NewzIntel.com

    • Checkout Page
    • Contact Us
    • Default Redirect Page
    • Frontpage
    • Home-2
    • Home-3
    • Lost Password
    • Member Login
    • Member LogOut
    • Member TOS Page
    • My Account
    • NewzIntel Alert Control-Panel
    • NewzIntel Latest Reports
    • Post Views Counter
    • Privacy Policy
    • Public Individual Page
    • Register
    • Subscription Plan
    • Thank You Page

Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Update 299 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

    The IAEA team based at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has been informed of a drone attack that damaged several vehicles near the site’s cooling pond last week, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today.

    Visiting near one of the areas of Friday’s purported attack, the IAEA team yesterday observed burnt grass and other charred vegetation, which the plant said was caused by a drone that crashed and caused a fire there.

    In the latest such report highlighting constant dangers to nuclear safety during the military conflict, the ZNPP said six drones had been involved in the incident.

    According to the plant’s information provided to the IAEA team, a group of personnel who were cleaning a nearby water reservoir at the time spotted the approaching drones and took cover, with no injuries. However, one of the drones hit the front of a truck and other vehicles were also damaged, the ZNPP said. Approximately one hour later, another drone crashed, causing the fire that burnt the vegetation, it added.

    The incident occurred outside the site perimeter, around 600 metres from the nearest of the ZNPP’s six reactors.

    The IAEA team members were yesterday shown the truck that was reportedly struck, but they could not confirm any damage as they were too far away from the vehicle. They also could not see any drone remains at that distance.

    “If this report is confirmed, it would represent a completely unacceptable attack in the proximity of a major nuclear power plant. Whoever is behind such attacks is playing with fire. It must stop immediately,” Director General Grossi said. 

    It comes just a few weeks after the IAEA team at the ZNPP heard repeated rounds of gunfire that appeared to be aimed at drones reportedly attacking the site’s training centre, also located just outside the site perimeter – on the opposite side to Friday’s reported attack. The training centre has been targeted several times this year, according to the ZNPP.

    In February, a drone severely damaged the New Safe Confinement (NSC) at the Chornobyl plant in northern Ukraine, built to prevent any radioactive release from the reactor unit 4 destroyed in the 1986 accident and to protect it from external hazards.

    Ukraine’s operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) – Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine – also regularly report of drones being detected near the respective sites.

    “There are too many drones flying too close to Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, potentially threatening nuclear safety. As we saw in February, they can cause major damage at these facilities. Once again, I call for maximum military restraint in the vicinity of nuclear facilities,” Director General Grossi said.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    July 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Update 299 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    The IAEA team based at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has been informed of a drone attack that damaged several vehicles near the site’s cooling pond last week, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today.

    Visiting near one of the areas of Friday’s purported attack, the IAEA team yesterday observed burnt grass and other charred vegetation, which the plant said was caused by a drone that crashed and caused a fire there.

    In the latest such report highlighting constant dangers to nuclear safety during the military conflict, the ZNPP said six drones had been involved in the incident.

    According to the plant’s information provided to the IAEA team, a group of personnel who were cleaning a nearby water reservoir at the time spotted the approaching drones and took cover, with no injuries. However, one of the drones hit the front of a truck and other vehicles were also damaged, the ZNPP said. Approximately one hour later, another drone crashed, causing the fire that burnt the vegetation, it added.

    The incident occurred outside the site perimeter, around 600 metres from the nearest of the ZNPP’s six reactors.

    The IAEA team members were yesterday shown the truck that was reportedly struck, but they could not confirm any damage as they were too far away from the vehicle. They also could not see any drone remains at that distance.

    “If this report is confirmed, it would represent a completely unacceptable attack in the proximity of a major nuclear power plant. Whoever is behind such attacks is playing with fire. It must stop immediately,” Director General Grossi said. 

    It comes just a few weeks after the IAEA team at the ZNPP heard repeated rounds of gunfire that appeared to be aimed at drones reportedly attacking the site’s training centre, also located just outside the site perimeter – on the opposite side to Friday’s reported attack. The training centre has been targeted several times this year, according to the ZNPP.

    In February, a drone severely damaged the New Safe Confinement (NSC) at the Chornobyl plant in northern Ukraine, built to prevent any radioactive release from the reactor unit 4 destroyed in the 1986 accident and to protect it from external hazards.

    Ukraine’s operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) – Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine – also regularly report of drones being detected near the respective sites.

    “There are too many drones flying too close to Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, potentially threatening nuclear safety. As we saw in February, they can cause major damage at these facilities. Once again, I call for maximum military restraint in the vicinity of nuclear facilities,” Director General Grossi said.

    MIL Security OSI –

    July 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Amplify Energy Announces Sale of Non-Operated Eagle Ford Assets

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    HOUSTON, July 01, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Amplify Energy Corp. (NYSE: AMPY) (“Amplify,” the “Company,” “us,” or “our”) announced today it entered into a definitive agreement to sell all of its non-operated working interest in its Eagle Ford assets to Murphy Exploration & Production Company — USA for a contract price of $23 million, subject to certain post-closing adjustments. The sale closed July 1, 2025 and has an effective date of June 15, 2025.

    The net proceeds from the sale will be used to pay down debt which will enhance the Company’s liquidity. With an improved balance sheet, Amplify is considering adding back high-return Beta development wells in 2025 that it had previously deferred in May. The Company expects to provide updated full-year 2025 guidance at the time it provides second quarter operating and financial results.

    Martyn Willsher, Amplify’s President and Chief Executive Officer stated, “The sale of our non-operated Eagle Ford assets is an important step forward in the transformation of Amplify Energy to a more streamlined and focused enterprise. We believe monetizing proved reserves and reinvesting those proceeds in high-return development wells at Beta will be value enhancing to our shareholders.”

    Mr. Willsher continued, “Reducing debt and accelerating Beta development are core tenets of our go-forward strategy. This deal is consistent with both of these objectives, and we believe we are receiving fair value for the divested assets. We will continue to look for other opportunities that align with our strategic intent.”

    About Amplify Energy

    Amplify Energy Corp. is an independent oil and natural gas company engaged in the acquisition, development, exploitation and production of oil and natural gas properties. Amplify’s operations are focused in Oklahoma, the Rockies (Bairoil), federal waters offshore Southern California (Beta), and East Texas / North Louisiana. For more information, visit www.amplifyenergy.com.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release includes “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. All statements, other than statements of historical fact, included in this press release that address activities, events or developments that the Company expects, believes or anticipates will or may occur in the future are forward-looking statements. Terminology such as “may,” “will,” “would,” “should,” “expect,” “plan,” “project,” “intend,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “estimate,” “predict,” “potential,” “pursue,” “target,” “outlook,” “continue,” the negative of such terms or other comparable terminology are intended to identify forward-looking statements. These statements address activities, events or developments that we expect or anticipate will or may occur in the future. These statements include, but are not limited to, statements about the anticipated impact of this proposed sale of assets on the Company’s business and future financial and operating results, the expected use of proceeds of this sale of assets, and the Company’s expectations of plans, goals, strategies (including measures to implement strategies), objectives and anticipated results with respect thereto. These forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties and other factors that could cause the Company’s actual results or financial condition to differ materially from those expressed or implied by forward-looking statements. These include risks and uncertainties relating to, among other things: the ability to complete this proposed sale of assets on the anticipated terms and timetable; the possibility that various closing conditions for this proposed sale of assets may not be satisfied or waived; the Company’s evaluation and implementation of strategic alternatives; risks related to the redetermination of the borrowing base under the Company’s revolving credit facility; the Company’s ability to satisfy debt obligations; the Company’s need to make accretive acquisitions or substantial capital expenditures to maintain its declining asset base, including the existence of unanticipated liabilities or problems relating to acquired or divested business or properties; volatility in the prices for oil, natural gas and NGLs; the Company’s ability to access funds on acceptable terms, if at all, because of the terms and conditions governing the Company’s indebtedness, including financial covenants; general political and economic conditions, globally and in the jurisdictions in which we operate, including the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, trade wars and the potential destabilizing effect such conflicts may pose for the global oil and natural gas markets; expectations regarding general economic conditions, including inflation; and the impact of local, state and federal governmental regulations, including those related to climate change and hydraulic fracturing, and potential changes in these regulations. Please read the Company’s filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), including “Risk Factors” in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K, and if applicable, the Company’s Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q and Current Reports on Form 8-K, which are available on the Company’s Investor Relations website at https://www.amplifyenergy.com/investor-relations/sec-filings/default.aspx or on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov, for a discussion of risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ from those in such forward-looking statements. You are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date of this press release. All forward-looking statements in this press release are qualified in their entirety by these cautionary statements. Except as required by law, the Company undertakes no obligation and does not intend to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future results or otherwise.

    Contacts

    Jim Frew — Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
    (832) 219-9044
    jim.frew@amplifyenergy.com

    Michael Jordan — Director, Finance and Treasurer
    (832) 219-9051
    michael.jordan@amplifyenergy.com

    The MIL Network –

    July 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: BigCommerce Appoints Former Adobe Fellow and Vice President of Technology Anil Kamath to its Board of Directors

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    AUSTIN, Texas, July 01, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — BigCommerce (Nasdaq: BIGC), a leading open SaaS ecommerce platform for B2C and B2B businesses, announced today that former Adobe Fellow and Vice President of Technology Anil Kamath has joined the BigCommerce Board of Directors.

    “Joining the Board of BigCommerce is an exciting opportunity to support BigCommerce’s innovation agenda through strategic guidance on data and AI,” Kamath said. “I see immense potential to leverage predictive analytics, personalization and intelligent automation to drive transformative growth for merchants. Ecommerce is one of the most dynamic frontiers for applied AI, and I’m thrilled to contribute to a vision that empowers businesses to scale smarter, serve customers better and innovate faster.”

    Over his 30-year career as a technology entrepreneur, advisor and leader, Kamath has developed expertise in business strategy, scaling companies, strategic oversight, governance and corporate development that, combined with his industry perspective, will enable him to provide BigCommerce with critical strategic guidance.

    During his 13 years at Adobe, Kamath was responsible for data science, machine learning and artificial intelligence for the Adobe Experience Cloud. Prior to joining Adobe, he was the founder and primary architect of Efficient Frontier, a digital ad buying platform that managed more than $2 billion in advertising spend until its acquisition by Adobe. He led the integration of Efficient Frontier into Adobe Marketing Cloud and developed data science-driven solutions that optimized customer acquisition, engagement, retention and growth across B2C and B2B businesses. More recently, he spearheaded the generative AI transformation for enterprise marketing, leading to the launch of Gen Studio for Performance Marketing.

    After a successful 13-year tenure at Adobe, Kamath transitioned earlier this year to focus on mentoring and supporting early-stage innovation. He is a longtime member of the Stanford Angels & Entrepreneurs, as well as lead mentor and advisor at StartX, a non-profit accelerator for Stanford University startups.

    “Anil brings an extensive blend of strong leadership and valuable technological expertise to BigCommerce at a time when our industry and our business are going through some exciting changes,” said Travis Hess, CEO of BigCommerce. “His addition to our Board will help strengthen BigCommerce’s core offerings as well as inform the innovations we are building to drive business outcomes for merchants. We are excited to leverage his experience and look forward to Anil’s perspectives and contributions.”

    Kamath was appointed to the vacancy created upon the departure of BigCommerce board member Lawrence Bohn who had served since 2011, when he became BigCommerce’s first investor through General Catalyst’s Series A investment in the company.

    “I want to personally thank Larry for his many significant contributions to the growth and success of BigCommerce,” Hess said. “Since the earliest days of the company, Larry has been invaluable to BigCommerce, and throughout his tenure, he has championed a deep belief in our mission and strategy.”

    About BigCommerce
    BigCommerce (Nasdaq: BIGC) is a leading open SaaS and composable ecommerce platform that empowers brands, retailers, manufacturers and distributors of all sizes to build, innovate and grow their businesses online. BigCommerce provides its customers sophisticated professional-grade functionality, customization and performance with simplicity and ease-of-use. Tens of thousands of B2C and B2B companies across 150 countries and numerous industries rely on BigCommerce, including Coldwater Creek, Harvey Nichols, King Arthur Baking Co., MKM Building Supplies, United Aqua Group and Uplift Desk. For more information, please visit www.bigcommerce.com or follow us on X and LinkedIn.

    Forward-Looking Statements
    This press release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. In some cases, you can identify forward-looking statements by terms such as “anticipate,” “believe,” “estimate,” “expect,” “intend,” “outlook,” “may,” “might,” “plan,” “project,” “will,” “would,” “should,” “could,” “can,” “predict,” “potential,” “strategy,” “target,” “explore,” “continue,” or the negative of these terms, and similar expressions intended to identify forward-looking statements. However, not all forward-looking statements contain these identifying words. By their nature, these statements are subject to numerous uncertainties and risks, including factors beyond our control, that could cause actual results, performance or achievement to differ materially and adversely from those anticipated or implied in the forward-looking statements. These assumptions, uncertainties and risks include that, among others, our expectations regarding our revenue, expenses, sales, and operations; anticipated trends and challenges in our business and the markets in which we operate; the war involving Russia and Ukraine and the potential impact on our operations, global economic and geopolitical conditions; the impacts of changes in U.S. trade policy and global tariffs; our anticipated areas of investments and expectations relating to such investments; our anticipated cash needs and our estimates regarding our capital requirements and refinancing; our ability to compete in our industry and innovation by our competitors; our ability to anticipate market needs or develop new or enhanced services to meet those needs; our ability to manage growth and to expand our infrastructure; our ability to establish and maintain intellectual property rights; our ability to manage expansion into international markets and new industries; our ability to hire and retain key personnel; our ability to successfully identify, manage, and integrate any existing and potential acquisitions; our ability to adapt to emerging regulatory developments, technological changes, and cybersecurity needs; the anticipated effect on our business of litigation to which we are or may become a party; the anticipated benefits and opportunities related to past and ongoing restructuring may not be realized or may take longer to realize than expected; our ability to manage key executive succession and retention or continue to attract qualified personnel; our ability to implement a go-to-market strategy that focuses on efficient profitable revenue growth, operating leverage, and healthy cash flow, may be impacted by unforeseen challenges in streamlining our organization and adapting to market dynamics; and our ability to remediate the material weakness could negatively affect our business. Additional risks and uncertainties that could cause actual outcomes and results to differ materially from those contemplated by the forward-looking statements are included under the caption “Risk Factors” and elsewhere in our filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), including our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024, our Quarterly Report for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, and the future quarterly and current reports that we file with the SEC. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date the statements are made and are based on information available to BigCommerce at the time those statements are made and/or management’s good faith belief as of that time with respect to future events. BigCommerce assumes no obligation to update forward-looking statements to reflect events or circumstances after the date they were made, except as required by law.

    BigCommerce® is a registered trademark of BigCommerce Pty. Ltd. Third-party trademarks and service marks are the property of their respective owners.

    Media Contact:
    Brad Hem
    pr@bigcommerce.com

    Investor Relations Contact:
    Tyler Duncan
    investorrelations@bigcommerce.com

    The MIL Network –

    July 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Russian President V. Putin held a telephone conversation with French President E. Macron

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, July 1 (Xinhua) — The Kremlin press service said Tuesday that Russian President Vladimir Putin and French President Emmanuel Macron had a telephone conversation. They discussed the situation around Ukraine, the Iranian-Israeli confrontation and the US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

    This is the first conversation between the presidents in nearly three years. The last time they spoke by phone was on September 11, 2022.

    The heads of the two states discussed in detail the situation in the Middle East in the context of the Iranian-Israeli confrontation and the American strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. It is noted that V. Putin and E. Macron pointed out the special responsibility of Russia and France as permanent members of the UN Security Council in maintaining peace and security, including in the Middle East region, as well as in preserving the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. “In this regard, the importance of respecting Tehran’s legitimate right to develop peaceful nuclear energy and continuing to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including cooperation with the IAEA, was emphasized,” the statement said.

    “The leaders expressed their support for the resolution of the crisis around the Iranian nuclear program, as well as the resolution of other contradictions in the Middle East, to be achieved exclusively by political and diplomatic means. It was agreed to continue contacts for the purpose of possible coordination of positions,” the Kremlin press service added.

    Speaking about the prospects for a peaceful settlement, the Russian president confirmed the fundamental approaches to possible agreements, which should be comprehensive and long-term, provide for the elimination of the root causes of the Ukrainian crisis and be based on “new territorial realities.” –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    July 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Can Türkiye still be considered a like-minded country following the latest assaults on democracy? – E-001229/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The arrest of the mayor of Istanbul on 19 March 2025 has given rise to questions regarding Türkiye’s adherence to its long-established democratic tradition[1].

    The EU has been continuously expressing serious concerns over the situation in the area of rule of law in Türkiye. In 2018, the Council took an extraordinary measure to put the accession negotiations at a standstill due to Türkiye moving away from the EU.

    At the same time, Türkiye is a candidate country and a key partner for the EU. The European Council of April 2024 reconfirmed[2] the EU’s strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye.

    The re-engagement efforts with Türkiye are recalibrated considering the developments in the country. Nevertheless, there are sectors where interests converge, and cooperation can be mutually beneficial, including the Customs Union, migration management, the green and digital transitions, agriculture and rural development, investment and connectivity, and crucial regional issues such as Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine .

    Leaving avenues for engagement open provides a broader platform for promoting stability and addressing shared challenges in a complex geopolitical landscape.

    The Commission doesn’t maintain a list of the like-minded countries. In a more general context, like-minded partners of the EU share the same or similar values, standards, vision and/or commitment for engagement in specific policy areas.

    • [1] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-high-representativevice-president-kallas-and-commissioner-kos-recent-events-2025-03-19_en.
    • [2] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/m5jlwe0p/euco-conclusions-20240417-18-en.pdf.
    Last updated: 1 July 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    July 2, 2025
  • Putin, Macron discuss Iran, Ukraine in first phone call in nearly three years

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Russian President Vladimir Putin had a “substantial” phone call with French President Emmanuel Macron on the Middle East crisis including Iran and the Ukraine conflict, the Kremlin said on Tuesday, their first such exchange since September 2022.

    In Paris, Macron’s office said the call lasted two hours and that the French leader had called for a ceasefire in Ukraine and the start of negotiations on ending the conflict.

    According to the Kremlin press service, Putin said it was necessary to respect Iran’s right to the peaceful development of nuclear energy as well as its continued compliance with its obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

    Putin also reiterated to Macron his view that the war in Ukraine was “a direct consequence of the West’s policy”, which he said had “ignored Russia’s security interests” over the past few years.

    Any possible peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine should have a “comprehensive and long-term character” and be based on “new territorial realities”, the Kremlin quoted Putin as saying.

    Putin has previously said Ukraine must accept Russia’s annexation of swathes of its territory as part of any peace deal.

    Macron’s office said the French president had also stressed the need for Iran to comply with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

    Macron and Putin agreed to coordinate their efforts and to speak again soon, the Elysee statement said.

    (Reuters)

    July 2, 2025
  • Putin, Macron discuss Iran, Ukraine in first phone call in nearly three years

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Russian President Vladimir Putin had a “substantial” phone call with French President Emmanuel Macron on the Middle East crisis including Iran and the Ukraine conflict, the Kremlin said on Tuesday, their first such exchange since September 2022.

    In Paris, Macron’s office said the call lasted two hours and that the French leader had called for a ceasefire in Ukraine and the start of negotiations on ending the conflict.

    According to the Kremlin press service, Putin said it was necessary to respect Iran’s right to the peaceful development of nuclear energy as well as its continued compliance with its obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

    Putin also reiterated to Macron his view that the war in Ukraine was “a direct consequence of the West’s policy”, which he said had “ignored Russia’s security interests” over the past few years.

    Any possible peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine should have a “comprehensive and long-term character” and be based on “new territorial realities”, the Kremlin quoted Putin as saying.

    Putin has previously said Ukraine must accept Russia’s annexation of swathes of its territory as part of any peace deal.

    Macron’s office said the French president had also stressed the need for Iran to comply with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

    Macron and Putin agreed to coordinate their efforts and to speak again soon, the Elysee statement said.

    (Reuters)

    July 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Member Meeks, McCaul Introduce Bipartisan Resolution Calling for the Return of Abducted Ukrainian Children

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Gregory W Meeks (5th District of New York)

    Washington, D.C. — Representatives Gregory W. Meeks, Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Michael McCaul, Chairman Emeritus of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, today introduced a bipartisan resolution condemning Russia’s abduction and forcible transfer of Ukrainian children and calling for their return before a peace agreement is finalized.

    “Putin is a war criminal and, under his watch, the Russian military has cruelly abducted and illegally deported tens of thousands of Ukrainian children from their homeland,” said Ranking Member Meeks. “These atrocities are not isolated incidents; they are the direct result of Putin’s war of choice. The United States has a responsibility to condemn these unconscionable acts by Russia and to demand the immediate return of each and every one of the children Russia has taken.”

    “Since the beginning of Putin’s war of aggression, Russia has abducted at least 19,500 Ukrainian children from their homeland — with some estimates putting the true number as high as 200,000. These children have been stripped of their national identity, adopted into Russian families, or indoctrinated as soldiers for the Kremlin. As a father, I can’t imagine the pain their families have experienced. Russia’s mass-scale child abduction is nothing short of evil; the United States must demonstrate moral leadership by demanding every child be returned to his or her family in Ukraine before true peace can be achieved,” said Chair Emeritus McCaul.

    Senators Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) and Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.) introduced the resolution in the Senate.

    Background:

    Ukrainian authorities have received at least 19,546 confirmed reports of unlawful deportations and forced transfers of Ukrainian children to Russia, Belarus, or Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory. The abductions aim to erase the children’s Ukrainian names, language, and identity. As of April 16, Ukraine and its partners have only managed to return 1,274 abducted children.

    The State Department’s 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report found Russia recruits or uses child soldiers, has a state-sponsored policy or pattern of human trafficking and is among the worst hubs for human trafficking in the world.

    Read the full text of the resolution here.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    July 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Banco Santander Chile: Second Quarter 2025 Analyst and Investor Webcast / Conference Call

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SANTIAGO, Chile, July 01, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — You are cordially invited to participate in Banco Santander Chile’s (NYSE: BSAC) conference call-webcast on Tuesday August 5, 2025, at 11.00 AM (ET time) where we will discuss 2Q 2025 financial results. The Bank’s Officers participating in the conference call are: Patricia Pérez, CFO, Cristian Vicuña, Chief Strategy Officer & Head of IR and Andrés Sansone, Chief Economist. A question and answer session will follow the presentation.

    The Management Commentary report will be published on July 31, 2025, before the market opens. The quiet period begins on July 17.

    To participate, the webcast presentation can be viewed at: https://mm.closir.com/slides?id=720987

    Or please dial in using any of the below numbers:
    United Kingdom +44 203 984 9844
    USA +1 718 866 4614
    Austria +43 720 022981
    Brazil +556120171549
    Canada +1 587 855 1318
    Chile +56228401484
    Czech Republic +420 910 880101
    Estonia +372 609 4102
    Finland +35 8753 26 4477
    France +33 1758 50 878
    Germany +49 30 25 555 323
    Hong Kong +852 3001 6551
    Mexico +52 55 1168 9973
    Peru +51 1 7060950
    Poland +48 22 124 49 59
    Russia +7 495 283 98 58
    Singapore +65 3138 6816
    South Africa +27872500455
    South Korea +82 70 4732 5006
    Sweden +46 10 551 30 20
    Turkey +90 850 390 7512
    Ukraine +380 89 324 0624

    Participant Passcode: 720987
    Please dial in approximately 10 minutes prior to the starting time of the conference.

    If you have any questions, please contact Cristian Vicuña at Banco Santander Chile at Cristian.vicuna@santander.cl, Rowena Lambert at Rowena.lambert@santander.cl or María Magdalena Rosende at Maria.rosende@santander.cl

    CONTACT INFORMATION

    Cristian Vicuña
    Investor Relations
    Banco Santander Chile
    Bandera 140, Floor 20
    Santiago, Chile
    Email: irelations@santander.cl
    Website: www.santander.cl

    Banco Santander Chile is one of the companies with the highest risk classifications in Latin America with an A2 rating from Moody’s, A- from Standard and Poor’s, A+ from Japan Credit Rating Agency, AA- from HR Ratings and A from KBRA. All our ratings as of the date of this report have a Stable Outlook.

    As of March 31, 2025, the bank had total assets of Ch$67,059,423 million (US$70,284 million), total gross loans (including those owed by banks) at amortized cost of Ch$41,098,666 million (US$43,075 million), total deposits of Ch$30,607,715 million (US$32,080 million), and bank owners’ equity of Ch$4,400,233 million (US$4,612 million). The BIS capital ratio was 16.9%, with a core capital ratio of 10.7%. As of March 31, 2025, Santander Chile employed 8,712 people and had 237 branches throughout Chile.

    The MIL Network –

    July 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: In the 2024-2025 marketing year, Ukraine reduced the export of grain and leguminous crops by 20.5 percent.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Kyiv, July 1 (Xinhua) — In the 2024-2025 marketing year (MY, July 1, 2024 – June 30, 2025), Ukraine exported 40.6 million tons of grain and leguminous crops, down 20.5 percent from the previous MY, according to data released Tuesday by the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine.

    The department noted that in the specified period, a decline was recorded for all major grain export items. Thus, corn supplies abroad decreased by 25.5 percent to 22 million tons, wheat – by 15.1 percent to 15.7 million tons, barley – by 8 percent to 2.3 million tons.

    The Ministry of Agrarian Policy added that, according to the results of 2024-2025 MY, flour exports from Ukraine amounted to 71.1 thousand tons, decreasing by 27.6 percent.

    In 2023-2024 MY, Ukrainian farmers supplied 51.1 million tons of grain and leguminous crops to foreign markets. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    July 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: 3 people killed, 35 hospitalized after drone attack on Izhevsk — head of Udmurtia A. Brechalov

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, July 1 /Xinhua/ — Three people were killed and 35 others were hospitalized, including 10 in serious condition, after unmanned aerial vehicles /UAVs/ of the Armed Forces of Ukraine /AFU/ attacked an enterprise in Izhevsk, the head of Russia’s Udmurt Republic Alexander Brechalov said on Tuesday.

    “I visited the victims in the hospital – at the moment, 35 people are hospitalized, 10 of them are in serious condition. Our doctors are providing assistance to everyone – including consultations with colleagues from the federal center. To our great regret, we have 3 fatalities,” he wrote on his Telegram channel.

    According to the Russian Defense Ministry, Russian air defense forces destroyed and intercepted 60 Ukrainian UAVs over Russian regions overnight. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    July 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Video: UK The work of the Secretary of State for Defence – Defence Committee

    Source: United Kingdom UK Parliament (video statements)

    The Defence Committee will hold an evidence session on the work of the Secretary of State for Defence at 2pm, on Wednesday 2 July.  

    The session will cover a wide range of topics. Members are likely to discuss the latest developments in the conflict in the Middle East. The security breach at RAF Brize Norton and the importance of homeland defence are likely to be covered in the session.

    Other topics include the Strategic Defence Review, defence spending commitments, and the current situation in Ukraine.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fo7iH77cBIk

    MIL OSI Video –

    July 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Ukraine: Eighth Review Under the Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility, Requests for Modification of Performance Criteria, Rephasing of Access, and Financing Assurances Review-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Alternate Executive Director for Ukraine

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    Summary

    Over three years of Russia’s war in Ukraine have taken a staggering social, humanitarian, and economic toll. Despite efforts for a ceasefire, the evolution of the war remains subject to exceptionally high uncertainty. Nevertheless, the authorities’ commitment to reforms and fulfillment of all necessary Fund policies support completion of the review. First, despite some structural reform delays, the authorities have met all quantitative conditionality for this review and remain committed to the overall program objectives of restoring sustainability. Second, the program remains fully financed. Looking ahead, despite the authorities’ program implementation and the large-scale external support, the program has limited space to absorb any further shocks, including from a more prolonged and intense war, while achieving the restoration of external viability by the end of the program.

    MIL OSI Economics –

    July 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: NATO to participate at World Expo 2025 in Osaka, Japan

    Source: NATO

    From 1 to 12 August, NATO will participate in the 2025 edition of the World Expo in Japan. Taking place in Osaka, Kansai, the theme for this year’s Expo is “Designing Future Society for Our Lives”, with the sub-themes of “Saving Lives”, “Empowering Lives” and “Connecting Lives”. This landmark event is expected to welcome over 28 million visitors, making it one of the largest global gatherings after the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games.

    With a long tradition dating back to 1851, World Expos (also known as World’s Fairs) are grand international exhibitions where countries unite to showcase their cultures, technologies and innovations, fostering global cooperation and exchanging new ideas. Since 2000, they have taken place once every five years.

    Osaka’s Expo is taking place over several months, from 13 April to 13 October. The “NATO Days” will take place in August aligning appropriately with the “Peace, Human Security and Dignity Week.” Although NATO is not an official Expo participant, it will collaborate closely with NATO member countries hosting pavilions at the event — a partnership facilitated by the Mission of Japan to NATO and coordinated through Norway and Romania, NATO’s Contact Point Embassies for Japan.

    This collaboration is a prime example of NATO’s broad framework of partnership with Japan. Since the early 1990s, NATO and Japan have been working together on a range of global security challenges, enhancing political dialogue and practical cooperation, and upholding and strengthening the rules-based international order. This complements the firm relationships between NATO and its other partners in the Indo-Pacific region: Australia, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand.

    NATO’s engagement activities during the “Peace, Security and Dignity Week” will emphasise the importance of multilateralism and cooperative security in addressing today’s complex challenges, including cyber security, hybrid threats, information threats, the Women, Peace and Security agenda, emerging technologies, and industrial cooperation. The events will also showcase NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Programme, promoting joint scientific research, technological innovation and knowledge exchange.

    Like many other countries and organisations who will be represented in Osaka by mascots, NATO will be travelling to Japan with a new version of its long-term unofficial mascot, the NATO Hedgehog. Hedgehogs are peaceful animals, but formidable and resilient when attacked, making them the perfect representation of NATO’s role as a defensive alliance.

    The provisional agenda for NATO’s participation at the Expo can be found below. Sign-up links for events requiring registration will be shared in late July. Any questions may be addressed to Dr Pietro De Matteis, Programme Officer for the Indo-Pacific.

    1 August

    • Romanian Pavilion: Opening of the “Home Beyond the Dawn: Contemporary Art Exhibit”. This exhibition features works by Ukrainian artists and is organised by the European Union in collaboration with Romania. The exhibition will be open until 12 August.

    5 August – Ukrainian National Day at Expo 2025

    • Romanian Pavilion: 15:30–16:30 – Panel discussion with Ukrainian artists of the “Home Beyond the Dawn: Contemporary Art Exhibit” on the topic: “Art as an instrument for resistance and solidarity in times of war”.
       
    • Belgian Pavilion:
      • 17:00–18:00 (provisional) – Panel discussion on “Women (artists) at war” to contribute to the celebration of Ukraine National Day at World Expo Osaka celebrated on 5 August.
      • 20:00–21:00 (provisional) – Cultural event with Ukrainian DJ Reset at the Belgian Pavilion organised by the European Union in collaboration with the Belgian Pavilion and Ukraine.
         
    • Expo Guest House:19:00–20:30 – Official Reception linked to the Ukraine National Day at Expo Guest House (by invitation only).

    7 August

    • Nordic Pavilion: 10:00–13:30 – NATO Conference Day 1: “NATO’s Contribution to Preserving Peace & Stability” at the shared pavilion of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The conference will provide an opportunity to discuss NATO’s engagement and its commitment to peace, security and international cooperation with representatives from the diplomatic community, international organisations, academia, think-tanks and youth.
       
    • Nordic Pavilion: 19:00–21:00 (provisional) – Networking Reception

    8 August

    • Nordic Pavilion: 10:00–13:30 –NATO Conference Day 2 – Continuation of the conference “NATO’s Contribution to Preserving Peace & Stability”
       
    • Nordic Pavilion: 14:30–16:30 (provisional) – “Youth for peace & security”. Activities involving young people from Japan and NATO member countries in partnership with Japanese universities.
       
    • Czech Pavilion: 13:00–18:00 –NATO Industry Day: “Designing Future Security for Our Lives”. This event will present NATO’s approach to industrial cooperation and foster connections with businesses, startups and young entrepreneurs from NATO member and partner countries.
       
    • Czech Pavilion: 19:00–21:00 – NATO Days Closing reception: A Spectacle of Air and Water show

    MIL Security OSI –

    July 1, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: NATO to participate at World Expo 2025 in Osaka, Japan

    Source: NATO

    From 1 to 12 August, NATO will participate in the 2025 edition of the World Expo in Japan. Taking place in Osaka, Kansai, the theme for this year’s Expo is “Designing Future Society for Our Lives”, with the sub-themes of “Saving Lives”, “Empowering Lives” and “Connecting Lives”. This landmark event is expected to welcome over 28 million visitors, making it one of the largest global gatherings after the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games.

    With a long tradition dating back to 1851, World Expos (also known as World’s Fairs) are grand international exhibitions where countries unite to showcase their cultures, technologies and innovations, fostering global cooperation and exchanging new ideas. Since 2000, they have taken place once every five years.

    Osaka’s Expo is taking place over several months, from 13 April to 13 October. The “NATO Days” will take place in August aligning appropriately with the “Peace, Human Security and Dignity Week.” Although NATO is not an official Expo participant, it will collaborate closely with NATO member countries hosting pavilions at the event — a partnership facilitated by the Mission of Japan to NATO and coordinated through Norway and Romania, NATO’s Contact Point Embassies for Japan.

    This collaboration is a prime example of NATO’s broad framework of partnership with Japan. Since the early 1990s, NATO and Japan have been working together on a range of global security challenges, enhancing political dialogue and practical cooperation, and upholding and strengthening the rules-based international order. This complements the firm relationships between NATO and its other partners in the Indo-Pacific region: Australia, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand.

    NATO’s engagement activities during the “Peace, Security and Dignity Week” will emphasise the importance of multilateralism and cooperative security in addressing today’s complex challenges, including cyber security, hybrid threats, information threats, the Women, Peace and Security agenda, emerging technologies, and industrial cooperation. The events will also showcase NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Programme, promoting joint scientific research, technological innovation and knowledge exchange.

    Like many other countries and organisations who will be represented in Osaka by mascots, NATO will be travelling to Japan with a new version of its long-term unofficial mascot, the NATO Hedgehog. Hedgehogs are peaceful animals, but formidable and resilient when attacked, making them the perfect representation of NATO’s role as a defensive alliance.

    The provisional agenda for NATO’s participation at the Expo can be found below. Sign-up links for events requiring registration will be shared in late July. Any questions may be addressed to Dr Pietro De Matteis, Programme Officer for the Indo-Pacific.

    1 August

    • Romanian Pavilion: Opening of the “Home Beyond the Dawn: Contemporary Art Exhibit”. This exhibition features works by Ukrainian artists and is organised by the European Union in collaboration with Romania. The exhibition will be open until 12 August.

    5 August – Ukrainian National Day at Expo 2025

    • Romanian Pavilion: 15:30–16:30 – Panel discussion with Ukrainian artists of the “Home Beyond the Dawn: Contemporary Art Exhibit” on the topic: “Art as an instrument for resistance and solidarity in times of war”.
       
    • Belgian Pavilion:
      • 17:00–18:00 (provisional) – Panel discussion on “Women (artists) at war” to contribute to the celebration of Ukraine National Day at World Expo Osaka celebrated on 5 August.
      • 20:00–21:00 (provisional) – Cultural event with Ukrainian DJ Reset at the Belgian Pavilion organised by the European Union in collaboration with the Belgian Pavilion and Ukraine.
         
    • Expo Guest House:19:00–20:30 – Official Reception linked to the Ukraine National Day at Expo Guest House (by invitation only).

    7 August

    • Nordic Pavilion: 10:00–13:30 – NATO Conference Day 1: “NATO’s Contribution to Preserving Peace & Stability” at the shared pavilion of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The conference will provide an opportunity to discuss NATO’s engagement and its commitment to peace, security and international cooperation with representatives from the diplomatic community, international organisations, academia, think-tanks and youth.
       
    • Nordic Pavilion: 19:00–21:00 (provisional) – Networking Reception

    8 August

    • Nordic Pavilion: 10:00–13:30 –NATO Conference Day 2 – Continuation of the conference “NATO’s Contribution to Preserving Peace & Stability”
       
    • Nordic Pavilion: 14:30–16:30 (provisional) – “Youth for peace & security”. Activities involving young people from Japan and NATO member countries in partnership with Japanese universities.
       
    • Czech Pavilion: 13:00–18:00 –NATO Industry Day: “Designing Future Security for Our Lives”. This event will present NATO’s approach to industrial cooperation and foster connections with businesses, startups and young entrepreneurs from NATO member and partner countries.
       
    • Czech Pavilion: 19:00–21:00 – NATO Days Closing reception: A Spectacle of Air and Water show

    MIL Security OSI –

    July 1, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Analysis: New special tribunal for Ukraine will pave the way for holding Russian leaders to account for the invasion

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Andrew Forde, Assistant Professor – European Human Rights Law, Dublin City University

    A special tribunal has been established by the international human rights organisation the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Ukrainian government to try crimes of aggression against Ukraine which could be used to hold Vladimir Putin and others to account for the February 2022 invasion and war crimes committed since.

    The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, signed an agreement with CoE secretary general, Alain Berset, on June 25, setting up the special tribunal. Subject to it securing the necessary political backing and budget the tribunal will be established within the framework of the CoE (which is not part of the European Union.

    Work on the first phase of the court could progress in 2026. In his speech to the Council of Europe parliamentary assembly in Strasbourg, Zelensky was cautious in his optimism but stressed that the agreement was “just the beginning”.

    “It will take strong political and legal cooperation to make sure every Russian war criminal faces justice – including Putin,” he said. He knows, through years of hard experience as he travelled the world seeking help from Ukraine’s allies, that political support can be fleeting.

    A new Nuremberg?

    Inspired by ad hoc courts established after major conflicts such as the Nuremberg tribunal after the second world war or, more recently the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
    in the 1990s, the Ukraine has been established with the aim of holding to account the perpetrators of the first full-scale armed conflict in Europe in the 21st century.

    The prohibition against the crime of aggression is a basic principle of international law, and a key part of the UN charter.

    In principle, the crime of aggression should be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court (ICC). But as Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute which underpins the court, that option was ruled out. Similarly, Russia’s veto on the UN security council meant that it would be impossible in practice to practically set up a court under the mandate of the UN – as the ICTY was in 1993.

    The Ukraine special tribunal, which was developed by a Core Group, made up of states plus the EU and the Council of Europe, seeks to fill an obvious accountability gap. If the illegal invasion is left unpunished, it would set a dangerous precedent.

    Such impunity would embolden Russia and inspire others with revanchist ambitions, undermining an already shaky international order. The US, which was instrumental in setting up the Core Group under the presidency of Joe Biden, withdrew in March 2025 when Donald Trump took office.

    The statute of the special tribunal sets out that the court will be based on Ukrainian law and will have a strong link to the country’s legal system. Ukraine’s prosecutor-general will play a key role in the proceedings, referring evidence for further investigation by the tribunal. But it will be internationally funded with international judges and prosecutors, and strong cooperation with the International Criminal Court. It is likely to be based in the Hague – although this has yet to be confirmed.

    The need for accountability for the illegal invasion of Ukraine was stressed in a resolution of the UN general assembly in February 2023 as the war headed into its second year. The resolution, which calls for “appropriate, fair and independent investigations and prosecutions at the national or international level” to “ensure justice for all victims and the prevention of future crimes” was approved by an overwhelming majority of 141 states. Any country in the world can join this core group to support its establishment.

    Holding leaders accountable

    Unlike previous international courts, the caseload is likely to be extremely narrow. There are likely to be dozens of charges rather than hundreds or thousands, which is perhaps reassuring in terms of managing costs.

    The tribunal will focus on those “most responsible” including the so-called “troika”: the president Vladimir Putin, prime minister Mikhail Mishustin and the minister for foreign affairs Sergey Lavrov. Charges may also be levelled against the leadership of Belarus and North Korea for their role in aiding, abetting and actively participating in the war of aggression. But don’t expect Kim Jong-un or Alexander Lukashenko in the dock anytime soon.

    The Court has opted for a novel approach to a longstanding customary rule by noting that heads of state are not functionally immune from prosecution. But it adds that indictments won’t be confirmed until such time as the suspect is no longer in office.

    Trials can take place in absentia if the accused fails to attend and all reasonable steps taken to apprehend them have failed. But, like the ICC, the court will still rely on states to apprehend and physically transfer indicted individuals in due course. This will inevitably limit the chances of seeing any of the key individuals actually in a court, something that has also dogged the ICC.

    The fact that a tribunal has now been set up is a major development in international criminal justice. But it is now in a sort of purgatory, existing and not existing at the same time. To become operational, another treaty known as an enlarged partial agreement must be signed by interested states. This will have to be ratified by many national parliaments, depending on their constitutions. This process could take years.

    But simply by creating the framework for the tribunal, the Council of Europe has demonstrated its commitment to ensuring accountability. In a further development, the European Court of Human Rights delivers its long-awaited judgment in the case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v Russia on July 9.

    This concerns “complaints about the conflict in eastern Ukraine involving pro-Russian separatists which began in 2014, including the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, and the Russian military operations in Ukraine since 2022”. The judgement will add further momentum to these accountability efforts.

    Symbolic as it may seem, this week’s agreement creates a real opportunity for the international community to send a message that impunity for international aggression is intolerable – not just for the victims, but for all who believe in the rule of law.

    Andrew Forde is affiliated with Dublin City University (Assistant Professor, European Human Rights Law). He is also, separately, affiliated with the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (Commissioner).

    – ref. New special tribunal for Ukraine will pave the way for holding Russian leaders to account for the invasion – https://theconversation.com/new-special-tribunal-for-ukraine-will-pave-the-way-for-holding-russian-leaders-to-account-for-the-invasion-260022

    MIL OSI Analysis –

    July 1, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Trump’s worldview is causing a global shift of alliances – what does this mean for nations in the middle?

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva, Lecturer in Government – National Security College, Australian National University

    Since US President Donald Trump took office this year, one theme has come up time and again: his rule is a threat to the US-led international order.

    As the US political scientist John Mearsheimer famously argued, the liberal international order

    was destined to fail from the start, as it contained the seeds of its own destruction.

    This perspective has gained traction in recent years. And now, Trump’s actions have caused many to question whether a new world order is emerging.

    Trump has expressed a desire for a new international order defined by multiple spheres of influence — one in which powers like the US, China and Russia each exert dominance over distinct regions.

    This vision aligns with the idea of a “multipolar” world, where no single state holds overarching global dominance. Instead, influence is distributed among several great powers, each maintaining its own regional sphere.

    This architecture contrasts sharply with earlier periods – the bipolar world of the Cold War, dominated by the US and the Soviet Union; and the unipolar period that followed, dominated by the US.

    What does this mean for the world order moving forward?

    Shifting US spheres of influence

    We’ve seen this shift taking place in recent months. For example, Trump has backed away from his pledge to end the war between Russia and Ukraine and now appears to be leaving it to the main protagonists, and Europe, to find a solution.

    Europe, which once largely spoke in a unified voice with the US, is also showing signs of policy-making which is more independent. Rather than framing its actions as protecting “Western democratic principles”, Europe is increasingly focused on defining its own security interests.

    In the Middle East, the US will likely maintain its sphere of influence. It will continue its unequivocal support for Israel under Trump.

    Amid shifting global alliances, the Trump administration will continue to support Israel, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
    noamgalai/Shutterstock

    The US will also involve itself in the region’s politics when its interests are at stake, as we witnessed in its recent strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

    This, along with increasing economic ties between the US and Gulf states, suggests US allies in the region will remain the dominant voices shaping regional dynamics, particularly now with Iran weakened.

    Yet it’s clear Trump is reshaping US dynamics in the region by signaling a desire for reduced military and political involvement, and criticising the nation building efforts of previous administrations.

    The Trump administration now appears to want to maintain its sphere of influence primarily through strong economic ties.

    Russia and China poles emerging elsewhere

    Meanwhile, other poles are emerging in the Global South. Russia and China have deepened their cooperation, positioning themselves as defenders against what they frame as Western hegemonic bullying.

    Trump’s trade policies and sanctions against many nations in the Global South have fuelled narratives (spread by China and Russia) that the US does not consistently adhere to the rules it imposes on others.

    Trump’s decision to slash funding to USAID has also opened the door to China, in particular, to become the main development partner for nations in Africa and other parts of the world.

    And on the security front, Russia has become more involved in many African and Middle Eastern countries, which have become less trustful and reliant on Western powers.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Xinping see opportunities to spread their influence in the Global South.
    plavi011/Shutterstock

    In the Indo-Pacific, much attention has been given to the rise of China and its increasingly assertive posture. Many of Washington’s traditional allies are nervous about its continued engagement in the region and ability to counter China’s rise.

    Chinese leader Xi Jinping has sought to take advantage of the current environment, embarking on a Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia push earlier this year. But many nations continue to be wary of China’s increasing influence, in particular the Philippines, which has clashed with China over the South China Sea.

    Strategic hedging

    Not all countries, however, are aligning themselves neatly with one pole or another.

    For small states caught between great powers, navigating this multipolar environment is both a risk and an opportunity.

    Ukraine is a case in point. As a sovereign state, Ukraine should have the freedom to decide its own alignments. Yet, it finds itself ensnared in great power politics, with devastating consequences.

    Other small states are playing a different game — pivoting from one power to another based on their immediate interests.

    Slovakia, for instance, is both a NATO and EU member, yet its leader, Robert Fico, attended Russia’s Victory Day Parade in May and told President Vladimir Putin he wanted to maintain “normal relations” with Russia.

    Then there is Central Asia, which is the centre of a renewed “great game,” with Russia, China and Europe vying for influence and economic partnerships.

    Yet if any Central Asian countries were to be invaded by Putin, would other powers intervene? It’s a difficult question to answer. Major powers are reluctant to engage in direct conflict unless their core interests or borders are directly threatened.

    As a result, Central Asian states are hedging their bets, seeking to maintain relations with multiple poles, despite their conflicting agendas.

    A future defined by regional power blocs?

    While it is still early to draw definitive conclusions, the events of the past few months underscore a growing trend. Smaller countries are expressing solidarity with one power, but pragmatic cooperation with another, when it suits their national interests.

    For this reason, regional power blocs seem to be of increasing interest to countries in the Global South.

    For instance, the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has become a stronger and larger grouping of nations across Eurasia in recent years.

    Trump’s focus on making “America Great Again,” has taken the load off the US carrying liberal order leadership. A multipolar world may not be the end of the liberal international order, but it may be a reshaped version of liberal governance.

    How “liberal” it can be will likely depend on what each regional power, or pole, will make of it.

    Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Trump’s worldview is causing a global shift of alliances – what does this mean for nations in the middle? – https://theconversation.com/trumps-worldview-is-causing-a-global-shift-of-alliances-what-does-this-mean-for-nations-in-the-middle-257113

    MIL OSI –

    July 1, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Three groups to be proscribed

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    Three groups to be proscribed

    Palestine Action, Maniacs Murder Cult and Russian Imperial Movement set to be banned following advice from cross-government experts.

    Three dangerous, terrorist groups will be banned under plans announced by the Home Secretary today.

    A draft proscription order has been laid in Parliament which will proscribe Palestine Action (PA), as well as two further groups: the Maniacs Murder Cult (MMC) and the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM).  

    This will make it a criminal offence to be a member of one of these groups or to invite or recklessly express support for them.

    Parliament will now consider and debate the draft Order and if passed, the Order will make it an offence punishable by up to 14 years in prison to belong to or support the groups.

    Proscription is ideologically neutral. By deciding to proscribe these three organisations, the government is demonstrating its zero tolerance approach to terrorism, regardless of its form or underlying ideology. National security is the government’s first priority and it will not shy away from this responsibility.   

    As previously put to Parliament by the Home Secretary on 23rd June, her intention to proscribe Palestine Action after following its orchestration and enaction of aggressive and intimidatory attacks against businesses, institutions and the public, which has crossed the thresholds established in the Terrorism Act 2000. 

    Home Secretary Yvette Cooper said:    

    National security is the first duty of any government, we will always take the action needed to protect our democracy and national security against different threats. 

    Maniacs Murder Cult, Palestine Action and the Russian Imperial Movement have each passed the threshold for proscription based on clear national security evidence and assessments. 

    The right to protest and the right to free speech are the cornerstone of our democracy and there are countless campaign groups that freely exercise those rights.  Violence and serious criminal damage has no place in legitimate protests.

    These include attacks at Thales in Glasgow in 2022; and last year at Instro Precision in Kent and Elbit Systems UK in Bristol. The attack on the Thales defence factory in Glasgow, caused over £1 million worth of damage to parts essential for submarines. Staff fled for safety as pyrotechnics and smoke bombs were thrown in evacuation areas.  

    Such acts do not represent legitimate acts of protest and the level of seriousness of Palestine Action’s activity has met the test for proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000.   

    MMC is a white supremacist, neo-Nazi organisation that is transnational and predominantly online. It aims to encourage individuals to engage in acts of violence against those it perceives as “anti-social”, to further its causes.   

    MMC leaders and members have claimed a number of violent attacks globally. MMC supplies instructional material which provides information that can be used by an aspiring attacker to increase their capability or motivation to conduct a terrorist attack posing a threat to the UK.   

    Proscription will help deter individuals from engaging with MMC’s violent and misanthropic content. Further supporting social media platforms to remove MMC content and the Police in their efforts to respond to individuals found in possession of such material.    

    RIM is a white supremacist, ethno-nationalist organisation which seeks to create a new Russian Imperial State. Via its paramilitary unit, the Russian Imperial Legion, RIM has fought alongside Russian forces in Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, directly advancing its own ideological causes.   

    RIM manages a paramilitary training programme called Partizan, which increases the capability of attendees to conduct terrorist attacks. In 2016, two Swedish nationals attended Partizan before committing a series of bombings in Gothemburg, Sweden.   

    Proscribing RIM will continue the steadfast support of Ukraine in its resistance to Russian aggression and demonstrate the UK’s commitment to countering future threats from Extreme Right-Wing Terrorists.    

    Should Parliament vote to proscribe, the right to peaceful protest will remain protected. As will the ability to defend the rights of the Palestinian people and to oppose actions of the Israeli government. The government has carefully considered the nature and scale of Palestine Action’s activities to ensure legitimate protest is not affected.  

    The proscription orders will be debated in Parliament during this week. If approved, the orders will come into over the weekend.

    This will mean that a total of 84 organisations are proscribed by the UK.

    Share this page

    The following links open in a new tab

    • Share on Facebook (opens in new tab)
    • Share on Twitter (opens in new tab)

    Updates to this page

    Published 1 July 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    July 1, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges – A10-0122/2025

    Source: European Parliament 2

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    (COM(2025)0164 – C10‑0064-2025 – 2025/0085(COD))

    (Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0164),

    – having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 164, 175, 177 and 322 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C10‑0064-2025),

    – having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets,

    – having regard to Rules 60 and 58 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Security and Defence,

    – having regard to the letter from the Committee on Regional Development,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (A10-0122/2025),

    1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

    2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

    3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

     

    Amendment  1

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) Given the major geopolitical and economic events that have reshaped some of the Union’s strategic political priorities, it is necessary to provide for possibilities for Member States to address those strategic challenges and to refocus their resources to newly emerging priorities.

    (1) Given the major geopolitical and economic events that have reshaped some of the Union’s strategic political priorities, it is necessary to provide for more structural possibilities for Member States to address those strategic challenges and the investment needs of industries and to refocus their resources to newly emerging priorities in an inclusive manner and only where those challenges have not been addressed in the current programmes, while safeguarding cohesion, creating quality jobs and preserving a level playing field in the internal market.

    Amendment  2

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1a) The ESF+ is an essential pillar of cohesion policy. The main objectives of the ESF+ are to support Member States and regions to achieve social inclusion, social cohesion, to activate the labour market and to deliver on the principles and the headline targets of the European Pillar of Social Rights by supporting investments in people and structures in the policy area of employment and social policies, which are far from met yet. ESF+ funding should support those objectives. The reprogramming of resources under the ESF+ should ensure that adjustment measures in response to strategic challenges do not undermine its social approach, but strengthen its capacity to combat inequality.

    Amendment  3

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1 b (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1b) The European Court of Auditors’ adopted on 6 May 2025 the opinion on the legislative proposal forming the basis for this Regulation.

    Amendment  4

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1 c (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1c) Cohesion policy is often used as an emergency response tool, which risks undermining the primary longer-term policy and objectives of cohesion policy, as underlined in the European Court of Auditors’ opinion of 6 May 2025. It is essential to ensure that any measures taken in the context of emergencies do not interfere with the objectives of cohesion policy. Member States should ensure safeguards in the regulatory framework to prevent the dismantling of the core objectives of the cohesion policy.

    Amendment  5

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1 d (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1d) The Union and its Member States continue to show that they can rapidly react to geopolitical events and are willing to use sufficient financial resources towards strengthening our defence industry through different Union and national programmes, which is positive and needed for the security of the Union. It is important to strengthen our defence sector through competitiveness programmes. At the same time, it is of utmost importance to continue to invest in the social objectives of the Union through the ESF+, as social cohesion is a cornerstone of the Union’s  democratic and societal resilience which is essential in facing threats of aggression.

    Amendment  6

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) The White paper for European Defence – Readiness 20303 paves the way for a true European defence union, including by suggesting to Member States to heavily invest into defence and the defence industry. In that regard, the Communication from the Commission – the Union of Skills of 5 March 20254 (‘the Union of Skills Communication’) sets out actions to address skills gaps and shortages in the Union, also through the Pact for Skills Initiative referred to in that Communication, and its large-scale partnerships, including one on the defence ecosystem. Therefore, it is appropriate to include incentives for the ESF+ established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council5 to facilitate the development of skills in the defence industry.

    (2) It is already possible to support the development of skills in the defence industry under the ESF+ established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council2a, to facilitate the development of skills and training in the defence industry, while safeguarding social standards. Together with the Niinisto Report, ‘Safer Together’, the EU Preparedness Strategy, and the European Defence Industrial Strategy, the White paper for European Defence – Readiness 20303 paves the way for a true European defence union, including by suggesting to Member States to heavily invest into defence, civil defence, the defence industry, dual use technologies and civil preparedness capabilities, which should be carried out together with social spending, creating employment and up- and reskilling opportunities . In that regard, the Communication from the Commission – the Union of Skills of 5 March 20254 (‘the Union of Skills Communication’) sets out actions to address skills gaps and shortages in the Union, also through the Pact for Skills Initiative referred to in that Communication, and its large-scale partnerships, including one on the defence ecosystem.

    __________________

    __________________

     

    2a Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj).

    3 Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, JOIN(2025) 120 final, 19.3.2025.

    3Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, JOIN(2025) 120 final, 19.3.2025.

    4 COM (2025) 90 final

    4 COM (2025)0090

    5 Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj).

     

    Amendment  7

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) It is already possible to support the adaptation of workers, entrepreneurs and enterprises to change under the ESF+. In line with the decarbonisation measures proposed by the Communication from the Commission – the Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation of 26 February 20256 and to further facilitate industrial adjustment linked to the decarbonisation of production processes and products, in the context of the objective of providing lifelong opportunities to regularly upskill and reskill people, as set out in the Union of Skills Communication, including through a newly proposed Skills Guarantee, the ESF+ should facilitate the skilling, job maintenance and job creation throughout the decarbonisation process by providing flexibilities to implementation.

    (3) It is already possible to support the adaptation of workers, entrepreneurs and enterprises to change under the ESF+. In line with the decarbonisation measures proposed by the Communication from the Commission – the Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation of 26 February 20256 and to further facilitate industrial adjustment linked to the decarbonisation of production processes and products, in the context of the objective of providing lifelong opportunities to regularly upskill and reskill people, as set out in the Union of Skills Communication, including through a newly proposed Skills Guarantee, the ESF+ should facilitate the skilling, job maintenance and quality job creation throughout the decarbonisation process by providing flexibilities to implementation. Particular consideration should be given to the specific needs and circumstances of less developed regions and rural areas, which should benefit from the green transition and to ensure their integration into the Union’s broader economic, social and environmental development. In accordance with Article 5(1),  second subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the ESF+ contributes to the specific objective of enabling regions and people to address the social, employment, economic and environmental impacts of the transition towards the Union’s 2030 targets for energy and climate and a climate-neutral economy of the Union by 2050, based on the Paris Agreement.

    __________________

    __________________

    6 COM (2025) 85 final

    6 COM (2025)0085

    Amendment  8

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 4

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (4) It is already possible, under ESF+, to support investments contributing to the objectives of the ‘Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform’ (STEP) established by Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council7 which aims to strengthen the Union’s technological leadership. In order to further incentivise investments from the ESF+ in those critical fields, the possibility for Member States to receive a higher pre-financing for related programme amendments should be extended.

    (4) It is already possible, under ESF+, to support investments contributing to the objectives of the ‘Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform’ (STEP) established by Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council7 which aims to strengthen the Union’s technological leadership and the development of skills. In order to further incentivise investments from the ESF+ in those critical fields, the possibility for Member States to receive a higher pre-financing for related programme amendments should be extended.

    __________________

    __________________

    7 Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241 (OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj)

    7 Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241 (OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj)

    Amendment  9

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 8 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (8a) Skills development and the training of young talent and entrepreneurs through incentives and targeted training are essential for job creation, and institutions working on skills creation and uptake should cooperate closely to align with labour market needs. Especially, vocational education and training institutes, given their direct links to the labour market and this should be supported through the ESF+.

    Amendment  10

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 5

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (5) In order to enable Member States to carry out a meaningful reprogramming and focus resources on strategic Union priorities set out in recitals 2, 3 and 4 without causing further delays in implementation, it is appropriate to provide for further flexibilities. The mid-term review should serve as an opportunity to address emerging strategic challenges and new priorities therefore, Member States should benefit from additional time to complete the assessment of the outcome of the mid-term review and the submission of related programme amendments

    (5) In order to enable Member States to carry out a meaningful and just reprogramming without losing focus on the main objectives of the fund and focus resources on strategic Union priorities set out in recitals 2, 3 and 4 without causing further delays in implementation, it is appropriate to provide for further flexibilities. The mid-term review should serve as an opportunity to address emerging strategic social challenges and new priorities therefore, Member States should benefit from additional time to complete the assessment of the outcome of the mid-term review and the submission of related programme amendments. While aligning with new Union priorities, diverting attention to global strategic challenges should not change the primary mission of the ESF+. The cohesion policy must remain firmly rooted in its core objective: reducing regional disparities.

    Amendment  11

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 6

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (6) In order to accelerate the implementation of cohesion policy programmes and alleviate the pressure on national budgets and to inject the necessary liquidity for the implementation of key investments, an additional one-off pre-financing from the ESF+ should be paid for programmes. Because of the adverse impact of the Russian aggression in Ukraine, the pre-financing percentage should be further increased for certain programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine. In order to incentivise the re-programming towards key priorities in the context of the mid-term review, the additional pre-financing should only be available where a certain threshold for the reallocation of financial resources to specific crucial priorities is reached.

    (6) NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine are disproportionate heavily impacted by Russian war of aggression, experiencing job losses, less economic activity and social exclusion. In order to accelerate the implementation of cohesion policy programmes and alleviate the pressure on national budgets and to inject the necessary liquidity for the implementation of key investments, an additional one-off pre-financing from the ESF+ should be paid for programmes. Because of the adverse impact of the Russian aggression in Ukraine, the pre-financing percentage should be further increased for certain programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, with no specific conditions to reallocate financial resources of the programme to dedicated priorities.

    Amendment  12

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 8

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (8) It should also be possible to apply a maximum co-financing rate of up to 100% to priorities in programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, given the adverse impact of the Russian aggression on those regions.

    (8) It should also be possible, while taking into account the current differentiation between categories of regions, to apply a maximum co-financing rate of up to 95% to programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, given the adverse impact of the Russian aggression on those regions.

    Amendment  13

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 9

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (9) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to address strategic challenges, refocus investments on critical new priorities and simplify and accelerate policy delivery, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

    (9) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to address strategic social challenges, refocus investments on critical new priorities and simplify and accelerate policy delivery, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

    Amendment  14

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 9 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (9a) This Regulation has implications for the Union budget. Accordingly, the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets adopted a budgetary assessment, which forms an integral part of Parliament’s mandate for negotiations.

    Amendment  15

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 11

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (11) [Given the urgent need to enable crucial investments in skills in the defence industry as well as in adaptation to change linked to decarbonisation in the context of pressing strategic geopolitical challenges, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,]

    (11) [Given the increased need to enable crucial investments in specific skills in the critical industries, including the defence industry, as well as in adaptation to change linked to decarbonisation in the context of pressing strategic geopolitical challenges, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,]

    Amendment  16

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    In 2026, the Commission shall pay 4,5 % of the total support from the ESF+ as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as additional one-off pre-financing. The one-off pre-financing percentage in 2026 shall be increased to 9,5% for programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, provided the programme does not cover the entire territory of the Member State. Where, in a Member State, NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine are included exclusively in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State, the increased pre-financing set out in this paragraph shall apply to those programmes.

    In 2026, the Commission shall pay 4,5 % of the total support from the ESF+ as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as additional one-off pre-financing.

    Justification

    The minimum reprogramming threshold to be eligible to the 4,5% pre-financing should be lower as Member States should be incentivised to reprogramme to reasonable level. The one-off pre-financing for Eastern bordering regions should not be submitted to minimum reprogramming threshold taking into account the major challenges that these regions face, and the related subparagraph is moved in a new paragraph.

    Amendment  17

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    The additional pre-financing referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph shall only apply where reallocations of at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d have been approved; provided that the request for a programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    The additional pre-financing shall only apply where reallocations of at least 10% of financial resources of the programme from the ESF+ to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a 12c and 12d have been approved and provided that the measures supporting the dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d target smaller beneficiaries and provided that the request for a programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

     

    For the purpose of calculating the total reallocations of the financial resources of the programme from the ESF+ to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d, as referred to in the first subparagraph, the Commission shall assess the measures and take into account only the measures responding to the strategic priorities identified.

    Amendment  18

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    1a. The one-off pre-financing percentage in 2026 shall be increased to 9,5% for programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, provided that the programme does not cover the entire territory of the Member State. Where, in a Member State, NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine are included exclusively in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State, the increased pre-financing set out in this paragraph shall apply to those programmes. NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine require special attention and exceptional support as they are often at the frontline of potential conflicts and they are vulnerable to external threats, making it crucial to supporting their resilience in countering hybrid attacks.

     

    The pre-financing due to the Member State which results from programme amendments pursuant to reallocation to the priorities referred to in the second subparagraph of this paragraph shall be counted as payments made in 2025 for the purposes of calculating the amounts to be de-committed in accordance with Article 105 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, provided that the request for programme amendment was submitted in 2025.

    Amendment  19

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU)2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 b (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    1b. Before disbursing payment for the pre-financing pursuant to this Article, the Commission shall assess the Union’s overall budgetary situation, in particular with respect to the principle of the sustainability of the Union budget. Where, on the basis of that assessment, the Commission identifies a risk to the Union budget arising from paying the full pre-financing amount in 2026, the Commission is empowered to adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 37 to provide for only part of the pre-financing amount to be disbursed to the Member States in 2026, with the remaining part disbursed in 2027.

    Amendment  20

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) By way of derogation from Article 63(2) and Article 105(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the deadline for the eligibility of expenditure, the reimbursement of costs as well as for decommitment shall be 31 December 2030. That derogation shall only apply where programme amendments reallocating at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved.

    (2) By way of derogation from Article 63(2) and Article 105(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the deadline for the eligibility of expenditure, the reimbursement of costs as well as for decommitment shall be 31 December 2030. That derogation shall only apply where programme amendments reallocating at least 10% of the ESF+ financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved.

    Justification

    The minimum reprogramming threshold to be eligible to the 4,5% pre-financing should be lower as Member States should be incentivised to reprogramme to reasonable level.

    Amendment  21

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 2 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (2a) When amending programmes, the Member States shall include, with the close and meaningful participation of social partners, for the dedicated priorities, obligations to the beneficiaries to respect working and employment conditions under applicable Union and national law, conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and collective agreements.

    Justification

    In line with Articles 33 and 169 of the Financial Regulation.

    Amendment  22

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for priorities in programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine shall be 100 %. The higher co-financing rate shall not apply to programmes covering the entire territory of the Member State concerned, unless those regions are included only in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State. The derogation shall only apply where reallocations of at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved, provided that the programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    (3) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for priorities in programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine shall be 95 %. The higher co-financing rate shall not apply to programmes covering the entire territory of the Member State concerned, unless those regions are included only in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State.

    Justification

    The 95% co-financing rate for Eastern bordering regions should not be submitted to minimum reprogramming threshold taking into account the major challenges that these regions face.

    Amendment  23

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 4

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (4) In addition to the assessment for each programme on the outcome of the mid-term review to be submitted in accordance with Article 18(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Member States may resubmit a complementary assessment as well as related requests for programme amendments, taking into account the possibility for dedicated priorities in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d within 2 months of the entry into force of Regulation (EU) XXXX/XXXX [this Regulation]. The deadlines set out in Article 18 (3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 shall apply.

    (4) In addition to the assessment for each programme on the outcome of the mid-term review to be submitted in accordance with Article 18(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Member States may resubmit a complementary assessment as well as related requests for programme amendments, taking into account the possibility for dedicated priorities in accordance with Articles 12a 12c and 12d by 31 December 2025. The deadlines set out in Article 18 (3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 shall apply.

    Justification

    Taking into account that a significant level of reprogramming is expected, Member States could need more time to provide a complementary assessment.

    Amendment  24

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    In addition to the pre-financing for the programme provided for in Article 90(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, where the Commission approves an amendment of a programme including one or more priorities dedicated to operations supported by the ESF+ contributing to the STEP objectives referred to in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2024/795, it shall make an exceptional pre-financing of 30 % on the basis of the allocation to those priorities, provided that the programme amendment is submitted to the Commission by 31 December 2025. That exceptional pre-financing shall be paid within 60 days of the adoption of the Commission decision approving the programme amendment.;

    In addition to the pre-financing for the programme provided for in Article 90(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, where the Commission approves an amendment of a programme including one or more priorities dedicated to operations supported by the ESF+ contributing to the STEP objectives referred to in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2024/795, it shall make an exceptional pre-financing of 30 % on the basis of the allocation to those priorities, provided that smaller beneficiaries have priority access to the funding and that the programme amendment is submitted to the Commission by 31 December 2025. That exceptional pre-financing shall be paid within 60 days of the adoption of the Commission decision approving the programme amendment;

    Amendment  25

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – title

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    Support to the defence industry

    Support to skills in civil preparedness and the defence industry

    Amendment  26

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12 c – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) Member States may decide to programme support to development of skills in the defence industry under dedicated priorities. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (l).

    (1) Member States may decide to programme support for the development of skills in the defence industry and cyber security under dedicated priorities, prioritising dual use capabilities related to civil defence and preparedness, provided that micro, small and medium- sized enterprises have priority access to the support. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (g).

     

    In this context, Member States may allocate resources to attract young talent and entrepreneurs, particularly to rural or less developed regions, through incentives and targeted training.

    Amendment  27

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – paragraph 5

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (5) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be 100%.

    (5) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be increased by 10 percentage points above the co-financing rate applicable, not exceeding 100%.

    Amendment  28

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12d – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) Member States may decide to programme support aiming at skilling, up-skilling and re-skilling with a view to adaptation of workers, enterprises and entrepeneurs to change contributing to decarbonisation of production capacities under dedicated priorities. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (l).

    (1) Member States may, after consulting the social partners at national level, decide to programme targeted support aiming at skilling, up-skilling and re-skilling and training with a view to adaptation of workers, enterprises and entrepreneurs in particular micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and the social economy to change contributing to decarbonisation of production capacities under dedicated priorities, with in the objective of maintaining competitiveness, sustainability and innovation during the green transition. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (g).

     

    Member States may support promoting collaboration between different organisations, such as educational institutions who support skills development, provided that such measures support any of the specific objectives set out in Article(4), points (a) to (g).

     

    Resources allocated to the dedicated priority referred to in the first two subparagraphs of this paragraph shall be taken into account when ensuring compliance with the thematic concentration requirements as set out in Article 7.

    Amendment  29

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12d – paragraph 5

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (5) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be 100%..

    (5) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be increased by 10 percentage points above the co-financing rate applicable, not exceeding 100%.

    Amendment  30

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new)

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12d a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (3a) the following article is inserted:

     

    Article 12da

     

    Guidance and administrative simplification

     

    The Commission shall publish, by … [60 days after the entry into force of Regulation (EU) XXXX/XXXX (this amending Regulation)], detailed guidelines, accompanied by a Q&A system, aiming to clarify the technical, legal and procedural implications of the measures adopted in Articles 5a, 12c and 12d. Those guidelines shall support the managing authorities in the uniform application of this Regulation, reducing the administrative burden and facilitating solutions to early doubts.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

    Entity and/or person

    ETUC

    Social Platform

    Save the Children

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

     

    BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS (18.6.2025)

    for the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

    on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    (COM(2025)0164 – C10‑0064/2025 – 2025/0085(COD))

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment: Jean‑Marc Germain 

    The Committee on Budgets has carried out a budgetary assessment of the proposal under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure and has reached the following conclusions:

    The Committee on Budgets,

    A. whereas the proposal does not modify existing budgetary commitments and remains within the limits of the overall allocations for the period 2021-2027 and is therefore budgetary neutral;

    B. whereas the combined effect of exceptional one-off 30 % pre-financing and 100 % co-financing on new EU priorities, as well as additional one-off pre-financing of 4.5 % (9.5 % for NUTS 2 regions that have borders with Russia, Belarus or Ukraine) for programmes that reallocate at least 15 % of their resources to the new priorities, leads to a partial frontloading of estimated payment appropriations of EUR 500 million in 2026, followed by lower payments in 2027;

    C. whereas the extension of the eligibility period by one year – from the end of 2029 to the end of 2030 – for programmes that reallocate at least 15 % of their total allocation to new specific objectives creates payments in 2030 and changes the applicable decommitment rule for 2027 from year n+2 to year n+3;

    Conclusions of the budgetary assessment 

    1. Determines that the proposal is compatible with the MFF Regulation[1]; notes that the proposed measures are voluntary and do not involve any top-up of the initial allocation available to Member States;

    2. Notes that the proposal requires additional human resources of EUR 376 000 per year in 2025, 2026 and 2027, for two establishment plan posts; notes that the additional needs will be covered by redeployment within the Directorate-General or other Commission services; notes, however, that the overall impact of redeployments within the Commission services has reached its limit;

    3. Determines that the proposal is compatible with the Interinstitutional agreement on budgetary discipline (IIA)[2]; notes, however, that re-programming in the context of the mid-term review is considered not to alter the contribution to climate targets as set out in point 16 of the IIA; underlines that allocating resources to new objectives, including for the competitiveness, preparedness and strategic autonomy of the EU, could lead to shifting resources from interventions with a higher coefficient for calculation of support to climate change objectives to interventions with a lower coefficient, thus potentially reducing the expenditure supporting climate objectives; invites the Commission to take preventive action to counter this risk; calls on the Commission to assess the impact of the revised plans on the shares of expenditure supporting climate objectives; notes also that the ‘do no significant harm’ principle should apply to all European investments in line with the applicable legislation;

    4. Considers that the proposal is compatible with the budgetary principles laid down in the Financial Regulation[3]; notes, however, that the pre-financing paid in 2026 will be counted as payments made in 2025 for the purposes of calculating the amounts to be decommitted, in particular as regards respect for the principle of annuality;

    5. Recalls the importance of the general regime of conditionality as set out in Article 6 of the Financial Regulation; urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and to respect the Union values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union in the implementation of the budget;

    6. Notes that the Commission does not expect any implications for the budget for 2025 beyond the redeployment of existing human resources; expects the Commission to take into account the current proposal and the updated payment needs for the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) in the budgetary procedure for 2026 following the actual re-programming by Member States and to keep Parliament informed in a timely manner of the progress of the mid-term review in the Member States; calls for a prudent approach to payment frontloading;

    Recommendations as regards budget implementation

    7. Notes that the proposal provides further flexibility and introduces incentives for Member States in the context of the mid-term review of cohesion policy to address strategic challenges that the EU is facing by redirecting resources to new EU priorities; underlines that cohesion policy should not be used again as a crisis response tool and maintains that this approach risks undermining its longer-term policy and investment objectives, including investments in regional development, skills, innovation and productivity; regrets that the Commission did not perform an impact assessment of the changes; acknowledges that the proposal offers a pragmatic, albeit unsatisfactory, way forward for dealing with insufficient budgetary flexibility and response capacity in the EU budget;

    8. Recalls that the ESF+ is an essential pillar of cohesion policy and its main objective is to support Member States and regions in achieving social inclusion and social cohesion, to activate the labour market and to deliver on the principles and the headline targets of the European Pillar of Social Rights by supporting investments in people and systems in the policy area of employment and social policies; highlights that the Member States should ensure safeguards in the regulatory framework to prevent the dismantling of the core objectives of cohesion policy; underlines the need to ensure that the implementation of the amended ESF+ Regulation[4] is accompanied by measures for simplification and strengthening of administrative capacities in order to drive investments in key sectors and increase the absorption rate;

    9. Underlines that the combined effect of reallocating a minimum of 15 % of resources and of lifting of the 20 % ceiling for transfer towards Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) objectives may have a negative impact on the achievements of targets initially set in the ESF+ Regulation and could result in some initially planned actions for later years not materialising owing to a discontinuity in matching objectives with resources, while noting the need to adapt to new priorities, taking into account the recent geopolitical dynamics;

    10. Notes that payments to 2021-2027 cohesion policy programmes were of a very low level in the first years of implementation, leading to an increase in payment needs towards the later years; recalls that this actual payment cycle does not coincide with the more linear payment profile set out in the MFF Regulation[5] and that this situation results in a serious risk of exceeding payment ceilings; recalls that the gradual increase in payments towards the later part of the programming period is a feature of multiannual programmes; considers that the frontloading of payments towards 2026 could have an impact on the pressure on payments;

    11. Recalls that the STEP Regulation[6] and the RESTORE Amending Regulation of 2024 were accompanied by a frontloading of payment appropriations in the budgets for 2024 and for 2025; notes that the total amount of payment appropriations in the 2026 draft budget is very close to the payment ceiling and is concerned, in this respect, about the high level of uncertainty with regard to the volume of payment claims in 2026; highlights the difficulties in predicting the take-up of the newly introduced flexibilities and incentives and in estimating payment needs, as also underpinned by the ongoing trend of increasing inaccuracy of payment forecasts by Member States; calls on the Commission to closely monitor payment developments and provide timely information to Parliament in this regard, and to propose any remedial action to the budgetary authority if needed;

    12. Recalls that 100 % co-financing without additional resources leads to a lower total amount of financial support through the programme; insists that broadening the scope of investment must not lead to a reduction in financial support for the initial priorities of investing in employment, social services, inclusive education and skills, and of providing assistance to the most vulnerable, including children; recalls that mandatory co-financing is an important principle of cohesion policy funding;

    13. Requests that the Commission provide traceable information in the form of timely reports on transfers to ensure that the impact of the mid-term review is clearly identifiable for the budgetary authority;

    14. Calls on the Commission to maintain consistency in applying conditionality across all EU funding streams and insists that amendments in Parliament’s reading are essential to close any loophole; demands rigorous enforcement of conditionality mechanisms and explicitly rejects any reallocation of blocked cohesion policy funds if this would circumvent the rule-of-law-related requirements established in the Common Provisions Regulation[7]; underlines that rule of law conditionality is a fundamental principle that must apply to all EU funds without exception;

    15. Considers that the actual take-up of the proposal may depend on various factors, such as the effectiveness of the 15 % re-allocation threshold and the availability of more favourable funding options under other Union programmes; considers that the proposed condition of the reallocation of at least 15 % of the funds to new priorities may be too high and unsuitable for single national programmes, as it could create implementation complications; highlights the importance of preventing double financing and calls on the Member States and the Commission to ensure that support for new types of investment is in addition to support under other Union programmes, including the EDF, EDIP and SAFE;

    16. Notes that the mid-term review may reduce the amount of funds at risk of decommitment; recalls that an amount equivalent to the cumulative decommitments made on outstanding commitments since 2021 can be made available for the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI); asks the Commission to provide further analysis of the impact of the mid-term review on the EURI instrument.

     

     

    AMENDMENT

     

    As part of its budgetary assessment, the Committee on Budgets also submits the following amendment to the proposal:

     

    Amendment  1

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital [9] a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    ([9]a) This Regulation has implications for the Union budget. Accordingly, the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets adopted a budgetary assessment, which forms an integral part of Parliament’s mandate for negotiations.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for budgetary assessment declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    Title

    Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    References

    COM(2025)0164 – C10-0064/2025 – 2025/0085(COD)

    Committee(s) responsible

    EMPL

     

     

     

    Budgetary assessment by

     Date announced in plenary

    BUDG

    5.5.2025

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment

     Date appointed

    Jean-Marc Germain

    12.5.2025

    Discussed in committee

    5.6.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    16.6.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    24

    6

    3

    Members present for the final vote

    Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Tomasz Buczek, Jens Geier, Thomas Geisel, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Andrzej Halicki, Alexander Jungbluth, Giuseppe Lupo, Ignazio Roberto Marino, Siegfried Mureşan, Jana Nagyová, Fernando Navarrete Rojas, Matjaž Nemec, Danuše Nerudová, Ruggero Razza, Karlo Ressler, Bogdan Rzońca, Hélder Sousa Silva, Joachim Streit, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs, Lucia Yar, Auke Zijlstra

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Pablo Arias Echeverría, Roman Haider, Céline Imart, Rasmus Nordqvist, Jacek Protas, Annamária Vicsek

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Benoit Cassart, Andi Cristea

     

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    24

    +

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Pablo Arias Echeverría, Andrzej Halicki, Céline Imart, Siegfried Mureşan, Fernando Navarrete Rojas, Danuše Nerudová, Jacek Protas, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva

    Renew

    Benoit Cassart, Joachim Streit, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    Andi Cristea, Jens Geier, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Giuseppe Lupo, Matjaž Nemec, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs

    Verts/ALE

    Rasmus Andresen, Ignazio Roberto Marino, Rasmus Nordqvist

     

    6

    –

    ESN

    Alexander Jungbluth

    NI

    Thomas Geisel

    PfE

    Tomasz Buczek, Roman Haider, Annamária Vicsek, Auke Zijlstra

     

    3

    0

    ECR

    Ruggero Razza, Bogdan Rzońca

    PfE

    Jana Nagyová

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE (17.6.2025)

    for the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

    on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    ((COM(2025)0164 – C10‑0064/2025 – (2025/0085(COD))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Urmas Paet

     

     

     

    AMENDMENTS

    The Committee on Security and Defence submits the following to the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, as the committee responsible:

    Amendment  1

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) The White paper for European Defence – Readiness 20303 paves the way for a true European defence union, including by suggesting to Member States to heavily invest into defence and the defence industry. In that regard, the Communication from the Commission – the Union of Skills of 5 March 20254 (‘the Union of Skills Communication’) sets out actions to address skills gaps and shortages in the Union, also through the Pact for Skills Initiative referred to in that Communication, and its large-scale partnerships, including one on the defence ecosystem. Therefore, it is appropriate to include incentives for the ESF+ established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council5 to facilitate the development of skills in the defence industry.

    (2) The White paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 of 19 March 2025 paves the way for a true European defence union, including by suggesting to Member States to heavily invest into defence and the defence industry. Investment in defence and security-related skills covering dual use and transferable skills contributes not only to European defence resilience but also to territorial cohesion. In that regard, the Communication from the Commission – the Union of Skills of 5 March 20254 (‘the Union of Skills Communication’) sets out actions to address skills gaps and shortages in the Union, also through the Pact for Skills Initiative referred to in that Communication, and its large-scale partnerships, including one on the defence ecosystem. Furthermore, lifelong learning programmes and initiatives should promote continuous development and adaptation to emerging technologies and defence needs. Moreover, in the European Defence Industrial Strategy of 5 March 2024, the Commission set the priority of the full integration of defence and security as a strategic objective of relevant Union funding and programmes, including ESF+. Therefore, it is appropriate to include incentives for the ESF+ established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council5 to facilitate the development of skills in the European defence industry, in particular to address skills gaps and shortages directly related to the ability to address the critical capability gaps set out in the White paper. Defence industry should be understood as the industries producing defence products, their respective supply chains, and industries which develop and produce dual-use goods.

    __________________

    __________________

    3 Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, JOIN(2025) 120 final, 19.3.2025.

     

    4 COM (2025) 90 final

    4 COM (2025) 90 final

    5 Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj).

    5 Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj).

    Amendment  2

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 2 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (2a) In accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 , Member States should promote synergies and avoid duplications between actions arising for dedicated priorities referred to in Article 12c and actions resulting from other Union programmes that benefit the defence industry.

    Amendment  3

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    In 2026, the Commission shall pay 4,5 % of the total support from the ESF+ as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as additional one-off pre-financing. The one-off pre-financing percentage in 2026 shall be increased to 9,5% for programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, provided the programme does not cover the entire territory of the Member State. Where, in a Member State, NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine are included exclusively in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State, the increased pre-financing set out in this paragraph shall apply to those programmes.

    In 2026, the Commission shall pay 4,5 % of the total support from the ESF+ as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as additional one-off pre-financing. The one-off pre-financing percentage in 2026 shall be increased to 9,5% for programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, provided the programme does not cover the entire territory of the Member State. Where, in a Member State, NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine are included exclusively in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State, the increased pre-financing set out in this paragraph shall apply to those programmes. NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine require special attention and exceptional support as they are often at the frontline of potential conflicts and they are vulnerable to external threats, making it crucial to support their resilience in countering hybrid attacks, breaches of the Union’s external borders, terrorist activities and war.

    Amendment  4

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    The additional pre-financing referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph shall only apply where reallocations of at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d have been approved; provided that the request for a programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    The additional pre-financing referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph shall only apply where reallocations of at least 5% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d have been approved; provided that the request for a programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    Amendment  5

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) By way of derogation from Article 63(2) and Article 105(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the deadline for the eligibility of expenditure, the reimbursement of costs as well as for decommitment shall be 31 December 2030. That derogation shall only apply where programme amendments reallocating at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved.

    (2) By way of derogation from Article 63(2) and Article 105(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the deadline for the eligibility of expenditure, the reimbursement of costs as well as for decommitment shall be 31 December 2030. That derogation shall only apply where programme amendments reallocating at least 5% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved.

    Amendment  6

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 2a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (2a) The Member States shall work closely with social partners, when reprogramming, and respect working and employment conditions  under applicable ILO conventions, Union and national law and collective agreements.

    Amendment  7

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for priorities in programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine shall be 100 %. The higher co-financing rate shall not apply to programmes covering the entire territory of the Member State concerned, unless those regions are included only in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State. The derogation shall only apply where reallocations of at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved, provided that the programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    (3) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for priorities in programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine shall be 100 %. The higher co-financing rate shall not apply to programmes covering the entire territory of the Member State concerned, unless those regions are included only in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State. The derogation shall only apply where reallocations of at least 5% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved, provided that the programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    Amendment  8

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – title

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    Support to the defence industry

    Support European defence industry and cybersecurity

    Amendment  9

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) Member States may decide to programme support to development of skills in the defence industry under dedicated priorities. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (l).

    (1) Member States may decide to programme support to development of skills in the defence industry and related cybersecurity, as well as in skills related to civil defence and preparedness under dedicated priorities to meet urgent needs. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (l). This support may include actions that promote the recognition of skills acquired during military service and facilitate their conversion into qualifications recognised on the civilian labour market.

    Amendment  10

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    In addition to the yearly pre-financing for the programme provided for in Article 90(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the Commission shall pay 30% of the allocation to the dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as exceptional one-off pre-financing.

    In addition to the yearly pre-financing for the programme provided for in Article 90(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the Commission shall pay 35% of the allocation to the dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as exceptional one-off pre-financing.

    Amendment  11

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – paragraph 5a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (5a) When allocating funds to dedicated priorities pursuant to paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that those funds contribute to the Member States’ ability to address critical capability gaps set out in the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030.

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Title

    Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    References

    COM(2025)0164 – C10-0064/2025 – 2025/0085(COD)

    Committee(s) responsible

    EMPL

     

     

     

    Opinion by

     Date announced in plenary

    SEDE

    5.5.2025

    Rapporteur for the opinion

     Date appointed

    Urmas Paet

    14.5.2025

    Discussed in committee

    3.6.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    16.6.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    31

    8

    4

    Members present for the final vote

    Petras Auštrevičius, Wouter Beke, Marc Botenga, Tobias Cremer, Salvatore De Meo, Özlem Demirel, Elio Di Rupo, Michał Dworczyk, Alberico Gambino, Niclas Herbst, Costas Mavrides, Vangelis Meimarakis, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Hans Neuhoff, Andrey Novakov, Kostas Papadakis, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Reinis Pozņaks, Marjan Šarec, Mārtiņš Staķis, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Michał Szczerba, Riho Terras, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Mihai Tudose, Reinier Van Lanschot, Roberto Vannacci, Michael von der Schulenburg, Alexandr Vondra, Lucia Yar

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    José Cepeda, Bart Groothuis, Marina Mesure, Thijs Reuten, Hélder Sousa Silva, Villy Søvndal, Petra Steger, Claudiu-Richard Târziu, Matej Tonin, Marta Wcisło

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Anna Bryłka, Tomasz Buczek

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    31

    +

    ECR

    Michał Dworczyk, Alberico Gambino, Reinis Pozņaks, Claudiu-Richard Târziu, Alexandr Vondra

    PPE

    Wouter Beke, Salvatore De Meo, Niclas Herbst, Vangelis Meimarakis, Andrey Novakov, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Hélder Sousa Silva, Michał Szczerba, Riho Terras, Matej Tonin, Marta Wcisło

    PfE

    Pierre-Romain Thionnet

    Renew

    Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis, Marjan Šarec, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    José Cepeda, Tobias Cremer, Elio Di Rupo, Costas Mavrides, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Thijs Reuten, Mihai Tudose

    Verts/ALE

    Mārtiņš Staķis

     

    8

    –

    ESN

    Hans Neuhoff

    NI

    Kostas Papadakis, Michael von der Schulenburg

    PfE

    Petra Steger, Roberto Vannacci

    The Left

    Marc Botenga, Özlem Demirel, Marina Mesure

     

    4

    0

    PfE

    Anna Bryłka, Tomasz Buczek

    Verts/ALE

    Villy Søvndal, Reinier Van Lanschot

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT (25.6.2025)

    Ms Li Andersson

    Chair

    Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges (2025/0085(COD) – COM(2025)0164 – C10-0064/2025)

     

     

    Dear Ms Andersson,

     

    Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Regional Development was asked to submit an opinion to your Committee.

     

    At its meeting of 9 April 2025, REGI committee decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter. It discussed the matter at its meeting of 13 May 2025 and adopted the opinion at its meeting of 25 June 2025[8].

     

    The Committee on Regional Development:

     

    1. Underlines the crucial role that cohesion policy and sectoral programmes, in spite of the fact that they are not crisis management instruments, have repeatedly and efficiently played in helping regions to respond effectively to emergencies and asymmetric shocks such as the COVID-19 crisis, Brexit, the energy crisis and the refugee crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as natural disasters;

     

    2. Is aware of the rapidly evolving economic, societal, environmental and geopolitical context, as well as the housing crisis, and shares the need for more flexibility in assessing the extent to which cohesion policy programmes can help respond to these changes; nevertheless is of the firm opinion that the capacity to offer flexible responses to unpredictable challenges should not come at the expense of the clear long-term strategic focus and objectives of cohesion policy, in accordance with Article 174 TFEU;

     

    3. Reiterates that ESF+ stands as positive example of EU solidarity and that its main objective is to support Member States and regions to achieve social inclusion, social cohesion, to activate the labour market and to deliver on the principles and the headline targets of the European Pillar of Social Rights that are far from met yet; stresses that the reprogramming of resources under the ESF+ should ensure that adjustment measures in response to strategic challenges do not undermine its social approach, but strengthen its capacity to combat inequality;

     

    4. Underlines the fact that cohesion policy shall first and foremost ensure social cohesion, not defence spending; nonetheless acknowledges that flexibility of the policy from the point of view of the beneficiaries is a key point, and stresses the need to provide regions with greater flexibility already when programming the funding, in order to cater for their particular needs and specificities, particularly border regions; furthermore acknowledges that investment in defence capabilities through the development of skills and training, while safeguarding social standards, is already possible under the ESF+ established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057;

     

    5. Acknowledges that investment in defence capabilities and in adaptation linked to decarbonisation makes a key contribution to the promotion of the competitiveness, preparedness and strategic autonomy of the EU, and requires having people with the right skills; in general, recognises the importance of the development of skills through lifelong learning and training models, targeted in particular at young people not in education, employment and training (NEET) and unemployed people, and targeted also at teachers, trainers, mentors, coaches, as well as entrepreneurs and researchers; encourages in this regard private sector involvement to enhance skills development and labour market integration, ensuring that ESF+ investments translate into tangible economic benefits; calls for stronger partnerships between businesses, educational institutions, and regional authorities to align training programs with labour market demands, fostering innovation and job creation;

     

    6. Stresses the strategic importance of strong external border regions for the security and resilience of the EU; welcomes the focus given by the legislative proposal to the challenges the Eastern border regions are facing since the Russian aggression against Ukraine began; supports the proposal that programmes under the Investment for jobs and growth goal, with NUTS 2 regions that have borders with Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, should benefit from the possibility of a one-off 9.5% pre-financing of the programme allocation in 2026 and a 100% Union financing;

     

    7. Reaffirms that cohesion policy and ESF+ should reach all EU regions, especially those affected by transformation processes, while keeping a focus on least developed regions and people; stresses that cohesion policy should be deepened where possible, with a view to remain the EU’s main long-term investment instrument for reducing disparities, ensuring economic, social and territorial cohesion, and stimulating regional and local sustainable growth in line with EU strategies;

     

    8. Reiterates the importance of compliance with horizontal enabling conditions, and stresses that funds suspended under Regulation 2020/2092 should not be subject to amended programmes or transfers;

     

    9. Encourages the European Commission to allow for targeted simplification measures in Member States where administrative capacity constraints may hinder full or efficient absorption of ESF+ and cohesion funds, and to provide technical assistance to local and regional authorities to ensure efficient implementation and spending; furthermore stresses the importance of simplifying the rules and procedures to limit bureaucratic burden;

     

    10. Believes that the ESF+ strengthens a pro-European identity in the entire EU and should be communicated as such and that local and regional authorities, in light of their role as both beneficiary and managing authority, as well as social partners shall be meaningfully involved in the formulation of new legislative proposals and in the revision of programmes pursuant to the mid-term review, in order to guarantee more effectiveness and coordination between the ESF+ and the broader cohesion and regional policy and its financing tools;

     

    11. Suggests laying down measures to facilitate access for Outermost Regions to flexibilities introduced by the mid-term review, such as lowering to 10% the amounts of reallocations to one or more dedicated priorities established in the second subparagraph of Art. 5a(1), and in the first subparagraph of Art. 5a(2), which are required to benefit from the additional one-off pre-financing.

     

     

    Yours sincerely,

    Dragoş BENEA

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Title

    Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    References

    COM(2025)0164 – C10-0064/2025 – 2025/0085(COD)

    Date submitted to Parliament

    2.4.2025

     

     

     

    Committee(s) responsible

     Date announced in plenary

    EMPL

    5.5.2025

     

     

     

    Committees asked for opinions

     Date announced in plenary

    SEDE

    5.5.2025

    BUDG

    5.5.2025

    ITRE

    5.5.2025

    REGI

    5.5.2025

    Not delivering opinions

     Date of decision

    ITRE

    9.4.2025

     

     

     

    Rapporteurs

     Date appointed

    Marit Maij

    8.5.2025

     

     

     

    Simplified procedure – date of decision

    5.5.2025

    Budgetary assessment

     Date of budgetary assessment

    BUDG

    16.6.2025

     

     

     

    Discussed in committee

    13.5.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    25.6.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    32

    15

    11

    Members present for the final vote

    Maravillas Abadía Jover, Grégory Allione, Marc Angel, Pascal Arimont, Konstantinos Arvanitis, Nikola Bartůšek, Gabriele Bischoff, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Rachel Blom, Andrzej Buła, David Casa, Estelle Ceulemans, Leila Chaibi, Per Clausen, Henrik Dahl, Johan Danielsson, Marie Dauchy, Mélanie Disdier, Elena Donazzan, Gheorghe Falcă, Chiara Gemma, Niels Geuking, Isilda Gomes, Alicia Homs Ginel, Sérgio Humberto, Katrin Langensiepen, Miriam Lexmann, Marit Maij, Marlena Maląg, Jagna Marczułajtis-Walczak, Idoia Mendia, Maria Ohisalo, Branislav Ondruš, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin, Nicola Procaccini, Dennis Radtke, Nela Riehl, Liesbet Sommen, Villy Søvndal, Pál Szekeres, Georgiana Teodorescu, Jana Toom, Raffaele Topo, Francesco Torselli, Brigitte van den Berg, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Marianne Vind, Mariateresa Vivaldini, Petar Volgin, Jan-Peter Warnke, Séverine Werbrouck

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Regina Doherty, Rosa Estaràs Ferragut, Kathleen Funchion, Rudi Kennes, Hristo Petrov

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Mireia Borrás Pabón, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral

    Date tabled

    30.6.2025

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    32

    +

    ECR

    Georgiana Teodorescu

    PPE

    Maravillas Abadía Jover, Pascal Arimont, Andrzej Buła, David Casa, Henrik Dahl, Regina Doherty, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral, Rosa Estaràs Ferragut, Gheorghe Falcă, Niels Geuking, Sérgio Humberto, Jagna Marczułajtis-Walczak, Dennis Radtke, Liesbet Sommen

    Renew

    Grégory Allione, Hristo Petrov, Jana Toom, Brigitte van den Berg, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne

    S&D

    Marc Angel, Gabriele Bischoff, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Estelle Ceulemans, Johan Danielsson, Isilda Gomes, Alicia Homs Ginel, Marit Maij, Idoia Mendia, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin, Raffaele Topo, Marianne Vind

     

    15

    –

    ESN

    Petar Volgin

    NI

    Branislav Ondruš, Jan-Peter Warnke

    PfE

    Nikola Bartůšek, Rachel Blom, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Marie Dauchy, Mélanie Disdier, Pál Szekeres, Séverine Werbrouck

    The Left

    Konstantinos Arvanitis, Leila Chaibi, Per Clausen, Kathleen Funchion, Rudi Kennes

     

    11

    0

    ECR

    Elena Donazzan, Chiara Gemma, Marlena Maląg, Nicola Procaccini, Francesco Torselli, Mariateresa Vivaldini

    PPE

    Miriam Lexmann

    Verts/ALE

    Katrin Langensiepen, Maria Ohisalo, Nela Riehl, Villy Søvndal

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    July 1, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Turkish FM welcomes cooperation with UK, calls for expansion of bilateral trade

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    ANKARA, July 1 (Xinhua) — Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan here on Monday hailed “intensive cooperation” with Britain and called for further expansion of bilateral trade.

    During a joint press conference with British Foreign Secretary David Lammy, he spoke about interstate cooperation in the areas of economics, defense and technology.

    The minister praised Britain’s supportive stance on issues such as the conflicts in Gaza, Syria, other parts of the Middle East and Ukraine, and welcomed London’s recent decision to lift some sanctions on Syria.

    H. Fidan stressed that ensuring a ceasefire, especially between Iran and Israel, as well as in the Gaza Strip, remains one of Ankara’s top strategic priorities.

    The annual trade turnover between Turkey and Great Britain has reached almost 30 billion US dollars, and both sides are striving to further expand economic ties, the minister noted.

    Mr Lammy highlighted the strength of Turkish-British relations, pointing to a potential free trade agreement that could bring mutual economic benefits of up to £28 billion (US$38.36 billion).

    “We look forward to negotiations on the Free Trade Agreement in the coming weeks and months,” he said.

    The Foreign Minister also praised Turkey’s efforts to promote peace in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and stressed that both countries are working to ease the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and implement the principle of “two states for two peoples” for the Palestinians. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    July 1, 2025
  • Alcaraz survives Wimbledon scare, Sabalenka serene, but others feel the heat

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Carlos Alcaraz survived Wimbledon’s hottest-ever opening day although the Spaniard was far from his sizzling best as he began his quest for a hat-trick of titles with a scare against Fabio Fognini at the All England Club on Monday.

    With air temperatures soaring to 32 degrees Celsius, Alcaraz needed more than four hours to subdue veteran Fognini, winning 7-5 6-7(5) 7-5 2-6 6-1 – the last set interrupted after a spectator became unwell in the heat and required assistance.

    Women’s top seed Aryna Sabalenka, bidding to win Wimbledon for the first time, had no trouble as she dispatched Canadian qualifier Carson Branstine 6-1 7-5 but last year’s runner-up, fourth seed Jasmine Paolini, was pushed hard by Latvia’s Anastasija Sevastova in a 2-6 6-3 6-2 win.

    While five-times Grand Slam champion Alcaraz, who won the Queen’s Club title in the build-up, lives to fight another day, several high-profile players departed the men’s draw.

    No arena at Wimbledon gets as hot as bowl-like Court Two and the conditions were clearly not to the liking of ex-world number one Daniil Medvedev as the ninth seed saw his hopes scorched by Frenchman Benjamin Bonzi, who won 7-6(2) 3-6 7-6(3) 6-2.

    Eighth seed Holger Rune of Denmark, yet to really make his mark at a Grand Slam, won the opening two sets against Chilean qualifier Nicolas Jarry but succumbed 4-6 4-6 7-5 6-3 6-4.

    Greece’s Stefanos Tsitsipas, twice a Grand Slam runner-up was left despondent after retiring with a back injury having fallen two sets behind against French qualifier Valentin Royer.

    American fifth seed Taylor Fritz looked to be on his way out before battling back to force a fifth set against big-serving Frenchman Giovanni Mpetshi Perricard before their match was suspended with the Grand Slam’s 11 p.m. curfew looming.

    German third seed Alexander Zverev summoned up similar fighting spirit to draw level at one set apiece with Arthur Rinderknech in another match scheduled to resume on Tuesday.

    WINNING STREAK

    Only two defending men’s champions had ever lost in the first round at Wimbledon, but there were moments when Alcaraz looked in danger of joining compatriot Manuel Santana on that short list as Fognini rolled back the years.

    Alcaraz arrived at Wimbledon on an 18-match winning streak, which included a spellbinding French Open final win over Jannik Sinner. But the spark was missing on Monday in front of a Centre Court crowd that included David Beckham.

    Heat is second nature to Alcaraz, but it was Fognini who flourished in the sun and when he broke serve twice to level the match at two sets apiece a massive shock looked possible.

    But Alcaraz, regularly using an ice towel to cool down, found an extra gear in the decider and even charmed the crowd by offering his water bottle to the distressed fan.

    He then led the warm applause for former top-10 player Fognini, for whom this was his final Wimbledon.

    “I don’t know why it’s his last Wimbledon because the level he has shown, you know, he can still play three or four more years. It’s unbelievable,” Alcaraz said of Fognini.

    Next up for Alcaraz is British qualifier Oliver Tarvet who marked his Grand Slam main draw debut with a superb 6-4 6-4 6-4 defeat of fellow qualifier Leandro Riedi of Switzerland.

    Tarvet is one of 23 British players in the singles draw, the most since 1984. The home charge was led Sonay Kartal who upset 20th seed and former French Open champion Jelena Ostapenko 7-5 2-6 6-2. She was joined in round two by British number one Emma Raducanu who comfortably passed a tricky test against Mingge Xu, one of three British teenaged wild cards to play on Monday.

    When Katie Boulter later knocked out Spanish ninth seed Paula Badosa 6-2 3-6 6-4 on Centre Court, seven British players had enjoyed victories, the most in a single day for the home nation in the professional era.

    Home hope Jacob Fearnley could not follow suit though as he was outshone 6-4 6-1 7-6(5) by Brazilian teenager Joao Fonseca, who showed why he is creating such a stir with carnival tennis on a steamy Court One.

    TOUGH WORKOUT

    World number one Sabalenka won the opening five games against part-time model Branstine but was given a far tougher workout after that as she moved into round two.

    The 27-year-old from Minsk missed last year’s event because of a shoulder injury and arrived this time with a point to prove after losing in the Australian and French Open finals this year.

    Several other women’s contenders sparkled in the sunshine, none more than 13th seeded American Amanda Anisimova who served up a dreaded ‘double-bagel’ 6-0 6-0 defeat to Yulia Putintseva.

    Ukraine’s Elina Svitolina beat Anna Boindar in straight sets while 2023 champion Marketa Vondrousova continued her return to form by knocking out American 30th seed McCartney Kessler, setting up a second-round clash with Raducanu.

    Australian Open champion Madison Keys, seeded sixth, battled for two hours and 41 minutes to beat Romania’s Elena Ruse and played down the impact of the heat.

    “It’s funny coming from the States, because this is quite literally a very typical summer day,” she said.

    Four-times Grand Slam champion Naomi Osaka overcame some first-round jitters to beat Australian qualifier Talia Gibson, prevailing 6-4 7-6(4).

    There was a sad end for Tunisia’s twice runner-up Ons Jabeur though as she retired against Viktoriya Tomova due to illness.

    (Reuters)

    July 1, 2025
  • Alcaraz survives Wimbledon scare, Sabalenka serene, but others feel the heat

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Carlos Alcaraz survived Wimbledon’s hottest-ever opening day although the Spaniard was far from his sizzling best as he began his quest for a hat-trick of titles with a scare against Fabio Fognini at the All England Club on Monday.

    With air temperatures soaring to 32 degrees Celsius, Alcaraz needed more than four hours to subdue veteran Fognini, winning 7-5 6-7(5) 7-5 2-6 6-1 – the last set interrupted after a spectator became unwell in the heat and required assistance.

    Women’s top seed Aryna Sabalenka, bidding to win Wimbledon for the first time, had no trouble as she dispatched Canadian qualifier Carson Branstine 6-1 7-5 but last year’s runner-up, fourth seed Jasmine Paolini, was pushed hard by Latvia’s Anastasija Sevastova in a 2-6 6-3 6-2 win.

    While five-times Grand Slam champion Alcaraz, who won the Queen’s Club title in the build-up, lives to fight another day, several high-profile players departed the men’s draw.

    No arena at Wimbledon gets as hot as bowl-like Court Two and the conditions were clearly not to the liking of ex-world number one Daniil Medvedev as the ninth seed saw his hopes scorched by Frenchman Benjamin Bonzi, who won 7-6(2) 3-6 7-6(3) 6-2.

    Eighth seed Holger Rune of Denmark, yet to really make his mark at a Grand Slam, won the opening two sets against Chilean qualifier Nicolas Jarry but succumbed 4-6 4-6 7-5 6-3 6-4.

    Greece’s Stefanos Tsitsipas, twice a Grand Slam runner-up was left despondent after retiring with a back injury having fallen two sets behind against French qualifier Valentin Royer.

    American fifth seed Taylor Fritz looked to be on his way out before battling back to force a fifth set against big-serving Frenchman Giovanni Mpetshi Perricard before their match was suspended with the Grand Slam’s 11 p.m. curfew looming.

    German third seed Alexander Zverev summoned up similar fighting spirit to draw level at one set apiece with Arthur Rinderknech in another match scheduled to resume on Tuesday.

    WINNING STREAK

    Only two defending men’s champions had ever lost in the first round at Wimbledon, but there were moments when Alcaraz looked in danger of joining compatriot Manuel Santana on that short list as Fognini rolled back the years.

    Alcaraz arrived at Wimbledon on an 18-match winning streak, which included a spellbinding French Open final win over Jannik Sinner. But the spark was missing on Monday in front of a Centre Court crowd that included David Beckham.

    Heat is second nature to Alcaraz, but it was Fognini who flourished in the sun and when he broke serve twice to level the match at two sets apiece a massive shock looked possible.

    But Alcaraz, regularly using an ice towel to cool down, found an extra gear in the decider and even charmed the crowd by offering his water bottle to the distressed fan.

    He then led the warm applause for former top-10 player Fognini, for whom this was his final Wimbledon.

    “I don’t know why it’s his last Wimbledon because the level he has shown, you know, he can still play three or four more years. It’s unbelievable,” Alcaraz said of Fognini.

    Next up for Alcaraz is British qualifier Oliver Tarvet who marked his Grand Slam main draw debut with a superb 6-4 6-4 6-4 defeat of fellow qualifier Leandro Riedi of Switzerland.

    Tarvet is one of 23 British players in the singles draw, the most since 1984. The home charge was led Sonay Kartal who upset 20th seed and former French Open champion Jelena Ostapenko 7-5 2-6 6-2. She was joined in round two by British number one Emma Raducanu who comfortably passed a tricky test against Mingge Xu, one of three British teenaged wild cards to play on Monday.

    When Katie Boulter later knocked out Spanish ninth seed Paula Badosa 6-2 3-6 6-4 on Centre Court, seven British players had enjoyed victories, the most in a single day for the home nation in the professional era.

    Home hope Jacob Fearnley could not follow suit though as he was outshone 6-4 6-1 7-6(5) by Brazilian teenager Joao Fonseca, who showed why he is creating such a stir with carnival tennis on a steamy Court One.

    TOUGH WORKOUT

    World number one Sabalenka won the opening five games against part-time model Branstine but was given a far tougher workout after that as she moved into round two.

    The 27-year-old from Minsk missed last year’s event because of a shoulder injury and arrived this time with a point to prove after losing in the Australian and French Open finals this year.

    Several other women’s contenders sparkled in the sunshine, none more than 13th seeded American Amanda Anisimova who served up a dreaded ‘double-bagel’ 6-0 6-0 defeat to Yulia Putintseva.

    Ukraine’s Elina Svitolina beat Anna Boindar in straight sets while 2023 champion Marketa Vondrousova continued her return to form by knocking out American 30th seed McCartney Kessler, setting up a second-round clash with Raducanu.

    Australian Open champion Madison Keys, seeded sixth, battled for two hours and 41 minutes to beat Romania’s Elena Ruse and played down the impact of the heat.

    “It’s funny coming from the States, because this is quite literally a very typical summer day,” she said.

    Four-times Grand Slam champion Naomi Osaka overcame some first-round jitters to beat Australian qualifier Talia Gibson, prevailing 6-4 7-6(4).

    There was a sad end for Tunisia’s twice runner-up Ons Jabeur though as she retired against Viktoriya Tomova due to illness.

    (Reuters)

    July 1, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: ER Report: A Roundup of Significant Articles on EveningReport.nz for July 1, 2025

    ER Report: Here is a summary of significant articles published on EveningReport.nz on July 1, 2025.

    Trauma is carried in your DNA. But science reveals a more complicated story
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Tara-Lyn Camilleri, Postdoctoral researcher of transgenerational effects, Monash University Radu Bercan/Shutterstock As war continues to rage in Gaza and Ukraine, there is concern about how the related trauma might be transmitted to future generations of people in those regions. More generally, interest in the idea of transgenerational

    Aamir Khan’s big screen comeback, Sitaare Zameen Par, features an all-star neurodivergent cast – a Bollywood first
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Yanyan Hong, PhD Candidate in Communication, Media and Film Studies, University of Adelaide Bharti Dubey/X Bollywood star Aamir Khan’s return to the big screen after a three-year hiatus has been far from ordinary. Sitaare Zameen Par (2025) which translates to “stars on Earth”, is the first major

    The rising rate of type 2 diabetes in young New Zealanders is becoming a health crisis
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Lynne Chepulis, Associate Professor, Health Sciences, University of Waikato vadimguzhva/Getty Images No longer just a condition of middle age, type 2 diabetes is increasingly affecting children, teenagers and young adults in New Zealand. And our health system is nowhere near ready to manage this surge. Type 2

    Understanding the ‘Slopocene’: how the failures of AI can reveal its inner workings
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Daniel Binns, Senior Lecturer, Media & Communication, RMIT University AI-generated with Leonardo Phoenix 1.0. Author supplied Some say it’s em dashes, dodgy apostrophes, or too many emoji. Others suggest that maybe the word “delve” is a chatbot’s calling card. It’s no longer the sight of morphed bodies

    Trump’s worldview is causing a global shift of alliances – what does this mean for nations in the middle?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva, Lecturer in Government – National Security College, Australian National University Since US President Donald Trump took office this year, one theme has come up time and again: his rule is a threat to the US-led international order. As the US political scientist John Mearsheimer famously

    We have drugs to manage HIV. So why are we spending millions looking for cures?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Bridget Haire, Associate Professor, Public Health Ethics, School of Population Health, UNSW Sydney Alim Yakubov/Shutterstock Over the past three decades there have been amazing advances in treating and preventing HIV. It’s now a manageable infection. A person with HIV who takes HIV medicine consistently, before their immune

    Sexy K-pop demons, a human lie detector and shearers on strike: what to watch in July
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By John Mickel, Adjunct Associate Professor, School of Justice, Queensland University of Technology Tomorrow marks exactly halfway through 2025. Luckily there’s a suite of streaming options to help get you through the mid-year bump. We’ve got iconic classics celebrating major anniversaries, as well as an animated K-Pop spectacle,

    Fiji human rights coalition challenges Rabuka over decolonisation ‘unfinished business’
    Asia Pacific Report The NGO Coalition on Human Rights in Fiji (NGOCHR) has called on Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka as the new chair of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) to “uphold justice, stability and security” for Kanaky New Caledonia and West Papua. In a statement today after last week’s MSG leaders’ summit in Suva, the

    Battle of Ideas: Political Lawfare and the Destitution of Pedro Castillo
    Source: Council on Hemispheric Affairs – Analysis-Reportage COHA On June 29, Radio Negro Primero, a community-based station in Venezuela, and affiliates, will examine the jailing and prosecution of Peru’s constitutional president, Pedro Castillo. The program, Battle of Ideas, hosted by William Camacaro (Senior Analyst for COHA) and Mary Dugarte (Venezuelan Journalist), will feature distinguished panelists:

    In Struggle and Solidarity: The Enduring Legacy of Joaquín Domínguez Parada
    Source: Council on Hemispheric Affairs – Analysis-Reportage By Fred Mills and Evelyn Gonzalez Mills Silver Spring, MD Joaquín Domínguez Parada, a renowned Salvadoran attorney and tireless advocate for refugees of war and persecution, passed away on Thursday, June 26, 2025, four days after his 77th birthday in El Salvador, leaving a legacy of love, integrity,

    Here’s how First Nations landholders can share the benefits of the NSW energy transition
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Heidi Norman, Professor of Australian and Aboriginal history, Faculty of Arts, Design and Architecture, Convenor: Indigenous Land & Justice Research Group, UNSW Sydney Hay Local Aboriginal Land Council staff and members with researchers and actuaries from Finity Consulting. UNSW Indigenous Land and Justice Research Group The shift

    Warmer seas are fuelling the dangerous ‘weather bomb’ about to hit NSW
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Steve Turton, Adjunct Professor of Environmental Geography, CQUniversity Australia Heavy surf and intense rains hit Sydney beaches during a 2020 East Coast Low. Lee Hulsman/Getty Right now, a severe storm likely to be the first significant east coast low in three years is developing off the coast

    ‘I’m just exhausted’: sexual harassment at work is still rife. These new laws would help
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Sarah Ailwood, Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Wollongong FG Trade/Getty Last week, the Australian Human Rights Commission launched a new report on sexual harassment, called Speaking From Experience. It includes the voices of more than 300 victim-survivors of workplace sexual harassment from vulnerable communities. In

    My shins hurt after running. Could it be shin splints?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Krissy Kendall, Senior Lecturer in Exercise and Sports Science, Edith Cowan University lzf/Getty If you’ve started running for the first time, started again after a break, or your workout is more intense, you might have felt it. A dull, nagging ache down your shins after you exercise.

    Australia’s cutest mammal is now Australia’s cutest three mammals
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Cameron Dodd, PhD Student in Evolutionary Biology and Taxonomy, The University of Western Australia The long-eared kultarr (_A. auritus_) is the middle child in terms of body size, but it has by far the biggest ears. Ken Johnson Australia is home to more than 60 species of

    Occupational therapists tackle obstacles in the home, from support to cook a meal, to navigating public transport
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Danielle Hitch, Senior Lecturer in Occupational Therapy, Deakin University Occupational therapists (OTs) have been in the spotlight this month after the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) froze NDIS payments for these services at $193.99 per hour for the sixth year. The NDIA also cut travel payments for

    Do you have Bitcoin? Be aware of the tax consequences of selling your investment
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Christina Allen, Senior lecturer, Curtin University Bitcoin is ubiquitous. It is impossible to open a social media stream or news source without encountering yet another mention of the topic. Many Australians have invested, hoping for a good return. But they may not have considered the tax consequences

    On her new album, Lorde creates pop at its purest – performative, playful and alive to paradox
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Rosemary Overell, Senior Lecturer in Communication Studies, University of Otago “✏️Describe the vibe” goes the demand to commenters underneath the YouTube video for Lorde’s latest single, “Hammer”. Fans form a flow; a “vibe check” in Zillenial parlance: The pure rawness … (@lynmariegm) A more raw true-to-self form

    Men traded wares – but women traded knowledge: what a new archeological study tells us about PNG sea trade
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Robert Skelly, Archaeologist, Monash University Women loading pots on a Motu lakatoi trading vessel, in this photograph published in 1887. J. W. Lindt Australia’s closest neighbour, Papua New Guinea, is a place of remarkable cultural diversity. Home to cultures speaking more than 800 languages, this region has

    Unsafe and unethical: bed shortages mean dementia patients with psychiatric symptoms are admitted to medical wards
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Cindy Towns, Senior Lecturer in General Medicine and Geriatrics, University of Otago Getty Images New Zealand’s mental health crisis is well documented in the government’s 2018 inquiry, He Ara Oranga, which shows one in five people experience mental illness or significant mental distress. However, an almost singular

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    July 1, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: ER Report: A Roundup of Significant Articles on EveningReport.nz for July 1, 2025

    ER Report: Here is a summary of significant articles published on EveningReport.nz on July 1, 2025.

    Trauma is carried in your DNA. But science reveals a more complicated story
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Tara-Lyn Camilleri, Postdoctoral researcher of transgenerational effects, Monash University Radu Bercan/Shutterstock As war continues to rage in Gaza and Ukraine, there is concern about how the related trauma might be transmitted to future generations of people in those regions. More generally, interest in the idea of transgenerational

    Aamir Khan’s big screen comeback, Sitaare Zameen Par, features an all-star neurodivergent cast – a Bollywood first
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Yanyan Hong, PhD Candidate in Communication, Media and Film Studies, University of Adelaide Bharti Dubey/X Bollywood star Aamir Khan’s return to the big screen after a three-year hiatus has been far from ordinary. Sitaare Zameen Par (2025) which translates to “stars on Earth”, is the first major

    The rising rate of type 2 diabetes in young New Zealanders is becoming a health crisis
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Lynne Chepulis, Associate Professor, Health Sciences, University of Waikato vadimguzhva/Getty Images No longer just a condition of middle age, type 2 diabetes is increasingly affecting children, teenagers and young adults in New Zealand. And our health system is nowhere near ready to manage this surge. Type 2

    Understanding the ‘Slopocene’: how the failures of AI can reveal its inner workings
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Daniel Binns, Senior Lecturer, Media & Communication, RMIT University AI-generated with Leonardo Phoenix 1.0. Author supplied Some say it’s em dashes, dodgy apostrophes, or too many emoji. Others suggest that maybe the word “delve” is a chatbot’s calling card. It’s no longer the sight of morphed bodies

    Trump’s worldview is causing a global shift of alliances – what does this mean for nations in the middle?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva, Lecturer in Government – National Security College, Australian National University Since US President Donald Trump took office this year, one theme has come up time and again: his rule is a threat to the US-led international order. As the US political scientist John Mearsheimer famously

    We have drugs to manage HIV. So why are we spending millions looking for cures?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Bridget Haire, Associate Professor, Public Health Ethics, School of Population Health, UNSW Sydney Alim Yakubov/Shutterstock Over the past three decades there have been amazing advances in treating and preventing HIV. It’s now a manageable infection. A person with HIV who takes HIV medicine consistently, before their immune

    Sexy K-pop demons, a human lie detector and shearers on strike: what to watch in July
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By John Mickel, Adjunct Associate Professor, School of Justice, Queensland University of Technology Tomorrow marks exactly halfway through 2025. Luckily there’s a suite of streaming options to help get you through the mid-year bump. We’ve got iconic classics celebrating major anniversaries, as well as an animated K-Pop spectacle,

    Fiji human rights coalition challenges Rabuka over decolonisation ‘unfinished business’
    Asia Pacific Report The NGO Coalition on Human Rights in Fiji (NGOCHR) has called on Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka as the new chair of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) to “uphold justice, stability and security” for Kanaky New Caledonia and West Papua. In a statement today after last week’s MSG leaders’ summit in Suva, the

    Battle of Ideas: Political Lawfare and the Destitution of Pedro Castillo
    Source: Council on Hemispheric Affairs – Analysis-Reportage COHA On June 29, Radio Negro Primero, a community-based station in Venezuela, and affiliates, will examine the jailing and prosecution of Peru’s constitutional president, Pedro Castillo. The program, Battle of Ideas, hosted by William Camacaro (Senior Analyst for COHA) and Mary Dugarte (Venezuelan Journalist), will feature distinguished panelists:

    In Struggle and Solidarity: The Enduring Legacy of Joaquín Domínguez Parada
    Source: Council on Hemispheric Affairs – Analysis-Reportage By Fred Mills and Evelyn Gonzalez Mills Silver Spring, MD Joaquín Domínguez Parada, a renowned Salvadoran attorney and tireless advocate for refugees of war and persecution, passed away on Thursday, June 26, 2025, four days after his 77th birthday in El Salvador, leaving a legacy of love, integrity,

    Here’s how First Nations landholders can share the benefits of the NSW energy transition
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Heidi Norman, Professor of Australian and Aboriginal history, Faculty of Arts, Design and Architecture, Convenor: Indigenous Land & Justice Research Group, UNSW Sydney Hay Local Aboriginal Land Council staff and members with researchers and actuaries from Finity Consulting. UNSW Indigenous Land and Justice Research Group The shift

    Warmer seas are fuelling the dangerous ‘weather bomb’ about to hit NSW
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Steve Turton, Adjunct Professor of Environmental Geography, CQUniversity Australia Heavy surf and intense rains hit Sydney beaches during a 2020 East Coast Low. Lee Hulsman/Getty Right now, a severe storm likely to be the first significant east coast low in three years is developing off the coast

    ‘I’m just exhausted’: sexual harassment at work is still rife. These new laws would help
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Sarah Ailwood, Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Wollongong FG Trade/Getty Last week, the Australian Human Rights Commission launched a new report on sexual harassment, called Speaking From Experience. It includes the voices of more than 300 victim-survivors of workplace sexual harassment from vulnerable communities. In

    My shins hurt after running. Could it be shin splints?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Krissy Kendall, Senior Lecturer in Exercise and Sports Science, Edith Cowan University lzf/Getty If you’ve started running for the first time, started again after a break, or your workout is more intense, you might have felt it. A dull, nagging ache down your shins after you exercise.

    Australia’s cutest mammal is now Australia’s cutest three mammals
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Cameron Dodd, PhD Student in Evolutionary Biology and Taxonomy, The University of Western Australia The long-eared kultarr (_A. auritus_) is the middle child in terms of body size, but it has by far the biggest ears. Ken Johnson Australia is home to more than 60 species of

    Occupational therapists tackle obstacles in the home, from support to cook a meal, to navigating public transport
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Danielle Hitch, Senior Lecturer in Occupational Therapy, Deakin University Occupational therapists (OTs) have been in the spotlight this month after the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) froze NDIS payments for these services at $193.99 per hour for the sixth year. The NDIA also cut travel payments for

    Do you have Bitcoin? Be aware of the tax consequences of selling your investment
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Christina Allen, Senior lecturer, Curtin University Bitcoin is ubiquitous. It is impossible to open a social media stream or news source without encountering yet another mention of the topic. Many Australians have invested, hoping for a good return. But they may not have considered the tax consequences

    On her new album, Lorde creates pop at its purest – performative, playful and alive to paradox
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Rosemary Overell, Senior Lecturer in Communication Studies, University of Otago “✏️Describe the vibe” goes the demand to commenters underneath the YouTube video for Lorde’s latest single, “Hammer”. Fans form a flow; a “vibe check” in Zillenial parlance: The pure rawness … (@lynmariegm) A more raw true-to-self form

    Men traded wares – but women traded knowledge: what a new archeological study tells us about PNG sea trade
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Robert Skelly, Archaeologist, Monash University Women loading pots on a Motu lakatoi trading vessel, in this photograph published in 1887. J. W. Lindt Australia’s closest neighbour, Papua New Guinea, is a place of remarkable cultural diversity. Home to cultures speaking more than 800 languages, this region has

    Unsafe and unethical: bed shortages mean dementia patients with psychiatric symptoms are admitted to medical wards
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Cindy Towns, Senior Lecturer in General Medicine and Geriatrics, University of Otago Getty Images New Zealand’s mental health crisis is well documented in the government’s 2018 inquiry, He Ara Oranga, which shows one in five people experience mental illness or significant mental distress. However, an almost singular

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    July 1, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Trauma is carried in your DNA. But science reveals a more complicated story

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Tara-Lyn Camilleri, Postdoctoral researcher of transgenerational effects, Monash University

    Radu Bercan/Shutterstock

    As war continues to rage in Gaza and Ukraine, there is concern about how the related trauma might be transmitted to future generations of people in those regions.

    More generally, interest in the idea of transgenerational trauma has recently surged. For example, earlier this year, National Geographic magazine asked whether genes carry past family trauma.

    But while this might be a catchy question, it’s also slightly misleading. Because while trauma can ripple across generations, shaped by how our bodies respond to their environments, its effects aren’t hard-coded in our genes.

    Plastic minds and bodies

    At the heart of this process is what’s known as phenotypic plasticity.

    This is the capacity for organisms to produce different outcomes from the same genes, depending on their environment. These outcomes, called phenotypes, can include stress sensitivity and body shape.

    One way different phenotypes can arise from the same genes is via epigenetics: small chemical changes to the DNA molecule that make particular genes more or less active. Think of these like a director’s notes on a script. These notes guide the cell on which lines to emphasise or soften, without changing the script itself.

    But epigenetics is just one way this plasticity is expressed.

    Understanding how trauma is passed across generations means looking beyond genes and cells to the environments that shape and influence them.

    Human development is sculpted by lived experience, from caregiving and community to stress, safety and belonging.

    These factors interact to produce lasting – but not always fixed – effects. By focusing on how they interact, rather than on single causes, we can better understand why trauma echoes across generations. This also helps us identify how that cycle might be disrupted.

    Widespread in nature

    Phenotypic plasticity is widespread in nature.

    In honeybees, genetically identical larvae become queens or workers depending on what they eat while developing. In three-spined stickleback fish, early exposure to predators reshapes their stress physiology and body shape, making them harder for predators to grasp.

    These aren’t genetic differences – they’re environmental effects on development.

    In humans, early-life conditions similarly shape development. A child raised in an unsafe setting may develop heightened vigilance or stress sensitivity – traits that help in danger but can persist as anxiety or chronic stress in times of safety. This is known as environmental mismatch.

    Across generations, plasticity becomes more complicated. In some of my past research, I studied how diet in one generation of fruit flies shaped health, reproduction and longevity in their offspring and grand offspring.

    The results varied depending on diet, generation and trait. Traits that appeared to be useful in one generation weren’t always so in the next. This highlights how difficult transgenerational effects are to predict – precisely because of this plasticity.

    In three-spined stickleback fish, early exposure to predators reshapes their stress physiology and body shape.
    drakiragavon/iNaturalist, CC BY-ND

    Too narrow an explanation

    Epigenetics often reflect environmental exposures – such as stress, trauma, nutrition or caregiving. But they’re not necessarily permanent “scars”. Many are dynamic and can shift with changing environments – especially early in life.

    Studies show that epigenetic patterns linked to early childhood adversity vary depending on later environments such as family stability and social support. This suggests the biological imprint of early stress is shaped by what happens next.

    It’s tempting to treat epigenetics as the key to explaining inherited trauma – but that’s too narrow. Trauma can influence the next generation through altered hormones, immune function or in utero conditions – all of which shape brain development and stress reactivity.

    Genetic variation also plays a major role. It doesn’t encode trauma itself, but it shapes traits such as sensitivity to threat or emotional regulation. These traits aren’t chosen – they arise from a web of biological and social influences beyond our control.

    But how they unfold, and whether they’re amplified or softened, depends on the systems that surround us.

    Connection to culture

    Connection to culture plays an important role too.

    In Aotearoa New Zealand, Māori-led initiatives that centre land, language and whakapapa (ancestral lineage) have shown promise in restoring wellbeing after generations of colonisation-related trauma.

    For Holocaust survivors and descendants, connection to cultural identity through ritual and shared narrative can reduce the psychological burden of transmitted trauma.

    But not all trauma is collective or institutional. Interventions such as trauma-informed parenting and early relational therapies have been shown to improve outcomes in the next generation.

    These psychological supports affect biology. Feeling safe in our relationships, having stable routines and a sense of meaning can reduce stress hormones, modulate immune function, and buffer against long-term disease risk.

    In this way, culture, caregiving and connection are all biological interventions. When they soften the effects of earlier stress, they may help interrupt its transmission.

    Trauma-informed parenting has been shown to improve outcomes in the next generation.
    fizkes/Shutterstock

    Reframing inherited vulnerability

    This matters, because it changes how we understand inherited vulnerability.

    Rather than a permanent wound passed down through DNA, the effects of trauma are better understood as changeable responses shaped by context.

    Thanks to plasticity, our biology is always in conversation with the environment – and when we change the context, we can change the outcome.

    Tara-Lyn Camilleri receives funding from from Australian Graduate Women, a not-for-profit organisation that advocates for education and supports women in postgraduate education with scholarships. Her research has also been supported by Australian Research Council grants and Royal Society funding. She is a volunteer committee member for Graduate Women Victoria.

    – ref. Trauma is carried in your DNA. But science reveals a more complicated story – https://theconversation.com/trauma-is-carried-in-your-dna-but-science-reveals-a-more-complicated-story-259057

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    July 1, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Submissions: New special tribunal for Ukraine will pave the way for holding Russian leaders to account for the invasion

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Andrew Forde, Assistant Professor – European Human Rights Law, Dublin City University

    A special tribunal has been established by the international human rights organisation the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Ukrainian government to try crimes of aggression against Ukraine which could be used to hold Vladimir Putin and others to account for the February 2022 invasion and war crimes committed since.

    The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, signed an agreement with CoE secretary general, Alain Berset, on June 25, setting up the special tribunal. Subject to it securing the necessary political backing and budget the tribunal will be established within the framework of the CoE (which is not part of the European Union.

    Work on the first phase of the court could progress in 2026. In his speech to the Council of Europe parliamentary assembly in Strasbourg, Zelensky was cautious in his optimism but stressed that the agreement was “just the beginning”.

    “It will take strong political and legal cooperation to make sure every Russian war criminal faces justice – including Putin,” he said. He knows, through years of hard experience as he travelled the world seeking help from Ukraine’s allies, that political support can be fleeting.

    A new Nuremberg?

    Inspired by ad hoc courts established after major conflicts such as the Nuremberg tribunal after the second world war or, more recently the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
    in the 1990s, the Ukraine has been established with the aim of holding to account the perpetrators of the first full-scale armed conflict in Europe in the 21st century.

    The prohibition against the crime of aggression is a basic principle of international law, and a key part of the UN charter.

    In principle, the crime of aggression should be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court (ICC). But as Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute which underpins the court, that option was ruled out. Similarly, Russia’s veto on the UN security council meant that it would be impossible in practice to practically set up a court under the mandate of the UN – as the ICTY was in 1993.

    The Ukraine special tribunal, which was developed by a Core Group, made up of states plus the EU and the Council of Europe, seeks to fill an obvious accountability gap. If the illegal invasion is left unpunished, it would set a dangerous precedent.

    Such impunity would embolden Russia and inspire others with revanchist ambitions, undermining an already shaky international order. The US, which was instrumental in setting up the Core Group under the presidency of Joe Biden, withdrew in March 2025 when Donald Trump took office.

    The statute of the special tribunal sets out that the court will be based on Ukrainian law and will have a strong link to the country’s legal system. Ukraine’s prosecutor-general will play a key role in the proceedings, referring evidence for further investigation by the tribunal. But it will be internationally funded with international judges and prosecutors, and strong cooperation with the International Criminal Court. It is likely to be based in the Hague – although this has yet to be confirmed.

    The need for accountability for the illegal invasion of Ukraine was stressed in a resolution of the UN general assembly in February 2023 as the war headed into its second year. The resolution, which calls for “appropriate, fair and independent investigations and prosecutions at the national or international level” to “ensure justice for all victims and the prevention of future crimes” was approved by an overwhelming majority of 141 states. Any country in the world can join this core group to support its establishment.

    Holding leaders accountable

    Unlike previous international courts, the caseload is likely to be extremely narrow. There are likely to be dozens of charges rather than hundreds or thousands, which is perhaps reassuring in terms of managing costs.

    The tribunal will focus on those “most responsible” including the so-called “troika”: the president Vladimir Putin, prime minister Mikhail Mishustin and the minister for foreign affairs Sergey Lavrov. Charges may also be levelled against the leadership of Belarus and North Korea for their role in aiding, abetting and actively participating in the war of aggression. But don’t expect Kim Jong-un or Alexander Lukashenko in the dock anytime soon.

    The Court has opted for a novel approach to a longstanding customary rule by noting that heads of state are not functionally immune from prosecution. But it adds that indictments won’t be confirmed until such time as the suspect is no longer in office.

    Trials can take place in absentia if the accused fails to attend and all reasonable steps taken to apprehend them have failed. But, like the ICC, the court will still rely on states to apprehend and physically transfer indicted individuals in due course. This will inevitably limit the chances of seeing any of the key individuals actually in a court, something that has also dogged the ICC.

    The fact that a tribunal has now been set up is a major development in international criminal justice. But it is now in a sort of purgatory, existing and not existing at the same time. To become operational, another treaty known as an enlarged partial agreement must be signed by interested states. This will have to be ratified by many national parliaments, depending on their constitutions. This process could take years.

    But simply by creating the framework for the tribunal, the Council of Europe has demonstrated its commitment to ensuring accountability. In a further development, the European Court of Human Rights delivers its long-awaited judgment in the case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v Russia on July 9.

    This concerns “complaints about the conflict in eastern Ukraine involving pro-Russian separatists which began in 2014, including the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, and the Russian military operations in Ukraine since 2022”. The judgement will add further momentum to these accountability efforts.

    Symbolic as it may seem, this week’s agreement creates a real opportunity for the international community to send a message that impunity for international aggression is intolerable – not just for the victims, but for all who believe in the rule of law.

    Andrew Forde is affiliated with Dublin City University (Assistant Professor, European Human Rights Law). He is also, separately, affiliated with the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (Commissioner).

    – ref. New special tribunal for Ukraine will pave the way for holding Russian leaders to account for the invasion – https://theconversation.com/new-special-tribunal-for-ukraine-will-pave-the-way-for-holding-russian-leaders-to-account-for-the-invasion-260022

    MIL OSI –

    July 1, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Food security in Africa: managing water will be vital in a rapidly growing region

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Christian Siderius, Senior researcher in water and food security, London School of Economics and Political Science

    Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is growing at 2.7% per year and is expected to reach two billion by the year 2050. The region’s urban population is growing even faster: it was at 533 million in 2023, a 3.85% increase from 2022.

    The need to feed this population will put pressure on land and water resources.

    I’m part of a group of researchers who have looked at whether regional food production would be sufficient to supply growing urban populations. By and large, we have found high levels of food self-sufficiency. But climate change could put a spanner in the works.

    We have also looked at the potential of local water conservation measures to help achieve food self-sufficiency in sub-Saharan Africa.

    Our study shows that measures such as better irrigation or water harvesting could boost food production while buffering the vagaries of weather.

    We found that ambitious – yet realistic – adoption of such measures increases food supply to cities and makes the region as a whole self-sufficient.

    A new model

    In large parts of eastern Africa, rainfall is relatively abundant and well distributed over the growing season, resulting in good yields. In future, however, the gap between water availability and crop water demand is expected to increase.

    We wanted to know whether sub-Saharan Africa would be able to increase its food production to meet future demand, in a changing climate. To do so, we built a novel foodshed model which simulates crop production using climate data and links urban demand to nearby food supply. Foodsheds have been defined as areas where supply matches demand. We assessed various water management measures that could buffer weather variability or increase production (or both). Understanding the potential of such measures can help mobilise and target much needed investments in Africa’s food system.

    Conserving water and growing more food

    First, we looked at whether regional food production was sufficient to supply growing urban populations.

    Combining large databases and crop simulations, we outlined the regions that food might come from for urban areas. Sub-Saharan Africa produces 85% of its overall crop food demand at present, according to our calculations, much of it in eastern Africa. Tanzania, Kenya, and even Uganda – if it were to use its food exports for domestic consumption – come close to being self-sufficient.

    Local exceptions are the large cities of Mombasa, the largest port city in Kenya, and Arusha, an important tourism and diplomatic and conference hub in Tanzania, and their immediate surroundings.

    In future, a larger population will demand more food. At the same time, the gap between how much water is available and how much crops need is expected to increase. Higher water losses due to higher temperatures will not be fully compensated for by changes in rainfall, according to climate model projections. And even where rainfall is projected to increase, more extreme events are likely to affect crop production. It might rain either too much or too little, which will lead to higher year-to-year variability.

    Our study shows that local water conservation measures could buffer some of the projected negative impacts of climate change in eastern Africa. It could also boost food production.

    Water harvesting, soil conservation and making sure water infiltrates in the soil would slow runoff and store more water in the soil.

    Irrigation systems should be gradually upgraded to drip irrigation or sprinklers. This will improve irrigation efficiency and water consumption. On rainfed areas, rainwater harvesting reservoirs should be installed. The water stored could be used for supplemental irrigation during dry periods. Soil moisture conservation measures will also be applied. These measures will prevent water from evaporating from the bare soil. Irrigation could offset occasional drought risk and so provide better financial stability or create possibilities for planting a different or a second or third crop, further increasing production and income.

    Even the foodsheds of rapidly growing cities such as Dar es Salaam in Tanzania will be able to supply enough to meet demand from relatively short distances.

    Large scale expansion of irrigation onto new lands should, however, be considered carefully. Potential trade-offs with energy and tourism incomes must equally be considered.

    In an earlier study, assessing Tanzania’s ambitious formal irrigation expansion plans, we found that expansion without water conservation measures would pose considerable risk to hydropower production in the new Julius Nyerere Hydropower Project. It would also be a risk to river-dependent ecosystems and national parks and the substantial tourism income that they generate.




    Read more:
    Kenya needs to grow more food: a focus on how to irrigate its vast dry areas is key


    Why our findings matter

    Producing more food in Africa is essential to keep pace with population growth and changing diets. The alternative is an increasing dependence on imports from outside the continent. In 2021, the total value of Africa’s food imports was roughly US$100 billion. Imports can be a useful supplement to local production, but major food exporters in Europe and America are already producing at peak productivity. They have limited scope to increase area and production.

    Security concerns around global supply chains in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and broader geo-political realignment have also made countries wary of relying too much on others.

    Our study confirms the potential of Africa to supply much of the increased demand for food within the continent. We looked at all food crops, including regionally important ones such as cassava, beans and millet. Countries in eastern Africa play a pivotal role.

    Improved productivity due to measures proposed would reduce the need for more land elsewhere to grow crops, and limit conflicts related to land use. This is equally important for biodiversity and tourism.




    Read more:
    Diet and nutrition: how well Tanzanians eat depends largely on where they live


    Looking forward

    What we propose requires large investments. Exploring these costs against benefits in a case study in the Rufiji basin in Tanzania we found that most water management measures would be cost effective, but only when considering the overall impact of water conservation on agriculture, hydropower production, and the riverine ecosystem.

    Not all farmers will be able to finance these measures themselves. The government and private sector have to provide incentives, reduce risks and increase access to affordable loans.

    Nor should these measures be taken in isolation. Other buffer mechanisms to support a stable food supply are increased storage facilities for food, diversified production, and stable and diversified trade relationships.
    With farmers innovating, the region’s infrastructure rapidly developing, and expanding urban areas becoming catalysts for growth, there is both the need and the scope to further invest in and improve the region’s food system.

    Christian Siderius received funding to conduct this research from the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) for the Future Water Challenges project (E555182DA/5200000978/9) and in preparation of the 2021 United Nations Food Systems Summit. Other cited work was carried out under the Future Climate for Africa UMFULA project with financial support from the UK Natural Environment Research Council (grants NE/M020398/1 and NE/M020258) and the UK government’s former
    Department for International Development.

    Christian is a director and founder of Uncharted Waters Ltd, a not-for-profit climate-food system analytics company, and a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Grantham Research Institute of the London School of Economics and Political Science in the United Kingdom, and Visiting Senior Researcher the Water Resources Management group at Wageningen University in the Netherlands

    – ref. Food security in Africa: managing water will be vital in a rapidly growing region – https://theconversation.com/food-security-in-africa-managing-water-will-be-vital-in-a-rapidly-growing-region-241281

    MIL OSI –

    July 1, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Submissions: AI is consuming more power than the grid can handle — nuclear might be the answer

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Goran Calic, Associate Profesor of Strategy and Entrepreneurship Leadership Chair, McMaster University

    New partnerships are forming between tech companies and power operators — ones that could reshape decades of misconceptions about nuclear energy.

    Last year, Meta (Facebook’s parent company) put out a call for nuclear proposals, Google agreed to buy new nuclear reactors from Kairos Power, Amazon partnered with Energy Northwest and Dominion Energy to develop nuclear energy and Microsoft committed to a 20-year deal to restart Unit 1 of the Three Mile Island nuclear plant.

    At the centre of these partnerships is artificial intelligence’s voracious appetite for electricity. One Google search uses about as much electricity as turning on a household light for 17 seconds. Asking a Generative AI model like ChatGPT a single question is equivalent to leaving that light on for 20 minutes.




    Read more:
    AI is bad for the environment, and the problem is bigger than energy consumption


    Having GenAI generate an image can draw about 6,250 times more electricity, roughly the energy of fully charging a smartphone, or enough to keep the same light bulb on for 87 consecutive days.

    The hundreds of millions of people now using AI have effectively added the equivalent of millions of new homes to the power grid. And demand is only growing. The challenge for tech companies is that few sources of electricity are well-suited to AI.

    The grid wasn’t ready for AI

    AI requires vast amounts of computational power running around the clock, often housed in energy-intensive data centres.

    Renewable energy sources such as solar and wind provide intermittent energy, meaning they don’t guarantee the constant power supply these data centres require. These centres must be online 24/7, even when the sun isn’t shining and the wind isn’t blowing.

    Fossil fuels can run continuously, but they carry their own risks. They have significant environmental impacts. Fuel prices can be unpredictable, as exemplified by the gas price spikes due to the war in Ukraine, and the long-term availability of fossil fuels is uncertain.

    Major tech companies like Google, Amazon and Microsoft say they are committed to eliminating CO2 emissions, making fossil fuels a poor long-term fit for them.

    This has pushed nuclear energy back into the conversation. Nuclear energy is a good fit because it provides electricity around the clock, maximizing the use of expensive data centres. It’s also clean, allowing tech companies to meet their low CO2 commitments. Lastly, nuclear energy has very low fuel costs, which allows tech companies to plan their costs far into the future.

    However, nuclear energy has its own set of problems that have historically been hard to solve — problems that tech companies may now be uniquely positioned to overcome.

    Is nuclear energy making a comeback?

    Nuclear power has long been considered too costly and too slow to build. The estimated cost of a 1.1 gigawatt nuclear power facility is about US$7.77 billion, but can run higher. The recently completed Vogtle Units 3 and 4 in the state of Georgia, for example, cost US$36.8 billion combined.

    Historically, nuclear energy projects have been hard to justify because of their high upfront costs. Like solar and wind power, nuclear energy has relatively low operating costs once a plant is up and running. The key difference is scale: unlike solar panels, which can be installed on individual rooftops, the kind of nuclear reactors tech companies require can’t be built small.

    Yet this cost is now more palatable when compared to the expense of AI data centres, which are both more costly and entirely useless without electricity. The first phase of OpenAI and SoftBank’s Stargate AI project will cost US$100 billion and could be entirely powered by a single nuclear plant.

    Nuclear power plants also take a long time to build. A 1.1 gigawatt reactor takes, on average, 7.5 years in the U.S. and 6.3 years globally. Projects with such long timelines require confidence in long-term electricity demand, something traditional utilities struggle to predict.

    To solve the problem of long-range forecasting, tech companies are incentivizing power providers by guaranteeing they’ll purchase electricity far into the future.

    These companies are also literally and financially moving closer to nuclear power, either by acquiring nuclear energy companies or locating their data centres next to nuclear power plants.

    Destigmatizing nuclear energy

    One of the biggest challenges facing nuclear energy is the perception that it’s dangerous and dirty. Per gigawatt-hour of electricity, nuclear produces only six tonnes of CO2. In comparison, coal produces 970, natural gas 720 and hydropower 24. Nuclear even has lower emissions than wind and solar, which produce 11 and 53 tonnes of CO2, respectively.

    Nuclear energy is also among the safest energy sources. Per gigawatt-hour, it causes 820 times fewer deaths than coal, 43 times fewer than hydropower and roughly the same as wind and solar.

    Still, nuclear energy remains stigmatized, largely because of persistent misconceptions and outdated beliefs about nuclear waste and disasters. For instance, while many public concerns remain about nuclear waste, existing storage solutions have been used safely for decades and are supported by a strong track record and scientific consensus.

    Similarly, while the Fukushima disaster in Japan displaced thousands of people and was extremely costly (total costs of the disaster are expected at about US$188 billion), not a single person died of radiation exposure after the accident, a United Nations Scientific Committee of 80 international experts found.




    Read more:
    With nuclear power on the rise, reducing conspiracies and increasing public education is key


    For decades, there was little effort to correct public perceptions about nuclear fears because it wasn’t seen as necessary or profitable. Coal, gas and renewables were sufficient to meet the demand required of them. But that’s now changing.

    With AI’s energy needs soaring, Big Tech has classified nuclear energy as green and the World Bank has agreed to lift its longstanding ban on financing nuclear projects.

    Big Tech’s billion-dollar bet on nuclear

    The world has long lived with two nuclear dilemmas. The first is that, despite being one the safest and cleanest form of energy, nuclear was perceived as one the most dangerous and dirtiest.

    The second is that upgrading the power grid requires large-scale investments, yet money had been funnelled into small, distributed sources like solar and wind, or dirty ones like coal and natural gas.

    Now tech companies are making hundred-billion-dollar strategic bets that they can solve both nuclear dilemmas. They are betting that nuclear can offer the kind of steady, clean power their AI ambitions require.

    This could be an unexpected positive consequence of AI: the revitalization of one of the safest and cleanest energy sources available to humankind.

    Michael Tadrous, an undergraduate student and research assistant at the DeGroote School of Business at McMaster University, co-authored this article.

    Goran Calic does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. AI is consuming more power than the grid can handle — nuclear might be the answer – https://theconversation.com/ai-is-consuming-more-power-than-the-grid-can-handle-nuclear-might-be-the-answer-258677

    MIL OSI –

    July 1, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Readout of the Secretary-General’s meeting with H.E. Mr. Alar Karis, President of the Republic of Estonia

    Source: United Nations secretary general

    The Secretary-General met with H.E. Mr. Alar Karis, President of the Republic of Estonia, on the margins of the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development held in Sevilla, Spain.  The Secretary-General and the President discussed the war in Ukraine and the situation in the Middle East.

    The Secretary-General commended Estonia’s engagement with the UN to advance the international financing for development agenda.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    July 1, 2025
←Previous Page
1 … 25 26 27 28 29 … 174
Next Page→
NewzIntel.com

NewzIntel.com

MIL Open Source Intelligence

  • Blog
  • About
  • FAQs
  • Authors
  • Events
  • Shop
  • Patterns
  • Themes

Twenty Twenty-Five

Designed with WordPress