Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI Security: Secretary General praises Latvia for its contributions to NATO

    Source: NATO

    On Wednesday (16 October 2024), at his official residence in Brussels, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte met with the Prime Minister of Latvia, Evika Siliņa, to discuss further strengthening NATO’s defences and NATO’s continued support to Ukraine.

    Mr. Rutte praised Latvia for its many contributions to the Alliance. “You spend almost 3 percent of GDP on defence, you host a multinational battlegroup where Allies work side by side to defend NATO’s eastern flank, as well as military exercises to ensure that Latvian and Allied armed forces maintain a high level of readiness and interoperability,” said Mr Rutte at the joint press conference with Prime Minister Siliņa. He referred to Latvia’s commitment to increase defence spending to 3 percent of GDP and noted Riga’s ambition to reach this goal even sooner than expected. Mr. Rutte also commended Latvia for its contributions to NATO’s peacekeeping mission in Kosovo and NATO’s training mission in Iraq.

    On Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the Secretary General reiterated that “we must deliver on the commitments we made at the Washington Summit,” noting that Russia has relentlessly attacked Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure with winter just around the corner. He recalled that “Latvia has provided extensive military training for Ukrainian soldiers” and leads a coalition that works with industry to supply drones.  “I welcome your recent announcement of a new military aid package, including armoured personnel vehicles,” added Mr. Rutte.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Europe: At a Glance – Establishing the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and providing exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine – 16-10-2024

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU will provide a new macro-financial assistance (MFA) loan of up to €35 billion to Ukraine as part of a G7 initiative to support Ukraine with a loan of up to US$50 billion (€45 billion). The new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism will provide revenues originating from immobilised Russian sovereign assets, so that Ukraine can service and repay loans from the EU and other G7 lenders. Parliament is expected to adopt the proposal during its October II plenary sitting.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Confirmation hearings of the Commissioners-designate: Kaja Kallas – High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission – 15-10-2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Kaja Kallas served as the prime minister of Estonia from 2021 to 2024. In 2024, she was awarded the Walther Rathenau Prize in recognition of outstanding lifetime achievement in foreign policy. Having joined the Estonian Reform Party in 2011, Kallas has been its leader since April 2018. From 2011 to 2014, she was a member of the Estonian Parliament (12th Riigikogu) and served as chair of its Economic Affairs Committee (2011). She was also a member of the 14th Riigikogu (2019 to 2021). As a Member of the European Parliament from 2014 to 2018, Kallas belonged to the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE, now Renew Europe) political group. During this term, Kallas was Vice-Chair of Parliament’s Delegation to the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee. Kallas was born in 1977 in Tallinn. She graduated from the University of Tartu in 1999 with a degree in law and pursued postgraduate studies at the Estonian Business School in 2007. Before entering politics, Kallas worked as an attorney at law. This is one of a set of briefings designed to give an overview of issues of interest relating to the portfolios of the Commissioners designate. All these briefings can be found at: https://epthinktank.eu/commissioner_hearings_2024.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Strengthening dialogue and action to address the needs of Ukrainian Roma impacted by war focus of ODIHR event

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: Strengthening dialogue and action to address the needs of Ukrainian Roma impacted by war focus of ODIHR event

    Mykhailo Bilyavskyi, a Lawyer and Roma mediator from the Roma Women’s Fund “Chiricli,” speaks at an event related to Ukrainian Roma impacted by the war in Ukraine, organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) during the Warsaw Human Dimension Conference. (OSCE/Piotr Dziubak) Photo details

    Greater efforts are required to address inequalities and the needs of Ukrainian Roma impacted by the war in Ukraine, agreed participants at an event organized this week by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) during the Warsaw Human Dimension Conference.
    “The human rights challenges experienced by Ukrainian Roma remain a matter of importance for ODIHR,” said Tea Jaliashvili, ODIHR Director’s Alternate/First Deputy Director. “We continue to make significant efforts to support both states and civil society in assisting Roma communities from Ukraine.”
    ODIHR is continuing its work to provide a platform for discussion between the Ukrainian government, Roma civil society, and the international community, on the challenges facing the Roma community since 24 February 2022.
    “The war has brought so much harm to the civilian population, including Roma, who were already suffering from unequal treatment and hardship. The Ukrainian Government continues to implement tailored policies to protect the rights of Roma despite the difficult circumstances,” emphasised Ihor Lossovskyi, Deputy Head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience.
    Participants in the event, which was organised under the auspices of ODIHR’s Advancing the Human Dimension of Security in Ukraine project, emphasised that forcibly displaced Roma often face prejudice and discrimination, while women suffer particularly from intersectional discrimination and exploitation. To address these concerns, Roma civil society, the international community and the Ukrainian authorities need to join efforts to ensure that the rights of Roma are respected without discrimination and with dignity.
    “Promoting and protecting Roma rights is not only an act of justice for Roma, but an indicator of equality in society overall,” said Janush Panchenko, a Roma human rights advocate from Ukraine. “The war has worsened already existing inequalities and forced Roma into profound exclusion. It is a collective duty to prevent further marginalisation.”
    ODIHR provides a forum for dialogue between OSCE states and civil society to ensure the protection of Roma communities at risk. The Office has continued to provide a platform for discussion between the Ukrainian government, Roma civil society, and the international community on challenges facing Roma since the war began, and ODIHR has also carried out human rights monitoring of displaced Roma, including women, in Ukraine as well as neighbouring countries.
    The Office’s mandate to improve the situation of Roma and Sinti also includes promoting dialogue between OSCE states and civil society to ensure the protection of Roma communities, in line with the 2003 Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area. In December 2023, ODIHR published its five-yearly report on progress made by OSCE states towards Roma inclusion and the many challenges that remain.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Moldova votes on whether to join EU as Russia intensifies vast disinformation campaign

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

    Moldova is emerging as a major strategic battleground in a fierce competition between Russia and the west. A Kremlin-backed disinformation campaign has intensified over the last few months, in the run-up to Moldova’s presidential elections.

    One of the key reasons for this is that a referendum on EU membership has been scheduled for the same day, October 20.

    The challenges for this small country, wedged between Ukraine and Romania, are complex. Russia continues to foment instability through its persistent disinformation initiatives, instigation of anti-government protests, and acts of sabotage and vandalism.

    Add to this credible allegations of vote buying, and efforts to call into question the legitimacy of a pro-European election and referendum result, and the situation in Moldova appears highly combustible.

    Moldova gained its independence in 1991 after the fall of the Soviet Union. A brief civil war between the government and separatists in the eastern Transnistria region, supported by remnants of the Soviet army stationed there, ended with the de-facto division of the country.




    Read more:
    Moldova: Russia continues its mischief-making in breakaway Transnistria


    Attempts to settle this conflict have made little progress over the past three decades. And living with an unresolved conflict within its borders has held Moldova back in its development, and contributed to economic problems.

    Voting on EU membership

    Moldova’s incumbent, staunchly pro-western president, Maia Sandu, has tied the EU referendum to her re-election campaign. The referendum could be the country’s best chance to finally break free from its Soviet past.

    If recent polls are accurate, a clear majority of the electorate is likely to vote “yes” on whether they support joining the EU, which would be the first step in a lengthy process.

    Moldova’s president speaks to the European parliament in 2022.

    For many Moldovans, EU membership is associated with better economic development in one of Europe’s poorest countries. The October 10 visit of Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, suggested that the EU could help.

    Von der Leyen did not merely offer political support for Sandu, she also brought with her a financial support package worth €1.8 billion (£1.5 billion) over the next three years to boost economic growth.

    But this vision that the EU can help Moldova’s economy is fiercely contested by Russia and its proxies in Moldova. They exploit the anxiety among a significant number of Moldovans that a vote to join the EU is one that will force the country towards higher inflation, more immigration, politicised anti-corruption measures, mandatory English-language proficiency, and the sale of Moldovan land to foreigners.


    Shutterstock

    Persistent domestic issues such as the economy have been skilfully targeted in a vast Kremlin-backed influencing campaign.

    For a long time, Moldova has suffered from a lack of social, political, institutional and territorial cohesion. The country has significant social divisions between different ethnic and linguistic groups, as well as urban-rural and rich-poor divides.

    Politically, the party system remains highly fractured and increasingly polarised, and lacking common ground over what Moldovan national identity stands for.

    Moldova’s challenges

    Moldova’s territorial disputes also remain challenging. This is most obvious in the pro-Russian Transnistria region and in Gagauzia, but also in ethnically and culturally distinct regions such as Balti and Taraclia.

    These regions will require careful management to prevent a major political and economic crisis in the aftermath of October 20 and beyond. Some of the reforms in the country as part of the integration process, such as EU regulations on competition, subsidies and market access, will have a short-term cost for Moldova. Moldovans who oppose the country’s westward orientation are likely to exploit this in anti-EU narratives.

    So far, Russian destabilisation operations don’t seem to have eroded most Moldovans’ European aspirations. But the mix of blunt disinformation and skilfully capitalising on the cost of living crisis, which has hit Moldova hard as a result of the war against Ukraine, has given Russia and its allies tools to entrench, and in some cases deepen, divisions here.


    The world is watching the US election campaign unfolding. Sign up to join us at a special Conversation event on October 17. Expert panellists will discuss with the audience the upcoming election and its possible fallout.


    Much of the pro-European campaigning has been framed as anti-Russian. But one of the cleverer moves by the pro-Russian movement is to suggest that Moldovans can be both a friend to Moscow and Brussels, and don’t have to choose.

    If a Sandu government is building a pro-European alliance, she will want to grow support from the Russian-speaking part of the population. This will be essential to both counter Russian destabilisation efforts and to build a broader coalition.

    As countries that have joined the EU – from the Baltic to the Balkans – have demonstrated over the past two decades, the EU accession process can help reshape political and economic institutions, and can ultimately help create a more optimistic vision of the future.

    Crucially, this is not something that Russia’s narrative of fear can credibly offer to the majority of Moldovans.

    Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

    ref. Moldova votes on whether to join EU as Russia intensifies vast disinformation campaign – https://theconversation.com/moldova-votes-on-whether-to-join-eu-as-russia-intensifies-vast-disinformation-campaign-240657

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Hosts Enhanced Honor Cordon and Bilat for Denmark’s MoD Poulsen at the Pentagon

    Source: United States Department of Defense

    SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LLOYD AUSTIN: Well, Mr. Poulsen, it’s an honor to host you at the Pentagon. And Denmark is a close and longstanding ally, and we appreciate Denmark’s many contributions to our shared national security interests. We’re grateful for your country’s continued support of Pituffik Space Base in Greenland. It’s our northernmost military installation, and it performs vital space and missile defense missions.

    Now, the US and Denmark also stand united in helping Ukraine defend itself against Putin’s cruel war of aggression. So, Mr. Minister, thanks for everything that you’re doing to support the Ukrainian people and their military. Denmark may be a small country, but it’s one of the top financial donors to Ukraine as a percentage of GDP.

    Denmark has also led the way in finding innovative solutions to meet Ukraine’s operational requirements. And you have stepped up as a co-leader of the Air Force capability coalition of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, alongside my country and the Netherlands. So, thanks for leading the way on providing F-16s to Ukraine and training their pilots.

    Last December, the US signed a defense cooperation agreement with Denmark, and so I look forward to building on this momentum and deepening our bilateral defense partnership. Our countries both believe that our democratic values and our close defense cooperation are vital for peace, prosperity, and security in the North Atlantic. So, I appreciate Denmark’s increasing role in regional defense, and I applaud Denmark’s commitment to meet the pledge that all NATO members took to invest at least 2 percent of your GDP in defense this year.

    Mr. Minister, thanks again for making the trip. I look forward to a great conversation. Over to you.

    DENMARK MINISTER OF DEFENSE TROELS LUND POULSEN: Thank you very much, and thank you for the warm welcome here at the Pentagon. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, it is a great honor for me to be here, and also having the possibility to talk to you about some of the most crucial elements right now.

    And as you just mentioned, Denmark and the US have a long-lasting cooperation. And you are indeed a very warm and also strong ally for Denmark, and we very much support you in that. And I hope that we also could continue that support in the future.

    Thank you also for what you personally have been doing since 2022 at the Ramstein meetings. It is indeed a great honor for me to participate in these meetings, and also the great support from the US to Ukraine and also the very needed support for the fight for freedom for the people of Ukraine. I think you have personally done an outstanding job, and thank you so much for that.

    We are also looking into new discussions. New NATO targets will arrive next year. Denmark will be very active also to deliver on these targets. I think you’re also aware that Denmark is now being able to spend 2.4 percent of the GDP on defense. We will continue doing that also in the future.

    And I have also said to you before that I think Europe have to spend more on our own defense, and then we will also be an important player in that discussion. Denmark can do more in the future, but I also think that Europe should do more for our own security. We cannot depend on US. We should do more, Europe, in context for our own defense.

    Let me also just recognize the close cooperation that we have. You mentioned Pituffik Air Base. I think you will have also strong cooperation in the future. Also among the Kingdom of Denmark, we have the Faroe Islands and also Greenland, and then of course also Denmark. We can do even more together, and we will be happy to do that together with the US.

    And let me just conclude saying that we are also having soldiers in Latvia, 800 soldiers. I paid a visit to them last week. And we will also be active in doing even more in the future to help our friends in the Baltic area securing their security.

    So, once again, thank you so much for having us here today. It’s a great honor for us to be here.

    SECRETARY AUSTIN: Mr. Minister, welcome, and thanks for making the trip. And I look forward to a great conversation. Thanks, everybody.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: 2023 IAEA Annual Report Presented to the UN General Assembly

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    The 2023 IAEA Annual Report contains highlights of a significant year for the Agency. (Image: A.Vargas).

    The 2023 IAEA Annual Report is now available to read online, in all the official UN languages. The 2023 report was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly  today by the IAEA’s Director General, Rafael Mariano Grossi.

    The 2023 IAEA Annual Report contains highlights of a significant year for the Agency. A new Atoms4Food initiative was launched by Mr Grossi, together with the Director General Qu Dongyu of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. The initiative builds on the IAEA’s experience of helping countries to use nuclear techniques to help them tackle global hunger by enhancing food security and nutrition. 

    At the same time, the IAEA continued to implement its existing key initiatives. These include Rays of Hope: Cancer Care for All, aimed at closing the gap in cancer care in lower- and middle- income countries, its Zoonotic Disease Integrated Action initiative  (ZODIAC) tasked with preventing future pandemics and NUTEC Plastics, which fights global plastic pollution.

    “Every day on every continent, the IAEA assists nations in overcoming challenges like diseases, poverty, hunger, pollution and climate change,” said Mr Grossi in his written statement to the UN General Assembly. “In partnership with our 178 Member States, we are enabling communities to improve healthcare, agriculture and energy systems through the power of nuclear science and technology.”

    An important part of the IAEA’s work in 2023 was to ensure transparency around the discharge of ALPS treated water from Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station. In July, Mr Grossi presented to Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan an Agency report that concluded the discharge approach and activities to be consistent with international safety standards.

    Another key priority was to support Ukraine’s nuclear safety and security. A total of 86 IAEA missions comprising 187 staff travelled to Ukraine in 2023. The IAEA also maintained a continuous presence at all five nuclear sites in Ukraine. In May, Mr Grossi presented to the UN Security Council the five principles for protecting nuclear safety and security at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant.

    A significant milestone for the IAEA was at last year’s United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP28) in Dubai, where leaders backed investment in nuclear as a low-carbon energy source for the first time. Further notable developments concerning nuclear energy included two interconnected mechanisms: the IAEA Platform on SMRs and their Applications and the IAEA’s Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative, launched together in 2023 to support its Member States with the safe and timely deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs). SMRs offer a viable option to  enhance energy security while helping to achieve global climate goals for many countries worldwide. 

    The IAEA’s unique laboratories at Seibersdorf achieved a milestone last year, fundraising was completed for the renewal of the Nuclear Application Laboratories (ReNuAL) initiative. In addition, the IAEA’s new Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre opened, ready to assist Member States in tackling nuclear terrorism and crime.

    Mr Grossi also launched the World Fusion Energy Group in 2023, which will bringing together key stakeholders as this future technology continues its journey from experimentation to demonstration and deployment.

    In addition, the IAEA celebrated achievements in promoting gender equality in the nuclear sector. By the end of 2023, the IAEA Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme had 560 fellows, and the Lise Meitner Programme was also in place, offering early- and mid-career women in the nuclear sector new opportunities for career advancement. In 2023, gender balance was achieved in senior management at the IAEA.

    More information about the significant activities of the Agency during the past year is available here. The 2023 IAEA Annual Report can also be read in the UN official languages of Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish, as well as English. Mr Grossi’s full statement can be read here.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Secretary of Defense to Travel to Brussels and NATO for Defense Ministerial Meetings Followed by G7 Defense Ministers Meeting in Italy and Other Engagements in Italy and Vatican City

    Source: United States Department of Defense

    Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III will travel to Brussels, Belgium, from October 16-18, 2024, to participate in a series of multilateral meetings, including the NATO Defense Ministerial and the Ministerial of the force contributing members of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (D-ISIS). These engagements and others will focus on strengthening NATO’s collective defense posture, adapting the D-ISIS Coalition to an evolving threat from ISIS in the Middle East and globally, and enhancing military support for Ukraine.

    Secretary Austin will then attend the first-ever G7 Defense Ministers Meeting Oct. 19 in Naples, Italy, where he will also meet with Italian Minister of Defense Guido Crosetto and the new Minister of Defense of Japan, Nakatani Gen. The discussions at the G7 will center on ensuring continued security assistance for Ukraine in its defense against Russia’s aggression, addressing the urgent need to deescalate tensions in the Middle East, exchanging views on the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific, discussing support for partners in Africa, and fostering additional cooperation on defense industry issues among the world’s leading democratic economies.

    Secretary Austin will also conclude his trip with official engagements in Vatican City.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB Group hosts the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg and Chékéba Hachemi for discussions on wartime sexual violence

    Source: European Investment Bank

    ©Vio Dudau/ EIB

    On 14 October 2024, the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group held an event for staff focused on tackling sexual violence in conflict zones.

    Guests at the EIB’s Luxembourg headquarters included Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess Maria Teresa of Luxembourg, who is president of the association Stand Speak Rise Up!, and Ms. Chékéba Hachemi, former first female Afghan diplomat, women’s rights activist and the co-founder of the association. 

    The event highlighted the association’s transformative work in advocating for and supporting survivors of sexual violence in fragile environments as well as children born of rape.

    EIB President Nadia Calviño opened the discussion, saying that investing in women is key to building stronger communities worldwide. She stressed the EIB Group’s commitment to protecting women and empowering them economically, particularly in conflict areas.

    The Grand Duchess and Ms. Hachemi presented projects led by Stand Speak Rise Up! aimed at increasing access to education, housing, health and justice and at driving economic independence for survivors and children born of rape. The presentations were followed by a lively exchange of views with EIB staff members.

    The association provides a platform for victims to share their experiences and receive support. Since its creation in 2019, Stand Speak Rise Up! has offered direct help to over 6,000 women from 13 countries including Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and Ukraine.

    This EIB event offered a reminder of the shared responsibility to support victims of sexual violence, amplify their voices, advocate to end the use of rape as a weapon of war and strive for the universal protection of human rights.


    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: FDFA State Secretary Alexandre Fasel holds political consultations with Brazil

    Source: Switzerland – Federal Administration in English

    Bern, 15.10.2024 – Alexandre Fasel, the state secretary of the FDFA, met with the deputy foreign minister of Brazil, Maria Laura da Rocha, in Brasilia. The political consultations centred on bilateral relations, issues relating to economic and security policy, respect for human rights and cooperation to protect the environment.

    Since 2008, Switzerland and Brazil have held annual political consultations to discuss bilateral and multilateral matters of the day. At the 11th edition of these consultations on 15 October 2024, Mr Fasel and Ms Da Rocha highlighted the close relations between their two countries, which are put into effect through nine regular dialogues in areas ranging from business, science, and research to human rights.

    Brazil is Switzerland’s biggest trading partner in Latin America, with a total volume of approximately CHF 4.4 billion in 2023. This corresponds to around a quarter of Switzerland’s total trade with all Latin American countries. Economic issues were thus at the centre of the discussions in Brasilia. In addition to the intensification of bilateral trade and investment, a particular focus was placed on the negotiations between the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), of which Switzerland is a member, and Mercosur, a single market of around 270 million inhabitants comprising the four South American states of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. The negotiations between EFTA and Mercosur were largely concluded in 2019 and are now in the final phase. Mr Fasel and Ms Da Rocha expressed their hope that the free trade agreement can be signed soon.

    The political consultations also involved a discussion on various crises and conflicts, including regional security in general and in particular the situation in Venezuela, and the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. Both interlocutors underscored the importance of contributing to peace and security through dialogue and mediation. In this context, Mr Fasel emphasised that in Switzerland’s view all initiatives for peace in Ukraine that are based on international law and the UN Charter should be considered. He also informed Ms Da Rocha about Switzerland’s work during its term on the UN Security Council, which will come to an end in December 2024.

    Measures to boost cooperation to protect the environment and promote sustainability were also on the agenda of the Brasilia meeting. Switzerland supports several initiatives to protect the Amazon rainforest and in areas such as decarbonisation, sustainable infrastructure and cleantech in Brazil. These projects are coordinated as part of the run-up to the COP 30 climate conference (‘the Road to Belém’), which will take place in Belém in 2025 – the gateway city to the Amazon.

    During his visit to Brazil, Mr Fasel also held talks with representatives from the political and scientific communities in Brasilia and São Paulo. In Brasilia, he also took part in an event to mark 75 years of the Geneva Conventions and Switzerland’s presidency of the UN Security Council in October 2024.

    Brazil is a priority country in the Federal Council’s Americas Strategy 2022–25: since 2023, seven meetings have taken place between members of the Federal Council and their Brazilian counterparts, and two at presidential level.


    Address for enquiries

    FDFA Communication
    Federal Palace West Wing
    CH-3003 Bern, Switzerland
    Tel. Press service: +41 58 460 55 55
    E-mail: kommunikation@eda.admin.ch
    Twitter: @SwissMFA


    Publisher

    Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
    https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home.html

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Video: Lebanon, Yemen, Statelessness & other topics – Daily Press Briefing (15 Oct 2024) | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    -Lebanon
    -Lebanon/Humanitarian
    -Occupied Palestinian Territory
    -Yemen
    -Ukraine
    -Statelessness
    -Women/Social protection
    -International Day of Rural Women
    -Briefings Tomorrow

    LEBANON
    The United Nations notes with concern the continued strikes across the Blue Line by Hizbullah and the Israel Defense Forces. Launches
    In this regard, the airstrike on Aitou in North Lebanon which resulted in at least 23 fatalities, according to Lebanese authorities, is deeply concerning. The Secretary-General strongly condemns the civilian loss of lives.
    The UN remains deeply concerned at the impact on civilians on both sides of the Blue Line but particularly in Lebanon. All actors must uphold obligations under international law, including International Humanitarian Law, and to protect civilians.
    The UN also notes that clashes continue in southern Lebanon, where the Israel Defense Forces has conducted ground operations since 1 October.
    In recent days the UN underscored our alarm about UNIFIL peacekeepers coming under fire, with at least five peacekeepers injured, and UN premises being impacted on at least 20 occasions since 1 October. The Secretary-General reiterates that UNIFIL personnel and its premises must never be targeted. Attacks against peacekeepers are in breach of international law, including international humanitarian law. They may constitute a war crime.
    As the President of the Security Council stated on behalf of all 15 Council members yesterday, “all parties [are] to respect the safety and security of UNIFIL personnel and premises”.
    The UN notes that the Council “… recalled that UN peacekeepers and UN premises must never be the target of an attack.”
    The UN appreciates the stated support of the Council for the work of our brave peacekeepers who remain in position, in support of efforts to create space for a diplomatic solution to this crisis and support a return to a cessation of hostilities and the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006).
    The UN reiterates its calls for an immediate ceasefire, noting this is the only way to ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers as well as to protect the populations of Lebanon and Israel from further suffering.

    LEBANON/HUMANITARIAN
    This crisis has a huge impact on civilians on both sides, in Lebanon and in Israel.
    In Lebanon, today, a 12-truck convoy carrying vital aid arrived in the villages of Marjeyoun [Marji-yun] and Klayaa in the south of the country.
    The inter-agency mission – supported by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Food Programme, the UN Refugee Agency, UNICEF and the UN Population Fund – delivered bottled water, family hygiene kits, blankets, pillows and mattresses, among other essential items.
    The UN and partners continue to support the tens of thousands of men, women and children impacted by the ongoing crisis across Lebanon.
    WFP provides ready-to-eat food and cash to some 200,000 people on a daily basis, while UNICEF and UNHCR continue to support primary health care services and provide water, hygiene kits, mattresses, blankets and other basic items.
    OCHA reports that ongoing hostilities continue to displace people. The national authorities in Lebanon report that 1.2 million people have been affected or displaced.
    As of October 13th, the International Organization for Migration has identified more than 740,000 people displaced by the escalation of hostilities within the country.
    Of these people, more than 188,000 are staying in about 1,000 government shelters.
    UNHCR is working with the Lebanese authorities to upgrade the shelters with weatherproofing and rehabilitation of water and sanitation facilities, as well as assessing more sites to host displaced people.
    Together with their partners, UNHCR continues to support people in Syria who have fled Lebanon at five border crossings by providing water, food, blankets and mattresses.
    The UN reiterates that all civilians, both in Lebanon, Israel and elsewhere, must be always protected whether they leave or stay. And aid must be allowed to reach civilians wherever they are, safely and without impediment.

    Full Highlights:
    https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=15%20October%202024

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kCHZtzOb6Qc

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Video: Lebanon, Yemen, Statelessness & other topics – Daily Press Briefing (15 Oct 2024) | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    -Lebanon
    -Lebanon/Humanitarian
    -Occupied Palestinian Territory
    -Yemen
    -Ukraine
    -Statelessness
    -Women/Social protection
    -International Day of Rural Women
    -Briefings Tomorrow

    LEBANON
    The United Nations notes with concern the continued strikes across the Blue Line by Hizbullah and the Israel Defense Forces. Launches
    In this regard, the airstrike on Aitou in North Lebanon which resulted in at least 23 fatalities, according to Lebanese authorities, is deeply concerning. The Secretary-General strongly condemns the civilian loss of lives.
    The UN remains deeply concerned at the impact on civilians on both sides of the Blue Line but particularly in Lebanon. All actors must uphold obligations under international law, including International Humanitarian Law, and to protect civilians.
    The UN also notes that clashes continue in southern Lebanon, where the Israel Defense Forces has conducted ground operations since 1 October.
    In recent days the UN underscored our alarm about UNIFIL peacekeepers coming under fire, with at least five peacekeepers injured, and UN premises being impacted on at least 20 occasions since 1 October. The Secretary-General reiterates that UNIFIL personnel and its premises must never be targeted. Attacks against peacekeepers are in breach of international law, including international humanitarian law. They may constitute a war crime.
    As the President of the Security Council stated on behalf of all 15 Council members yesterday, “all parties [are] to respect the safety and security of UNIFIL personnel and premises”.
    The UN notes that the Council “… recalled that UN peacekeepers and UN premises must never be the target of an attack.”
    The UN appreciates the stated support of the Council for the work of our brave peacekeepers who remain in position, in support of efforts to create space for a diplomatic solution to this crisis and support a return to a cessation of hostilities and the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006).
    The UN reiterates its calls for an immediate ceasefire, noting this is the only way to ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers as well as to protect the populations of Lebanon and Israel from further suffering.

    LEBANON/HUMANITARIAN
    This crisis has a huge impact on civilians on both sides, in Lebanon and in Israel.
    In Lebanon, today, a 12-truck convoy carrying vital aid arrived in the villages of Marjeyoun [Marji-yun] and Klayaa in the south of the country.
    The inter-agency mission – supported by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Food Programme, the UN Refugee Agency, UNICEF and the UN Population Fund – delivered bottled water, family hygiene kits, blankets, pillows and mattresses, among other essential items.
    The UN and partners continue to support the tens of thousands of men, women and children impacted by the ongoing crisis across Lebanon.
    WFP provides ready-to-eat food and cash to some 200,000 people on a daily basis, while UNICEF and UNHCR continue to support primary health care services and provide water, hygiene kits, mattresses, blankets and other basic items.
    OCHA reports that ongoing hostilities continue to displace people. The national authorities in Lebanon report that 1.2 million people have been affected or displaced.
    As of October 13th, the International Organization for Migration has identified more than 740,000 people displaced by the escalation of hostilities within the country.
    Of these people, more than 188,000 are staying in about 1,000 government shelters.
    UNHCR is working with the Lebanese authorities to upgrade the shelters with weatherproofing and rehabilitation of water and sanitation facilities, as well as assessing more sites to host displaced people.
    Together with their partners, UNHCR continues to support people in Syria who have fled Lebanon at five border crossings by providing water, food, blankets and mattresses.
    The UN reiterates that all civilians, both in Lebanon, Israel and elsewhere, must be always protected whether they leave or stay. And aid must be allowed to reach civilians wherever they are, safely and without impediment.

    Full Highlights:
    https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=15%20October%202024

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kCHZtzOb6Qc

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI: Silvaco Announces Preliminary Unaudited Revenue for Q3 and Updates Full Year 2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SANTA CLARA, Calif., Oct. 15, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Silvaco Group, Inc. (Nasdaq: SVCO) (“Silvaco” or the “Company”), a provider of TCAD, EDA software, and SIP solutions that enable semiconductor design and digital twin modeling through AI software and innovation, today announced preliminary unaudited revenue results for the third quarter 2024 and updated its outlook for the full year 2024. The Company will report its full third quarter 2024 earnings results and hold a conference call with an earnings presentation on November 12, 2024.

    “Similar to trends observed across the semiconductor industry, we saw a decline in orders from Asia during Q3 primarily driven by economic challenges and the ongoing strain in U.S.-China trade relations. Accordingly, we are adjusting our expectations for the remainder of the year,” said Babak Taheri, Silvaco’s Chief Executive Officer. Dr. Taheri continued, “We remain confident in our long-term strategy and continue to believe we will be able to achieve double-digit long-term revenue growth driven by our proprietary platform and solutions, examples of which are described in our recent press release of September 24, 2024, alongside our ability to effectively capitalize on strategic acquisition opportunities.”

    Preliminarily, the Company expects total unaudited revenues for the third quarter 2024 to be approximately $11.0 million, not including a large order of approximately $5.0 million, which was expected in the third quarter of 2024, but was received in the first week of the fourth quarter of 2024. This order is included in our full-year guidance for bookings below and is expected to contribute to the Company’s fourth quarter of 2024 revenue. Preliminary results are unaudited, subject to completion of the Company’s financial reporting process, based on information known by management as of the date of this press release, and do not represent a comprehensive statement of our financial results for the third quarter 2024.

    In addition, based on current business trends and conditions, the Company is updating its expectations regarding the full year 2024, as follows:

      Previous Full Year 2024 Guidance Updated Full Year 2024 Guidance
    Gross bookings $67 million to $71 million $64 million to $67 million
    Revenue $63 million to $66 million $60 million to $63 million
    year-over-year growth 16% to 22% 10% to 16%
    Non-GAAP gross margin 85% to 89% 85% to 87%
    Non-GAAP operating income $8.0 million to $11.0 million $5.0 million to $8.0 million
         

    This updated guidance represents Silvaco’s current estimates of its operations and financial results as of October 15, 2024. The financial information above represents forward-looking financial information and in some instances forward-looking, non-GAAP financial information, including estimates of non-GAAP gross margin and non-GAAP operating income. GAAP gross margin is the most comparable GAAP measure to non-GAAP gross margin, and GAAP operating income is the most comparable GAAP measure to non-GAAP operating income. Non-GAAP operating income differs from GAAP operating income in that it excludes items such as certain transaction-related costs, IPO preparation costs, estimated acquisition-related litigation claims and costs, stock-based compensation, amortization of acquired intangible assets, impairment charges and executive severance costs. Silvaco is unable to predict with reasonable certainty the ultimate outcome of these exclusions without unreasonable effort. Therefore, Silvaco has not provided guidance for GAAP gross margin or GAAP operating income or a reconciliation of the forward-looking non-GAAP gross margin or non-GAAP operating income guidance to GAAP gross margin or GAAP operating income, respectively. However, it is important to note that these excluded items could be material to our results computed in accordance with GAAP in future periods.

    Q3 2024 Conference Call Details

    A press release highlighting the Company’s results along with supplemental financial results will be available at https://investors.silvaco.com/ along with an earnings presentation to accompany management’s prepared remarks on the day of the conference call, after market close. An archived replay of the conference call will be available on this website for a limited time after the call. Participants who want to join the call and ask a question may register for the call here to receive the dial-in numbers and unique PIN.

    Date: Tuesday, November 12, 2024
    Time: 5:00 p.m. Eastern time
    Webcast: Here (live and replay)

    About Silvaco

    Silvaco is a provider of TCAD, EDA software, and SIP solutions that enable semiconductor design and digital twin modeling through AI software and innovation. Silvaco’s solutions are used for semiconductor and photonics processes, devices, and systems development across display, power devices, automotive, memory, high performance compute, foundries, photonics, internet of things, and 5G/6G mobile markets for complex SoC design. Silvaco is headquartered in Santa Clara, California, and has a global presence with offices located in North America, Europe, Brazil, China, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.

    Safe Harbor Statement

    This press release contains forward-looking statements based on Silvaco’s current expectations. The words “believe”, “estimate”, “expect”, “intend”, “anticipate”, “plan”, “project”, “will”, and similar phrases as they relate to Silvaco are intended to identify such forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements reflect the current views and assumptions of Silvaco and are subject to various risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from expectations.

    These forward-looking statements include but are not limited to, statements regarding our future operating results, financial position, and guidance, our business strategy and plans, our objectives for future operations, our development or delivery of new or enhanced products, and anticipated results of those products for our customers, our competitive positioning, projected costs, technological capabilities, and plans, and macroeconomic trends.

    A variety of risks and factors that are beyond our control could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statements including, without limitation, the following: (a) market conditions; (b) anticipated trends, challenges and growth in our business and the markets in which we operate; (c) our ability to appropriately respond to changing technologies on a timely and cost-effective basis; (d) the size and growth potential of the markets for our software solutions, and our ability to serve those markets; (e) our expectations regarding competition in our existing and new markets; (f) the level of demand in our customers’ end markets; (g) regulatory developments in the United States and foreign countries; (h) changes in trade policies, including the imposition of tariffs; (i) proposed new software solutions, services or developments; (j) our ability to attract and retain key management personnel; (k) our customer relationships and our ability to retain and expand our customer relationships; (l) our ability to diversify our customer base and develop relationships in new markets; (m) the strategies, prospects, plans, expectations, and objectives of management for future operations; (n) public health crises, pandemics, and epidemics and their effects on our business and our customers’ businesses; (o) the impact of the current conflicts between Ukraine and Russia and Israel and its adversaries including Hamas and Hezbollah and the ongoing trade disputes among the United States and China on our business, financial condition or prospects, including extreme volatility in the global capital markets making debt or equity financing more difficult to obtain, more costly or more dilutive, delays and disruptions of the global supply chains and the business activities of our suppliers, distributors, customers and other business partners; (p) changes in general economic or business conditions or economic or demographic trends in the United States and foreign countries including changes in interest rates and inflation; (q) our ability to raise additional capital; (r) our ability to accurately forecast demand for our software solutions; (s) our expectations regarding the outcome of any ongoing litigation; (t) our expectations regarding the period during which we qualify as an emerging growth company under the JOBS Act and as a smaller reporting company under the Exchange Act; (u) our expectations regarding our ability to obtain, maintain, protect and enforce intellectual property protection for our technology; (v) our status as a controlled company; and (w) our use of the net proceeds from our initial public offering.

    It is not possible for us to predict all risks, nor can we assess the impact of all factors on our business or the extent to which any factor, or combination of factors, may cause actual results or outcomes to differ materially from those contained in any forward-looking statements we may make. Accordingly, you should not rely on any of the forward-looking statements. Additional information relating to the uncertainty affecting the Silvaco’s business is contained in Silvaco’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These documents are available on the SEC Filings section of the Investor Relations section of Silvaco’s website at http://investors.silvaco.com/. These forward-looking statements represent Silvaco’s expectations as of the date of this press release. Subsequent events may cause these expectations to change, and Silvaco disclaims any obligations to update or alter these forward-looking statements in the future, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

    Discussion of Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    We use certain non-GAAP financial measures to supplement the performance measures in our consolidated financial statements which are presented in accordance with GAAP. These non-GAAP financial measures include non-GAAP gross margin, and non-GAAP operating income (loss). We use these non-GAAP financial measures for financial and operational decision-making and as a means to assist us in evaluating period-to-period comparisons.

    We define non-GAAP gross margin as our GAAP gross margin adjusted to exclude certain costs, including stock-based compensation and amortization of acquired intangible assets. We define non-GAAP operating income (loss) as our GAAP operating income (loss) adjusted to exclude certain costs, including certain transaction-related costs, IPO preparation costs, estimated acquisition-related litigation claims and costs, stock-based compensation, amortization of acquired intangible assets, impairment charges, and executive severance costs. We monitor non-GAAP gross margin and non-GAAP operating income (loss) as non-GAAP financial measures to supplement the financial information we present in accordance with GAAP to provide investors with additional information regarding our financial results.

    Certain of the items excluded from our non-GAAP gross margin and non-GAAP operating income (loss) are non-cash in nature or are not indicative of our core operating performance and render comparisons with prior periods and our competitors less meaningful. We adjust GAAP gross margin and GAAP operating income (loss) for these items to arrive at non-GAAP gross margin and non-GAAP operating income (loss) because these amounts can vary substantially from company to company within our industry depending upon accounting methods and book values of assets, capital structure and the method by which the assets were acquired. By excluding certain items that may not be indicative of our recurring core operating results, we believe that non-GAAP gross margin and non-GAAP operating income (loss) provide meaningful supplemental information regarding our performance.

    We believe these non-GAAP financial measures are useful to investors and others because they allow for additional information with respect to financial measures used by management in its financial and operational decision-making and they may be used by our institutional investors and the analyst community to help them analyze our financial performance and the health of our business. However, there are a number of limitations related to the use of non-GAAP financial measures, and these non-GAAP measures should be considered in addition to, not as a substitute for or in isolation from, our financial results prepared in accordance with GAAP. Other companies, including companies in our industry, may calculate these non-GAAP financial measures differently or not at all, which reduces their usefulness as comparative measures.

    Investor Contact:
    Greg McNiff
    investors@silvaco.com

    Media Contact:
    Tyler Weiland
    press@silvaco.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Translation: 15/10/2024 Undersecretary of State Jakub Wiśniewski met with the French Secretary of State for Development Policy

    MIL ASI Translation. Region: Polish/Europe –

    Fuente: Gobierno de Polonia en poleco.

    Undersecretary of State Jakub Wiśniewski met with the French Secretary of State for Development Policy15.10.2024On Monday, October 14, Polish-French consultations in the area of development cooperation were held in Paris. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Jakub Wiśniewski discussed current issues related to this area with the French Secretary of State for Development Policy Thani Mohamed Soilihi, particularly in the context of preparations for the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2025.

    Undersecretary of State Jakub Wiśniewski presented the priorities of the Polish presidency, emphasizing the particular importance of the eastern policy and the EU enlargement process. He also presented the plans of the Polish presidency in the area of development cooperation, drawing attention to the priority topic – building resilience, and discussed the main events, including ministerial meetings and the European Humanitarian Forum. The interlocutors emphasized the importance of EU solidarity and cooperation, especially in the context of the EU developing a response to hybrid threats and the effects of Russian aggression against Ukraine. They agreed that it is important to support the countries of the so-called Global South in responding to current challenges, including in the area of migration and combating disinformation. The French side drew attention to the importance of supporting women’s rights and the participation of young citizens in public life, and Deputy Minister Wiśniewski emphasized the role of supporting the rule of law and good governance in developing countries. In the context of the current situation in the Middle East, the interlocutors emphasized the urgent need for a ceasefire and humanitarian aid for the civilian population.

    MILES AXIS

    EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is a translation. Apologies should the grammar and/or sentence structure not be perfect.

    MIL Translation OSI

  • MIL-OSI: Solitron Devices, Inc. Announces Fiscal 2025 Second Quarter Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    WEST PALM BEACH, Fla., Oct. 15, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Solitron Devices, Inc. (OTC Pink: SODI) (“Solitron” or the “Company”) is pleased to announce fiscal 2025 second quarter results.

    FISCAL 2025 SECOND QUARTER HIGHLIGHTS

    • Net sales increased 39% to approximately $3.58 million versus $2.58 million in the prior year period.
    • Net bookings decreased 21% to $1.75 million versus $2.23 million in the prior year period.
    • Backlog decreased 14% to $7.57 million at the end of the fiscal 2025 second quarter as compared to $8.79 million at the end of the fiscal 2024 second quarter.
    • Net income decreased to $0.02 million, or $0.01 per share, in the fiscal 2025 second quarter versus net income of $0.20 million, or $0.10 per share, in the fiscal 2024 second quarter.

    This is our fourth quarter since we closed the acquisition of Micro Engineering (MEI). Thus far we are pleased with the results. We continue the process of integration of systems and are excited about the potential to expand our relationship with existing customers. MEI contributed $1.58 million in revenue in the fiscal 2025 second quarter.

    While revenue increased from the prior year, it declined sequentially from $3.97 million in the fiscal first quarter to $3.58 million in the fiscal second quarter. Net income declined significantly due to the decreased revenue and increase in cost of sales. We had a number of issues negatively impact the quarter. The most significant was an issue with a plating supplier that resulted in fully reserving over 2,000 parts. To put that in some perspective we shipped approximately 9,200 units from Solitron’s WPB facility in the quarter. Scrapping the parts caused a loss of revenue while incurring the cost to reserve all raw material and work in process up until the time of scrapping. We are still in discussions with the supplier about recovering costs. We are withholding payment on existing payables while the matter is resolved. Also included in costs for the fiscal 2025 second quarter are $53,000 of intangible amortization; and $26,000 of non-cash interest costs related to the accrued contingent consideration.

    While reported operating income was $50,000 in the fiscal 2025 second quarter, if we adjust for the intangible amortization, it was $103,000. That number excludes the $26,000 of non-cash interest costs, which are non-operating. We believe the adjusted number more accurately reflects the performance of the business during the quarter. Regardless, it was a significant decline from the previous quarter due mainly to the scrapping of parts noted above.

    Bookings in the quarter were down compared to the prior year quarter. We once again want to reiterate that our bookings have historically been lumpy. Based on conversations, it is our expectation that the two largest programs Solitron generates revenue from will place orders in the coming months. At present, we expect the orders to be similar in size to the past year, thus we do not expect the orders to include any additional demand related to the stockpile program. We also recently quoted a large end-of-life order with expected deliveries over a three-year period. Our current expectation is to receive between $7 million and $12 million of bookings between today and calendar year end. The $12 million amount would include being awarded the end-of-life order near the maximum quantities quoted.

    We continue to see increased interest in new product development, including silicon carbide. We have developed various prototypes for testing by potential customers and continue to be optimistic about creating additional revenue sources.

     
    SOLITRON DEVICES, INC.
    CONSOLIDATED CONDENSED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
    FOR THE THREE AND SIX MONTHS ENDED AUGUST 31, 2024 AND AUGUST 31, 2023
    (in thousands except for share and per share amounts)
                   
      For The Three
    Months ended
      For The Three
    Months ended
      For The Six
    Months ended
      For The Six
    Months ended
      August 31, 2024   August 31, 2023   August 31, 2024   August 31, 2023
      unaudited   unaudited    unaudited    unaudited
    Net sales $ 3,581     $ 2,579     $ 7,548     $ 4,617  
    Cost of sales   2,843       1,682       5,135       3,113  
                   
    Gross profit   738       897       2,413       1,504  
                   
    Selling, general and administrative expenses   688       614       1,571       1,156  
                   
    Operating income   50       283       842       348  
                   
    Other income (loss)              
    Interest income   1       6       6       20  
    Interest expense   (77 )     (26 )     (127 )     (53 )
    Dividend income   6       18       22       19  
    Realized gain on investments   22       210       33       332  
    Unrealized gain (loss) on investments   21       (291 )     48       (637 )
    Total other (loss)   (27 )     (83 )     (18 )     (319 )
                   
    Net income (loss) before tax $ 23     $ 200     $ 824     $ 29  
    Income taxes   (6 )           (218 )      
    Net income (loss) $ 17     $ 200     $ 606     $ 29  
                   
    Net income (loss) per common share – basic and diluted $ 0.01     $ 0.10     $ 0.29     $ 0.01  
                   
    Weighted average shares outstanding – basic and diluted   2,083,436       2,083,436       2,083,436       2,083,436  
                                   

    For more information see our 10-Q filing at https://www.sec.gov/edgar/browse/?CIK=91668&owner=exclude

    The unaudited financial information disclosed in this press release for the three months ended August 31, 2024, is based on management’s review of operations for that period and the information available to the Company as of the date of this press release. The Company’s results included herein have been prepared by, and are the responsibility of, the Company’s management. The Company’s independent auditors have audited the Company’s results for the fiscal year ending February 29, 2024. The financial results presented herein should not be considered a substitute for the information filed or to be filed with the SEC in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K and Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the respective periods once such reports become available.  

    About Solitron Devices, Inc.

    Solitron Devices, Inc., a Delaware corporation, designs, develops, manufactures, and markets solid state semiconductor components and related devices primarily for the military and aerospace markets. The Company manufactures a large variety of bipolar and metal oxide semiconductor (“MOS”) power transistors, power and control hybrids, junction and power MOS field effect transistors (“Power MOSFETS”), and other related products. Most of the Company’s products are custom made pursuant to contracts with customers whose end products are sold to the United States government. Other products, such as Joint Army/Navy (“JAN”) transistors, diodes, and Standard Military Drawings voltage regulators, are sold as standard or catalog items.

    Effective September 1, 2023, Solitron closed its acquisition of Micro Engineering Inc. (MEI) based in Apopka, Florida. MEI specializes in solving design layout and manufacturing challenges while maximizing efficiency and keeping flexibility to meet unique customer needs. Since 1980 the MEI team has been dedicated to overcoming obstacles to provide cost efficient and rapid results. MEI specializes in low to mid volume projects that require engineering dedication, quality systems and efficient manufacturing.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements regarding future events and the future performance of Solitron Devices, Inc. that involve risks and uncertainties that could materially affect actual results, including statements regarding the Company’s expectations regarding future performance and trends, including production levels, government spending, backlog and delivery timelines, new product development, our efforts and performance following our acquisition of MEI, and potential future revenue and trends with respect thereto from each of the foregoing. Factors that could cause actual results to vary from current expectations and forward-looking statements contained in this press release include, but are not limited to, the risks and uncertainties arising from potential adverse developments or changes in government budgetary spending and policy including with respect to the war in Ukraine, which may among other factors be affected by the upcoming presidential election and the possibility of reduced government spending on programs in which we participate depending on the outcome thereof and the policy interests of elected officials, inflation, elevated interest rates, adverse trends in the economy and the possibility of a recession the likelihood of which appears to have increased based on recent economic data, the possibility that management’s estimates and assumptions regarding bookings, sales and other metrics prove to be incorrect; the timing and size of orders from our clients, our delivery schedules and our liquidity and cash position; our ability to make the appropriate adjustments to our cost structure; our ability to properly account for inventory in the future; the demand for our products and potential loss of, or reduction of business from, substantial clients our dependence on government contracts, which are subject to termination, price renegotiations and regulatory compliance and which may among other factors be adversely affected by the factors described elsewhere herein, our ability to continue to integrate MEI in an efficient and effective manner, and the possibility that such acquisition or any other acquisition or strategic transaction we may pursue does not yield the results or benefits desired or anticipated. Descriptions of other risk factors and uncertainties are contained in the Company’s Securities and Exchange Commission filings, including its most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended February 29, 2024.

    Tim Eriksen
    Chief Executive Officer
    (561) 848-4311
    Corporate@solitrondevices.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Inflation Expectations – Why They Matter and How They Are Formed

    Source: Reserve Bank of Australia

    Introduction

    I would first like to pay respect to the traditional and original owners of this land, the Gadigal people of the Eora Nation, to pay respect to those who have passed before us and to acknowledge today’s custodians of this land. I also extend that respect to any First Nations people joining us here today.

    A low and stable inflation rate is critical to preserving macroeconomic stability. Having a good idea of what’s going to happen to prices allows businesses to plan for investment and expansion. It also makes things like budgeting and financial planning easier for households. This is particularly true for those on low incomes, who typically have smaller financial buffers than others and spend more of their income on essentials. And with more stable household and business balance sheets, the financial system is more stable.

    The experience of the last few years has clearly highlighted this. Everyone across the economy has felt the increased cost of living. This is very clear in the data we monitor, such as household spending, but it’s perhaps more apparent in survey metrics such as consumer confidence, which remains much lower than its pre-pandemic average (Graph 1). So there are a number of good reasons to bring inflation down and keep it at a low and stable rate.

    In addition to the tangible impact of elevated inflation today, central bankers often note that they want to make sure that inflation expectations remain anchored. But why is this the case? And what impact do current inflation outcomes have on expectations?

    Why do inflation expectations matter?

    Macroeconomists generally think that a prerequisite for consistently achieving low and stable inflation over time is well-anchored inflation expectations. That is, people across the economy believe inflation will generally average a low rate (in Australia’s case, 2–3 per cent), and they make decisions based on this underlying belief that becomes self-reinforcing. Indeed, this is a key lesson from economic history; there are multiple episodes that demonstrate the damage de-anchored expectations can cause, and the policy effort and welfare costs associated with re-anchoring them. Türkiye’s current experience is just one example (Graph 2).

    So why do expectations matter at all when it comes to economic outcomes? We think they matter because people don’t just make decisions based on what is happening today, they also factor in what they think will happen tomorrow. In other words, inflation expectations are at least partly self-fulfilling.

    For example, our decision over how much to save for retirement today is determined by how much income we think we’ll need once we stop working, and this is partly influenced by what we think will happen to prices between now and then.

    In addition to changing the behaviour of households, inflation expectations also directly feed into all of the decisions firms make – for example, over capital investment, pricing and staffing. One way this occurs is through the wage-setting process (Graph 3). This could be workers, or their union representatives, bargaining for higher wages if they think inflation will be higher. Or it could be firms’ expectations of higher future prices giving them the confidence to offer higher wages today to attract workers.

    And given that this is an investment conference, I’d be remiss not to mention how important inflation expectations are to the domestic and international portfolio allocation decisions made by financial market participants. These expectations then feed into long-term interest rates, exchange rates, and the prices of assets in our superannuation funds and all other investment portfolios. In short, inflation expectations are a factor in pretty much every economic decision that’s made every day.

    The fact that expectations feed into actual inflation outcomes means de-anchored expectations typically leads to greater inflation volatility (Graph 4). Volatility breeds uncertainty, and uncertainty makes decisions harder for everyone. As a business, how do you decide when it’s right to invest if you’re less sure of the financial returns? And to go back to the example of households deciding how much to save for retirement or to buy a home, a bout of unexpectedly high inflation is very hard to plan for. Both the effort required to make decisions with uncertainty, and that some otherwise good decisions will not be made, makes us all worse off.

    Tracking inflation expectations

    Given the enormous damage that such de-anchoring can cause, and that policy can be enacted more flexibly while expectations remain anchored, the RBA Board is constantly alert for signs that this risk might emerge here in Australia. It does that by tracking a range of inflation expectations measures, including multiple financial market measures, and surveys of households, unions and professional forecasters. That analysis indicates that inflation expectations have not become de-anchored through the current high-inflation experience (Graph 5).

    So we’re not currently concerned that expectations could become de-anchored in the near term. But we do think it’s important that we track how they’re evolving and that we understand how expectations are formed, so we can monitor whether there are any signs of this risk materialising in the future.

    As I’ve already alluded to, there are a number of different groups across the economy, and each plays a part in determining aggregate macroeconomic outcomes. To understand what’s happening to expectations, we therefore need to understand how different groups form their inflation expectations, as they each play critical roles in determining how the economy evolves over time.

    For consumption/savings decisions, households’ own expectations matter the most. For wage bargaining and competition for labour, unions’ and firms’ expectations likely matter most. And when it comes to how inflation expectations feed into long-term interest rates, it’s the financial markets’ expectations that matter.

    In short, given the importance of inflation expectations as a driving force of many economic decisions, we need to understand how all of the different groups across the economy form their inflation expectations so that we can do our best to keep them anchored.

    So today I’m going to discuss some of the latest research in this area, which we have conducted ourselves and in partnership with our colleagues in academia. This includes a Research Discussion Paper that has been released in parallel with this event, which explores some of the points below in more detail – I encourage you all to have a look at my colleagues’ work.

    The presentation I am giving today draws heavily on a presentation at one of the first ‘Policy Issues Meetings’ with RBA Board members earlier this year. As previously highlighted by Governor Bullock, these meetings:

    … assemble a group of staff with the right experience and expertise to give the members insights and diversity of perspectives on the key issues relevant for policy. It will provide analysis of issues that are relevant to a few upcoming [Board] meetings, not just the immediate one.

    These new meetings have been very well received by Board members. They have appreciated the opportunity to explore policy-relevant topics in more depth and to meet with more of the staff that are engaged in the work. In turn, staff have valued the additional engagement with their work, so it’s been a clear win-win.

    For most of this speech, I’ll be focusing on household and union expectations, and mostly on short-term expectations. In the past, how these groups form expectations has been less well-understood, and this is why we’ve focused our latest research here.

    But before turning to unions and households, it is worth mentioning that we have a reasonable understanding of how financial markets form expectations. Financial markets efficiently incorporate signals about the likely future direction of inflation into market prices; by taking active positions that are contingent on economic outcomes, it’s no surprise that market participants keep themselves very well-informed about what’s happening. From these prices, we can discern whether their short- and long-term expectations remain anchored to the RBA’s inflation target.

    To understand how households and unions form their expectations, we’ve collaborated with academic colleagues to develop a very general model approach that we’ve then applied to different data series. The model assumes that some people form their expectations by extrapolating from their previous experience. That is, they assume that their experience of price increases in the past are a good guide for what they’ll experience in the future. The model also assumes that some people build on this and take account of forward-looking information as well. For example, they might expect to see a sharp increase in grocery prices in the future if it’s reported that the harvest has been poor.

    The first iteration of the model was run through to around the middle of the pandemic. The graph shows the fit of the model to actual data. In the grey lines are unions’ one- and two-year-ahead expectations, and households’ one-year-ahead expectations (Graph 6). And then the blue lines are the model estimates of each of these.

    We think the model did a reasonable job over the historical period. Especially for unions, where the model pretty much captured every major wiggle in their expectations.

    We’ve learned a lot from this process, but there are three key insights that I want to highlight:

    1. We estimate that around three-quarters of households and unions form their expectations by extrapolating from their lived experience. That is, they observe what inflation was yesterday and compare it to what they expected. Every time inflation turns out higher than what these people expected, they partially adjust their expectations up.
    2. This extrapolation process happens a lot slower for households than it does for unions. That is, households only adjust their expectations a small amount each time they are surprised. As a result, inflation has to be persistently higher or lower than previously expected for expectations to change significantly.
    3. The remaining one-quarter of unions and households don’t just extrapolate, they incorporate a lot more of the broader economic information available to them (beyond inflation outcomes themselves) to make forward-looking judgements about where inflation is likely to go. In principle, this is similar to the RBA’s forecasting process – we look at past outcomes and forward-looking indicators to assess how we think inflation will evolve from today.

    Of the roughly 25 per cent who take on board additional information, this could come from a number of different sources. To carry on my groceries example from earlier, in 2011 this group might have expected that banana prices would shoot up in the months after Tropical Cyclone Yasi struck northern Queensland, given the reporting of the damage to that year’s crop. Or this group could be looking at economic forecasts – including the RBA’s – to get a sense of where inflation may be heading.

    With this better understanding of how people form their inflation expectations, we can now assess how they have evolved recently, relative to what the models expected they would do.

    Less extrapolation recently could reflect greater attention to inflation or recognition that the recent episode is temporary

    The orange line is the model’s prediction for how inflation expectations would evolve during the recent high-inflation period (Graph 7). While inflation was rising, expectations were evolving in-line with the model’s output. But the model suggested that the turning point in expectations would come later. So expectations are currently lower than our models thought would be the case.

    As best we can tell, the models missed the turning point because unions and households have been extrapolating less from the recent high inflation outcomes. The model attributes part of this to an increase in the share of people who take on board forward-looking information, from around one-quarter to over two-thirds for unions.

    This finding is consistent with a theory known as the ‘rational inattention’ hypothesis. The idea being that when inflation is low and stable, extrapolation from the past provides a reasonably accurate expectation of the future, so it is not worth paying more ‘attention’. Conversely, when inflation does not fit this pattern – for example, in the recent past when it was much higher – extrapolation might provide a poor forecast. So it is ‘rational’ for people to put more effort into thinking about where inflation will head next.

    Another finding from the model is that those who use previous inflation to form their expectations, that is they use yesterday’s experience to guide today, have been adjusting their view more slowly in recent years. A possible reason for this is that some people have seen the recent experience as atypical and so don’t expect it to continue – given the nature of the shocks (the pandemic and then the conflict in Ukraine), it’s easy to understand this. So while this group only use previous inflation outcomes to form their expectations, they do appear to adjust how much weight they put on specific outcomes to take account of broader economic conditions.

    Unfortunately, these are just plausible hypotheses at this point, we don’t have enough evidence to be definitive. If once inflation sustainably returns to the target band expectation formation reverts to how it was before the recent episode, that would provide further evidence in favour of these hypotheses. But more importantly, it would give us comfort that in future inflationary episodes, expectation formation might similarly change in a way that mutes the increase in expectations.

    Another possible explanation is that some more ‘salient’ prices have evolved differently to average prices

    In everything I’ve shown so far, we assume that the price increases that matter most are the ones that people spend most of their money on. Which is exactly how the Consumer Price Index, or CPI, is constructed.

    But that might not be how people extrapolate from what they have previously observed to form their expectations. Our lived experience is that we ‘see’ some prices much more frequently than others, and that some price changes are more noticeable than others.

    Prices that change regularly or that people pay often may be particularly influential when people form their expectations – they’re more visible, and they could be seen as a proxy for what’s happening to all prices across the economy. These are known as salient prices.

    While there are some obvious candidates for prices that may be salient – such as fuel, groceries, rent, and energy prices – determining how salient they are has unfortunately proven difficult.

    The strongest result we have obtained is with respect to petrol and diesel prices – that is, the prices you see changing every day when you drive past a petrol station or fill your car up. For other potentially salient prices, whether or not our models identify them as salient depends on the various other modelling decisions that are made. But for fuel prices, it doesn’t seem to matter what you do to the model, these prices almost always show up as salient.

    Having said all that, allowing for fuel to be a salient price in the model does not significantly change the model’s estimate of inflation expectations most of the time. This occurs because fuel prices are volatile and households learn slowly. So it actually takes an extended period of fuel prices evolving differently to other prices before there would be a meaningful impact on expectations (according to the model).

    But that’s exactly what we have seen in the past few years (Graph 8). From the beginning of 2021 until mid-2022, fuel price inflation was much higher than average price inflation, increasing 61 per cent over this period. But for most of the period since then, fuel price inflation has been around its historical average, while much of the broader consumption basket has continued to experience above-target price inflation.

    So, for household’s expectations, accounting for the salience of fuel prices can at least partially explain why the simpler inflation expectations model presented earlier predicted that short-term inflation expectations would remain higher for longer.

    Conclusion

    To conclude, recent research has improved our understanding of how people form inflation expectations. As a result, we have been able to better analyse how expectations have evolved during the recent high-inflation period. And it’s a good news story with respect to expectations:

    • Short-term expectations appear to be converging towards long-term expectations, and these have remained anchored through the recent past.
    • There’s no evidence of expectations being more persistent than normal.
    • And there’s even some evidence of households and unions extrapolating less from recent inflation, at least during the period of higher inflation.
    • We need to be mindful of certain prices that may be particularly ‘salient’ for households. But such prices work in both directions, and recently have been working to bring expectations down faster.

    References

    Afrouzi H and C Yang (2021), ‘Dynamic Rational Inattention and the Phillips Curve’, CESifo Working Paper No 8840.

    Ampudia M, MJ Lombardi and T Renault (2024), ‘The Wage-price Pass-through Across Sectors: Evidence from the Euro Area’, BIS Working Paper No 1192.

    Anesti N, V Esady and M Naylor (2024), ‘Food Prices Matter Most: Sensitive Household Inflation Expectations’, CFM Discussion Paper Series CFM-DP2024-34.

    Bazzoni E, M Jacob, S Land, M Mijer, J Moulton and S Welchering (2022), ‘European Consumer Pessimism Intensifies in the Face of Rising Prices’, McKinsey & Company, October.

    Beckers B and A Brassil (2022), ‘Inflation Expectations in Australia’, The Australian Economic Review, 55.

    Beckers B, A Clarke, A Gao, M James and R Morgan (2024), ‘Developments in Income and Consumption Across Household Groups’, RBA Bulletin, January.

    Bernanke B (2013), ‘A Century of US Central Banking: Goals, Frameworks, Accountability’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(4).

    Binder CC (2017), ‘Measuring Uncertainty Based on Rounding: New Method and Application to Inflation Expectations’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 90.

    Binder CC (2018), ‘Inflation Expectations and the Price at the Pump’, Journal of Macroeconomics, 58.

    Blinder AS (1982), ‘The Anatomy of Double-Digit Inflation in the 1970s’, in Hall RE (ed), Inflation: Causes and Effects, University of Chicago Press, pp 261–282.

    Borio C, M Lombardi, J Yetman and E Zakrajšek (2023), ‘The Two-regime View of Inflation’, BIS Papers No 113.

    Brassil A, C Gibbs and C Ryan (forthcoming), ‘Boundedly Rational Expectations and the Optimality of Flexible Average Inflation Targeting’, RBA Research Discussion Paper.

    Brassil A, Y Haidari, J Hambur, G Nolan and C Ryan (2024), ‘How Do Households Form Inflation and Wage Expectations?’, RBA Research Discussion Paper No 2024-07.

    Bullock M (2023), ‘A Monetary Policy Fit for the Future’, Australian Business Economists Annual Dinner, Sydney, 22 November.

    Bullock M (2024), ‘The Costs of High Inflation’, Keynote Address to the Anika Foundation Fundraising Lunch, Sydney, 5 September.

    Charm T, JR Saavedra, K Robinson and T Skiles (2022), ‘The Great Uncertainty: US Consumer Confidence and Behavior during Inflationary Times’, McKinsey & Company, August.

    Chin M and L Lin (2023), ‘The Pass-through of Wages to Consumer Prices in the COVID-19 Pandemic: Evidence from Sectoral Data in the U.S.’, IMF Working Paper No 2023/233.

    Chua CL and S Tsiaplias (2024), ‘The Influence of Supermarket Prices on Consumer Inflation Expectations’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 219.

    Coibion O, Y Gorodnichenko, S Kumar and M Pedemonte (2020), ‘Inflation Expectations as a Policy Tool?’, Journal of International Economics, 124.

    D’Acunto F, U Malmendier, J Ospina and M Weber (2019), ‘Salient Price Changes, Inflation Expectations, and Household Behavior’, June.

    De Fiore F, T Goel, D Igan and R Moessner (2022), ‘Rising Household Inflation Expectations: What are the Communication Challenges for Central Banks?’, BIS Bulletin, No 55.

    Haidari Y and G Nolan (2022), ‘Sentiment, Uncertainty and Households’ Inflation Expectations’, RBA Bulletin, September.

    Hambur J and R Finlay (2018), ‘Affine Endeavour: Estimating a Joint Model of the Nominal and Real Term Structures of Interest Rates in Australia’, RBA Research Discussion Paper No 2018-02.

    Kilian L and X Zhou (2022), ‘Oil Prices, Gasoline Prices, and Inflation Expectations’, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 37(5).

    Maćkowiak B, F Matějka and M Wiederholt (2023), ‘Rational Inattention: A Review’, Journal of Economic Literature, 61(1).

    Moore A (2016), ‘Measures of Inflation Expectations in Australia’, RBA Bulletin, December.

    RBA (2024), ‘Box A: Are Inflation Expectations Anchored?’, Statement on Monetary Policy, August.

    Reiche L and A Meyler (2022), ‘Making Sense of Consumer Inflation Expectations: The Role of Uncertainty’, ECB Working Paper Series No 2642.

    Sims C (2003), ‘Implications of Rational Inattention’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 50(3).

    Suthaharan N and J Bleakley (2022), ‘Wage-price Dynamics in a High-inflation Environment: The International Evidence’, RBA Bulletin, September.

    Wood D, I Chan and B Coates (2023), ‘Inflation and Inequality: How High Inflation Is Affecting Different Australian Households’, Working paper prepared for the RBA Annual Conference, Sydney, 25–26 September.

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: New total defence resolution for a stronger Sweden

    Source: Government of Sweden

    The Government has now presented a Total Defence Bill for the period 2025–2030. It includes substantial reinforcements of the total defence. Additional funding totalling SEK 170 billion will be allocated to the military defence and SEK 35.7 to the civil defence through 2030. These are historically large investments. Defence expenditures will therefore already reach 2.6 per cent of GDP in 2028.

    Substantial reinforcement of capabilities within the total defence 

    Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine illustrates the destruction and strains that Sweden and its Allies could face. Russia is levelling cities, attacking civilian infrastructure and treating the civilian population like  legitimate targets. The Swedish Government is now building up total defence capabilities to meet these threats. 

    The Government also intends to increase funding to the military defence and the civil defence to increase total defence capabilities so that Sweden can meet various threats such as cyberattacks and hybrid attacks. This involves working systematically to break down barriers to growth within the total defence. The Government’s aim and approach is to accelerate the pace of rearmament. Where the defence resolutions of 2015 and 2020 provided a skeletal framework, the Government’s aim with the 2024 Defence Resolution is to lend the total defence some muscles. 

    Military defence

    “This is a powerful Defence Resolution that will give the total defence more strength and better balance. Now the efforts to step up the pace of the defence’s growth continue,” says Minister for Defence Pål Jonson. 

    The Government’s strategic approach for the military defence is to rapidly build up military capability and establish military units with the necessary materiel, personnel and coordinated training to meet the demands of the current geopolitical situation. This is in line with Sweden’s ambition of being a credible, reliable and loyal Ally. Four new brigades will be in place by 2030. The number of conscripts will increase to 10 000 by 2030, and then reach approximately 12 000 between 2032 and 2035. The number of refresher training sessions will be increased to maintain skills.  

    The war organisation’s capability will be enhanced during this defence resolution period. Greater resources will be invested in renovating, modifying and extending the service life of existing materiel and filling stockpiles of ammunition, anti-aircraft munitions and supplies. New capabilities are also being introduced, including long-range capability in the form of cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles and rocket artillery.

    NATO Capability Targets

    Fighting units are the basis of Sweden’s contribution to NATO deterrence and collective defence. The NATO Capability Targets already apportioned and those expected in 2025 serve as an important starting point for shaping the Swedish war organisation. The war organisation under this Defence Resolution is line with the requirements that we are expected to meet. 

    Reinforcements for the Army

    • Supplementary purchases (updates) of combat vehicles and tanks are being made.
    • An increase of anti-aircraft capability is in progress.
    • Development of rocket artillery capability will begin. 
    • More drones are being procured.
    • Continued additions of the previously ordered 72 Archer artillery systems.

    Reinforcements for the Navy

    • An investment in the Navy is taking place in the form of increased funding to increase personnel volume. Visby-class corvettes are undergoing a mid-term modification during this defence resolution period and, in conjunction with this modification, the five surface combat vessels will be armed with anti-aircraft missile systems. 
    • In addition, the coastal missile capability will be expanded and organised into two units to increase both availability and durability. The units armed with anti-ship missiles are an important complement for protection of the Baltic Sea.
    • Procurement of new Luleå-class surface combat vessels will begin in the period 2025–2030. Once delivered, those vessels will give the Navy increased capability and capacity, and make a significant contribution to anti-aircraft capabilities.

    Reinforcements for the Air Force

    • Three qualified S106 Globaleye reconnaissance planes will be procured for the Air Force during this defence resolution period.
    • Introduction of JAS Gripen 39E fighter aircraft begins in late 2024 and continues to be introduced in the armed forces during the period 2025-2030. 
    • Additional Black Hawk HK16 utility helicopters will be procured.
    • Additional SK 50 (Grob) basic trainer aircraft will be procured.
    • The Defence Resolution accelerates Sweden’s incorporation into NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD), which consists of necessary measures for deterrence or to nullify or reduce threats from the air domain. This will be achieved in part by incorporating Sweden into a system of integrated NATO and national sensor, command and control assets.

    Reinforcement of digitalisation, innovation and research

    The Government’s proposals also include a specific focus on materiel, defence innovation and research and development aimed at producing new capabilities and ensuring self-supply. 

    • By 2027, the appropriation for technological development, research innovation and defence research (appropriation 1:4) will increase by more than 50 per cent to just over SEK 1.6 billion.
    • NATO membership also entails requirements of greater interoperability with Allies within NATO. The Government therefore proposes that the war organisation be expanded in certain parts of command and logistics and that a new category of units designated for territorial duties be introduced.
    • The Government is also enhancing Sweden’s role as a credible space actor. This will be made possible through participation in various initiatives such as space-based reconnaissance and surveillance, responsive launching and satellite communications in the Arctic region.
    • Digitalisation will be carried out within command and intelligence functions and a reinforcement of defensive and offensive cyberoperations capabilities. 

    Civil defence

    Enhanced capabilities and an accelerated pace are priorities for developing the civil defence. The Total Defence Bill outlines a historically large investment in the civil defence through an allocation of SEK 37.5 billion through 2030. 

    “With the Defence Resolution in place, the course has now been set for a to build a powerful total defence. The civil defence will be built up based on the demands of war, and we aim to swiftly build up capabilities that strengthen Sweden and make our country more secure,” says Minister for Civil Defence Carl-Oskar Bohlin. 

    The introduction of the economic planning framework will serve as an important foundation for funding of the civil defence. The aim is to bring predictability, endurance and transparency to the strategic approach of the civil defence, and an ability to better prioritise and follow up results of the measures taken.

    Priority preparedness sectors

    All preparedness sectors in the civil defence will receive additional funding during the period 2025–2030. Society’s functionality is vital for the Swedish Armed Forces to be able to carry out its duties. Some preparedness sectors have therefore been given special priority. These include electronic communications and postal services, food supply and drinking water, health and social care, transport, energy supply, rescue services and protection of the civilian population. 

    Coordination and command of the civil defence  

    The Total Defence Bill highlights the need to strengthen command and coordination of the civil defence.

    The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency currently has far-ranging tasks and responsibilities, which is why the Government sees a need to enable it to better provide support for the coordination of the civil defence at national level. The Government therefore intends to review responsibilities for rescue services and protection of the civilian population. The name of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency will also be reviewed.

    Command of the civil defence during heightened alert and ultimately war should be exercised by actors with geographical areas of responsibility. This requires a clear allocation of responsibilities and mandates at the relevant levels. The Bill stresses that the county administrative boards with responsibility for civil areas and government agencies with responsibility for sectors need clearer roles and stronger mandates. 

    Economic defence and cooperation with the business sector

    Sweden’s economic defence needs to be strengthened and central government needs to be clear about what requirements will be placed on the business sector and what its role is in the total defence. In war or under threat of war, it is critical that production and supply chains are durable, the business sector has the capacity to adapt its production, and stockpiles of essential goods – including input goods – are available. The Government intends to clarify government agencies’ responsibilities concerning the supply of critical goods and services for the needs of the total defence and for foreign trade.

    Psychological defence and will to defend

    Psychological defence is an important component of a strong total defence. Strengthening and maintaining the population’s will to defend itself is a core task of the psychological defence. Proactive and continuous work is needed throughout the defence resolution period to preserve and reinforce the population’s will to defend itself, resilience and personal preparedness. As an Ally, Sweden will also contribute to NATO’s capability to defend against cognitive warfare. 

    Cybersecurity 

    Cybersecurity is another important pillar of the modern civil defence. Essential public services need to have the capacity to withstand cyberattacks, and information security and cybersecurity must therefore be prioritised. With a new national cybersecurity centre and extensive investments, the Government is enhancing protection against increasingly pervasive cyberthreats.

    Sweden’s resilience as part of NATO deterrence 

    The resilience being built up by reinforcing the civil defence is vital not only to Sweden’s security, but also to that of our Allies in NATO. Society’s resilience thus becomes part of NATO’s collective deterrence and defence.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Translation: 14/10/2024 Undersecretary of State Marek Prawda participated in the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council

    MIL ASI Translation. Region: Polish/Europe –

    Fuente: Gobierno de Polonia en poleco.

    Undersecretary of State Marek Prawda participated in the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council on 14/10/2024. The main topics of today’s meeting in Luxembourg were Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the situation in the Middle East.

    The ministers also held an informal discussion with British Foreign Secretary David Lammy. The Council also adopted further sanctions against Iran in connection with its military support for Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine. In the discussion on Russia’s aggression against the Minister of Ukraine, Marek Prawda stressed the need to provide further support for the attacked country, including military and energy support. He spoke in favour of lifting restrictions on the use of weapons transferred to Ukraine by the West and appealed for the urgent unblocking of financing for military support for Ukraine from the European Peace Facility. He also supported the proposal to establish an EU and G7 loan mechanism, guaranteed by income from the frozen assets of the Central Bank of Russia. He also pointed to the need to maintain sanctions pressure on Russia and effectively combat the circumvention of sanctions, including by using the so-called “shadow fleet”. Minister Pravda also stressed the need to combat the Kremlin’s false propaganda. He noted that all peace initiatives must be in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principle of inviolability of borders and prepared in close consultation with Ukraine and accepted by it. In relation to the situation in the Middle East, Deputy Minister Marek Prawda emphasized that de-escalation remains the overriding goal. The Deputy Head of Polish Diplomacy also drew attention to the need to protect civilians, aid workers, UN personnel and members of the UNIFIL mission. The Undersecretary of State recalled that it was at Poland’s initiative that 40 countries participating in the peacekeeping forces in Lebanon signed a statement condemning the recent attacks on the mission’s force base. In an informal discussion with British Minister David Lammy, Deputy Minister Prawda declared Poland’s support for strengthening cooperation between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in the area of foreign policy and WA. As part of current affairs, the Deputy Minister referred to Poland’s support for Moldova on the eve of the presidential elections and the referendum on EU integration, and also pointed to the key importance of the upcoming parliamentary elections in Georgia for its geopolitical future.

    MILES AXIS

    EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is a translation. Apologies should the grammar and/or sentence structure not be perfect.

    MIL Translation OSI

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Attorney General’s 2024 Bingham Lecture on the rule of law

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    On 14 October 2024, the Attorney General Lord Hermer KC delivered the 2024 Bingham Lecture titled ‘The Rule of Law in an Age of Populism’.

    Opening remarks

    Thank you Helena for that introduction.  It is a particular privilege to be introduced by a friend who I admire and respect so much and by someone who has spent a lifetime promoting the rule of law and protecting human rights.      

    Thank you also to the Bingham Centre for inviting me to speak to you this evening.

    For nearly fifteen years, the Bingham Centre has been an essential voice for the advancement of rule of law values at home and abroad. Its work to promote a better understanding of the rule of law and to help build the capacity to give it practical effect, has never been more vital than it is today.

    It is a record of which Tom Bingham, in whose name I am honoured to give this lecture, would surely have been proud. It is wonderful to see so many of his family here tonight, Lady Bingham, Dame Kate, Kit and Mary.

    Lord Bingham’s judicial and non-judicial writing, his stature as one of the great postwar judges, has been an inspiration for generations of lawyers, myself very much included.  I had the privilege of appearing in front of Lord Bingham as a junior in a series of interesting cases before the House of Lords in which I was led by a promising young silk called Keir Starmer. 

    But like many in this audience I also felt a personal tie to Tom Bingham.  I applied for silk in 2009 and Lord Bingham was one of my referees but sadly my father, who was a lawyer, died shortly before my appointment.  My sense of loss at not being able to share the news with my dad was softened by the fact that before he died I was able to show him a letter that Lord Bingham had written to me.  The letter was filled with the warmth and support that many who knew Tom Bingham will recognise. Thus I will always feel a very personal debt of gratitude to him for the joy and pride that his letter gave to my dad.   

    It was in his cogent and elegant account of the rule of law that Tom Bingham encapsulated in his eight principles.  Such was the authority and clarity of his analysis that the principles are now a necessary reference point for any discussion (or indeed speech) on the subject.

    As Sir Jeffrey Jowell put it when he spoke at the launch of this Centre back in December 2010:

    Tear open the Bingham package of requirements for the rule of law and, as each of his ingredients falls away, we progressively observe the stark outlines of tyranny- at worst; or authoritarianism – at best.

    That remark has a particular resonance today. And what better illustration of the enduring contribution of that book could there be than the sight, earlier this year, of its Ukrainian translation being launched in Kyiv, on the frontline of the ongoing struggle for democratic, rules-based values.

    Introduction: setting the scene, and the challenge

    As that scene attests, we are living through uncertain and challenging times, with threats to the rule of law on a number of fronts.

    This evening, I would like to talk about the necessary response to these challenges, through restoration of our reputation as a country that upholds the rule of law at every turn and by embedding resilience to rebuff the populist challenge. 

    Restoration and resilience.  I’m going to begin by setting out the nature of the challenge as well as proffering some thoughts on the relationship between the rule of law, democracy and human rights.  I will then turn to three themes that I consider lie at the heart of the restoration and resilience project firstly, the rebuilding our reputation as a leader in the field of international law and the international rules based order; secondly, the strengthening of Parliament’s role in upholding the rule of law and thirdly the promotion of a rule of law culture.

    Our starting point is not a happy one.  Conflict currently affects more countries than at any time since the Second World War. As too many people around the world are driven from their homes by wars and instability, there is a sense of an international system that is unable to act. That is unable to prevent wars of aggression and to address desperate humanitarian need.

    As the Prime Minister said at the General Assembly in New York, those “institutions of peace” that the UK and others worked so hard to establish after the horrors of the Second World War are struggling. Those rules that we have all worked so hard to maintain are being undermined. And faith in international law, and the international rule of law, is being chiselled away in communities who are told, time and again, that the system is failing to deliver for them.

    The challenges we face are increasingly global – whether the development of AI, the threat of climate change, growing inequality, or increased migration – and we need a functioning global order, underpinned by a strong commitment to the rule of law, to even begin to tackle them.

    At home, too, we cannot afford to be complacent about the extent to which values that once were taken for granted have been undermined. A near decade of crisis and political instability has, at times, stretched the fabric of our constitution to its limit.  I don’t wish to make a party political speech, indeed I am determined to make the promotion of the rule of law a project we can all sign up to irrespective of our political allegiance. 

    At a time when there is a desperate need for cooperation and solutions, we are increasingly confronted by the divisive and disruptive force of populism. This is not a new phenomenon. But in recent years we have grown accustomed to diagnosing its symptoms, on both right and left.

    We face leaders who see politics as an exercise in division; who appeal to the ‘will of the people’ (as exclusively interpreted by them) as the only truly legitimate source of constitutional authority.

    Their rhetoric conjures images of a conspiracy of ‘elites’; an enemy that is hard to define, but invariably including the people and independent institutions who exercise the kind of checks and balances on executive power that are the essence of liberal democracy and the rule of law. Judges. Lawyers. A free press. NGOs. Parliament. The academy. An impartial and objective civil service.  Populists work to diminish their legitimacy or, at worst, actively remove them from the scene altogether.

    Allied to this, we have also seen how populism, in its most pernicious forms, works to demonise other groups, usually minorities – to discredit the legal frameworks and institutions that guarantee their rights, and dismantle, often through calculated misinformation, the political consensus that underpins them.

    The argument

    Times of crisis and challenge are fertile ground for this kind of politics. And they can create a receptive audience for the populists’ argument that the rule of law is somehow in tension with democratic values.

    It is this dynamic that I want to address in tonight’s speech – I want to argue that this is precisely the time for us to reaffirm that the rule of law – both domestically and internationally – is the necessary precursor to those democratic values, providing the foundations for political and economic flourishing.

    And I want to be clear that by the rule of law, I do not just mean rule by law; a purely procedural and formal conception that populists and authoritarians can themselves so often use as a cloak of legitimacy.

    One of Lord Bingham’s great contributions was to promote a more substantive conception of the rule of law, including the idea that the law must afford adequate protection of fundamental human rights. I too believe that human rights – both at the level of principle, and in practice through how they are enforced – are an essential element of the rule of law and a stable democratic culture. As well as recognising and protecting the dignity of all, they guarantee the essential rights and freedoms which underpin our system.

    Far from being at odds with democracy, as some populists would have us believe, the rule of law is the bedrock on which it rests. What good is democracy – indeed, can democracy exist – without the right to free and fair elections or freedom of speech, guaranteed by the right of access to the courts and an independent judiciary? And I would go further. Democracy, in my view, is inextricably related to the rule of law, properly understood. For what good is the rule of law without democracy, which confers essential legitimacy on the rules that govern the relationship between citizen and state?

    Lord Bingham’s conception of the rule of law also recognises that international law is the ‘Rule of Law’ writ large, and that States must comply with their international obligations, just as they must comply with domestic law. This, too, is crucial. International law is not simply some kind of optional add-on, with which States can pick or choose whether to comply. It is central to ensuring our prosperity and security, and that of all global citizens.  As will develop later, our reputation as a country that can trusted to comply with its international law obligations, and has a robust adherence to the rule of law, is essential to our ability to grow the economy, as grow it we shall.

    And maintaining our international reputation also enhances our ability to work with our partners to get things done in this time of global challenge. Rather than isolating ourselves from our closest allies, it means we can strengthen cooperation on issues like migration; whether that’s the Anti-Smuggling Action Plan, which the Home Secretary secured with G7 partners in Italy earlier this month; or closer working with international law enforcement partners to target smuggling gangs.

    To shore up the rule of law against the forces of populism, we must also emphasise its importance as an idea that unites, rather than divides us. The work to rebuild a political consensus around these values will not be easy. It must be proactive, cross-party and internationalist. It must be sensitive to any legitimate reasons why people have lost faith in the rule of law and its institutions. It will require patient, long-term thinking, hard work and consistent commitment to build the necessary coalitions, and to produce and implement detailed policy proposals.

    So, to meet these challenges it is my view that we need to take immediate steps to restore the UK’s reputation as a rule of law leader whilst at the same time also seek to build and secure the rule of law’s long term resilience in the face of threats known and unknown, domestic and international.

    Restoration and resilience.  Restoration and resilience.  In this speech, I want to talk about three themes that will guide this Government in this project.  As I outlined earlier, my first theme, is rebuilding the UK’s international rule of law leadership before turning next to the role of Parliament and then finally embedding a rule of law culture.

    Theme 1: rebuilding the UK’s international rule of law leadership

    The UK’s international rule of law leadership.

    Historically, the UK has been a leader in developing and promoting international law and the institutions on which its effectiveness depends. British lawyers and politicians have been at the forefront of drafting and negotiating the most important treaties that underpin our international legal system and building the institutional machinery that breathes life into those paper agreements.

    The UK will again demonstrate that leadership – so essential in today’s highly-connected, but highly fragmented, world – and sadly so absent in recent years.

    That starts by clearly, and without question, honouring our obligations under international law.

    Since taking office, this Government has already taken steps to uphold those obligations and demonstrate our deep commitment to international law. We have reached agreement with Mauritius to settle the historic sovereignty claims over BIOT/Chagos Archipelago in a manner that successfully marries our international law obligations with vital national security requirements; we have applied our IHL obligations by compliance with our arms licensing criteria – applying law not politics; we have made plain our commitment to our cornerstone international institutions not least the ICJ and ICC.

    And we will continue to abide by and unequivocally support the European Convention on Human Rights, including by complying with requests from the Court for interim measures. Walking, or threatening to walk away, would be a total abdication of our international law responsibilities and send out precisely the wrong message at a time when the rule of law is under threat in so many places.

    But we will go further than simply meeting our obligations under the Convention specifically and international law generally – that we will do so should go without saying. My point is that the UK will once again be a champion for international courts and institutions, taking positive steps to promote their importance and to rebuild the respect for them that the populists have sought to destroy.  As the Prime Minister has said, having discovered the Convention in a law library in Leeds some 40 years ago, the rights it sets out speak about the dignity of every human being, and are a source of inspiration from which we can all draw strength and value.

    After the First World War, the UK championed the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. British Judges sitting in that Court and many subsequent international courts and tribunals have delivered judgments that have brought clarity to all areas of international law.

    I am therefore delighted that the UK National Group has announced its intention to nominate Professor Dapo Akande – who will be well known to many in this room – as the UK’s candidate for election to the International Court of Justice in 2026. I cannot think of a better representative for the UK’s expertise in international law and I am delighted to personally endorse Dapo’s campaign.

    And it is through international courts that we hope to finally see justice for Ukraine. I have dedicated my professional life to fighting for justice and accountability, and nowhere was the need for that more apparent than in my recent visit to Ukraine. I was profoundly struck by the stories I heard at Bucha’s cathedral and in Irpin.

    Despite the unimaginable suffering that the people of Ukraine have endured, they remain clear-eyed about the importance of the international rule of law and accountability. I – and the whole Government – remain steadfast in our support for Ukraine, on the battlefield and in the courtroom. This includes support for work towards establishing a Special Tribunal on the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.

    But these systems, and the promise offered by international law, only work when we work in partnership with our friends and partners around the world.

    In many parts of the world, especially in the Global South, the international rules-based order and human rights are often seen as imperialist constructs, selectively invoked by western governments when it suits their interests. It is incumbent upon us to first, listen, to those who feel unheard. And secondly, to demonstrate – not just with warm words, but with concrete actions – that international law can deliver real benefits to all. And those actions must be consistent, we must show that we will hold ourselves to the highest standards.

    We will advocate for reform of the Security Council, to ensure that those with seats at the top table truly represent the global community. That means permanent representation from Africa, from Brazil, India, Japan and Germany.  And our approach to international development will show that we have learnt the lessons of history that, to be sustainable, the rule of law cannot be imposed on developing countries by former colonial rulers, but must be grown organically from within by working closely with local communities and institutions.

    And we will be unwavering in our commitment to tackling climate change, where we know that many of the worst effects are felt by those who have made the smallest contributions to this existential threat.

    Theme 2: defending and strengthening Parliament’s role in upholding the rule of law.

    My second theme is closer to home. A crucial part of restoring the rule of law, and building resilience in the face of future threats, involves thinking about the respective roles of our own institutions in upholding these fundamental values.

    This must start by recognising that upholding the rule of law cannot just be left to the courts. All branches of our constitution must see the rule of law, in its fullest sense, as a guiding force for their own actions.

    Speaking as a relatively new member of two of these branches, I hope my colleagues in this room will not mind if I offer some initial reflections on the role of Parliament in this regard; both in terms of its own functions, and the Government’s relationship to it.

    Parliamentary sovereignty is one of the fundamental features of our constitution and the ultimate legal authority of Parliament to make or unmake any law is crystal clear.  However, viewing the rule of law through this distorting lens of ultimate decision-making authority alone risks mistaking it for a purely formal, and thin, conception of ‘rule by law’. 

    As lawyers know, Parliament’s authority in our constitution is legal authority, an authority that requires that Parliament maintains in its legislation the ideals of the rule of law, of government under law, one of the contributions to the modern world of which we in the UK are justly proud.  And as I (following Lord Bingham) have explained, those ideals are much thicker and more substantive that the thin gruel of a formal conception of ‘rule by law’.

    We have seen in recent years where that disregard for our constitutional rule of law heritage can lead.  It is crucial that all institutional actors understand their role in a government under law. When Government invites Parliament to breach international law, or oust the jurisdiction of the courts, it not only undermines the rule of law, but also the mutual respect that historically has been one of the great strengths of our constitution.  It risks pitting one institution against another in ways that damage our reputation both inside and outside our borders as a law-abiding nation. 

    We must also work to counter the false choice, offered by some, between parliamentary democracy and fundamental rights. For almost a quarter of a century, the Human Rights Act has shown how it is possible, with imagination, to provide a legal framework for the protection of fundamental rights which can co-exist with parliamentary sovereignty. Indeed, the Act specifically preserves Parliament’s ultimate decision-making authority through its regime of non-binding Declarations of Incompatibility, defences, and section 19(1)(b) statements.

    And the enforcement of the Act otherwise by the courts, far from being at odds with democracy, is its vindication. Because it was our democratically elected Parliament that legislated for the Human Rights Act, and provided the mechanisms by which individual rights should be given meaningful effect in domestic law. It is testament to the framers of the Act that no Parliament elected since 1998 has chosen to fundamentally alter that position.

    It is also right to reflect on how Parliament can itself actively protect and enhance rule of law values. It does this through its scrutiny of legislation, most notably through the expertise of my colleagues in both Houses, but also through its Select Committee system. And it is incumbent on any government to ensure that those Committees are able to do their jobs effectively. I welcome the contribution that committees such as the Lords Constitution Committee, the Delegated Powers Committee and the Joint Committee on Human Rights make to the debate on human rights and the rule of law, and I look forward to working constructively with them in this Parliament.

    But there are aspects of Government’s relationship with Parliament that require more careful examination. Most pressingly, there is in my view a real need to consider the balance between primary and secondary legislation, which in recent years has weighed too heavily in favour of delegated powers.

    The twin challenges of Brexit and the Covid pandemic had the effect of concentrating immense power in the hands of the executive, through the conferral and exercise of broad delegated powers, including so-called Henry VIII powers. Some of this can be explained by the exceptional character, and unique demands, of both events. However, it would be a mistake to view this as an aberration. As the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee have noted, Brexit and Covid did not mark the beginning of the shift in the balance between Parliament and the executive, so much as an acceleration and intensification of an existing trend.

    As technical as these issues may sound, they raise real questions about how we are governed. I said earlier that I see democracy as inextricably related to the rule of law. In our system of Parliamentary democracy, consent to be governed is expressed through the delegation, every four or five years, of powers by the governed to Parliament. It is the importance of this model of consent that explains in very large measure why I have been so concerned, on entering Government, to improve the standards we adhere to when we make policy and law – and specifically to ensure that the processes we adopt support the rule of law.

    Secondary legislation has an indispensable role to play in a modern, regulated society. There is no suggestion that the Government should not take or exercise delegated powers. However, excessive reliance on delegated powers, Henry VIII clauses, or skeleton legislation, upsets the proper balance between Parliament and the executive. This not only strikes at the rule of law values I have already outlined, but also at the cardinal principles of accessibility and legal certainty.

    In my view, the new Government offers an opportunity for a reset in the way that Government thinks about these issues. This means, in particular, a much sharper focus on whether taking delegated powers is justified in a given case, and more careful consideration of appropriate safeguards.

    Theme 3: promoting a rule of law culture, which builds public trust in the law and its institutions

    Finally, in my third theme I want to talk about culture and how we promote a rule of law culture which builds public trust in the law and its institutions – a vital task if the rule of law is to be made resilient enough to withstand the threats I have described in this age of populism.

    We begin this task from a difficult place. Too often, the starting point for debate is that law is part of the problem. At best, an abstraction that is disconnected from the realities of people’s lives. At worst, it can be held up by populists as a force that is somehow illegitimate. All of us who care about this subject – and particularly those of us in Government – need to work hard to counter these attitudes, and to foster a better understanding of the rightful place of law in a liberal democratic society.

    For Government, this means leading by example.  I hope you take some comfort in the fact that the importance of the rule of law and the constitutional balance is embedded in my DNA and that of a Prime Minister who not only rose to the top ranks of the Bar but served his country as DPP.  Vitally, it is also a principle deeply cherished and jealously protected by the Lord Chancellor who has overarching constitutional authority as the guardian of the rule of law not least to protect the independence of the judiciary.  Anyone who knows the Lord Chancellor and her determination to champion the rule of law will know that there will be no repeat of failures to defend attacks on the judiciary under her watch.   

    Of course, we will be judged by what we do, not what we may have done in the past let alone what we say now – and we will demonstrate our commitment to the rule of law in real and practical ways.  By way of example only, in the coming weeks I will issue an amended guidance for assessing legal risk across government that will seek to raise the standards for calibrating legality that the thousands of brilliant lawyers working in every part of government activity apply to deliver for the people of this country – I want them to feel empowered to give their full and frank advice to me and others in government and to stand up for the rule of law.

    But the challenge to rebuild a broad consensus around rule of law values, cannot be left merely to politicians.  It is a project that can only succeed if it is taken up by all of us, politicians, judges, lawyers, civil society, citizens. 

    We need to recognise that the populists have stolen a march – it is nearly always easier to deride and denigrate than it is to promote complex but vital principles.  We cannot stand by idly as rule of law principles and the human rights idea are undermined, sometimes without challenge, on television screens, the pages of newspapers and most effectively and invidiously of all, on social media.

    The challenge is to get out and explain the importance of the principles that we hold so dear – we have a fantastic story to tell and tell it we must. 

    We need to explain that the rule of law is not the preserve of arid constitutional theory.  We need to explain how it provides the stable and predictable environment in which people can plan their lives, do business and get ahead; in which businesses can invest, the economy can grow; people can resolve disputes fairly and peacefully, and express and enjoy their basic rights and freedoms. We must illustrate how systems that do not hold to these values can be arbitrary and capricious. And backsliding from Rule of Law values, once it begins, can take an unpredictable course.

    The story that we must tell is how the rule of law matters for growth, jobs and people’s livelihoods – how it impacts upon the pound in their pocket and on the type of future their children deserve to enjoy. Governments that undermine, or take a ‘pick and mix’ approach to these values, disincentivise investment. Today, we have hosted the Investment Summit with a clear message that Britain is open for business. Britain has many commercial advantages, but one of our greatest is the trust that businesses can have in our courts, and the confidence they can have in a stable and transparent business environment, underpinned by a strong rule of law.

    Education has a crucial role to play. We must take these messages to our schools and wider communities. I commend the work of civil society groups and charities such as Young Citizens and the Citizenship Foundation, and the Bingham Centre itself, who work with schools to promote a better understanding of the law and its importance in society. I believe it is right to think about whether even more can be done to strengthen the role of citizenship education as a means of promoting a better understanding of our constitution and, particularly, the importance of the rule of law.

    But we must also talk about these issues in a way that resonates with the public and in language that everyone understands. Because most people would instinctively recognise rule of law principles as values that are part of the very fabric of our society. Fair play. Justice. Rules that apply equally to all; not one rule for them, and another for the rest of us. And where disputes do arise – whether with a business, an employer, or a neighbour – an independent courts system which provides the means for their just resolution.

    And in the public realm, law is the great leveller that holds the powerful to account, and ensures that individual rights are respected. Those rights – human rights – are our rights, and belong to us all.  

    So it is we must proudly own the story of the European Convention on Human Rights, not least because in so doing we expose the wanton superficiality of many of its critics. We must explain how the values of the Convention are not foreign to us. They are universal. Closely connected rights are found deeply embedded in the heart of our own legal tradition. Echoes of habeas corpus, Magna Carta, and the Bill of Rights, can all be located in Articles 5 and 6 ECHR.  This country banned torture long before our continental cousins, never mind the promulgation of Article 3.  It is no coincidence that it was British lawyers, most notably the Conservative David Maxwell Fyfe, who helped to frame the European Convention after the Second World War, drawing of course inspiration from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but also centuries of our own legal values.  It is simply legally fatuous and historically ignorant of armchair critics of the Convention to declare that its supporters somehow seek to undermine our traditions or should be dismissed as naive snowflakes. 

    To the contrary, the Convention was drafted by men and women who had witnessed the very worst that humans can do to each other, their views were forged not in a Tufton Street seminar but in the trenches and the battle grounds, in the prisoner of war camps and the historic prosecutions of the Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg.  The drafting and adoption took place not in a time of overindulgence but when societies were rebuilding from rubble and indeed this country was still under rationing.  They were hard-nosed men and women from a generation who had seen conflict and vowed ‘never again’.    The structures they helped to create, the values that underpin them, have served us well as a bulwark against totalitarianism, and a foundation for European peace. And they remain the best hope of protecting us from the threats we face today.

    For too long, populists have been able to frame the debate on human rights too narrowly, by reference to issues which, important as they are, can often feel disconnected from the everyday. We have to work to change this, not only by busting myths, but by showing how human rights positively touch so many aspects of wider society. The right to be treated equally. The right to express ourselves. The freedom to live in the way we choose, without undue interference from the state. These are the values we cherish and have chosen, collectively, to protect.

    So too must we work to combat disinformation and misinformation about law and lawyers. The disgraceful scenes of violent disorder over the summer, including threats against immigration law firms and advice centres, showed only too vividly that what is said online can have dangerous consequences in the real world.

    But the response to the riots also showed something more hopeful. People took to the streets not only to clean up and repair the damage, but to stand together against the forces of reaction and division. It is that spirit of decency and fairness that we must harness in our cause.   

    When I went to Liverpool I visited the library that had been burnt down in the riots and met a group of children who had been cowering under beds and in cupboards as the mobs went by at night but who the next morning got up and came to volunteer to rebuild.  I talked with them about the books that we were donating to the library (including Helena’s latest) which all concern how law and justice work for everyone – and we discussed the meaning and significance of the inscription that my office had placed inside each cover, taking the words of Dr Martin Luther King – that although the arc of humanity is long, it bends towards justice.

    Conclusion

    Restoration and resilience. These are the watchwords that will guide our defence of the rule of law in the face of populism. It is by renewing our commitment to rule of law values, as a Government and as a nation, at home and abroad, and patiently rebuilding the political consensus underpinning that commitment, that we will ensure that the rule of law is safe for future generations; so we may continue to work together towards achieving the Bingham Centre’s vision of ‘a world in which every society is governed by the Rule of Law in the interests of good government, peace at home and in the world at large’.

    Updates to this page

    Published 15 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: OLAF intelligence supports Spanish Operation enforcing EU sanctions against Russia

    Source: European Anti-Fraud Offfice

    Press release 17/2024
    PDF version 

    The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) assisted the Spanish authorities with the enforcement of EU sanctions against Russia during Operation “Probirka” (Russian for “Test Tube”). The operation led to the arrest of four individuals involved in the illegal export of chemicals to Russia and the seizure of 13 tons of chemical substances.

    Since 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union has imposed sanctions on the country, including strict bans on the export and import of certain goods. OLAF has been actively engaged in investigating, monitoring trade flows, conducting analytical work, and identifying potential attempts to circumvent these sanctions. By mapping out suspicious trade routes and identifying operators, OLAF has played a key role in preventing illegal transactions that could support Russia’s military capabilities.

    As part of the Joint Sanctions Enforcement Operation that OLAF has been running since July 2023, OLAF was called upon by the Spanish authorities to assist with investigations into the export of chemical substances from Spain. It was suspected that certain companies were bypassing EU sanctions by rerouting goods through intermediaries in Kyrgyzstan, with the final destination being Russia. 

    OLAF responded by gathering export data from various EU Member States and sharing critical intelligence with the Spanish investigators. OLAF’s collaboration provided crucial evidence to confirm that these illegal exports were indeed reaching Russia.

    Ville Itälä, Director-General of OLAF, reiterated that: “OLAF’s ability to join the dots and to bring together the data and intelligence from national authorities is once again key to the success of our partners. OLAF is best placed to facilitate this synergy and cooperation and we remain steadfast in our commitment to support our partners in their endeavours to enforce the sanctions imposed on Russia and Belarus. Sanctions are only as effective as their enforcement, and we are proud to contribute actively.”

    Four arrested and 13 tons of chemicals seized 

    As part of the investigation, the Spanish National Police and Customs Surveillance Service arrested four individuals in the Spanish region of Catalonia, three of whom are Russian nationals. The operation also resulted in the seizure of 13,000 kilograms of a chemical compound subject to export restrictions, at the Port of Barcelona.

    The investigation revealed that a Spanish company, managed by Russian nationals, had established a sophisticated logistical and economic scheme to export internationally sanctioned chemical products to Russia. This network involved the use of shell companies in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan to disguise the true destination of the goods, which were later rerouted to Russia.

    OLAF’s contribution has been pivotal in enhancing the Spanish authorities’ ability to enforce EU sanctions and prevent illegal trade that could undermine the effectiveness of the sanctions against Russia. The investigation remains ongoing, with efforts focused on identifying and arresting additional individuals involved in this smuggling network.

    OLAF mission, mandate and competences:
    OLAF’s mission is to detect, investigate and stop fraud with EU funds.    

    OLAF fulfils its mission by:
    •    carrying out independent investigations into fraud and corruption involving EU funds, so as to ensure that all EU taxpayers’ money reaches projects that can create jobs and growth in Europe;
    •    contributing to strengthening citizens’ trust in the EU Institutions by investigating serious misconduct by EU staff and members of the EU Institutions;
    •    developing a sound EU anti-fraud policy.

    In its independent investigative function, OLAF can investigate matters relating to fraud, corruption and other offences affecting the EU financial interests concerning:
    •    all EU expenditure: the main spending categories are Structural Funds, agricultural policy and rural development funds, direct expenditure and external aid;
    •    some areas of EU revenue, mainly customs duties;
    •    suspicions of serious misconduct by EU staff and members of the EU institutions.

    Once OLAF has completed its investigation, it is for the competent EU and national authorities to examine and decide on the follow-up of OLAF’s recommendations. All persons concerned are presumed to be innocent until proven guilty in a competent national or EU court of law.

    For further details:

    Pierluigi CATERINO
    Spokesperson
    European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)
    Phone: +32(0)2 29-52335  
    Email: olaf-media ec [dot] europa [dot] eu (olaf-media[at]ec[dot]europa[dot]eu)
    https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu
    X: @EUAntiFraud
    LinkedIn: European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)

    Theresa ZAHRA
    Deputy Spokesperson
    European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)
    Phone: +32 (0)2 29-57270   
    Email: olaf-media ec [dot] europa [dot] eu (olaf-media[at]ec[dot]europa[dot]eu)
    https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu
    X: @EUAntiFraud
    LinkedIn: European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)

    If you’re a journalist and you wish to receive our press releases in your inbox, pleaseleave us your contact data.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Escalating cyber threats demand stronger global defense and cooperation

    Source: Microsoft

    Headline: Escalating cyber threats demand stronger global defense and cooperation

    Microsoft customers face more than 600 million cybercriminal and nation-state attacks every day, ranging from ransomware to phishing to identity attacks. Once again, nation-state affiliated threat actors demonstrated that cyber operations—whether for espionage, destruction, or influence—play a persistent supporting role in broader geopolitical conflicts. Also fueling the escalation in cyberattacks, we are seeing increasing evidence of the collusion of cybercrime gangs with nation-state groups sharing tools and techniques.  

    We must find a way to stem the tide of this malicious cyber activity. That includes continuing to harden our digital domains to protect our networks, data, and people at all levels. However, this challenge will not be accomplished solely by executing a checklist of cyber hygiene measures but only through a focus on and commitment to the foundations of cyber defense from the individual user to the corporate executive and to government leaders.

    These are some of the insights from the fifth annual Microsoft Digital Defense Report, which covers trends between July 2023 and June 2024. 

    State-affiliated actors increasingly are using cybercriminals and their tools.  

    Over the last year, Microsoft observed nation state actors conduct operations for financial gain, enlist cybercriminals to collect intelligence, particularly on the Ukrainian military, and make use of the same infostealers, command and control frameworks, and other tools favored by the cybercriminal community. Specifically:  

    • Russian threat actors appear to have outsourced some of their cyberespionage operations to criminal groups, especially operations targeting Ukraine. In June 2024, a suspected cybercrime group used commodity malware to compromise at least 50 Ukrainian military devices.  
    • Iranian nation state actors used ransomware in a cyber-enabled influence operation, marketing stolen Israeli dating website data. They offered to remove specific individual profiles from their data repository for a fee. 
    • North Korea is getting into the ransomware game. A newly-identified North Korean actor developed a custom ransomware variant called FakePenny, which it deployed at organizations in aerospace and defense after exfiltrating data from the impacted networks—demonstrating both intelligence gathering and monetization motivations.  

    Nation state activity was heavily concentrated around sites of active military conflict or regional tension 

    Aside from the United States and the United Kingdom, most of the nation-state-affiliated cyber threat activity we observed was concentrated around Israel, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, and Taiwan. In addition, Iran and Russia have used both the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Hamas conflict to spread divisive and misleading messages through propaganda campaigns that extend their influence beyond the geographical boundaries of the conflict zones, demonstrating the globalized nature of hybrid warfare.  

    • Approximately 75% of Russian targets were in Ukraine or a NATO member state, as Moscow seeks to collect intelligence on the West’s policies on the war. 
    • Chinese threat actors’ targeting efforts remain similar to the last few years in terms of geographies targeted—Taiwan being a focus, as well as countries within Southeast Asia—and intensity of targeting per location. 
    • Iran placed significant focus on Israel, especially after the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war. Iranian actors continued to target the US and Gulf countries, including the UAE and Bahrain, in part because of their normalization of ties with Israel and Tehran’s perception that they are both enabling Israel’s war efforts. 
    Example of Iran’s targeting shift following the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict.

    Russia, Iran, and China focus in on the U.S. election 

    Russia, Iran, and China have all used ongoing geopolitical matters to drive discord on sensitive domestic issues leading up to the U.S. election, seeking to sway audiences in the U.S. to one party or candidate over another, or to degrade confidence in elections as a foundation of democracy. As we’ve reported, Iran and Russia have been the most active, and we expect this activity to continue to accelerate over the next two weeks ahead of the U.S. election.  

    In addition, Microsoft has observed a surge in election-related homoglyph domains—or spoofed links—delivering phishing and malware payloads. We believe these domains are examples both of cybercriminal activity driven by profit and of reconnaissance by nation-state threat actors in pursuit of political goals. At present, we are monitoring over 10,000 homoglyphs to detect possible impersonations. Our objective is to ensure Microsoft is not hosting malicious infrastructure and inform customers who might be victims of such impersonation threats.  

    Financially motivated cybercrime and fraud remain a persistent threat  

    While nation-state attacks continue to be a concern, so are financially motivated cyberattacks. In the past year Microsoft observed:   

    • A 2.75x increase year over year in ransomware attacks. Importantly, however, there was a threefold decrease in ransom attacks reaching the encryption stage. The most prevalent initial access techniques continue to be social engineering—specifically email phishing, SMS phishing, and voice phishing—but also identity compromise and exploiting vulnerabilities in public facing applications or unpatched operating systems. 
    • Tech scams skyrocketed 400% since 2022. In the past year, Microsoft observed a significant uptick in tech scam traffic with daily frequency surging from 7,000 in 2023 to 100,000 in 2024. Over 70% of malicious infrastructure was active for less than two hours, meaning they may be gone before they’re even detected. This rapid turnover rate underscores the need for more agile and effective cybersecurity measures. 

    Threat actors are experimenting with generative AI 

    Last year, we started to see threat actors—both cybercriminals and nation states—experimenting with AI. Just as AI is increasingly used to help people be more efficient, threat actors are learning how they can use AI efficiencies to target victims. With influence operations, China-affiliated actors favor AI-generated imagery, while Russia-affiliated actors use audio-focused AI across mediums. So far, we have not observed this content being effective in swaying audiences.  

    Nation-state adversarial use of AI in influence operations.

    But the story of AI and cybersecurity is also a potentially optimistic one. While still in its early days, AI has shown its benefits to cybersecurity professionals by acting as a tool to help respond in a fraction of the time it would take a person to manually process a multitude of alerts, malicious code files, and corresponding impact analysis. We continue to innovate our technology to find new ways that AI can benefit and strengthen cybersecurity.   

    Collaboration remains crucial to strengthening cybersecurity. 

    With more than 600 million attacks per day targeting Microsoft customers alone, there must be countervailing pressure to reduce the overall number of attacks online. Effective deterrence can be achieved in two ways: by denial of intrusions or by imposing consequences for malicious behavior. Microsoft continues to do our part to reduce intrusions and has committed to taking steps to protect ourselves and our customers through our Secure Future Initiative. 

    While the industry must do more to deny the efforts of attackers via better cybersecurity, this needs to be paired with government action to impose consequences that further discourage the most harmful cyberattacks. Success can only be achieved by combining defense with deterrence. In recent years, a great deal of attention has been given to the development of international norms of conduct in cyberspace. However, those norms so far lack meaningful consequence for their violation, and nation-state attacks have been undeterred, increasing in volume and aggression. To shift the playing field, it will take conscientiousness and commitment by both the public and private sectors so that attackers no longer have the advantage.  

    Microsoft continues to share important threat intelligence with the community, including our recent Cyber Signals research looking at cyber risks in the education sector. 

    Tags: AI, artificial intelligence, China, cyberattacks, cybercrime, cybersecurity, election, elections, generative ai, Hamas, homoglyphs, Iran, Israel, malware, Microsoft Digital Defense Report, NATO, North Korea, phishing, Russia, Secure Future Initiative, Tech scams, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Defence Minister Bill Blair to travel to Europe for North Atlantic Treaty Organization and G7 Defence Ministers’ Meetings

    Source: Government of Canada News

    The Honourable Bill Blair, Minister of National Defence, will travel to Europe from October 17-20 to meet with Allies and partners to discuss issues of shared interest and ways to strengthen defence relationships.

    October 15, 2024 – Ottawa, Ontario – National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces

    The Honourable Bill Blair, Minister of National Defence, will travel to Europe from October 17-20 to meet with Allies and partners to discuss issues of shared interest and ways to strengthen defence relationships.

    From October 17-18, Minister Blair will attend the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defence Ministers’ Meeting (DMM) in Brussels, Belgium. This meeting will be an important opportunity for Allies to discuss issues related to security in the Euro-Atlantic, Middle East and Indo-Pacific regions, as well as NATO’s ongoing support for Ukraine.

    In Brussels, Minister Blair will participate in several side events, including a Defence Ministers’ Meeting of the Global Coalition Against Daesh. The Minister will also host a Northern Defence Dialogue with Arctic Allies and partner states to reaffirm their shared commitment to enhanced collaboration on Arctic security and defence.

    From October 18-20, the Minister will attend the first-ever G7 DMM in Naples, Italy. He will participate in discussions with his counterparts on G7 priorities, including support for Ukraine, the conflict in the Middle East, as well as economic security and resilience.

    While in Europe, Minister Blair will hold several bilateral meetings with counterparts.

    Media Availability

    Following the G7 DMM, Minister Blair will hold individual interviews with Canadian media. For further information, please contact Simon Lafortune (details below).

    Date and time: Saturday, October 19 between 9:30AM and 10:30AM ET

    Other arrangements can be made if necessary.

                                                                                            -30-      

    Simon Lafortune
    Press Secretary and Communications Advisor
    Office of the Minister of National Defence
    Phone: 343-549-0778
    Email: Simon.Lafortune2@forces.gc.ca

    Media Relations
    Department of National Defence
    Phone: 613-904-3333
    Email: mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Manchester Libraries twin with Ukraine Library

    Source: City of Manchester

    Manchester Libraries has been twinned with a Ukrainian library through a partnership programme set up to bring closer links with libraries in Ukraine.

    Libraries Connected, the organisation of all public libraries in the United Kingdom, has overseen the development of a library twinning partnership with Library County, the Ukrainian library association.

    The announcement has seen Manchester Libraries, twinned with the Lviv Regional Youth Library. It is one of several UK libraries twinned with a counterpart in Ukraine.

    Being twinned with a Youth Library is particularly apt because of Moss Side Powerhouse Youth Library, a library specialising in offering a service to young people. Lviv, like Manchester is a UNESCO City of Literature.

    Since the war broke out, libraries in Ukraine have had to adapt to changing conditions with a focus on supporting their communities’ mental health, countering misinformation, and providing practical help.

    The twinning programme aims to promote information exchange about language, literature, and culture, to develop joint initiatives, connect audiences through exchange of experience, books and digital material as well as celebrating both UK and Ukrainian literature and culture.

    Councillor John Hacking, Executive Member for Skills, Employment and Leisure welcomed the opportunity to twin with the Lviv Regional Youth Library today and said:

    ” We are delighted that Manchester has been given this opportunity to twin with a Ukrainian library. We have a strong Ukrainian community, and we have been eager to show solidarity and connect with them in this way.

    “Libraries whether here or in Ukraine sit at the heart of and are the bedrock of communities and are an important resource for our young people, we hope to support Lviv Youth Library and the library staff in whatever way we can.”

    Manchester Libraries is a Library of Sanctuary having been re-awarded Libraries of Sanctuary Status for another three years, earlier this year. It recognises and celebrates libraries that go above and beyond to welcome sanctuary seekers and refugees, demonstrating solidarity and inclusivity and the benefits of a welcoming culture to everyone.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Berlin Process Summit 2024: Minister Doughty intervention

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    UK Minister of State for Europe, North America and Overseas Territories outlines UK support for the Western Balkans and calls for a strong and connected Europe.

    Thank you, Chancellor Scholz, Madam President, Excellencies, friends.

    Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine shows that we cannot take peace and security in Europe for granted and so we must guard against all those who seek to destabilise the Western Balkans.

    Our work to achieve common goals and diffuse tensions is even more important than it’s already been in the 10 year history of this process.

    And indeed, the challenging outlook requires a strong and connected Europe, and that is why, under its new government, the United Kingdom is resetting our relations with friends across the continent, in this room and many more today at the Foreign Affairs Committee in Luxembourg, which my colleague, Foreign Secretary David Lammy is attending today.

    Indeed, the Western Balkans is one of the areas I believe that we, the United Kingdom, the European Union, all of whom in this room can work together much more closely, because our shared goals are basics we all need for a good life. Security. Prosperity. Equality.

    Buoyant business, solid infrastructure and strong institutions are crucial for driving regional growth.

    The United Kingdom is playing, and will continue to play its full part in supporting the European alignment of the region.

    We are very supportive of the Common Regional Market, and we are delighted to see progress on the Central Europe Free Trade Agreement.

    Over the life of this process, the United Kingdom’s trade with Western Balkans has quadrupled to over £4 billion.

    Through the Global Clean Power Alliance, we will roll out renewables faster and work with partners around this table on energy security and green transition.

    And through UK export finance, new infrastructure projects to help growth take off, working alongside partners here.

    But there is much more we can do.

    We must create more jobs for young people, curbing the ‘brain drain’ that damages a country’s economy.

    We must continue to make progress on the rights of women and girls as part of wider improvements on rights governance and ensuring pluralist democratic societies.

    Not just because that is the right thing to do, but because it is the cornerstone of our efforts to create a more peaceful, stable, prosperous region.

    So, I hope we will build on the success of the Gender Equality Forum and make that an annual feature.

    Chancellor Scholz – the drumbeat from the ministerial meetings has heightened expectations for the Berlin Process.

    And we can now make the most of the momentum and make amazing things happen. I look forward to our work together.

    Thank you.

    Updates to this page

    Published 14 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI: Red Cat Introduces ARACHNID™ Family of Small ISR and Precision Strike Systems at AUSA 2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SAN JUAN, Puerto Rico, Oct. 14, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Red Cat Holdings, Inc. (Nasdaq: RCAT) (“Red Cat”), a drone technology company building hardware and software for military, federal, and commercial operations, today introduced its ARACHNID™ family of unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and precision strike systems. Red Cat unveiled the Family of Systems at AUSA 2024 Annual Meeting and Exposition in Washington D.C.

    The ARACHNID family of systems is purpose built for the U.S. Army’s roadmap to integrate UAS and long endurance aircraft in a combined arms fight with synchronized fire and maneuver across various command levels. Red Cat currently addresses the needs of warfighters at the platoon and company level with drones that span capabilities and endurance for short and medium-range operations in air, land, and maritime environments. Future potential partnerships will enable long-range reconnaissance.

    Red Cat redefines the future of sUAS for defense applications by combining the capabilities of portable, low-cost, and recoverable ISR drones with precision strike payloads. The company is enabling a shift away from legacy, high-cost UAS to highly interoperable systems that can adapt to a rapidly evolving battlefield. This shift includes layered UAS/LE deployment to shape fires and maneuver, extended reach via networks and autonomy, and reduced cognitive burden with increased safety and survivability for warfighters.

    “The U.S. Army has prioritized integrating UAS across military formations from squad to corps and have specific requirements informed by an understanding of emerging real-world threats,” said Jeff Thompson, Red Cat CEO. “We are introducing the ARACHNID™ family of systems to ensure we can react to the rapidly evolving needs of sUAS for short, medium and long range operations. With future partnerships, our drones can be dropped from long endurance aircraft or integrated into unmanned surface vessels to extend reach and penetration at the battlefield’s tactical edge.”

    ARACHNID advances Red Cat’s established leadership in the sUAS space and brings enhanced capabilities and tech integrations to its existing flagship products from Teal. To reflect this technology evolution and the capabilities of the newest model that Red Cat developed for the U.S. Army’s SRR Program of Record, the company has rebranded its flagship within the ARACHNID family of systems:

    • Black Widow™ (successor to Teal 2) is a highly capable, rucksack portable sUAS designed specifically for operation in Electronic Warfare (EW) environments. A fully modular architecture enables swift adaptation to mission requirements including short range reconnaissance and secondary payload operation. Black Widow™ is significantly enhanced from the Teal 2 model with longer endurance, EW resilience, and advanced autonomy.
    • WEB™ (Warfighter Electronic Bridge) is a Ground Control Station purpose built to operate Red Cat’s entire ARACHNID family of systems for military operations. WEB is fully integrated with Kinesis and ATAK to provide seamless integration with platforms and enhance mission effectiveness. WEB can also function as a stand-alone GCS for other non-Red Cat platforms, offering multi-domain versatility.

    To address the needs of medium-range reconnaissance and persistent strike systems, Red Cat is accelerating the development of its FANG™ line of First-Person View (FPV) drones. Additionally, Red Cat’s product roadmap includes TRICHON™, which will build upon the FlightWave Edge 130 Blue, a military-grade VTOL tricopter for medium-range mapping, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

    “The Pentagon’s Replicator initiative established a bold mission to accelerate the deployment of attritable sUAS to the warfighter. In concert with Replicator’s mission we are accelerating the development of our products that will enhance the effectiveness and safety of military and security operations,” said George Matus, Red Cat CTO. “In many ways, domestic UAS innovation has been spurred by learnings in Ukraine and Israel, where drones have clearly demonstrated asymmetric warfare. The ARACHNID family of systems represents what we believe the future of drones needs to look like.”

    The new family of systems will leverage ongoing industry collaboration, underpinned by the Red Cat Futures Initiative. Both through Red Cat’s agile internal research and development, as well as robust partnerships, the family of systems will continually iterate with new capabilities across hardware and software. Red Cat has the ability to manufacture these systems at a high production rate with superior quality to meet the demands of our customers globally.

    To meet with Red Cat and see the Black Widow™ and rest of the family of systems, visit booth 330 at AUSA October 14-16, 2024.

    For more information about the Red Cat family of systems and capabilities, visit: https://redcat.red/solutions/family-of-systems/.

    About Red Cat, Inc. 
    Red Cat (Nasdaq: RCAT) is a drone technology company integrating robotic hardware and software for military, government, and commercial operations. Through two wholly owned subsidiaries, Teal Drones and Flightwave Aerospace, Red Cat has developed a bleeding-edge Family of ISR and Precision Strike Systems including Black Widow™, a small unmanned system offering the highest-resolution thermal imaging in its class, TRICHON™ Tricopter for extended endurance and range, and FANG™, the industry’s first line of NDAA compliant FPV drones optimized for military operations with precision strike capabilities. Learn more at http://www.redcat.red.

    Forward-Looking Statements
    This press release contains “forward-looking statements” that are subject to substantial risks and uncertainties. All statements, other than statements of historical fact, contained in this press release are forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements contained in this press release may be identified by the use of words such as “anticipate,” “believe,” “contemplate,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “intend,” “seek,” “may,” “might,” “plan,” “potential,” “predict,” “project,” “target,” “aim,” “should,” “will,” “would,” or the negative of these words or other similar expressions, although not all forward-looking statements contain these words. Forward-looking statements are based on Red Cat Holdings, Inc.’s current expectations and are subject to inherent uncertainties, risks and assumptions that are difficult to predict. Further, certain forward-looking statements are based on assumptions as to future events that may not prove to be accurate. These and other risks and uncertainties are described more fully in the section titled “Risk Factors” in the final prospectus related to the public offering filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Forward-looking statements contained in this announcement are made as of this date, and Red Cat Holdings, Inc. undertakes no duty to update such information except as required under applicable law. 

    Contacts:

    INVESTORS:
    E-mail: Investors@redcat.red

    NEWS MEDIA:
    Indicate Media
    Phone: (347) 880-2895
    Email: peter@indicatemedia.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Russia: The Institute of Marketing raised funds to help the SVO

    MILES AXLE Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: State University of Management – Official website of the State –

    The Institute of Marketing of the State University of Management took part in raising funds to help the SVO, which were donated to the Charitable Foundation “Revival of the Native Land”, created by the industrial partner of the State University of Management, the Production Association “FORENERGO”.

    The Revival of the Native Land Foundation is an initiative aimed at supporting and restoring our territories, preserving cultural heritage and developing local communities. With the start of the special operation in Ukraine, one of the priority areas of the foundation’s work has become supporting military personnel and their families.

    The choice of this particular fund is not accidental. The founder of the fund is the industrial partner of the Institute of Marketing – PO FORENERGO. The fund has been operating for over 10 years and has proven in practice that its true mission is to help people and develop regions.

    All funds raised will be used to support military personnel and residents of the new territories.

    Subscribe to the TG channel “Our GUU” Date of publication: 10/14/2024

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    The Institute of Marketing raised funds to help the SVO

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Statement of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group (09 May 2022)

    Source: Republic of France in English
    The Republic of France has issued the following statement:

    1. We, the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group, reiterate the G7´s profound condemnation of Russia’s premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustifiable war of choice against Ukraine, enabled by the Belarusian government. We condemn in the strongest terms the numerous atrocities committed by Russian armed forces in Ukraine. We reaffirm our solidarity with the Ukrainian people and our support to the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Russia’s ongoing war of aggression is a blatant violation of international law with severe consequences for international security, including global non-proliferation efforts. We condemn Russia’s disinformation campaign and we warn against any threat or use of chemical or biological weapons. We recall Russia’s obligations under international treaties of which it is a party, and which protect us all. Any use by Russia of such a weapon would be unacceptable and result in further consequences. We condemn Russia’s unjustified use of nuclear rhetoric and signalling. We urge Russia to behave responsibly and exercise restraint.

    2. Besides these deeply disturbing actions of unprecedented scale, our efforts to strengthen non-proliferation have been severely tested in past years. The increasing use of chemical weapons, rapidly evolving biological threats, destabilizing transfer and deployment of conventional weapons, and targeted appropriation of emerging technology all have a considerable impact as does the growing threat of nuclear proliferation and emerging threats to outer space security. Some states are now significantly increasing and diversifying their nuclear arsenals and investing in novel nuclear technologies and weapons systems. Against this highly challenging background, the G7 remains committed to working together, including with our partners, to defend and strengthen international law, norms and institutions and to build a more secure, more stable, and safer world.

    3. In view of the 10th Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in August 2022, we are united in our resolve to comprehensively strengthen the NPT, promote its universalisation, reinforce the importance of commitments made at past Review Conferences and advance implementation of the Treaty across all three of its mutually reinforcing pillars. We underline the authority and primacy of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear technology. We resolutely support the Review Conference President-designate, Ambassador Gustavo Zlauvinen, and commit to working with all NPT States Parties in good faith in the lead up to and during the Review Conference towards achieving a positive outcome.

    4. The G7 reaffirms its commitment to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all, achieved through concrete, practical, and purposeful steps. The overall decline in global nuclear arsenals must be sustained and not reversed. We welcome diplomatic pathways that offer real possibilities for advancing the universal disarmament goals of the NPT, as promoted through key initiatives such as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, the Stockholm Initiative on Nuclear Disarmament, and Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament.

    5. We welcome efforts by the G7 Nuclear Weapon States to promote effective measures, such as strategic risk reduction, transparency and confidence building measures on their postures, doctrines, and capabilities, which are critical to making progress towards disarmament under the NPT. The G7 underlines that all Nuclear Weapon States have the responsibility to engage actively and in good faith in arms control dialogues. We welcome the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races of 3 January 2022, including the important affirmation that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. However, we deplore Russia’s provocative statements about raising its nuclear alert levels, which undermines the credibility of Russia’s commitment to this Joint Statement.

    6. Recalling our statements of 15 March and 7 April 2022, we condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including forcefully seizing control of nuclear facilities and other actions that pose serious threats to the safety and security of these facilities and endanger the population of Ukraine, neighbouring states, and the international community. We support the IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi’s efforts to ensure the nuclear safety and security of, and the application of safeguards to, nuclear material and facilities in Ukraine as a matter of urgency, while respecting full Ukrainian sovereignty over its territory and infrastructure. We urge Russia’s leadership to immediately withdraw its military forces from Ukraine, cease all violent actions against nuclear and radiological facilities in Ukraine and restore full control to Ukrainian authorities over all facilities within its internationally recognized borders to ensure their safe and secure operations.

    7. The G7 is united in its resolve to promote the goals and objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We underline the urgent need to bring this treaty into force pursuant to Article XIV of the CTBT, and we support Italy as co-coordinator of these efforts. A universal and effectively verifiable CTBT constitutes a fundamental instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, we call on all states to declare new or maintain existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosions. We also resolutely support the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission and its important work to develop the Treaty’s verification regime.

    8. The G7 is equally committed to, and underlines the importance of, immediate commencement of negotiations – based on document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein – with the key countries on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. We remain convinced that the Conference on Disarmament is an appropriate venue to negotiate such an instrument and we call upon countries to make innovative contributions in all appropriate forums, including the 10th Review Conference of the States Parties to the NPT, to facilitate negotiations of such a treaty. Pending those actions, we call on all states that have not yet done so to declare and maintain voluntary moratoria on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

    9. The G7 is committed to working towards effective measures for strategic and nuclear risk reduction that enhance mutual comprehension, increase predictability, promote confidence building and establish effective crisis management and prevention tools. We are equally engaging in the development of multilateral nuclear disarmament verification capabilities and we welcome the start of work of the Group of Governmental Experts on nuclear disarmament verification, the Franco-German exercise NuDiVe 2022 conducted in April 2022 and the continuing work of the IPNDV and the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership by Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. All of this is essential groundwork for achieving the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, underpinned by transparency, verification and irreversibility.

    10. The G7 welcomed the extension of the New START Treaty in early 2021 and has supported the U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability Dialogue, aimed at laying the foundation for future U.S.-Russia arms control arrangements. The G7 sees the need for arms control to address all nuclear weapons, including new destabilizing weapon systems and non-strategic nuclear weapons. The G7 also supports and encourages wider efforts towards an active arms control dialogue involving China. The G7 regrets that the U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability Dialogue has come to a halt due to Russia’s brutal and unprovoked war on Ukraine.

    11. The G7 also deplores Belarus’s recent referendum and amendment to its Constitution removing Article 18, which pledged to “make its territory a nuclear-free zone.” Belarus’ actions only further increase uncertainty amidst heightened tensions.

    12. Nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZ) make important contributions to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We see the relevant protocols to existing NWFZ treaties as the vehicle for extending to the treaty parties a legally binding negative security assurance. We remain fully committed to the creation of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. We firmly believe that this can only be achieved based on consensus arrangements freely arrived at by all states in the region. We acknowledge the efforts made during the first two sessions of the UN Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction held in 2019 and 2021. Going forward, we underscore the need for inclusive dialogue among the regional states.

    13. The G7 supports universalisation of key safeguards agreements including Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, the Additional Protocol thereto, and, where applicable, the revised Small Quantities Protocol. A Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with an Additional Protocol represents the de facto safeguards standard under the NPT. We echo the IAEA Director General’s call on those states that have yet to bring into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement or an Additional Protocol to do so as soon as possible and applaud his efforts to further strengthen the safeguards system. Recalling our strong support for the professional and impartial work of the IAEA, the G7 underscores the importance of streng-thening the effectiveness and optimizing the efficiency of the international safeguards system and ensuring it remains fit for its purpose in the 21st century.

    14. We reaffirm the IAEA’s central role in strengthening cooperation in nuclear security and the commitments in the Ministerial Declaration of the IAEA’s International Conference on Nuclear Security in 2020. We support the IAEA in facilitating the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies in a safe, secure, and sustainable manner. We support aiding the development of new regulatory frameworks for the deployment of next-generation technologies, including small modular reactors. We encourage all Member States, who are able to do so, to make financial and/or technical contributions to enable the IAEA to continue its work.

    15. The G7 commits to promoting full implementation by all states of the highest standards of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards. This is essential to facilitate the safe and the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology consistent with the NPT, and thereby promote prosperity and address the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

    16. The G7 urges States engaged in nuclear activities to become parties to and fully implement the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

    17. The G7 is resolved to increase political attention to the challenges of countering the threat of non-state actors acquiring nuclear and radioactive materials as weapons of terrorism and to accelerate national and international steps to manage the risks posed by such materials. We affirm our commitment to minimise Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) stocks globally and encourage states with civil stocks of HEU to further reduce or eliminate them where economically and technically feasible.

    18. The G7 calls on all States that have not yet done so to become parties to and fully implement the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM). We welcome the positive outcome of the A/CPPNM Review Conference in March-April 2022. We remain steadfast in our support of the IAEA, the Nuclear Security Contact Group, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

    19. The G7 supports effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) and the work of the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts. We encourage all states to fully implement the resolution and to offer assistance to interested states.

    20. The G7 actively supports global efforts to enhance education and professional development in the field of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament and is strongly committed to the integration of gender equality in this field. We are mindful that learning about the realities of any use of nuclear weapons will help strengthen global efforts towards nuclear disarmament. To raise and sustain awareness, we encourage political leaders, the young generation and others to visit the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

    21. We renew our support for a restoration and full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. A diplomatic solution remains the best way to restrict Iran’s nuclear programme. We commend the participants of the Vienna talks as well as the EU coordinator for their tireless efforts. We urge Iran to seize the offer currently on the table to bring negotiations to a successful conclusion and to refrain from further escalation of its nuclear activities.

    22. We urge Iran to uphold and fully implement all obligations under its NPT-required safeguards agreement with the IAEA. We further urge Iran to provide all required information to enable the IAEA to clarify and resolve outstanding safeguards issues without further delay. The G7 expresses strong support for the crucial verification and monitoring mandate of the IAEA, underscores the technical nature of the IAEA’s independent work, and commends the Director General’s continued professional and impartial efforts. Full and timely cooperation by Iran is essential for the IAEA to assure the international community that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful uses and eventually reach the Broader Conclusion.

    23. We recall our serious concerns about Iran’s unabated activities related to ballistic missiles “designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology,” which Iran pursues in defiance of UNSCR 2231 (2015). Iran’s space programme is enabling it to test technology that is essential to the development of ballistic missiles, including future long-range delivery systems, as demonstrated again with Iran’s announcement on March 8 of a launch of a military satellite. We urge Iran to cease all these activities and fully abide by UNSCR 2231 (2015). We also remain extremely concerned about Iran’s destabilising activities in and around the Middle East, including transfers of missiles and missile technology, drones and conventional arms to state and non-state actors. Such proliferation is destabilising for the region and escalates already high tensions, as does the use of such weapons in the region, like the attack by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on Erbil on 13 March 2022. We urge Iran to stop all activities inconsistent with relevant UNSCRs and call on all parties to play a constructive role in fostering regional stability and peace.

    24. The G7 strongly condemns the continued testing of ballistic missiles by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), including the recent Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launch conducted on 24 March 2022, which are blatant violations of the DPRK’s obligations under numerous UNSCRs. Since 2021, the DPRK has conducted an unprecedented series of missile tests, including launches of alleged hypersonic weapons using ballistic missiles and a submarine-launched ballistic missile test. These tests demonstrate the DPRK’s continued efforts to expand and further develop its ballistic missile capabilities. We deeply regret that the DPRK has abandoned its self-declared moratorium on ICBM launches. In addition, nuclear activities (such as restarting nuclear reactors and behaviour consistent with fissile material production) have been observed at several nuclear sites since 2020, suggesting an ongoing nuclear program development. All these reckless actions threaten regional and international peace and security, pose a dangerous and unpredictable risk to international civil aviation and maritime navigation in the region and demand a united response by the international community, including further measures to be taken by the UN Security Council.

    25. The G7 remains fully committed to the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of all its nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges, as well as related programs and facilities, consistent with UNSCRs. We strongly urge the DPRK to fully comply with all obligations arising from the relevant UNSCRs, to abandon its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and to return at an early date to, and fully comply with, the NPT and IAEA safeguards. We call on the DPRK to accept the repeated offers of dialogue put forward by all parties concerned, including the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.

    26. The G7 is committed to working with all relevant partners towards the goal of peace on the Korean Peninsula and to upholding the rules-based international order. We call on all states to fully and effectively implement all restrictive measures relating to the DPRK imposed by the UN Security Council and to address the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and related delivery systems, from the DPRK as an urgent priority, particularly through additional UN Security Council action. We note with concern the report by the Panel of Experts established pursuant to UNSCR 1874 (2009) that illicit ship-to-ship transfers continue to take place. We remain ready to assist in and strengthen capacities for effective sanctions implementation. We are clear that the dire humanitarian situation in the DPRK is primarily the result of the diversion of the DPRK’s resources into unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs rather than into the welfare of its people. In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, we commend the work of the 1718 Committee, which has swiftly approved all Covid-19 related sanctions exemption requests for humanitarian assistance for the DPRK.

    27. The G7 intends to bolster efforts to counter the weaponization of biological agents and toxins. Never has it been so urgent for all states to work together to achieve universal adherence to and full compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Good faith and engagement are essential to overcoming the longstanding stalemate of the Convention in order to meet evolving biological threats stemming from state and non-state actors and to address new developments in science and technology. We intend to work towards a successful Review Conference which would promote effective implementation, increase transparency, enhance compliance and confidence-building measures. Near-term concrete action should include the establishment of a new expert working group to examine concrete measures to strengthen the Convention.

    28. We pledge our continued support to the United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism to investigate alleged uses of chemical, biological or toxin weapons. We will firmly resist and condemn any attempts by any state or individual seeking to undermine its integrity, independence, and impartial character and mandate. As the only established international mechanism mandated to investigate alleged uses of biological weapons, we pledge to cooperate with partners to ensure that the mechanism is properly resourced, equipped, and operationalized to conduct effective investigations when needed.

    29. We salute the 20th anniversary of the G7-led, 31-member Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. With its unparalleled networks, expertise, partnerships, and collective funding, the GP has been instrumental in countering threats posed by chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and materials. The GP’s contribution to global threat reduction has made the world a safer and more secure place. We are committed to coordinated action with the GP to provide leadership to ensure that the GP remains a key contributor to countering persistent and emerging threats.

    30. The G7, as expressed in the 29 March statement of the GP on Ukraine, finds Russia’s unsubstantiated claims concerning alleged biological weapons development in Ukraine outrageous. Such allegations about legitimate biological research for civilian purposes are especially cynical, as the world has suffered a pandemic for two years during which biological laboratories have been of crucial importance to humankind. These allegations are part of Russia’s disinformation campaign against Ukraine and have undermined the subject and purpose of the BTWC and the international rules-based order. Ukraine is a respected member of the GP and the BTWC and has our full support.

    31. We will dedicate further efforts to addressing biological threats in the GP framework. The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the far-reaching impact of large-scale disease outbreaks and the importance of strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect and respond to all forms of biological threats, whether deliberate, accidental, or natural. Covid-19 has also accelerated the global life sciences and biotechnology revolution, including the research and development of new diagnostics, vaccines, and treatments for potentially high-consequence pathogens. Substantial improvements are needed in global biosafety, biosecurity, and oversight for dual use research, in order to prevent laboratory accidents and deliberate misuse. We commit to reinforcing existing national efforts, as well as to improving the level of biosafety and biosecurity practices globally. With this imperative, we intend to deepen our health-security cooperation with African partners and other key stakeholders to develop and implement the GP’s signature initiative aimed at mitigating biological threats in Africa. We recognize the significant contribution already made by the G7 and the EU to the GP signature initiative and encourage all GP members to actively contribute to this important initiative.

    32. We are determined to uphold the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons and support the full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). As participating States of the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, we stand together to reaffirm that any use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, under any circumstances is unacceptable and contravenes international standards and norms against such use. There can be no impunity for chemical weapon use.

    33. We will work towards a successful 2023 Review Conference to strengthen the Convention. We are unwavering in our support of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its work to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons and we applaud the OPCW’s professionalism and integrity. The G7 seeks to ensure that the OPCW is equipped to continue to fulfil its mandate, including through funding via the GP for important initiatives such as the new Centre for Chemistry and Technology.

    34. We welcome the decision of the OPCW Conference of the States Parties “Understanding Regarding the Aerosolised Use of Central Nervous System-Acting Chemicals for Law Enforcement Purposes” that affirms that the aerosolized use of CNS-acting chemicals is understood to be inconsistent with law enforcement purposes as a “purpose not prohibited” under the Convention. This forward-thinking decision by CWC States Parties sends a strong signal to countries that they cannot hide work on such chemicals for offensive purposes under the guise of legitimate purposes under the Convention.

    35. We condemn attempts to impede the OPCW’s vital work, including investigations, through baseless attacks and outrageous disinformation, notably Russia’s unsubstantiated claims and false allegations that Ukraine was preparing to use chemical weapons. Ukraine is in full compliance with its obligations under the CWC, in stark contrast to Russia’s continued refusal to investigate the well-documented use of a chemical weapon on its own territory, contrary to its obligations under the Convention.

    36. In that context, the G7 reaffirms the statement made by Ministers on 26 January 2021 condemning in the strongest possible terms the poisoning of Alexey Navalny with a military grade chemical nerve agent of the “Novichok” group, a substance developed by the Soviet Union, and retained by Russia. There is no plausible account other than the involvement and responsibility of Russian state actors, as Russia continues to evade all appeals to launch an investigation of the case. We recall the OPCW’s conclusion that a similar nerve agent was used in Salisbury in 2018, resulting in the death of a British citizen, for which three Russian suspects have been charged.

    37. We again urge the Russian authorities to investigate and credibly explain the use of a chemical weapon on its soil considering Russia’s obligations under the CWC. We recall the questions asked on 5 October 2021 by 45 States Parties, including all G7 members, to Russia under Article IX of the CWC, which were not adequately answered by the Russian Federation. We support the statement made by 56 States Parties at the November 2021 OPCW Conference of the States Parties, calling on Russia to account for the use of a chemical weapon on its territory. We welcome actions, such as sanctions, taken by G7 members in response to those individuals and entities deemed to be involved in the development and use of chemical weapons. We also condemn Russia’s attempts to shield Syria from accountability for the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons.

    38. Syria’s chemical weapon use in violation of the CWC continues to be a matter of grave concern. We welcome the decision of the OPCW Conference of the States Parties to suspend Syria’s rights and privileges under the CWC, until it completes the steps set out in the OPCW Executive Council Decision of 9 July 2020. We urge the Syrian authorities to cooperate fully and comply with their obligations. We deplore disinformation about chemical weapon use in Syria and we are committed to supporting the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s work in investigating chemical weapon use in Syria, identifying those responsible, and ensuring Syria’s declaration is full and accurate. Syria will be held to account for any failures to meet its obligations. We commit to ensuring the full implementation of UNSCR 2118 (2013) and the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons programme once and for all.

    39. We remain gravely concerned by the accelerating proliferation of ballistic and other missile technologies, including at the hands of non-state actors, which is a threat to regional and global security. Recalling the G7 NPDG “Initiative on Countering Illicit and/or Destabilizing Missile Activities” launched by the French Presidency in 2019, we remain engaged in countering missile proliferation activities and strengthening missile governance.

    40. We reaffirm our commitment to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and we call on all states to unilaterally adhere to the MTCR guidelines and reiterate the importance of the fundamental principles underpinning ballistic missile non-proliferation including in accordance with UNSCR 1540 (2004). We are committed to further increasing the effectiveness of the MTCR.

    41. We strongly support the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) and call for its universalisation. In the 20 years since its establishment, the HCoC has proven to be an important transparency and confidence building measure that encourages responsible behaviour and restraint in the development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and aims to curb and prevent proliferation of such ballistic missiles. We will work towards the goals of universalization and full implementation of the HCoC, notably on the occasion of its 20th anniversary.

    42. The G7 re-affirms the importance of coordinated action to counter illicit intangible technology transfer and protecting academia and business sectors from hostile state exploitation. While promoting an environment in which science, technology and research collaboration can flourish, we are resolved to address the challenges posed by the misuse and illicit diversion of technology critical for the development of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and for advanced military technology programmes by state and non-state actors, as well as by dual-use research of concern, notably in the field of life sciences.

    43. The G7 members commit to enhancing export controls on materials, technology and research that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We plan to strengthen controls on materials (including dual-use components), technology and research that could support the development of advanced conventional weapons, ensuring that enhancements are proportionate and avoid negatively impacting on legitimate exports.

    44. The G7 is committed to acting to counter proliferation financing which, left unchecked, undermines the integrity of the global financial system and fuels threats to our common security. We therefore welcome the recent changes to the Financial Action Task Force standards regarding targeted financial sanctions on the DPRK and Iran, which, for the first time, expect all countries and regions to take concrete steps to understand the proliferation financing risks they face, and to oblige their financial sectors and designated non-financial business professions to do the same. Only by understanding the truly global reach of proliferation networks will we meet our responsibility to tackle this activity.

    45. We are determined to prevent illicit transfers and destabilizing accumulation of conventional weapons and ammunition, and to increase the safety and security of stockpiles, including by deploying our technical expertise, sharing best practices, e.g. in the framework of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, and by adhering to international law and norms on responsible transfer.

    46. The diversion of ammunition to unauthorized users, including criminals and terrorists, facilitates and fuels armed violence and armed conflict. Mindful of these implications for security and sustainable development, we strongly support the German-led initiative for a comprehensive framework to support safe, secure, and sustainable ammunition management at the national, sub-regional, regional, and global level and the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) mandated to carry out work in this regard. We encourage all states to engage constructively in the OEWG aiming at elaborating a set of political commitments as a new global framework that will address existing gaps in through-life ammunition management, including international cooperation and assistance.

    47. We advocate for the reinforcement of regimes that regulate the transfer and prevent the diversion of conventional weapons and ammunition in line with international law and norms, including the Arms Trade Treaty. We commit to adapting, where necessary, relevant regimes as new technologies are developed. In dialogue with other technology leaders, we seek to shape the global debate on responsible civilian and military use of new technologies, considering security and defence considerations and securing adherence to international law, in particular International Humanitarian Law and, where applicable, International Human Rights Law. Where necessary, new international principles for responsible use should be considered.

    48. As space activities evolve, the norms, rules and principles governing space activities should also evolve. State threats to the secure, safe, sustainable, and peaceful uses of outer space are of serious concern. Given that our societies are increasingly reliant on space systems for their security and prosperity, we are determined to reduce the risk of misperception and miscalculation and reduce space threats. We commit to engaging the international community to uphold and strengthen a rules-based international order for outer space.

    49. Establishing norms, rules and principles for responsible space behaviours is a pragmatic way forward to enhance security, mitigate threats against space systems and reduce the risks of misperception, miscalculation, and escalation. We strongly support the UK-led initiative at the UN General Assembly and the resulting UN Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) on “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours”. We encourage all states to positively engage in the OEWG that aims to build a common understanding of responsible space behaviours and consider first proposals for norms, rules, and principles in that regard.

    50. We call upon all nations to refrain from conducting dangerous and irresponsible destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests like those carried out by the Russian Federation on 15 November, 2021. We welcome the US commitment not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests. We reiterate the need to cooperate with all States and space actors to strengthen safety, security, stability, and sustainability of outer space and help all countries benefit from the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: John C Williams: All about data

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    Introduction

    Good morning. I’m so pleased to be here at Binghamton University, a true gem of the SUNY system. Meeting with students, educators, and business and community leaders is a valuable and enjoyable part of my job.

    The New York Fed represents the Federal Reserve System’s Second District, which includes New York State, northern New Jersey, western Connecticut, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. This is a diverse region made up of many smaller local economies. Therefore, it’s important for me and my colleagues at the New York Fed to collect data and learn about the challenges and opportunities facing all of the communities we serve.

    That said, monetary policy affects everyone, and the Federal Reserve is committed to using its tools to achieve its dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability. Today, I will talk about monetary policy and how the Fed is working to fulfill this dual mandate. I’ll also give you my outlook on the U.S. economy.

    Before I do, I will give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express today are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or others in the Federal Reserve System.

    Obsessing Over Data

    As I’ve traveled around the Southern Tier region, I’ve enjoyed seeing the emergence of the colors of autumn. Tracking fall foliage is a hobby for many. What I like is that it’s all about data. “Leaf peepers” submit field reports on changing color conditions, and experts pore over the information. One forecast predicts we will hit peak foliage in four days.1

    At the Fed, we’re equally obsessed with data. In our case, we study data about the economy-whether here in the district, across the country, or around the world. So, I’ll highlight some of the data that help my understanding of how the economy is performing relative to our dual mandate goals, as well as what policy actions we can take to achieve these goals.

    When inflation became unacceptably high and the labor market exceptionally tight, the FOMC acted with resolve to bring inflation back down to our 2 percent longer-run target. The Committee’s strong actions have helped bring the economy much closer to our goals. Imbalances between supply and demand in the economy have mostly dissipated, even as the economy and employment have continued to grow. And inflation, as measured by the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, has declined from over 7 percent in June of 2022 to just 2-1/4 percent in the latest reading. There’s still some distance to go to reach our goal of 2 percent, but we’re definitely moving in the right direction.

    The data paint a picture of an economy that has returned to balance, or in a word that the English majors in the room may appreciate, “equipoise.” In light of the progress we have seen in reducing inflation and restoring balance to the economy, the FOMC decided at its most recent meeting to lower the interest rate that it sets. Simply put, this action will help maintain the strength of the economy and labor market while inflation moves back to 2 percent on a sustainable basis.

    Moving to Price Stability

    I’ll go further into our policy decision and what it means for the economic outlook in a minute. But first, I’ll give more details about each side of our dual mandate, starting with inflation. I’ll use an onion analogy that I have found useful over the past two years to demonstrate how inflation’s three distinct layers are normalizing at different rates.2

    The onion’s outer layer represents globally traded commodities. As the economy started to rebound from pandemic shutdowns and demand began to soar, inflation surged, then rose further when Russia invaded Ukraine. Since then, supply and demand have come into balance, and these prices have generally been flat or falling.

    The middle onion layer is made up of core goods, excluding commodities. Demand for goods rose sharply as the economy emerged from the pandemic downturn-just as global pandemic-related supply-chain disruptions significantly hampered supply. But, as seen in the New York Fed’s Global Supply Chain Pressure Index, those supply pressures have eased, and core goods inflation has returned to pre-pandemic norms.3

    The inner onion layer comprises core services. Although this category is taking the longest to normalize, the disinflationary process is well underway here too. For example, measures of underlying inflation that tend to be heavily influenced by core services inflation today average around 2-1/2 percent.4

    One positive piece of data that reinforces my confidence that inflation is on course to reach our 2 percent goal is that inflation expectations remain well anchored across all forecast horizons. This is seen in the New York Fed’s Survey of Consumer Expectations as well as other surveys and market-based measures.5

    A Labor Market in Balance

    Now I’ll turn to the employment side of our mandate. And no surprise, I’ll point to data. A wide range of metrics-including the unemployment rate; measures of job openings, hiring, quits, and employment flows; and perceptions of job and worker availability-indicate that the very tight labor market of the past few years has now returned to more normal conditions and is unlikely to be a source of inflationary pressures going forward.

    Recent analysis by researchers at the New York Fed provides a useful way to gauge whether the labor market is tight or loose.They find that you can effectively summarize the state of the overall labor market in terms of its effect on compensation growth by using just two indicators: the rate at which employees quit their jobs and the ratio of job openings to job seekers. In fact, once you take these two measures into account, other labor market metrics that get a lot of attention-such as the unemployment rate and the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio-don’t provide additional useful information. 

    Combining these two measures into an index of labor market tightness provides two key insights. First, data as of the second quarter of this year indicate that the labor market is about where it was in early 2018-a period of solid labor market conditions and low inflation. Second, compensation growth should soon return to levels that prevailed prior to the pandemic.

    Seasons of Change

    So, the labor market is solid. The economy is in a good place. And inflation is closing in on our 2 percent longer-run goal. With the risks to achieving our goals now in balance, the FOMC decided to lower the target range for the federal funds rate by half a percentage point, to 4-3/4 to 5 percent. In addition, the Committee continued to normalize the holdings of securities on the Fed’s balance sheet.7

    Looking ahead, based on my current forecast for the economy, I expect that it will be appropriate to continue the process of moving the stance of monetary policy to a more neutral setting over time. The timing and pace of future adjustments to interest rates will be based on the evolution of the data, the economic outlook, and the risks to achieving our goals. We will continue to be data-dependent and attuned to the evolution of economic conditions in making our decisions.

    With monetary policy moving to a more neutral setting over time, I expect real GDP to grow between 2-1/4 and 2-1/2 percent this year and to average about 2-1/4 percent over the next two years. I anticipate the unemployment rate to edge up from its current level of about 4 percent to around 4-1/4 percent at the end of this year and stay around that level next year. With the economy in balance and inflation expectations well anchored, I expect overall PCE inflation to be around 2-1/4 percent this year, and to be close to 2 percent next year.

    Conclusion

    The economy has been on a remarkable journey. In two years, the red-hot labor market has normalized, and inflation has come within striking distance of our 2 percent longer-run goal-all while employment and the economy continue to grow.

    We instituted and maintained a very restrictive monetary policy stance until the data gave us confidence that inflation is sustainably on course to 2 percent. With this progress toward achieving price stability, moving toward a more neutral monetary policy stance will help maintain the strength of the economy and labor market. Although the outlook remains uncertain, we are well positioned to achieve our dual mandate goals.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Shaktikanta Das: Central banking at crossroads

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    feel highly privileged to be here at this High Level Conference on ‘Central Banking at Crossroads’ and share some of my thoughts. When the definitive history of our times is written, the turn of the current decade will, in all probability, be regarded as a watershed in the evolution of central banking. In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and the persistent geopolitical strife thereafter, central banks are treading in the uncharted terrain of a twilight zone. Today, like never before in the five centuries of their existence, central banks are confronted with a future where their mandates, their functions and their performances are all up for unforgiving scrutiny.

    Around them, the environment in which central banks have been operating is undergoing tectonic transformations. Structural changes are underway that have the power to fundamentally alter the context of central banking with headwinds from geo-economic fragmentation; muscular industrial, trade and financial policies that are already reshaping supply chains and the availability of critical minerals, intermediates, resources and services; new technologies; and climate change. In this rapidly evolving environment, central banks are required to navigate not just known unknowns but unknown unknowns too.

    Yet, even at these exceptional intersections, central banks are exploring new pathways and striving to reinvent their remit and functioning as the guardians of financial stability. Their effort is to stay ahead of these developments by strengthening guardrails and leveraging on technological innovations.

    For the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), as we commemorate its 90th year, it has been an eventful journey since its establishment in 1935. In many significant ways, the Reserve Bank embodies the developmental aspirations of India. The landmarks of its journey are equally milestones in the progress of India. At the current juncture and looking ahead, developments around the world are impacting India on a continuous basis and challenging us as practitioners of central banking.

    Today’s conference gives us an opportunity to introspect on the journey of central banking so far and how we want to visualise and shape our role in the future. In my remarks today, I propose to briefly focus on three areas where central banking is likely to be redefined in the future: monetary policy; financial stability; and new technologies. In fact, these are among the themes of specific sessions in today’s conference. My observations would be mainly in the context of central banking across countries.

    Monetary Policy

    The three decades of restrained volatility of business cycles and the co-existence of price stability and uninterrupted growth that preceded the global financial crisis (GFC), perhaps lulled central banks into the belief that inflation expectations are enduringly anchored. The beast of inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s seemed completely behind our times. Conditioned by that experience, central banks shed their role of ‘lender of the last resort’ and became lender of the first resort to defend their financial systems when they responded to the GFC. They continued from their GFC moment and once again rushed to the frontline as warriors of the first resort to protect and preserve lives and livelihood when the COVID-19 pandemic hit the world. They took interest rates to all-time lows, undertook unconventional policy measures to reach out to interest rates across the spectrum, including at the longer end, and gave assurances about low for longer interest rates. This was an uncharacteristic departure from the monetary mysticism that had prevailed up to the 1990s. Clearly, central banking has evolved in line with the developments of the 21st century.

    While the pandemic time measures provided the much needed support to the economies, in the aftermath of the pandemic the limits and downsides of easy monetary policy in protecting economic activity in a crisis period became evident. Today, rightly or wrongly, the central banks are accused of distributional consequences of their actions. The negative equity that weighs in the balance sheets of certain central banks is seen as compromising their independence in the conduct of monetary policy. The story in India was, however, different as most of our liquidity measures were calibrated and carried end dates at the time of their announcement itself.

    Another challenge staring at central banks today emanates from soaring public debt caused, in a considerable measure, by the pandemic-related fiscal stimuli and the subsequent efforts for fiscal consolidation not gaining adequate traction. Such a situation is becoming a binding constraint on monetary policy in several countries. Global public debt has surged post the pandemic to 93.2 per cent of GDP in 2023 and is likely to increase to 100 per cent of GDP by 20291. In major economies, debt-GDP ratios are on an upward trajectory, raising concerns about their sustainability and their negative spillovers for the broader global economy. In several other countries, central banks are willy-nilly expected to facilitate financing of such huge public debts. In fact, the debt overhang is simmering underneath the radar of central banks, threatening to un-anchor inflation expectations and undermine macroeconomic stability.

    For emerging market economy (EME) central banks, the international dimensions of monetary policy continues to be a testing challenge. For them, the trilemma is real. Today the global economy is more financially integrated than ever before. Monetary policy actions in systemic economies produce large fluctuations in capital flows and exchange rates, which can then feed into domestic liquidity, inflation and eventually affect the real economy. While monetary policies in the systemic economies are determined by their domestic inflation-growth considerations, they have large spillovers to the emerging and developing economies and even to other advanced economies. These spillovers can be expected to accentuate as capital flows dwarf trade flows. Quite naturally, emerging economies are having to strengthen their policy frameworks and buffers to manage this external flux and mitigate its adverse consequences.

    Financial Stability

    Financial stability is the essential reason why central banks exist. Price stability as a central bank objective is of more recent vintage. There is a growing opinion today that ‘low for long’ policies practiced during the GFC and again during the pandemic, apart from providing support to the real economy, also produced exuberant financial asset prices that have come back to haunt central banks in their role as guardians of financial stability. Amidst ultra-low interest rates and super abundant liquidity, leveraging and risk-taking were celebrated as if there is no tomorrow. Consequently, when central banks were confronted with inflation surges in 2022 in the shadow of the war in Ukraine, they reacted with one of the most aggressive and synchronised tightening of monetary policies in history. This resulted in risks to financial stability, especially when these risks morphed into banking crises in certain countries in March 2023 and sell-offs in financial markets in August and September 2024. These developments have once again brought to fore the role of central banks in securing and preserving financial stability. Specifically, how should they account for financial stability considerations in their pursuit of price stability?

    Let me now address some of the emerging risks to financial stability. First, the divergence in global monetary policies – monetary easing in some economies, tightening in a few, and pause in several other economies – can be expected to lead to volatility in capital flows and exchange rates, which may disrupt financial stability. We saw a glimpse of this with the sharp appreciation of the Japanese Yen in early August which led to disruptive reversals in the Yen carry trade and rattled financial markets across the globe.

    Second, private credit markets have expanded rapidly with limited regulation. They pose significant risks to financial stability, particularly since they have not been stress-tested in a downturn.

    Third, higher interest rates, aimed at curtailing inflationary pressures, have led to increase in debt servicing costs, financial market volatility, and risks to asset quality. Stretched asset valuations in some jurisdictions could trigger contagion across financial markets, creating further instability. The correction in commercial real estate (CRE) prices in some jurisdictions can put small and medium-sized banks under stress, given their large exposures to this sector. The interconnectedness between CRE, non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), and the broader banking system amplifies these risks.

    New Technologies

    In recent years, the technology-driven digitalisation wave in the payments sphere has been revolutionary. While most of the innovations have been at the national level focusing on retail payments, the market for cross-border payments has also expanded substantially. The significant volume of cross-border worker remittances, the growing size of gross flows of capital, and the increasing importance of cross-border e-commerce have acted as catalysts to this growth.23 Remittances are the starting point for many emerging and developing economies, including India, to explore cross-border peer-to-peer (P2P) payments. We believe there is immense scope to significantly reduce the cost and time for such remittances.

    India is one of the few large economies with a 24×7 real time gross settlement (RTGS) system. The feasibility of expanding RTGS to settle transactions in major trade currencies such as USD, EUR and GBP can be explored through bilateral or multilateral arrangements. India and a few other economies have already commenced efforts to expand linkage of cross-border fast payment systems both in the bilateral and multilateral modes.4

    India has developed a world-class digital public infrastructure (DPI), which has facilitated the development of high-quality digital financial products with enormous potential for cross-border payments. India is now home to the world’s third most vibrant startup ecosystem, with over 140,000 recognised startups, more than a hundred unicorns, and over US$150 billion in funding raised. India’s experience in DPI can be leveraged by other countries to improve and usher in a global digital revolution.

    Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) is another area which has the potential to facilitate efficient cross-border payments. India is one of the few countries that have launched both wholesale and retail CBDCs. Programmability, interoperability with the UPI retail fast payment system and development of offline solutions for remote areas and underserved segments of the population, are some of the value added services which we are now experimenting as part of our CBDC pilot.

    Going forward, harmonisation of standards and interoperability would be important for CBDCs for cross-border payments and to overcome the serious financial stability concerns associated with cryptocurrencies. A key challenge could be the fact that countries may prefer to design their own systems as per their domestic considerations. I feel we can overcome this challenge by developing a plug-and-play system that allows replicability of India’s experience while also maintaining the sovereignty of respective countries.

    It is well recognised that growing digitalisation of financial services has enhanced the efficiency of the financial sector across the globe. At the same time, it has brought in several challenges which central banks have to deal with. For instance, in the modern world with deep social media presence and vast access to online banking with money transfer happening in seconds, rumours and misinformation can spread very quickly and can cause liquidity stress. Banks have to remain alert in the social media space and also strengthen their liquidity buffers.

    Latest technological advancements such as artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) have opened new avenues of business and profit expansion for financial institutions. At the same time, these technologies also pose financial stability risks. The heavy reliance on AI can lead to concentration risks, especially when a small number of tech providers dominate the market. This could amplify systemic risks, as failures or disruptions in these systems may cascade across the entire financial sector. Moreover, the growing use of AI introduces new vulnerabilities, such as increased susceptibility to cyberattacks and data breaches. Additionally, AI’s opacity makes it difficult to audit or interpret the algorithms which drive decisions. This could potentially lead to unpredictable consequences in the markets. Banks and other financial institutions must put in place adequate risk mitigation measures against all these risks. In the ultimate analysis, banks have to ride on the advantages of AI and Bigtech and not allow the latter to ride on them.

    Conclusion

    Despite the difficult trials and trade-offs, central banking in the current decade is a success story. In the realm of monetary policy, central banks have been successful in bringing inflation closer to targets. Major financial collapses or recessions, seen during earlier episodes of crisis, have been averted. Central banks are now at the forefront of technological innovations and are driving them through sandboxes, innovation hubs and hackathons.

    As we navigate the high intensity tail events and black swans of the current decade, the lessons imbibed can well form the basis of our deliberations today to chart out a course for the future. Central banks must remain vigilant, adaptable, continuously assess risks and build resilience. They should remain prepared to navigate complex challenges, support sustainable growth, maintain price stability and promote sound and vibrant financial systems.

    Thank you.


    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Security: NATO Secretary General visits SHAPE and new NATO command to support security assistance to Ukraine based in Germany

    Source: NATO

    NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte met with the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Christopher Cavoli and other senior officials during his first visit to the Alliance’s Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE) in the Belgian city of Mons on Monday (14 October 2024).

    In the afternoon, the Secretary General travelled with General Cavoli to Wiesbaden, Germany to visit NATO’s new Security Assistance and Training Ukraine (NSATU) command at the Clay Barracks, where the Secretary General also met with German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius.

    In talking with the troops, Mr. Rutte noted how important their work was, preparing the way for 700 personnel who will be stationed in Wiesbaden and at logistical nodes on the Eastern flank of the Alliance. He said that the new command will make a real difference for Ukraine on the battlefield and “for our own security”.

    NSATU will coordinate the provision of military training and equipment for Ukraine by NATO Allies and partners – including artillery, ammunition and air defences – and will help Ukrainian forces prepare for the future.

    MIL Security OSI