     $ 14,223     $ 61,400     $ 51,753  
    Investment securities:                                        
    Taxable     2,210       2,301       2,453       9,298       9,594  
    Tax-exempt     738       747       761       3,008       3,094  
    Interest-bearing deposits at banks     49       41       49       193       242  
    Total interest income     18,952       19,022       17,486       73,899       64,683  
    Interest expense:                                        
    Deposits     5,350       5,830       4,879       22,310       15,254  
    FHLB and other borrowings     737       1,100       1,203       3,886       4,048  
    Subordinated debentures     389       416       422       1,635       1,590  
    Repurchase agreements     77       72       96       344       499  
    Total interest expense     6,553       7,418       6,600       28,175       21,391  
    Net interest income     12,399       11,604       10,886       45,724       43,292  
    Provision for credit losses     1,500       500       50       2,300       349  
    Net interest income after provision for credit losses     10,899       11,104       10,836       43,424       42,943  
    Non-interest income:                                        
    Fees and service charges     2,710       2,880       2,763       10,742       10,220  
    Gains on sales of loans, net     522       704       255       2,386       2,269  
    Bank owned life insurance     976       254       242       1,723       913  
    Losses on sales of investment securities, net     (1,031 )     –       (1,246 )     (1,031 )     (1,246 )
    Other     194       415       240       924       1,074  
    Total non-interest income     3,371       4,253       2,254       14,744       13,230  
    Non-interest expense:                                        
    Compensation and benefits     6,264       5,803       5,756       23,103       22,681  
    Occupancy and equipment     1,550       1,429       1,429       5,663       5,565  
    Data processing     452       464       462       1,889       1,940  
    Amortization of mortgage servicing rights and other intangibles     240       256       437       1,164       1,844  
    Professional fees     1,043       573       730       2,912       2,452  
    Valuation allowance on real estate held for sale     –       –       –       1,108       –  
    Other     2,325       2,034       1,748       8,240       7,501  
    Total non-interest expense     11,874       10,559       10,562       44,079       41,983  
    Earnings before income taxes     2,396       4,798       2,528       14,089       14,190  
    Income tax expense (benefit)     (886 )     867       (111 )     1,086       1,954  
    Net earnings   $ 3,282     $ 3,931     $ 2,639     $ 13,003     $ 12,236  
                                             
    Net earnings per share (1)                                        
    Basic   $ 0.57     $ 0.68     $ 0.46     $ 2.26     $ 2.13  
    Diluted     0.57       0.68       0.46       2.26       2.13  
    Dividends per share (1)     0.20       0.20       0.19       0.80       0.76  
    Shares outstanding at end of period (1)     5,775,198       5,776,282       5,751,475       5,775,198       5,751,475  
    Weighted average common shares outstanding – basic (1)     5,775,227       5,765,348       5,755,175       5,758,056       5,751,585  
    Weighted average common shares outstanding – diluted (1)     5,789,764       5,770,514       5,755,175       5,764,282       5,754,840  
                                             
    Tax equivalent net interest income   $ 12,574     $ 11,777     $ 11,017     $ 46,428     $ 44,040  
    (1 ) Share and per share values at or for the periods ended September 30, 2024 and December 31, 2024 have been adjusted to give effect to the 5% stock dividend paid during December 2024.
         

    LANDMARK BANCORP, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    Select Ratios and Other Data (unaudited)

        As of or for the three months ended,     As of or for the year ended,  
        December 31,     September 30,     December 31,     December 31,     December 31,  
    (Dollars in thousands, except per share amounts)   2024     2024     2023     2024     2023  
    Performance ratios:                                        
    Return on average assets (1)     0.83 %     1.01 %     0.67 %     0.83 %     0.80 %
    Return on average equity (1)     9.54 %     11.95 %     9.39 %     10.01 %     10.70 %
    Net interest margin (1)(2)     3.51 %     3.30 %     3.11 %     3.28 %     3.17 %
    Effective tax rate     -37.0 %     18.1 %     -4.4 %     7.7 %     13.8 %
    Efficiency ratio (3)     70.0 %     66.5 %     71.9 %     69.1 %     71.2 %
    Non-interest income to total income (3)     25.9 %     25.5 %     24.3 %     25.3 %     25.1 %
                                             
    Average balances:                                        
    Investment securities   $ 409,648     $ 428,301     $ 463,763     $ 432,928     $ 486,268  
    Loans     1,010,153       985,659       934,333       974,293       891,487  
    Assets     1,568,821       1,562,482       1,555,742       1,558,236       1,535,694  
    Interest-bearing deposits     944,969       936,218       910,610       938,223       892,373  
    FHLB and other borrowings     57,507       77,958       84,408       70,226       74,210  
    Subordinated debentures     21,651       21,651       21,651       21,651       21,651  
    Repurchase agreements     12,212       10,774       13,785       12,216       18,361  
    Stockholders’ equity   $ 136,933     $ 132,271     $ 111,560     $ 129,944     $ 114,339  
                                             
    Average tax equivalent yield/cost (1):                                        
    Investment securities     3.03 %     2.99 %     2.86 %     3.00 %     2.76 %
    Loans     6.28 %     6.43 %     6.04 %     6.30 %     5.81 %
    Total interest-bearing assets     5.34 %     5.38 %     4.97 %     5.28 %     4.71 %
    Interest-bearing deposits     2.25 %     2.48 %     2.13 %     2.38 %     1.71 %
    FHLB and other borrowings     5.10 %     5.61 %     5.65 %     5.53 %     5.45 %
    Subordinated debentures     7.15 %     7.64 %     7.73 %     7.55 %     7.34 %
    Repurchase agreements     2.51 %     2.66 %     2.79 %     2.82 %     2.72 %
    Total interest-bearing liabilities     2.52 %     2.82 %     2.54 %     2.70 %     2.13 %
                                             
    Capital ratios:                                        
    Equity to total assets     8.65 %     8.93 %     8.13 %                
    Tangible equity to tangible assets (3)     6.58 %     6.84 %     5.98 %                
    Book value per share   $ 23.59     $ 24.18     $ 22.07                  
    Tangible book value per share (3)   $ 17.53     $ 18.11     $ 15.87                  
                                             
    Rollforward of allowance for credit losses (loans):                                        
    Beginning balance   $ 11,544     $ 10,903     $ 10,970     $ 10,608     $ 8,791  
    Adoption of CECL     –       –       –       –       1,523  
    Charge-offs     (246 )     (153 )     (442 )     (659 )     (850 )
    Recoveries     27       144       80       476       894  
    Provision for credit losses for loans     1,500       650       –       2,400       250  
    Ending balance   $ 12,825     $ 11,544     $ 10,608     $ 12,825     $ 10,608  
                                             
    Allowance for unfunded loan commitments   $ 150     $ 300     $ 200                  
                                             
    Non-performing assets:                                        
    Non-accrual loans   $ 13,115     $ 13,415     $ 2,391                  
    Accruing loans over 90 days past due     –       –       –                  
    Real estate owned     167       428       928                  
    Total non-performing assets   $ 13,282     $ 13,843     $ 3,319                  
                                             
    Loans 30-89 days delinquent   $ 6,201     $ 7,301     $ 1,582                  
                                             
    Other ratios:                                        
    Loans to deposits     78.21 %     77.64 %     71.23 %                
    Loans 30-89 days delinquent and still accruing to gross loans outstanding     0.59 %     0.73 %     0.17 %                
    Total non-performing loans to gross loans outstanding     1.25 %     1.34 %     0.25 %                
    Total non-performing assets to total assets     0.84 %     0.89 %     0.21 %                
    Allowance for credit losses to gross loans outstanding     1.22 %     1.15 %     1.12 %                
    Allowance for credit losses to total non-performing loans     97.79 %     86.05 %     443.66 %                
    Net loan charge-offs to average loans (1)     0.09 %     0.00 %     0.15 %     0.03 %     -0.01 %
    (1 ) Information is annualized.
    (2 ) Net interest margin is presented on a fully tax equivalent basis, using a 21% federal tax rate.
    (3 ) Non-GAAP financial measures. See the “Non-GAAP Financial Measures” section of this press release for a reconciliation to the most comparable GAAP equivalent.
         

    LANDMARK BANCORP, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    Non-GAAP Finacials Measures (unaudited)

        As of or for the three months ended,     As of or for the year ended,  
        December 31,     September 30,     December 31,     December 31,     December 31,  
    (Dollars in thousands, except per share amounts)   2024     2024     2023     2024     2023  
                                   
    Non-GAAP financial ratio reconciliation:                                        
    Total non-interest expense   $ 11,874     $ 10,559     $ 10,562     $ 44,079     $ 41,983  
    Less: foreclosure and real estate owned expense     (13 )     (23 )     (40 )     (47 )     (61 )
    Less: amortization of other intangibles     (151 )     (171 )     (174 )     (663 )     (765 )
    Less: valuation allowance on real estate held for sale     –       –       –       (1,108 )     –  
    Adjusted non-interest expense (A)     11,710       10,365       10,348       42,261       41,157  
                                             
    Net interest income (B)     12,399       11,604       10,886       45,724       43,292  
                                             
    Non-interest income     3,371       4,253       2,254       14,744       13,230  
    Less: losses on sales of investment securities, net     1,031       –       1,246       1,031       1,246  
    Less: gains on sales of premises and equipment and foreclosed assets     (62 )     (273 )     –       (326 )     (1 )
    Adjusted non-interest income (C)   $ 4,340     $ 3,980     $ 3,500     $ 15,449     $ 14,475  
                                             
    Efficiency ratio (A/(B+C))     70.0 %     66.5 %     71.9 %     69.1 %     71.2 %
    Non-interest income to total income (C/(B+C))     25.9 %     25.5 %     24.3 %     25.3 %     25.1 %
                                             
    Total stockholders’ equity   $ 136,215     $ 139,691     $ 126,914                  
    Less: goodwill and other intangible assets     (34,955 )     (35,106 )     (35,618 )                
    Tangible equity (D)   $ 101,260     $ 104,585     $ 91,296                  
                                             
    Total assets   $ 1,574,142     $ 1,563,651     $ 1,561,672                  
    Less: goodwill and other intangible assets     (34,955 )     (35,106 )     (35,618 )                
    Tangible assets (E)   $ 1,539,187     $ 1,528,545     $ 1,526,054                  
                                             
    Tangible equity to tangible assets (D/E)     6.58 %     6.84 %     5.98 %                
                                             
    Shares outstanding at end of period (F)     5,775,198       5,776,282       5,751,475                  
                                             
    Tangible book value per share (D/F)   $ 17.53     $ 18.11     $ 15.87                  

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: PM meeting with Prime Minister Frederiksen of Denmark: 4 February 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    The Prime Minister hosted the Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, at Downing Street this evening.

    The Prime Minister hosted the Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, at Downing Street this evening.

    The leaders reflected on the EU Council dinner last night, and the Prime Minister said he was pleased to have been able to set out his vision for a closer UK and EU relationship that would benefit all sides through greater growth and enhanced defence and security cooperation.

    Both agreed on the need to strengthen European defence capabilities, including through NATO.

    Turning to security in the High North and Arctic region, the Prime Minister paid tribute to the important role Denmark was playing and welcomed their recent announcement of a new military package to defend the Arctic from hostile activity. 

    Both leaders agreed to step up joint cooperation to address threats in the Arctic and High North, working with allies through NATO and JEF Partners. 

    Turning to Ukraine, the Prime Minister welcomed the Danish Prime Minister’s reflections on the current battlefield situation and the leaders underscored the importance of supporting Ukraine’s forces for the long term, putting them in the strongest possible position.

    The Prime Minister welcomed Denmark’s upcoming presidency of the Council of the European Union, adding he looked forward to working closely with Prime Minister Frederiksen during this time, including on the shared challenge of migration.

    Updates to this page

    Published 4 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Press release: PM meeting with Prime Minister Frederiksen of Denmark: 4 February 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Prime Minister’s Office 10 Downing Street

    The Prime Minister hosted the Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, at Downing Street this evening.

    The Prime Minister hosted the Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, at Downing Street this evening.

    The leaders reflected on the EU Council dinner last night, and the Prime Minister said he was pleased to have been able to set out his vision for a closer UK and EU relationship that would benefit all sides through greater growth and enhanced defence and security cooperation.

    Both agreed on the need to strengthen European defence capabilities, including through NATO.

    Turning to security in the High North and Arctic region, the Prime Minister paid tribute to the important role Denmark was playing and welcomed their recent announcement of a new military package to defend the Arctic from hostile activity. 

    Both leaders agreed to step up joint cooperation to address threats in the Arctic and High North, working with allies through NATO and JEF Partners. 

    Turning to Ukraine, the Prime Minister welcomed the Danish Prime Minister’s reflections on the current battlefield situation and the leaders underscored the importance of supporting Ukraine’s forces for the long term, putting them in the strongest possible position.

    The Prime Minister welcomed Denmark’s upcoming presidency of the Council of the European Union, adding he looked forward to working closely with Prime Minister Frederiksen during this time, including on the shared challenge of migration.

    Updates to this page

    Published 4 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: The Commission and High Representative Kaja Kallas welcome a major step towards holding Russia accountable for its war of aggression against Ukraine

    Source: European Commission

    European Commission Press release Brussels, 04 Feb 2025 Today, senior legal experts of the European Commission, the European External Action Service, the Council of Europe, Ukraine and 37 States concluded the legal work on the establishment of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Ukrainian farmland increasingly US-owned – E-002526/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    In Ukraine, legislation excludes the purchase of farmland by foreigners. Some large agricultural companies working in Ukraine operate on leased land. The overall amount of leased land concerned is estimated by researchers at 3-4.3 million hectares, which corresponds to about 7% to 10.5% of the 41 million hectares of agricultural land which Ukraine had in 2020. In general, the agricultural companies operating in Ukraine sell their products on the international commodities markets thus providing food security for about 400 million people around the world.

    The Commission supports Ukraine in maintaining and improving its export infrastructure, including via the Black Sea ports, so that it can continue contributing to global food security.

    The EU accession negotiations, policy conditionalities and financial support under the Ukraine Facility[1] contribute to the reforms of the agricultural sector of Ukraine and its regulation in line with EU standards. This benefits all private investors in the sector, particularly the EU ones, which are already familiar with this regulation. Moreover, Ukraine Facility offers incentives for European businesses to invest in Ukraine, including in the agricultural sector.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202400792
    Last updated: 4 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – European companies following the introduction of sanctions – E-002556/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    From the outset, the sanctions have been designed and implemented to impose a heavy price on Russia and Belarus, whilst minimising adverse effects on the EU, its citizens and businesses.

    When developing sanctions packages, the Commission carefully considers their impact on EU operators and on individual Member States. Consultations with Member States and industry are aimed at preventing adverse impacts.

    Against the backdrop of Russia’s war of aggression, Ukraine has benefited from various EU support measures. The Autonomous Measures adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in June 2022 and renewed twice until June 2025 have provided duty and quota-free access for Ukrainian agricultural products to the EU market.

    The Commission has been monitoring the impact of these measures closely (monitoring reports are shared with the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade) and has not found any adverse impact of liberalisation on the EU market.

    Concerning the possible establishment of a mechanism to mitigate the impact of sanctions, the Commission would like to recall that the adoption of sanctions takes into account impacts on the EU’s economy and operators and systematically requires the unanimous approval by the Member States.

    Last updated: 4 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Continued strengthening of the EU Solidarity Lanes to support Ukraine – E-000335/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000335/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Tomas Tobé (PPE), Jens Gieseke (PPE), Norbert Lins (PPE), Elena Nevado del Campo (PPE), Borja Giménez Larraz (PPE)

    In response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the Commission launched the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes in May 2022, the purpose being to establish logistics routes and enable trade in Ukrainian goods to continue[1]. The Solidarity Lanes have been very effective. In two years, they have allowed Ukraine to export around 162 million tonnes of goods. The total value of trade via the Solidarity Lanes is estimated at around EUR 192 billion[2].

    Continued support for Ukraine in every sector is crucial for ensuring the country’s resilience, and the Solidarity Lanes highlight the importance of functioning infrastructure in this regard. In light of this:

    • 1.How does the Commission plan to strengthen the Solidarity Lanes between the EU and Ukraine?
    • 2.What other measures does the Commission plan to take in order to meet Ukraine’s infrastructure needs?

    Submitted: 27.1.2025

    • [1] https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/european-commission-establish-solidarity-lanes-help-ukraine-export-agricultural-goods-2022-05-12_en.
    • [2] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-solidarity-ukraine/eu-assistance-ukraine/eu-ukraine-solidarity-lanes_en.
    Last updated: 4 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Latest news – Next SEDE meeting – Committee on Security and Defence

    Source: European Parliament

    18 February 2025:

    The next meeting of the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) is scheduled to take place on Tuesday, 18 February 2025 from 9:00 – 13:00 and 14.15-18.15 in Brussels (SPINELLI 3G2).

    Further information about the meeting can be found here.

    _______________________

    SEDE missions 2024:

    • Ukraine – 25-26 October 2024
    • United Kingdom – 28-30 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Who are immigrants to the US, where do they come from and where do they live?

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Jennifer Van Hook, Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Demography, Penn State

    Immigrants to the U.S. increasingly arrive like these people, seeking asylum at a formal border crossing, rather than trying to sneak across the border. Carlos Moreno/NurPhoto via Getty Images

    Undocumented immigration is a key issue in American politics, but it can be hard to nail down the basic facts about who these immigrants are, where they live and how their numbers have changed in the past few decades.

    I study the demographics of the U.S. immigrant population and have seen how the data has changed over time. Here are some basics to set the stage as President Donald Trump begins his second term in office vowing to crack down hard on immigrants, including by conducting mass deportations.

    Immigration status

    My analysis of the Census Bureau’s 2023 American Community Survey data, in collaboration with the Migration Policy Institute, a nonpartisan nonprofit immigration research group, finds that as of the middle of 2023, approximately 51 million foreign-born people lived in the United States.

    Most immigrants are in the U.S. legally. About 49% have become U.S. citizens by a process known as naturalization. Another 19% hold lawful permanent resident status and are eligible to become U.S. citizens through naturalization. Still another 5% are in the country on temporary visas, like those for international students, diplomats and their families, and seasonal or temporary workers.

    The remaining 27% – around 13.7 million people – are outside those categories and therefore generally considered to be undocumented.

    My analysis shows that the number of undocumented immigrants held steady at around 11 million between 2007 and 2019. In the next four years, the numbers increased by nearly 3 million. This recent growth is mostly attributable to large increases in border crossings by migrants from Central and South America who were seeking asylum or other forms of humanitarian relief. Starting in June 2024, however, the number of people entering across the U.S.-Mexico border fell back to normal levels when the Biden administration implemented the Secure the Border rule, which suspends asylum applications at the border when crossings reach a seven-day average of 2,500.

    These changes were accompanied by changes in the undocumented migration process itself. In the past, undocumented immigrants often entered the country by slipping undetected across the U.S. border with Mexico. But increased border enforcement made the journey more dangerous and expensive.

    Instead of paying smugglers or risking their lives in the desert, growing numbers of undocumented immigrants now either directly approach immigration officials at airports or land-border crossings and seek asylum in the U.S. Others are initially admitted to the country legally on a temporary tourist, student or work visa – but then overstay the time period for which they have permission.

    Additionally, growing numbers of undocumented immigrants occupy what might be called a “liminal” or “in-between” status. The Migration Policy Institute analysis estimates this encompasses a range of groups as of the middle of 2023, including:

    • About 2.1 million people awaiting a decision on their asylum claims.
    • 521,000 parolees, allowed into the U.S. for humanitarian or national security reasons, like those paroled recently from Afghanistan and Ukraine.
    • 654,000 people who hold temporary protected status because it would be unsafe for them to return home due to armed conflict, natural disasters and other emergencies.
    • 562,000 who are protected by the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program because they were brought to the United States as children by their parents.

    The report estimates that just over one-quarter of undocumented immigrants currently occupy this type of “in-between” status. These immigrants are protected from deportation. Some even have a legal right to work in the U.S. Yet they do not possess a durable legal immigration status, and their rights could be threatened by policy changes.

    While Trump says he wants to deport as many as 11 million immigrants, analyses published by The New York Times and The Washington Post indicate that it may be difficult to remove many of them under existing U.S. law. The one group that is easy to remove – those with a criminal record – is relatively small, numbering about 650,000.

    Shifting countries of origin

    Since 1980, Mexicans have been the largest single national origin group in the United States. I found that 10.9 million Mexican-born individuals were living in the country in 2023, making up 23% of all immigrants. The second-largest group, immigrants from India, numbered just 2.9 million, or 6% of all immigrants living in the U.S.

    However, immigrants’ origins have been shifting away from Mexico.

    With the onset of the Great Recession of 2007-2009, work opportunities in U.S. construction and manufacturing evaporated. Many Mexican laborers had been working in construction at the time but went back to Mexico when the U.S. housing market collapsed.

    At that same time, Mexico’s economic conditions improved, its population growth slowed, and many would-be migrants opted to stay home. For the first time in decades, from 2007 to 2022 the number of Mexicans who returned home exceeded the number coming to the United States.

    This trend was especially pronounced among undocumented immigrants. I found that Mexicans made up about 51% of the undocumented immigrants who arrived in the country 10 or more years ago. Central Americans made up 20%, and the remaining originated from other regions.

    However, undocumented migrants now come from across the globe. Among undocumented immigrants who arrived within the past 10 years, 19% came from Mexico. Larger shares came from Central America and South America. While some of these new migrants seek work, others flee crime, economic and ecological disasters, and political persecution in their home countries.

    Duration of residence

    Most immigrants, whether they are in the U.S. legally or illegally, have lived in the United States for many years. Just under half of foreign-born individuals have lived in the country for two decades or more, and more than two-thirds have lived in the country for at least 10 years. Only 20% arrived within the past five years.

    This is a dramatic change from the early 2000s, when less than 10% of immigrants had been in the U.S. for more than two decades, and more than one-third had arrived within the previous five years.

    That means many of the people who are likely to be targeted for deportation in the coming months are settled, long-term members of American society.

    Place of residence

    As of 2023, 6.6 million immigrants reported on the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey that they moved to the United States in the past five years.

    However, the effects of these new immigrants on American communities has been uneven. Although most communities are more racially and ethnically diverse now than in the past, the numbers of newly arrived immigrants are relatively low in most places.

    Fifteen states host fewer than 20,000 immigrants, and 33 states are home to fewer than 100,000. In contrast, over half of new arrivals live in just five states: California, Florida, Illinois, New York and Texas are the home of over half of new arrivals yet have only 37% of the U.S. population. Other states such as Georgia, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Washington also are home to large and growing immigrant populations.

    The U.S. immigrant population is changing rapidly. In the early years of the 21st century, Mexican immigrants dominated undocumented immigration flows to the United States. Decades later, many of these people continue to live in the country.

    In the past four years, however, the flow of undocumented people increased dramatically. These new arrivals tend to come from troubled nations in Central and South America, many of whom are protected from deportation and have a legal right to work in the U.S. Altogether, most undocumented immigrants either have lived in the country for decades or have legal protections.

    Neither of these groups fit the profile of undocumented immigrants who are typically targeted for deportation.

    Jennifer Van Hook receives funding from the National Institutes of Health. She is a nonresident fellow of the Migration Policy Institute.

    – ref. Who are immigrants to the US, where do they come from and where do they live? – https://theconversation.com/who-are-immigrants-to-the-us-where-do-they-come-from-and-where-do-they-live-247430

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Commend the Democratic Republic of the Congo on Steps Taken to Provide Healthcare to Victims of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, Ask about Reparations for Victims and the Protect

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women today concluded its consideration of the report of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on sexual violence in armed conflict in the eastern part of the country, presented under its exceptional reporting procedure. 

    Committee Experts commended the State for the healthcare delivered to victims of conflict-related sexual violence, while asking about reparations for victims and how women seeking firewood and other resources in nature reserves could be protected

    A Committee Expert congratulated the State party for steps taken in the areas of healthcare. The Committee hailed the adoption of decree 23/9, which provided for the creation of multisectoral care for survivors of sexual-related violence.  The establishment of mobile clinics in internally displaced persons camps should be commended, as well as the distribution of post-rape kits by midwives. 

    Another Expert said the State party should be commended for enacting the fund for conflict-related sexual violence.  How did it operate and how many victims had benefitted from it?  What steps were being undertaken to ensure adequate resources to implement a victim-centred transitional justice mechanism? 

    A Committee Expert said as Goma was under siege, the most pressing issue was water.  How would the State install water distribution centres while ensuring the protection of women collecting the water?  Many women trekked from Goma in search of firewood, but instead were found by gunmen and faced rape.  Were there park rangers trained in violence prevention who were gender-sensitive and conscious of the epidemic of violence?  The proliferation of small arms and light weapons often claimed the lives of women and girls foraging for food and firewood; how was their illegal trading being addressed? 

     

    The delegation said victims were active participants in the reparation process.  A law implemented in 2022, which provided protection and reparation to victims of sexual violence, mandated a three per cent fixed amount to be sent to organizations for female victims to provide reparations.  Work was done with women at the local level to ensure their full participation.  More than 220,000 victims had been identified, including displaced persons. 

       

    Regarding the situation in the nature reserves in the east of the country, the delegation said this had become a ground for armed groups operating in the area.  Programmes were in place to address practical needs, including safe drinking water for persons in internally displaced persons camps, to ensure there was no need to forage further afield.  Steps had been taken to strengthen protection in the park areas, with regular security patrolling the areas, and keeping note of where women were located.  Awareness raising campaigns were being conducted to highlight the risks women faced when collecting firewood alone.  Women were provided with micro-credits to generate alternative income streams, allowing them to pay for resources such as firewood and water, rather than searching for them themselves. 

    Introducing the report, Chantal Chambu Mwavita, Minister for Human Rights of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and head of the delegation, called for a minute of silence to be observed for the victims of the conflict.  The special report being presented today on sexual violence in armed conflict in the eastern part of the country had been drafted at the request of the Committee.  The Congolese Government was committed to the prevention and suppression of sexual violence in times of conflict.

    Since the submission of the report, at least 945 police staff members had been deployed in areas where the United Nations Organization Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) had withdrawn to protect the civilian population.  The Government had adopted a national action plan, which included measures aimed at preventing violence against women in armed conflict.  The Minister said the Committee should support the creation of an international criminal tribunal for the Democratic Republic of the Congo to prosecute those responsible for sexual violence. 

    In closing remarks, Ms. Chambu Mwavita said it was an honour to be with the Committee to speak about the situation in the country.  The Democratic Republic of the Congo needed support.  The country had faced the aggression of its neighbour Rwanda for more than 30 years.  The dialogue today presented an opportunity to ask for unity and for efforts to respect the United Nations Charter.

    In her closing remarks, Nahla Haidar, Committee Chair, thanked the delegation for the constructive dialogue despite the difficult situation being faced in the country. The Committee expressed its solidarity with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and commended the State party for the efforts it had already taken. 

    The delegation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was comprised of representatives from the Ministry of Human Rights; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Gender; the National Assembly; the Coordination Body on Youth, Gender and Violence against Women and Trafficking in Persons; the High Military Court; the Superior Council of the Judiciary; the Secretary General for Human Rights; the Commission for Inter-Institutional Victim Assistance and Reform Support Organization; the Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Head of State and Focal Point for Sexual Violence; Gender and Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones Specialist; the National Assembly; the Directorate of Access to Justice; the Congolese National Police; the Head of State Security; and the Permanent Mission of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations Office at Geneva. 

    The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’s ninetieth session is being held from 3 to 21 February.  All documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet at 10 a.m. on Wednesday, 5 February, to begin its consideration of the seventh periodic report of Nepal (CEDAW/C/NPL/7).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the report of the Democratic Republic of the Congo presented under the Committee’s exceptional reporting procedure (CEDAW/C/COD/EP/1).

    Presentation of Report

    CHANTAL CHAMBU MWAVITA, Minister for Human Rights of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and head of the delegation, called for a minute of silence to be observed for the victims of the conflict.  The delegation was presenting the report at a particular moment in time when the territory of North Kivu and South Kivu and Ituri was being torn apart by acts of violence, targeting the civilian population and civilian infrastructure, perpetrated by the Rwandan army and the M23 armed group.  Rwanda was a party to the Convention and was directly responsible for these crimes. 

    Various reports from the United Nations and witness statements from survivors of sexual conflict showed that thousands of women and girls had been victims of rape, mutilation and other types of inhumane violence.  These atrocities not only affected displaced persons, but were also taking place at homes, schools and in prisons.  Now Goma and its surroundings had been taken by the M23 army and other parts of Kivu were being besieged.  If the international community did not take urgent measures, there could be the spread of a cycle of violence against women and girls. 

    The special report being presented today on sexual violence in armed conflict in the eastern part of the country had been drafted at the request of the Committee.  The Congolese Government was committed to the prevention and suppression of sexual violence in times of conflict.  Since the submission of the report, at least 945 police staff members had been deployed in areas where the United Nations Organization Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) had withdrawn to protect the civilian population.  They had been trained to protect people against sexual violence. 

    The Government had adopted a national action plan, which included measures aimed at preventing violence against women in armed conflict.  In 2024, over 1,030 cases were reported and prosecuted by police in South Kivu.  Rulings had been handed down, including under military jurisdiction, where reparations were provided for victims.  The Ministry of Human Rights had pledged to conclude military amendments for transitional justice in the country. 

    The Government was making combatting violence against women the number one priority.  National funds had been developed, providing reparation and health care to the survivors.  Mobile clinics had established health care near areas controlled by the Rwandan army and the M23.  The efforts to protect victims from sexual violence were being undermined by the increased attacks by the Rwandan army and M23, as they had stepped up their military efforts and attacks against civilians.  Two weeks ago, a Rwandan military offensive backed by M23 had resulted in the escape of over 3,000 prisoners from Goma’s central prison, the proliferation of light arms, infrastructure damage, rapes of 163 women held in the prison who were set alight while alive, pillaging of legal buildings, attacks on women defending women victims of violence, and the bombing of the maternal hospital in Goma which led to the deaths of pregnant women and women who had just given birth.

    The Minister said it was essential for the Committee to provide support without delay to women survivors of sexual violence who were in areas occupied by the Rwandan army and the M23.  The Committee should strongly condemn the occupation of Congolese territory by the Rwandan army and the M23, and actively advocate for sanctions against them.  The Committee should support the creation of an international criminal tribunal for the Democratic Republic of the Congo to prosecute those responsible for sexual violence.  The delegation was here to support the United Nations Charter and put an end to the war in the country. 

    NAHLA HAIDAR, Committee Chair, said the Committee stood with the delegation and the people of the Democratic of the Congo during this difficult time. 

     

    GISÈLE KAPINGA NTUMBA, National Human Rights Commissioner and head of the delegation of the National Human Rights Commission of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, saluted the delegation, which had spared no effort to take part in the session, despite the situation in the country.  The Commission welcomed the decisions taken by the Congolese Government to protect the civilian population from the risks of sexual violence and other related human rights violations committed by the parties to the ongoing conflict in the east of the country.  However, it remained concerned about the implementation of the decisions taken and their deterrent nature, particularly with regard to armed groups and the Rwandan army, which were not concerned by these decisions. 

    One of the major challenges for the Government was the security of and humanitarian assistance for the civilian population, both in areas besieged by armed groups and in camps for displaced persons.  The recent invasion and unprecedented assault on the city of Goma by the M23 rebels and the Rwandan army demonstrated the magnitude of the challenge and had led to systematic and widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, with women and children as primary targets.

    At least 700 people had died in Goma since the invasion, and about 500,000 people had been displaced, the majority of whom were women and children.  Sexual violence had reached its peak and health care facilities were overwhelmed.  The city had not been under the control of the Congolese Government, in violation of the principle of Congolese State sovereignty, since the invasion.

    Taking into account the current context, the Commission recommended that the Congolese State use all its powers to restore peace in the east by favouring diplomatic channels and the peaceful settlement of the conflict.  At the International Criminal Court, it was recommended that criminal proceedings be initiated against the leaders of the M23 and the Rwandan army for the various acts constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated in Goma and its surroundings.  Finally, at the United Nations Security Council, the Commission recommended that targeted sanctions be taken against Rwanda and that everything be done to bring peace to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    BRENDA AKIA, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, said the Committee members extended their heartfelt condolences to the Democratic Republic the Congo, and condemned the violence being experienced by women and girls in the country.  Ms. Akia commended the Government for the commitment to being part of the dialogue, the progress made in human rights, and the measures taken to tackle sexual violence.  Could the State party provide specific information on the different forms of conflict-related sexual violence currently being committed against women and girls?   

    An urgent political response was needed to ensure peace and security in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.  Given the complexity of the conflict, fuelled by the exploitation of minerals and the existence of armed groups, what strategies was the State party undertaking to push for peace in the country, and ensure the protection of women and girls under international humanitarian law?  What was being done to end the illicit exploitation of these minerals? The Committee commended the State party for the actions taken so far; what were the challenges faced in implementing these legal and policy frameworks?  What resources would the State party require to implement these frameworks?

    A Committee Expert said the Democratic Republic of the Congo was resource-rich, which was often a curse, having fuelled the conflict and sexual violence.  Several pieces of legislation had been passed with the aim of regulating the trade of minerals and armed conflict in the area.  How were extraterritorial actors, including businesses, being held accountable so they did not avoid impunity? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the illicit mining was one of the main causes of the crisis in the eastern part of the country.  The Government had enacted several measures to turn this situation around, but the major challenge was that the mines were under the control of armed groups as well as foreign States that were involving themselves in the conflict.  The Government was taking steps to ensure the certification of certain mining operations, but it was difficult to ensure this was a widespread approach.  The Government was hindered by the conflict and its economic pressure and the difficulty of imposing Government initiatives in areas controlled by rebel groups and foreign States, due to the lack of administrative control.

    The financial issues were a challenge, including for implementing transitional justice mechanisms, which was why an appeal had been made to States for support in this regard. Impunity needed to be tackled head on; the perpetrators of these crimes could not go unpunished.  Steps needed to be taken to bear pressure on other States involved in the conflict, including by sheltering perpetrators.  The Democratic Republic of the Congo was calling for an international criminal tribunal to ensure all involved, regardless of their location, could be apprehended.  When rapes had occurred in Goma, any measures taken by the Government to deal with this were difficult to enact, as other parties were now in charge of Goma. 

    In the conflict areas, women were principally being used by armed groups and other combatants to serve as sexual slaves.  This could result in forced pregnancies and exposure to sexually transmitted diseases. Women being held by these armed groups also did not have access to relevant and necessary health care.  A coordination unit had tracked 10 forms of sexual violence, including rape, human trafficking, sexual mutilation, public sexual violence and humiliation, including women whose sons had been forced to rape them in public, public sexual violence against men and boys, gang rape, transmission of HIV/AIDS as a result of rape, and stigmatisation as a result of the sexual violence, among others. 

    There was also a form of sexual violence deliberately targeting children, particularly young girls. The State had also seen sexual violence used as a weapon of war, which had been ongoing since 2011, when the country was first described as “the world rape capital”. 

    To ensure a better management of its natural resources, the Democratic Republic of the Congo participated in multiple inter-State cooperation efforts to ensure the tracing of natural resources, including those exploited via mining. One included the Kimberly Process for the tracing of diamonds.  The difficulty lay in the application of these pieces of legislation, as the majority of the areas where these resources were found were occupied by Rwanda in the eastern part of the country.  For this reason, it was difficult for the State to exercise its full sovereignty and ensure the traceability of resources.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert thanked the members of the delegation for their presence, despite the dire situation.  Many women in the Democratic Republic of the Congo faced marginalisation from the peace and security processes.  The weak rule of law, and the impunity for perpetrators of violence and gender-based violence, continued to undermine women’s involvement in the peace and security agenda.  The Expert was happy to note that the third national action plan on women, peace and security had been adopted in 2024; when did it come into effect?  How were women’s organizations and victims engaged in its implementation?  What were the key objectives of the plan?  What concrete plans existed to address the situation of impunity?  What concrete measures were being undertaken to ensure the effective participation of women’s organizations and victims of sexual violence in policies and frameworks relating to women, peace and security? 

    The State party should be commended for enacting the fund for conflict-related sexual violence. How did it operate and how many victims had benefitted from it?  What steps were being undertaken to ensure adequate resources to implement a victim-centred transitional justice mechanism?  Given the withdrawal of the United Nations Organization Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), how would the Government’s transition plan fill this void?  Was there any data on women’s direct participation in negotiation processes for peacebuilding? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said victims were active participants in the reparation process.  A law implemented in 2022, which provided protection and reparation to victims of sexual violence, mandated a three per cent fixed amount to be sent to organizations for female victims to provide reparations.  Work was done with women at the local level to ensure their full participation.  More than 220,000 victims had been identified, including displaced persons.  The situation of displaced persons had been catastrophic and required immediate assistance, with emergency measures implemented for this group, including holistic care, medical psychosocial care, and legal assistance and support; 49 per cent of people recorded came from North Kivu.  The situation was constantly changing which made it difficult to respond to. Rigorous monitoring and management efforts were taken to ensure victims were at the heart of responses, with the majority of resources gathered being dispersed as reparations.  Regular consultations were held with victims groups every three months. 

    The third national action plan on women, peace and security was approved in 2024 and included activities to improve the level of women’s participation.  For the first time in the country, there was a female Prime Minister and 32 per cent of those occupying high-level positions in the Government were women.  Awareness-raising campaigns were carried out to raise awareness of women’s rights, prevent sexual violence, and protect women and young girls from gender-based violence. The most recent plan had 26 million dollars earmarked, which had been provided by the Government, public and private partners and international partners, including Norway.  Innovative aspects had been included within the plan, including an aspect of positive masculinity. 

    The withdrawal of the United Nations Organization Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) from the Democratic Republic of the Congo began in 2021.  The withdrawal plan was supported by the Peace Consolidation Fund, to support the country when the Mission withdrew and bolster peace efforts.  This approach was inclusive, involving civil society and actively promoting cohesion among women’s organizations. 

    Since 2018, there had been an increase in women in decision-making positions, due to an introduction of measures to promote gender equality, as well as this being enshrined within the country’s Constitution. 

     

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the Democratic Republic of the Congo had ratified the Convention almost 40 years ago.  During this time, how had women’s participation in the political process changed? How many people were in top positions in the country?  Women and girls in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remained underrepresented in all spheres, including in the private sector.  Out of 500 members of Parliament, only 14 per cent of them were women. 

    A roadmap had been adopted up to 2028 to prevent violence in politics.  What steps were being taken to guarantee more women taking part in legislative bodies?  What was being done to eliminate violence in electoral processes?  How were women candidates being protected?  Taking into consideration the extreme violence in the eastern part of the country, it seemed difficult to foresee, but when would there be net parity in the representation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said a campaign had been spearheaded for positive masculinity. There was now a female Prime Minister and women occupied key decision-making and ministerial posts within the Government, including as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This year, all party leaders were called upon to ensure 50 per cent of female candidates in their electoral lists in scheduled elections.  These lists would be excused from having to pay the electoral fee, which was an incentive to guarantee more female candidates. 

    Steps had been taken at the electoral and appointed level to push for the stated goal of parity. However, it was another thing to ensure that the female candidates were elected as representatives or senators. The authorities had more control on appointing women to specific posts, rather than ensuring they were elected by voters.  A rule had been enacted to ensure parity with Director-Generals and Deputy Director-Generals, whereby every time a man was appointed to this position, so was a woman, and vice versa.  To ensure more female members of Parliament, women had to be able to persuade the local population to vote for them.  Hearts and minds needed to be changed at the grassroots level, but this was happening gradually.  Having more female leaders would go a long way to changing the electoral environment. 

    During the most recent elections, a programme was rolled out to address electoral violence in the eastern part of the country, and boost capacity for women who wanted to stand as electoral candidates.  Programmes were also rolled out targeting key communities and regions at a grassroots level. Awareness-raising was being carried out in villages to address the entrenched views within the country. Women female candidates often lacked resources, so it was important to engage in capacity building so they could undertake fundraising.  The process towards the drive towards parity was closely tied to the existence of legal instruments.  The Democratic Republic of the Congo was making efforts to promote women’s participation at all levels. 

    Legal and regulatory frameworks were in place under Congolese electoral law to protect female candidates.  A specialised police unit and the military were deployed to regions to ensure violence was not being inflicted on female candidates, and the police received special training in this regard.  Special campaigns were carried out to raise awareness of gender-based violence in elections and encourage female candidates to report this phenomenon.  The prevailing conflict hampered the opportunities to change the sociological and cultural mindsets within the country.  Of the 5,000 judges in the country, around 25 per cent were now women, when previously it had been almost zero.  To achieve this goal, women had been prioritised in recruitment drives.  There was a lack of trust in women’s competence which needed to be addressed. The State was exhausted by the war which was standing in the way of the process. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert said given the link between armed conflict and the climate crisis, could reparations be expanded to include climate-change related violence against women? In March 2021, the International Criminal Court had issued its first order for reparations for victims of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  Did the reparation fund provide funds for children born out of rape? Last year, a member of the militia was sentenced to imprisonment for life for crimes against humanity, due to forced pregnancy, which was a global first and should be congratulated.  Did the Penal Code address the 10 categories of sexual violence previously mentioned?  How did the Code help shift the stigma from the victim to the perpetrator? As Goma was under siege, the most pressing issue was water.  How would the State install water distribution centres while ensuring the protection of women collecting the water?

    Many women trekked from Goma in search of firewood, but instead were found by gunmen and faced rape.  Were there park rangers trained in violence prevention, who were gender-sensitive and conscious of the epidemic of violence?  The proliferation of small arms and light weapons often claimed the lives of women and girls foraging for food and firewood; how was their illegal trading being addressed?  It was estimated that the country faced acute food insecurity and was at the tipping point of famine.  How was a humanitarian corridor for access to food, water and medical supplies being established?  Unfortunately, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, food insecurity resulted in “famine brides”, particularly women and girls with disabilities, who were denied food and medicine and sold in sexual slavery.   

    Responses by the Delegation

    One speaker from the delegation said she had been raped during the war, and hearing the recent news was triggering many emotions.  At the time she had been a child; now she was 28 and it continued to haunt her.  It was vital for the reparation fund and other programmes which aimed to provide reparations to victims, to target children born in conflict, children born from rape, and children who witnessed conflict.  The Child and Youth Programme granted children who came from conflict or rape administrative documents.  Medical care, psychosocial assistance and social support, including access to education, was provided to children.  Laws were in place to ensure that those involved in the conflict would not be able to hold decision-making positions or receive any benefits. 

    M23 and the Rwandan Government had destroyed the displaced persons camps around Goma, depriving these people of their legitimate rights to protection.  The Government, with international partners, had made great efforts to help people establish these camps and have the bare necessities, but they were being destroyed.  It had become impossible to find a single shelter for displaced people in these areas. So many efforts had been made, with little results, as the Government could not control the area.  The speaker asked the international community to speak on behalf of victims, so that their voices were heard. 

    The State was working with the United Nations Children’s Fund, the United Kingdom and others to develop a tool to identify children born from rape.  This would not just help children from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but also children born from rape in Sudan, Ukraine and other parts of the world.  The Democratic Republic of the Congo was expecting a third wave of children born from rape, who would ask who their parents were.  There needed to be measures to ensure this did not happen again. It was difficult to bring down the number of light weapons. 

    There was an undeniable link between sexual violence against women and economisation. Regarding the situation in the nature reserves in the east of the country, this had become a ground for armed groups operating in the area.  One of the consequences of climate change was the energy crisis, meaning firewood and charcoal carbon were the energy resources sought by women and girls, who regularly fell victim to the armed groups, and were raped while seeking to meet their energy needs.  There were units responsible for protecting the reserves, but the light weapons they were armed with were no match for the firepower of the armed groups, who could then wreak havoc on the nature reserves.  The guards in the reserves were not equipped to protect the women searching for firewood and the Government did not have the ability to intervene as these areas were controlled by Rwanda.  Many of these parks and forests were registered as national heritage sites by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.  The impact of this part of the conflict needed to be properly understood and measured. 

    A programme had been developed to ensure youths were not tempted by the recruitment of the armed groups, and to provide for the needs of internally displaced persons and ensure their reintegration in their host communities.  The programme also targeted ex-combatants but excluded those who had taken arms against the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  A woman was a member of the leadership board on this programme. 

    Programmes were in place to address practical needs, including safe drinking water for persons in internally displaced persons camps, to ensure there was no need to forage further afield.  The war had hampered these endeavours, as many internally displaced persons were now fleeing from camps, and it was difficult to identify them.  Steps had been taken to strengthen protection in the park areas, with regular security patrolling the areas, and keeping note of where women were located.  The State was also seeking to address the issue of reforestation, by encouraging women to engage directly in sustainable forest management. 

    Awareness raising campaigns were being conducted to highlight the risks women faced when collecting firewood alone.  Women were provided with micro-credits to generate alternative income streams, allowing them to pay for resources such as firewood and water, rather than searching for them themselves.  A hotline was established, where women could call to report instances of rape or violence, and they were offered psychological assistance and support. Women were also taught how to have access to water and sustainably manage it, and water purification tablets were distributed to women, to ensure their water was drinkable.  Work was being done with local and international partners to bolster women’s protection systems and their sustainable natural management systems. 

    Steps were being taken to tackle food insecurity which was prevalent in the eastern part of the country, including through establishing canteens for displaced persons. The Government placed special emphasis on tackling the trading of small arms and light weapons, but this was often disregarded by States.  However, the Government sometimes had to disregard control measures themselves to ensure they were equipped to fight against the Rwandan army and M23.  It was important to note that the State was not refusing dialogue with the armed groups, but they would not re-enter former rebel combatants into the armed forces.  However, the State was willing to engage in dialogue with these groups, under the Nairobi agreement. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    An Expert said it was important that women were included in the Nairobi peace process. It was vital to document evidence and women’s narratives for women’s legal action.  The Congo basin was “the lungs of Africa” and it was important that it was protected to ensure the Sustainable Development Goals.  The Democratic Republic of the Congo had reintroduced the death penalty in January this year to address the wave of gang violence. It was hoped this would be reconsidered. 

    BRENDA AKIA, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, commended the State party for justice efforts taken to end impunity for conflict-related sexual violence, including the mobile courts which had led to the prosecution of numerous perpetrators.  Given the high level of sexual violence, the number of convictions were not commensurate.  Was the State party considering other jurisdiction methods to ensure perpetrators who passed through the porous borders in the regions would be prosecuted and held accountable? 

    The State party should emphasise in the Nairobi peace process negotiations the conflict-related sexual violence experienced by women and girls and the importance of gathering evidence for seeking justice.  How was the State party investing in strengthening the rule of law to ensure access to quality and affordable justice, including access to legal aid for victims of conflict-related sexual violence?  Could the State party provide data on the number of investigations, arrests, arrest warrants and successful convictions handed down against victims? Ms. Akia commended the State party for the commitment to the peace process

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said that following some complaints received by the Government, a Commission was established to look into alleged violations by members of law enforcement. In Goma, around 30 members of law enforcement had been judged.  Given the recent situation of the prison break, the whereabouts of these individuals was currently unknown.  The difficulty was related to the international nature of the crisis; even if domestic mechanisms would be established, there were international elements which needed to be addressed.  For the Government, the reinstation of the death penalty was an administrative deterrent measure for the situation in the eastern part of the country.  No executions had been carried out so far. 

    Justice was provided free of charge for victims of conflict-related sexual violence, practically and legislatively.  Many women did not want to present their cases before courts as they feared stigmatisation, and they also faced difficulty in access to justice, which explained the discrepancy between the number of cases of sexual violence reported and the number convicted.  Often times, victims could not pay for legal proceedings and did not understand how the courts operated, which presented further challenges.  The State party was aiming to remove some of these barriers, including by making access to the justice system free of charge.  Now, in the east of the country, this was the situation.  At the same time, legal assistance could be provided to victims. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert expressed solidarity and deep sadness for the tragic loss of life within the State party.  Could the State party provide information on what measures were being taken to ensure adequate capacity to strengthen coordination among duty-bearers responsible for preventing conflict-related sexual violence, including judges and prosecutors, among others?  What incentives had been applied to increase the recruitment of judges and prosecutors so that they could handle the backlog of conflict-related sexual violence cases, particularly in rural areas?  How often were duty-bearers responsible for combatting conflict-related sexual violence? How often was training conducted and what did it entail?  How often was the Convention incorporated in the training? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said according to the 2024 law on the status of judges, judges learned about several topics during their training, including sexual violence.  From the moment Congolese judges were appointed, they could begin to work on repressing sexual violence.  Following the ratification of the Convention, the Democratic Republic of the Congo had had to adapt its legal framework. 

    In areas of conflict, it would be difficult to provide statistical figures, as courts and legal buildings had been destroyed, meaning it was difficult to follow-up on written cases. The National Strategy to Combat Gender-Based Violence had been rolled out initially in 2010, was revised in 2019, and was being reviewed currently to see if it needed to be tailored to the existing context.  In 2019, the National Police drew up a national plan to tackle sexual violence, which contained a chapter outlining the modalities to be followed when it came to interviewing victims and witnesses. 

    The statue on the recruitment of judges covered lawyers who worked in the Attorney-General’s Office.  Around two thirds of magistrates recruited by the Office in 2023 would be reappointed to serve as judges in district courts.  There were more than nine instances of action criminalised as sexual violence, which were heard before the Peace Courts.  These cases were being heard whenever possible in local district courts.  This was a way used by the Government to address the backlog of cases.  Female mediators were currently being trained by Member States of the Southern African Community. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said conflict-affected mining grounds saw high levels of sexual slavery, fuelled by money from the mineral trade.  Human trafficking remained a worrying phenomenon in certain parts of the country.  How did the State party ensure that complaints of trafficking were handled appropriately and that victims themselves were not penalised?  How would the State party prevent trafficking of persons by members of the armed groups?  Were there plans to increase the number of shelters for female victims of human trafficking? 

    Another Expert said the Committee encouraged the State party’s efforts in the face of the resurgence of conflict.  Between January 2022 and March 2023, more than 100 schools had stopped operating due to the deteriorating security situation.  The Committee understood that educational activities were extremely difficult during the ongoing situation.  Was there an education policy for displaced women and girls?  Was education considered part of the services provided to survivors of conflict-related sexual violence?  What were the education plans for all levels of the system?  Were school age pregnant girls and mothers able to attend schools and access education? The Expert was pleased to hear of the State party’s approach to positive masculinity.  Young males were easy targets for recruitment into armed groups. Did gender-responsive education exist within the school and university systems, the armed forces, and State systems?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said as of last week, there were more than seven million internally displaced persons in the Democratic Republic of the Congo who were lacking aid, which presented a major crisis for the country.  Since 2019, the President had set up the National Agency to tackle the issue of human trafficking.  An expanded Technical Commission had been established to engage in discussions and debate.  In conflict zones, women and children were increasingly vulnerable to sexual exploitation. There was an increasing number of brothels in and around Goma, and in mining areas as well.  Those who worked there were victims, who had no other choice. There was a significant amount of forced labour in the mines, with a substantial number being children.  There were also many child combatants in the armed groups who had been tricked into joining them. 

    There was significant corruption surrounding human trafficking; the Government fully understood this issue and was attempting to tackle it head on.  The current political instability and the mass of displaced persons gave traffickers cover to carry out their activities.  The Government was doing its utmost to combat human trafficking and was working closely with the United Nations Office in Vienna.  The State had managed to stabilise the situation, but recognised there was still significant work to be done. 

    The Government had been able to rebuild around 20 schools which had been destroyed.  The approach to education always mainstreamed a gender dimension, and took into account the specific needs of women and girls. The major issue was the sheer number of displaced persons, with more than half of them women and children. The State was doing its utmost to ensure women and girls had access to education. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert congratulated the State party for steps taken in the area of healthcare. The Committee hailed the adoption of decree 23/9, which provided for the creation of multisectoral care for survivors of sexual-related violence.  The establishment of mobile clinics in camps for internally displaced people should be commended, as well as the distribution of post-rape kits by midwives. Could more data be provided, including the number of health care facilities built, the number of victims treated, the number of kits being distributed, and the training rate of those trained?

    Another Expert said in some contexts armed groups used child marriage as a weapon of war to hide human trafficking, with a very small percentage of cases brought to light. What special urgent actions was the State taking to counter this regrettable situation?  What were legal institutions doing to prevent child and forced marriages?  Was awareness being raised among the families to teach them about their rights?  Was current legislation being enforced?  How was security being provided to the victims? 

    NAHLA HAIDAR, Committee Chair, asked about the mass displacement of people; how were these people documented? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the legal instruments on sexual violence, particularly the law on children, stipulated how the system was regulated.  The Government did not have control over this part of the country, and it hurt that they could not answer questions about things happening on their land. The mechanisms existed, but the State could not enforce its own legal instruments because it did not have control over the territory. 

    Forced marriage carried a sentence of 20 years in prison for anyone responsible, including a parent or head of a tribe.  There were also awareness campaigns being carried out on forced marriage and human trafficking.  Institutions took cases of forced marriages very seriously.  A State official would not grant a marriage license without verifying the age of those seeking marriage.  A provincial action plan was in place for areas where there were high rates of early and forced marriages.  The police had put together an action plan against sexual violence which considered the child.  The Democratic Republic of the Congo had set up free programmes to provide education on child marriage.

     

    The State did not have access to areas under control of the Rwandan army and armed forces. Rehabilitation had been provided to displaced persons, but there were seven million displaced persons, which meant that the Government could not look after everyone.  Over 10,000 displaced persons had received medical care under a programme, but unfortunately the Government had to close this programme due to the war.  There was a budget in place to assist displaced persons.  Before the war, actions had been taken by the Government in land currently under Rwandese occupation. 

    This dialogue could be an opportunity to appeal to the international community for financial assistance to improve the State’s humanitarian response to the crisis. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert said due to the humanitarian crisis and high levels of poverty, high levels of food insecurity persisted, disproportionately affecting women and girls. In some cases, women were raped, mutilated, killed or burned.  Data was needed for the State party to be able to take measures.  Could disaggregated data be provided on the number of women and girls who were victims of conflict-related sexual violence in camps in the eastern part of the country?  What actions were applied by the State party to upgrade gender-specific security measures in and around these protection sites?  How did the State party sustain an emergency response for women and girls fleeing the conflict?  What specific education and training had been provided for peace? How was awareness raising undertaken in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, reaffirming peace and tolerance? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said Governments bore the responsibility of protecting their citizens. They should not be persecuting their people.  The country had been caught up in a crisis for the past three decades.  The programmes put in place demonstrated the commitment of the Government to restore children who had been educated in the culture of killing and war.  Before Goma fell, the Government had enacted measures to ensure security of the internally displaced person camps, including preventing people with no business in the camps from entering and installing security controls around the camps. Unfortunately, these efforts had proven to be in vain.  An action plan had been rolled out to bolster the humanitarian response, with a key component of the strategy focused on tackling gender-based violence. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert asked what proportion of the extractive industry was owned and led by women? What role did women play in supply chains in key sectors?  How was legislation being reformed for companies investing and trading in the extractive industry?  How was the State party providing necessary oversight through the licensing of the private sector?  How did public and private partnership projects explicitly promote and protect women’s rights?  How were appropriate social buffers provided to cushion the impact of war on women?   

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the State had begun the process of victim identification, and 54 per cent of victims identified were women.  This meant these women could benefit from reparations if they arrived at the end of the process.  No woman victim would be deprived of her right to reparation or remedy. 

    In the Congolese mining agreements and the forestry code, there was a legal mechanism in place, called the social clause.  Whatever resources were being exploited, no part of the land escaped this principle. Anyone who wished to exploit resources needed to engage with the community, but the State was the sovereign owner.  There were no clauses which prohibited women from working in the private sector or in the extractive industries.  In the initiative on human rights, there was a voluntary principle which allowed the State to monitor and intervene in instances of mining to ensure there were no violations of human rights or cases of forced labour.  Women played a full role in the private sector and there was a high rate of participation there. 

    Closing Remarks 

    CHANTAL CHAMBU MWAVITA, Minister for Human Rights of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and head of the delegation, said it was an honour to be with the Committee to speak about the situation in the country.  The Democratic Republic of the Congo needed support.  The country had faced the aggression of its neighbour Rwanda for more than 30 years.  The dialogue today presented an opportunity to ask for unity and for efforts to respect the United Nations Charter.

    NAHLA HAIDAR, Committee Chair, thanked the delegation for the constructive dialogue despite the difficult situation being faced in the country.  This was an exceptional report, and the Chair thanked the State party for participating in the dialogue which gave the Committee a chance to better understand the situation faced by women and girls who were victims of conflict-related sexual violence.  The Committee expressed its solidarity with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and commended the State party for the efforts it had already taken.  

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  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: The National Pharmaceuticals Pricing Policy, 2012 lays down the regulatory framework for pricing of drugs

    Source: Government of India (2)

    The National Pharmaceuticals Pricing Policy, 2012 lays down the regulatory framework for pricing of drugs

    The Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation has signed agreements or memorandum of understandings on regulatory cooperation with other international agencies

    Posted On: 04 FEB 2025 5:50PM by PIB Delhi

    The National Pharmaceuticals Pricing Policy, 2012 (NPPP, 2012) lays down the regulatory framework for pricing of drugs. The key principles for regulation of prices in the said policy are (i) regulation on the basis of essentiality of drugs, (ii) regulation of prices of formulations only, i.e., medicines used by consumers and not the upstream products such as bulk drugs or intermediates, and (iii) regulation through market-based pricing as against cost-based pricing under the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995. The details of the policy are available in the Gazette notification dated 7th December 2012 of the Department of Pharmaceuticals

    [https://egazette.gov.in/(S(cjt0i1uouyc1bl3ozo3jx3qk))/ViewPDF.aspx].

    As per the information provided by the Department of Health and Family Welfare, the Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation has signed agreements or memorandum of understandings on regulatory cooperation with other international agencies, including with such agencies in Afghanistan, Argentina, Brazil, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Germany, Guyana, Japan, Netherlands, Russian Federation, Suriname, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States of America and the Drug Regulatory Authority of BRICS.

    This information was given by the Union Minister of State for Chemicals and Fertilizers Smt Anupriya Patel in Rajya Sabha in a written reply to a question today.

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